lH««Ui 



Jwraffiffi 







"b x 

•^ r <? cp, 














%■ <$> 




-. 






V s -^ 







^ 
^ 



tf> 



ESSAYS/LECTURES, ETC. 



SELECT TOPICS 



REVEALED THEOLOGY, 



BY 



NATHANIEL ¥. TAYLOR, D.D. 

LATE D WIGHT PEOFESSOE OF DIDACTIC THEOLOGY 
IN YALE COLLEGE. 




u FOR I AM NOT ASHAMED OF THE GOSPEL OE CHRIST *, FOR IT IS THE POWER OF GOD 
VNTO SALVATION TO EVERT ONE THAT BELIE VETH." 



NEW YORK: 

PUBLISHED BY CLARK, AUSTIN & SMITH, 

8 PARK ROW & 3 ANN STREET. 

1859. 



e^ s 




\ 



6 . Ai .... 1 

Copy- *KU 



Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1859, by 

Noah Porter, Samuel G. Buckingham, and Walter T. Hatch, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern 
District of New York. 



By hittcnftng» 

MAR 26 1929 

* 

American University 



RENN1E, SHEA x LINDSAY, 

Stereotvpers and Electrotypkks, 

81, 83, and 85 Centre-street. 

New Yore 



Printed by 

C. A. ALTOED, 

15 Vandewater-st., 

New York. 



\V 



INTRODUCTION. 



This volume, as its title imports, consists of Essays, &c, 
from the pen of Dr. Taylor upon various topics in Revealed 
Theology. Dr. Taylor did not leave a fully written system or 
course of Theological lectures. The notes and briefs from 
which he lectured are so full indeed, that it would not be dif- 
ficult to give to the public his views in the form of a com- 
plete system of Revealed Theology. But this would involve the 
necessity of expanding, by another hand, the heads of argu- 
ment which were sketched by him. In many of these views 
there is little that is original with him, except the arrange- 
ment and development of the reasoning. There seems there- 
fore, to be no sufficient reason for publishing arguments with 
which theologians are already familiar. It would not how- 
ever be just to the memory of the deceased, nor to the cause 
of truth, to withhold any discussions which may promise to 
throw light upon important scriptural doctrines, or to advance 
in any way the science of Christian Theology. 

The volume contains papers on the Trinity, Human Sin- 
fulness, Justification, Election, and Perseverance. The Essays 
on the Trinity were written after the discussions and contro- 
versy on this subject, which are not yet forgotten. The mat- 
ter is somewhat different from that which Dr. Taylor was 
accustomed to read to his students in his earlier years. What- 
ever may be thought of the views expressed, they were 
carefully considered, and embody the results of earnest and 
honest thinking. It is to be regretted, that the Scriptural 
argument was so far unfinished that it is deemed unwise to 
publish any part of it. The papers on Human Sinfulness com- 



iv intkoducticTn. 

prise all the lectures which the author was accustomed to read 
on this subject, with some additional matter. The Essays on 
Justification are but a fragment of an extended series of 
papers, upon which Dr. Taylor bestowed much earnest investi- 
gation and careful study for two or three of the last years of 
his life. But though they are a fragment, they treat with 
great fullness of one topic under this general head. Were 
there no other reason for publishing this fragment, one might 
be found in the earnestness with which the author prosecuted 
his inquiries, and the importance he attached to the discussion 
of the subject in the present state of theological opinion. The 
sermons on Election and Perseverance were prepared with 
great care, after the author had been for many years a theo- 
logical instructor, and were always read in the place of lec- 
tures to his students, it being a favorite opinion with him that 
no truth of the Scriptures could be exhibited with so much 
effect by the preacher as the doctrine of Election ; and that in 
no truth, when rightly exhibited, was the gospel made so glo- 
rious as "the power of God unto salvation." The sermon 
"What is Truth" is a condensed summary of his views upon 
the principal doctrines of Theology, — unfolding them also in 
their practical relations. It, is to be regretted that the lec- 
tures of Dr. Taylor on the Atonement were in so fragmentary 
and unfinished a state as to make it unadvisable to publish 
them. His views on its necessity and nature can be gathered 
from the lectures on Moral Government, the appendix on Jus- 
tice, and from section third of the Essay on the Trinity in the 
present volume. N. P. 

Yale College, July, 1859. 



CONTENTS. 



I. THE TRINITY. 

L— THE IMPOST OF THE DOCTRINE. 

PAGE 

Mot presumptuous to attempt to define the doctrine.— Prevalence of the opposite view.— "We 
may believe an unintelligible proposition to be true; but what we do believe, we under- 
stand. — The proposition that there are three persons in one God, in the ordinary signifi- 
cation of the terms, is absurd. — The meaning of the words may be limited. — Different state- 
ments of the doctrine. — Remarks upon them. — The Scriptural doctrine stated. — Plau of 
the discussion, in five divisions. — 1. The import of the doctrine does not involve the use 
of the words being and person in the same meaning. — The peculiar meaning of each de- 
fined. — General form in which Trinitarians hold their doctrine. — More particular form may 
be authorized by the Scriptures 1 

II— THE POSSIBILITY OF ONE GOD IN THREE PERSONS. 

The real question at issue between the Unitarian and the Trinitarian. — Opinions of philoso- 
phers in respect to the definition of Being. — The opinions of common men, and their au- 
thority. — Rules for interpreting the words Being and Person. — The ordinary conception 
denoted by the word Being. — Is it possible that God, in some authorized use of the lan-r 
guage, should exist in three persons ?— (I.) Is it possible in the nature of things ?— Tho 
terms are used in a modified meaning, and ought so to be understood.— So understood, 
they involve no contradiction, even when used by those who cannot define the sense in 
which they use the terms. — (II.) Is it possible, stated in its particular form, argued by 
showing (1.) that several modes of the divine subsistence are possible, which are not self- 
contradictory.— Various modes supposed.— (J.) The doctrine of Spinoza.— (£) The doc- 
trines of Sherlock and Howe. — (C) That of Leibnitz. — (Z>) The doctrine of one nature and 
three forms of action. — {E) The doctrine of three self-active natures in one substance. — No 
necessary self-contradiction in these theories. — Prop. II. argued still further, by showing 
(2.) the human mind can not know that this mode of subsistence is impossible. — Various 
suppositions for illustration.— The subject-matter is such, that knowledge a priori is im- 
possible. — "What we do know, considered. — The assumption that more than this is impossi- 
ble, constantly made by the Unitarian 22 

III.— NO PRESUMPTION AGAINST, BUT RATHER A PRESUMPTION FOR THE 
TRUTH OF THE DOCTRINE. 

No such presumption in what man knows to be true of himself, nor in that we judge all other 
beings besides God to be like ourselves in this respect. — No presumption from divine reve- 
lation ; none from the Unity of God. — The presumption for its truth is founded on the fact, 
that God is administering a Moral Government under au economy of grace. — This requires 
an Atonement. — An Atonement seems to be most easily furnished and explained on the 
supposition of this mode of the Divine subsistence.— Nature of the Atonement incidentally 
explained.— Temporary sufferings and death of the Divine-man a sufficient evil 53 

IV— THE MANNER IN WHICH LANGUAGE IS USED IN THE SCRIPTURES 
RESPECTING THE MODE OF THE DIVINE SUBSISTENCE AND THE PER- 
SON OF CHRIST. 

Language of the Scriptures peculiar or self-contradictory.— The result of Unitarian and Trini- 
tarian attempts to explain it — The sacred writers give no indications of embarrassment — 
Natural inference.— Positions stated.— (I.) Important to decide whether the language is 



VI CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

peculiar. — Opinion of the Infidel. — Is the peculiarity unauthorized? — The first thing to be 
decided — before the question of inspiration. — Is the peculiarity authorized and proper? — 
If so, it should be settled beforehand. — Argued (1.) from known importance in analogous 
cases; (2 ) from results of overlooking this; (3.) from the ease of ascertaining it. — (II.) The 
language of the Scriptures is marked by some peculiarity. — The contrary unsupported by 
evidence. — Primary and secondary import of terms. — Positive proof decisive. — The com- 
mon meaning involves absurdity. — An uncommon and peculiar import gives a consistent 
and important meaning 89 

V.— THE MANNER IN WHICH LANGUAGE IS USED IN THE SCEIPTUEES 
EESPECTING THE MODE OF THE DIVINE SUBSISTENCE AND THE PEE- 
SON OF CHEIST, CONTINUED. 

III. — Erroneous assumption of both parties. — Language so used can not be interpreted. — Posi- 
tion not distinctly avowed.— Both parties improperly assume the inspiration of the writers. 
— Is not the Infidel right ? — Language may be modified, but not without warrant. — The 
warrant not shown by the Trinitarian. — Trinitarians assume an unauthorized use of lan- 
guage. — Three forms of the doctrine of the Trinity adduced. — Four laws of usage stated. — 
Applied to these forms of the doctrine. — Evil consequences of this mistaken assumption. — 
The Unitarian also modifies important terms without warrant, e. g., in insisting that God 
is applied to Christ in an inferior sense. — Principle of interpretation discussed and applied . 110 



II. HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

I.— ALL MEN AEE TOTALLY DEPEAVED. 

I. The doctrine explained. — What the doctrine is not. — Distinguished from total depravity 
by nature. — Must be consistent with just views of the nature of holiness and sin. — II. The 
doctrine proved (1.) from Scripture. — Eemark on man's enmity to God 134 

II.— ALL MEN AEE TOTALLY DEPEAYED.— {Continued) 

(2.) The argument from experience and observation. — Certain traits of character are adduced 
against its truth.— Considered under three particulars.— Traits specified, are innocence of 
childhood, honor, gratitude. — They are shown to be not morally good. — Argument on the 
application of the words good, lovely, &c 140 

III.— ALL MEN AEE TOTALLY DEPEAYED.— {Continued.) 

Argument from experience and observation continued. — Traits in question are not morally 
good. — Argument on the nature of the features adduced. — Considered as simply constitu- 
tional affections. — Eeply to objection, that not to have them is sinful. — The same considered 
as voluntary practical principles. — Third source of argument — from external action.— 
Habitual obedience to God the only legitimate evidence.— Habitual violation of one com 
mand decisive against goodness. — The good adduced may result from selfishness 148 

IY.-ALL MEN AEE TOTALLY DEPEAYED.— {Continued.) 

Argument continued from experience and observation. — The good characteristics alleged are 
considered in childhood and in adults.— Shown to be positively sinful, so far as they have 
any moral quality, by the nature of moral action and the true principles of judging of it. . . 156 

Y— OEIGINAL SIN.— YIEWS. 

Imputation, as a general term.— Not held by the Jews.— Nor by the Greek Church.— Originated 
in a mistake of Augustine.— Imputation as now used has five significations.— General form 
in which original sin is received by the Orthodox.— Five different forms in which it is 
taught.— Importance attached to some of them by some parties among the Orthodox 163 

YL— OEIGINAL SIN. 
Yiews of Augustine, Calvin, and Edwards 169 



CONTENTS. Vll 



VII.— TOTAL DEPEAVITY BY NATUEE. 

PAGE 

Plan of discussion. — Different theories explained. — (1.) Imputed sin. — (2.) Putative sin. — 
(3.) Want of original righteousness. — (4.) Divine efficiency. — (5.) Physical depravity: argu- 
I ments against this.— (a.) Does not explain the fact— (5.) Is self-contradictory. — (c.) Dis- 
proved by the proof alleged in its support. — (d.) Makes God the author of sin. — (e.) Incon- 
sistent with acknowledged truths. — (/) Not taught in the Scriptures. Gen. v. 3; Job xiv.; 
xv. 14 ; Ps. li. 5 ; lviii. 3 ; John iii. 6 179 

VIIL— TOTAL DEPEAYITY BY NATURE.— (Continued.) 

True account. — II. Theory explained. — 1. No property of the soul sinful. — 2. Nature not cor- 
rupted by oneness with Adam. — 3. Constitutional propensities not sinful. — 4. Excitement 
of propensities not sinful.— 5. Disposition, which is the cause of sin, not sinful 192 

IX.— TOTAL DEPEAVITY BY NATUEE.— (Continued.) 

True theory further explained.— Theory thus explained, defended.— (1.) Exempt from absur- 
dity.— (2.) Explains the facts.— (3.) Consistent with the universality of human sinfulness. — 
(4.) Is Orthodox.— Quotations from Edwards.— (5.) Supported by the Scriptures.— Objec- 
tions considered.— (1.) Universality of sin does not prove depravity by nature.— Objection 
considered under several particulars.— (a.) Occurrence of sin in Adam.— (b.) Freedom of 
will.— (c.) Bad example.— (d.) Circumstances.— (e.) Necessity of trials.— 2d Objection : In- 
consistent with free agency.— 3d Objection: Inconsistent with the moral perfection of God. 195 

X— TOTAL DEPEAVITY BY NATUEE.— (Continued.) 

Objections to the theory. — (4.) Infants are sinners. — The position of the author defined.— That 
infants are sinners inconsistent with this on one supposition.— I. Opinions of Orthodox 
writers. — II. The doctrine of the Scriptures.— 1. Supposed proofs for the doctrine.— 2. It is 
claimed that the Scriptures teach that infants are sinners at the moment of birth.— Eemarks 
on classification of proof-texts. — (1.) This cannot be true.— (2.) It contravenes common 
sense. — (3.) Violates the laws of usage 213 

XL-TOTAL DEPEAVITY BY NATUEE.- (Continued.) 

Fourth objection to theoiy (continued), viz., that infants are sinners. — Other supposed Scrip- 
ture proofs examined. — (II.) Argument from Justification. — (III.) From Eegeneration. — 
(IV.) Sanctification from the womb.— (V.) Destiny at death.— (VI.) Argument from their 
sufferings and death. — (VII.) Argument from infant baptism. — Proofs against infant de- 
pravity. 234 

XIL— CONSEQUENCES OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTEEITY, AND THE CON- 
NECTION BETWEEN THAT SIN AND THESE CONSEQUENCES. 

Subject divided into two parts.— I. The fact of a connection. — General statement variously 
modified.— Proved (1.) by narrative in Genesis.— Also by the assertions in Eomans v. 12, 
18, 19.— II. Mode of connection.— It is not true (1.) that Adam's posterity are created with 
a sinful nature, nor (2.) that they are guilty of his sin.— The doctrine involves absurdity, 
injustice, and is unsupported by the Scriptures. — The principle is denied in the Scriptures. 
— Not guilty of his sin by being counted as one with him, through a sovereign act of God. 
— Nor by putative act of God. — Biblical Eepertory and Christian Spectator 241 

XIIL- CONSEQUENCES OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTEEITY, AND THE CON- 
NECTION BETWEEN THAT SIN AND THESE CONSEQUENCES. 

Rom. v. 12-19, considered.— Falsely interpreted.— I. Eeasons for this untenable. — 1. Render- 
ing of f0' w.— 2. No rendering of rmaprov supports this doctrine.— 3. The drift of the argu- 
ment does not support it— The apostle does not teach that infants are sinners, nor that 
death is the legal penalty of sin. — " All have sinned.'" 1 — " Death by si?i." — Argument from 
fourteenth verse. — The death spoken of is not penal. — Signification of KaraKpijia. — Nature 
of the case. — The death common to all men. — It takes place in this world. — Denied by the 
apostle to be legal penalty. — Arguments from the prevalence of death from "Adam to 
Moses."— II. Proofs against this interpretation are decisive. 255 



vni CONTENTS. 

XIV.— CONSEQUENCES OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY. 

PAOB 

Exposition of Eomans v. 12-21 294 



III. JUSTIFICATION. 

I.-PEELIMINAEY OBSEEVATIONS.-EOMISH DOCTEINE.— JUSTIFICATION 
NOT SANCTIFICATION. 

Signification of right, morally rigid, right in relation to Moral Government, &c. — Views of 
the ancients in respect to justice and moral rectitude. — Eighteousness under Moral Govern- 
ment. — Importance of understanding the Eomish doctrine. — Doctrine before the Beforma- 
tion. — First and second Justification. — Eelation of Faith to the first, and of "Works to the 
second. — Eomish view controverted, particularly in respect to the nature of Faith. — Justi- 
fication not the infusion of a principle of holiness. — The Hebrew and Greek words trans- 
lated to justify, do not admit this interpretation. — The conception unknown to heathen 
nations. — Scriptural usage of the word discussed. 310 

II— CLASSICAL AND SCEIPTUEAL MEANING OF THE YEEB AIKAIOJ2.— 
JUSTIFICATION AS AN ACT OF GOD TO MAN DEFINED. 

1. General classical meaning of Siieaiou). — Justice as conceived by the ancients. — Definition of 
the verb in question. — Authority of Lexicographers. — The derivation of the word. — The 
conception of the production of holiness unknown to the ancients. — 2. Its forensic meaning 
in classical use. — Absolute and relative condition of a subject of law. — Classical forensic use 
not synonymous with English use of justify. 

Scriptural sense. — 1. The most general meaning. — 2. Its forensic meaning in the Scrip- 
tures.— Adapted to a peculiar system of things.— Man cannot be justified under mere law.— 
Actual usage of the term in the Scriptures. — Justification not synonymous with pardon. — 
Man prone to regard Justification as meritorious.— Influence of sacrifices. — Mistake of the 
Eomish Church. — Criteria for deciding what is the scriptural meaning. — Conclusion 341 



IV. ELECTION. 

I.-EXPLANATION OF THE DOCTEINE. 
" But the election hath obtained it."— Romans xi. 7 



II.— THE MODE OF EXECUTING THE PUEPOSE OF ELECTION. 
" Seeing ye have purified your souls, in obeying the truth, through the Spirit." — 1 Pet. i. 22. . . 389 

• III.— OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTEINE OF ELECTION. 
" And say, "We are delivered to do all these abominations."— Jeremiah vii. 10 407 

IV.— EEFLECTIONS AND APPLICATIONS. 
"All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable." — 2 Tim. iii. 16 426 



Y. PERSEVERANCE 

"Being confident of this very thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you, will perform 
it until the day of Jesus Christ."— Phil. i. 6 445 



VI. WHAT IS TRUTH? 

" Pilate saith unto him, What is truth V—John xviii. 38 461 



DOCTRINES OF REVELATION. 



i. 

THE TRINITY. 

I.— THE IMPOET OF THE DOCTEINE. 

Cfot presumptuous to attempt to define the doctrine. — Prevalence of the opposite view. — We may 
believe an unintelligible proposition to be true; but what we do believe, we understand. — The 
proposition that there are three persons in one God, in the ordinary signification of the terms, 
is absurd. — The meaning of the words may be limited. — Different statements of the doctrine. — 
Kemarks upon them. — The Scriptural doctrine stated. — Plan of the discussion in five divis- 
ions. — 1. The import of the doctrine does not involve the use of the words being and 'person in 
the same meaning. — The peculiar meaning of each defined. — General form in which Trinitari- 
ans hold their doctrine. — More particular form may be authorized by the Scriptures. 

What is the doctrine of the Trinity f 

By some this would be deemed, if not an irreverent, at least 
a presumptuous inquiry. The doctrine of the Trinity has so 
often been called a mystery, that he who claims to understand 
and explain it, can hardly expect a hearing, even on the part of 
many who profess to receive it as an essential doctrine of Chris- 
tianity. Explain the doctrine of the Trinity — this profoundest 
of all mysteries ! What presumption ! Presumption — folly — 
though it be, I must be permitted to profess to understand what 
I believe, and to hope that, guided by the oracles of God, I 
may lead others to understand and believe also. Otherwise, I 
should feel myself to be in the awkward and disgraceful posi- 
tion of professing to teach what I am convinced I do not un- 
derstand, and therefore cannot teach. Besides, what do they 
mean who characterize a doctrine of revelation — a doctrine 
revealed to faith — a revealed doctrine — as a mystery ? A re- 
vealed doctrine, if it is any thing, is a truth taught by divine 
revelation — a truth intelligibly presented to the human mind, 
for its apprehension and assent. Be this truth more or less 



a THE TRINITY. 

comprehensive, general or particular, so far as it is revealed, 
it is taught ; so far as it is taught^ it can be understood and 
believed ; and so far as it can be understood and believed, it 
constitutes the revealed doctrine, and no farther. A doctrine 
announced in words which cannot be interpreted or under- 
stood, is not a revealed doctrine. To saj that God, is one 
being in three persons, is to express some meaning, or it is not. 
If it expresses no meaning, why say it, or why pretend to be- 
lieve it % If it expresses some' meaning, what is it ? This 
meaning may be more or less. If it be real, it can be under- 
stood and believed ; and we are bound, if it be a doctrine of 
divine revelation, to understand and believe it. It is true that 
a divine revelation must have a limit, for man cannot know all 
that God knows. There must be some point where the curtain 
is not lifted, and beyond which all is darkness. But so far as 
revelation goes, so far there is light ; so far, and no farther, 
truth, be it little or much, is revealed, and therefore may be 
understood and believed. "What then, I ask, is a revealed 
truth or doctrine which is a mystery f — what but a revealed 
doctrine which is not revealed ? Men who take such ground, 
who claim to believe mysteries — what they do not understand, 
— must expect to be charged with holding contradictions and 
absurdities, and must, I think, be quite aware of the justice of 
the charge. 

It ought perhaps here to be said, that Trinitarians, when 
pressed with the absurdity of professing to believe a doctrine 
which they constantly denominate a mystery, often resort to a 
distinction between a fact and the mode or manner of a fact ; 
as, for example, the fact of the general resurrection, and the 
mode of the fact. This distinction is obvious. What is re- 
vealed — what is the fact — what is the doctrine f Plainly the 
resurrection of the body. " Behold, says the apostle, " I will 
show you a mystery." But this is no mystery when shown, 
but a fact, as easily comprehended as that man exists or lives 
before he dies. The mystery is not in that which is revealed — 
not in the fact which constitutes the doctrine to be believed — 
but in the mode or manner of the resurrection, which is not ex- 
plained, and which of course is no part of the revealed doctrine, 
and in no respect the object of faith. So in the present case, 
the fact of one God in three persons, in some peculiar sense of 
the language, is the doctrine revealed and the doctrine to be 



HOW MUCH CAN WE KNOW. 6 

believed. In respect to the mysterious, unrevealed mode of 
the fact, we are to have no faith. ISTow the error on the part 
of Trinitarians is, that they so constantly speak of the doctrine 
of the Trinity — the fact revealed to faith as a mystery — when 
after all and by their own showing, the fact which constitutes 
the doctrine is not a mystery, but only the mode or manner of 
the fact. So long as they confound this distinction, and call 
the doctrine (the truth revealed to faith) a mystery, what can 
they expect but to be charged with the absurdity of believing 
what they do not understand, or of teaching that what is re- 
vealed is not revealed ? 

It is true that one may believe an unintelligible proposition 
to be a true one, but he cannot believe the truth expressed in 
such a proposition. One who does not understand Greek, may 
be told that 'Ev dpxq v\v 6 Xoyog is a true proposition, and, on 
the ground of sufficient testimony, may believe it to be ; but he 
does not understand, and therefore cannot believe, the truth 
which it expresses. The proposition which he believes is one 
which he understands, viz., that the proposition in Greek is 
true ; but not understanding its import, he no more believes 
it — no more assents to the truth which it expresses, than he 
assents to its converse. Let us then no longer pretend to be- 
lieve what we do not understand, and when charged with it, 
exult in this self-stultification, as if we thereby honored God 
and God's revelation. This revelation, in requiring faith of 
men, proceeds on another principle. It limits its requirement 
to what is revealed, and of course to what can be understood. 
Without then, making the least claim to omniscience, or pre- 
tending to know all that concerning God which he knows con- 
cerning himself — without claiming to know what any one else 
may not know — I do claim to know what God has revealed 
concerning himself as one God in three persons. 

Let us then now look the difficulty directly in the face, that 
we may see what it is and all that it is. 

It is admitted then, that there is only one living and true 
God ; that is, that whatever God is as a Being, there is one and 
only one such being. Now the word person, as does each of 
the pronouns I, thou, he, implies in its ordinary use and appli- 
cation, a being — a distinct being ; and the word being denotes 
or implies the existence of one substance with one nature, or 
with one class or set of attributes or properties. Hence to say, 



4 THE TKINITY. 

in the ordinary use and meaning of these terms, that there is 
one God in three persons, or three persons ir one-God, is a plain 
contradiction. It is the absurdity of saying that one being is 
three beings — one God is three Gods ; or that three beings are 
one being — three Gods are one God. 

I have no desire to deny or conceal this absurdity ; but 
to charge Trinitarians with maintaining, or the Scriptures with 
teaching it, is a shameless misrepresentation. Who does not 
know that Trinitarians claim, in the statement of their doctrine, 
to use the terms being and person not in their ordinary, but in 
a peculiar meaning, demanded by the nature of the subjc?.!'? 
This, whatever else it may involve, does not necessarily involve 
the absurdity which results from the ordinary use of thev- 
terms. It is further claimed, that in using these and equivr 
lent terms in a peculiar and unusual meaning in their presen 
application, Trinitarians conform to the example of the sacret 
writers, and that the}^, in using the terms in question in a pe 
culiar and unusual meaning, were led to do so by those laws oj 
%isage which decisively control the. use of language in sucb 
cases. 

It is undeniable that the words God, being, person, either of 
the personal pronouns I, thou, he — indeed, any word — may be 
properly used in a more extended or a more limited meaning 
than its ordinary one, provided there is good and sufficient 
reason for such a use, and good and sufficient evidence that it is 
so used. On this principle, we claim to vindicate the peculiar 
use of the words specified, when employed in relation to the 
doctrine of the Trinity. What the meaning of any of these 
words is when thus employed, we propose to show hereafter. 
I only say now, that if there is that eternal, self-existent, infi- 
nite Being whom we call God, there is a reasonable presump- 
tion that the mode of his subsistence and the constituent ele- 
ments of his being should differ, at least in some respects, from 
those of creatures ; and that, should it become necessary for 
the purposes of his goodness and mercy, to reveal this differ- 
ence to any extent to the human mind through the medium of 
human language, it would become necessary also to change the 
terms used from the meaning they had acquired in their ordi- 
nary application. This is indeed the great law of usage which 
has ever prevailed when new truths are to be made known in 
the use of ordinarv term?. When such truths are to be com- 



VAKIOITS DEFINITIONS. 

municatecl to the popular mind, the natural and common mode 
of communication is not to invent new, but to employ old words, 
in more or less of their former meaning, and to rely on the 
known nature of the subject, or other evidence, to determine 
the new and changed import of the terms employed. 

To recur to our leading inquiry — 

What is the doctrine of the Trinity ? 

This question may be understood to refer to what the defend- 
ers of the doctrine have meant by it, or to the doctrine which 
is supposed to be taught in the Scriptures. 

To pursue the inquiry in reference to all the varieties of opin- 
ion which have been propounded by the advocates of the doc- 
trine, would take us beyond our prescribed limits. At the 
same time, it is important to our main purpose to examine some 
of the most prominent opinions on this controverted subject. 
The general and more common statement of the doctrine of the 
Trinity is, that there is one God in three persons, — the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Yery different meanings how- 
ever, have been given to the word person in this application. 
By the Sabellians, the phrase " three persons" was used to de- 
note three relations of God ; viz., that of Creator, that of Re- 
deemer, and that of Sanctifier. " This," says Dr. Wallis, " is 
what we mean, and all we mean, when we say God is three 
persons." " If, among us, one man may sustain three persons 
(as when Tully says, ' Sustineo unus tres jpersonas / meam, ad- 
versarii, judicis*), without being three men, why should it be 
thought incredible that three divine persons may be one God, 
as well as those three other persons be one man V — Letters on 
the Trinity, pp. 68, 69. 

Says Bishop Bull : " The unanimous sense of the Catholic 
doctors of the Church, for the first three ages of Christianity, is — 

" I. That there are in the Godhead three (not mere names or 
modes, but) really distinct hypostases or persons, — the Father, 
the Son or Word of God, and the Holy Ghost. 

" II. That these three persons are one God, which they thus 
explain : 

" 1. There is but one fountain or principle of Divinity : God 
the Father, who only is dvrodeog — God of and from himself ; the 
Son and Holy Ghost, deriving their divinity from him; the 
Son immediately from the Father ; the Holy Ghost from the 
Father and the Son, or from the Father by the Son. 



6 THETKINITY. 

" 2. The Son and Holy Ghost are so derived from the Foun- 
tain of the Divinity, as that they are not separate or separable 
from it, but do still exist in it, and are most intimately united 
to it."— Works, vol. iii., p. 829. 

Says Waterland : " By person, I certainly mean a real per- 
son, an hypostasis ; no mode, attribute, or property. Each 
divine person is an individual, intelligent agent ; but as sub- 
sisting in one undivided substance, they are ail together, in that 
respect, but one undivided, intelligent agent. The Church 
never professed three hypostases in any other sense but as 
they meant three persons." — Vinci, of Christ's Divinity, pp. 
350, 351. 

Sherlock maintains that the word person signifies being, and 
considers the Father, Son, and Spirit as three distinct minds or 
beings, and yet maintains that these are inseparably one God. 
" It is plain," says he, " the persons are perfectly distinct. A 
person is an intelligent being ; and to say there are three divine 
persons, and not three distinct infinite minds, is both heresy 
and nonsense." — Vinci, of the Trinity, sec. iv., p. 76. 

John Howe is more cautious, and without affirming three 
distinct substances, i. e., three distinct minds or spirits, asserts 
the possibility that there should be three spirits so united as to 
be one thing, and yet continuing distinct. — Works, p. 140. 

Bishop Horsley says : " I hold that the Father's faculties are 
not exerted on external things, otherwise than through the Son 
and the Holy Ghost ; that the Scriptures, by discovering a 
Trinity, teach clearly that the metaphysical unity of the divine 
nature is not a unity of persons ; but that they do not teach 
such a separation and independence of these persons as amounts 
to Tritheism. I maintain that the three persons are one being, 
— one by mutual relation, indissoluble connection, and gradual 
subordination ; so strictly one, that any individual thing in the 
whole world of matter and of spirit presents but a faint shadow 
of their unity. I maintain that each person by himself is God, 
because each possesses fully every attribute of the divine nature. 
But I maintain that these three persons are all included in the 
very idea of God." 

Dr. Emmons, by three persons in the Godhead, means that 
" God exists in such a manner, that there is a proper foundation 
in his nature to speak of himself in the first, second, and third 
persons, and to say /, thou, and he, meaning only himself." 



THE IMPORT OF THE DOCTRINE. 7 

Dr. Worcester's view of the three persons in the Godhead 
seems to differ from that of Dr. Emmons, chiefly in being more 
particular. He speaks of three divine agents united in one 
Gocl, and of each as possessing divine attributes, and affirms 
that his understanding of the term person, thus used, is as clear 
as when applied to angels or to men. How these agents, each 
possessing divine attributes, can be one God, he pretends not 
to understand. His proposition declares nothing of the mode 
of the union, and concerning this he believes nothing. 

Professor Stuart, by the word person, intends that which, in 
some respect or other, corresponds to persons as applied to men, 
that is, some distinction / not that we attach to it the meaning 
of three beings with a separate consciousness, will, omnipo- 
tence, omniscience, &c. He says : " We undertake not at all 
to describe affirmatively the distinction of the Godhead." And 
yet he has done it to a certain extent. Thus he says, " There 
is a distinction which affords ground for the appellations of the 
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which lays a foundation for the 
application of the personal pronouns I, thou, he, which renders 
it proper to speak <jf sending, and being sent," &c. The same 
writer, in a letter to the Christian Spectator, 1821, p. 435, pro- 
nounces the distinction between essence and attributes a chi- 
mera ; asserts that numerical unity — which he explains to be 
one instance of the union of divine attributes — is the only unity 
which can be predicated of the Deity. He rejects a distinc- 
tion in divine attributes, and on the ground that the distinction 
of persons can be applied to neither essence nor attributes, sup- 
poses other properties, which are neither essence nor attributes, 
of which the distinction is predicable. And yet in his letters 
to Dr. Charming, he has virtually contradicted this by saying 
in respect to numerical unity, " How does this prove that there 
may not be, or that there are not, distinctions in the Godhead, 
either in regard to attributes or essence, the nature of which is 
unknown to us ?" &c. How many incongruities there are in 
these statements I will not decide. 

With respect to that view of the doctrine of the Trinity 
which supposes it to respect the three relations of God as Cre- 
ator, Eedeemer, and Sanctifier, I shall hope to show hereafter, 
that it contradicts the whole tenor of the word of God. 

With respect to that view of the doctrine which considers 
the word person as equivalent to the word being, it is obvious, 



THE TRINITY. 

that if the word being is understood in its ordinary import, and 
if it be said that God is one being in three persons, this view 
is self-contradictory. This however, is not perhaps reasonably 
supposed. 

With respect to that view which makes the distinction in 
the Godhead a proper ground for applying the personal pro- 
nouns to denote it, and yet maintains that the word person and 
the pronouns in this use have not their ordinary meaning, this, 
though a common view of the doctrine, is attended with one 
serious difficulty, — it is using language which conveys no defi- 
nite meaning beyond the fact of a mere distinction. To say 
that there is a distinction in the Godhead which renders proper 
the application of the personal pronouns to denote it, is saying 
nothing, unless it be told what is meant by the pronouns when 
thus applied. Their import may be, as thus used, more or less 
extensive. To say that they are not used in their ordinary sense 
and no more, is simply saying what they do not mean. These 
terms, as used in the Scriptures, are designed to convey, and 
do unavoidably convey a meaning, and it becomes us to say 
what that meaning is. Otherwise there can be no reason for 
their use, and any other words, or no words, might as well be 
used as these. 

With respect to that view of the doctrine which affirms a 
threefold distinction in the Godhead and disclaims any affirma- 
tive description of that distinction, and yet to a certain extent 
professedly gives such a description, it is difficult to say any 
thing positively. If the writer means that there is a distinction 
which is the ground of applying the pronouns I, thou, he, with- 
out any part of their ordinary meaning, his doctrine is the same 
as that last considered, and is liable to the same objections. If 
the pronouns retain a part of their ordinary meaning, the ques- 
tion is, how much and what ? Unless this be told, who will be 
the wiser for such a use of words ? Be these things however, 
as they may, the positions of this writer seem to justify the 
remark, that writers, in attempting to define or explain this 
doctrine, are liable to say too little as well as too much. On 
the one hand he seems to have said too much. When he pro- 
nounces the distinction between essence and attributes a chi- 
mera, he asserts more than he knows or can prove to be true. 
The same remark applies to his affirmation, that numerical 
unity, or one instance of the union of divine attributes, is the 



WHAT THE DOCTKINE EESPECTS. 9 

only unity that can be predicated of the Deity. When he sup- 
poses that other properties pertain to the Deity which are 
neither essence nor attributes, and of which the distinctions in 
the Godhead are to be predicated, he contradicts another sup- 
position that he makes, viz., that there are distinctions in regard 
to either essence or attributes. On the other hand he asserts 
too little, when he simply says that there is a distinction in the 
Godhead which is the foundation of applying the personal 
pronouns I, thou, he. For to say this and nothing more, except 
to deny, as he does, the ordinary meaning of the words when 
thus applied, is to say nothing, or at the best, to assert the fact 
of a distinction which might as well be denoted by any three 
letters of the alphabet as by the personal pronouns. Besides, 
to predicate other properties of Gocl, which are neither essence 
nor attributes, seems like predicating other properties than all 
which are essential to his Deity. 

If the preceding remarks are just, we have arrived at no very 
satisfactory conclusion from examining the views of others re- 
specting the doctrine of the Trinity. It ought however, to be 
remarked, that none of the statements which we have noticed 
are liable to the charge of Tritheism. 

I now proceed to the inquiry — 

What is the doctrine of the Trinity as taught in the Scrip- 
tures % 

This doctrine respects the peculiar mode of the divine sub- 
sistence — the peculiar elements which constitute the being 
whom the Scriptures call God. On the one hand some sup- 
pose that in the exhibition which the Scriptures make of God, 
there is nothing peculiar in respect to the mode of his subsist- 
ence, but on the contrary, that they authorize and require us 
to form the same general conception of his being as consisting 
of one substance and one phenomenal nature (or, as this may 
be and is, for convenient conception and speech, subdivided 
into particular attributes, by which he is constituted the divine 
Being or God), that we form of the being of a man or of an 
angel, as consisting of one substance and one phenomenal na- 
ture (which may be subdivided and classified in like manner), 
and by which he is constituted a man or an angel. On the.other 
hand, it is now maintained, thlfct in the scriptural exhibition of 
God is involved a peculiar mode of subsistence, and that the 
Scriptures employ such peculiarity of language on this subject, 



10 THE TRINITY. 

as to oblige us to form a very different conception of what con- 
stitutes God the being that he is, from our ordinary conception 
of what constitutes man or an angel the being that he is. To 
express then, my own views of the subject, I now proceed to 
say, that — 

The Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity, in some peculiar and 
authorized import of the language, is, that — 

There is one God in three persons ; or, that God is one heing 
in three persons / or, that God is one divine heing in three di- 
vine perso?is. 

Here I will briefly state what I mean "by a peculiar and 
authorized import of the language." If the mode in which 
God subsists be peculiar and diverse from that of his creatures ; 
if the revelation of this peculiarity to men was demanded by 
the designs of his wisdom and goodness, and could be ex- 
pressed for his purposes, in the best way possible, by adopting 
terms already in familiar use, modifying their ordinary import 
by extending and restricting that import, according to usage 
in such cases ; and if according to these princij)les the best 
form of announcing the truth were to say, God is one being in 
three persons, or to say the same thing in any other equivalent 
forms of speech, this would be using language in a, peculiar yet 
authorized^ import. 

I now propose to discuss, in several lectures, the subject un- 
der consideration in the following method : 

I. To explain the import of the foregoing statement of the 
doctrine of the Trinity, in this general, and also in a more par- 
ticular form of presenting it ; 

II. To show the possibility, in opposition to the alleged im- 
possibility, of its truth in both forms of statement ; 

III. To show that there is no presumption against, but rather 
a presumption for, the truth of the doctrine ; 

IY. To consider the manner in which the language of the 
Scriptures on the subject is used ; 

Y. To show that this language of the Scriptures, according 
to a just interpretation, teaches the doctrine of the Trinity as 
now explained.* 

I propose — 

I. To explain the import of this doctrine. 

° The discussion of the last of these positions was not finished by Dr. Taylor. 



BEING NOT PEKSON. 11 

Here I remark at the outset, that the very statement of the 
doctrine, though in general and unexplained terms, ought to 
be sufficient security against the charge of using the words 
being and person in the same meaning. Indeed this or any 
equivalent statement, made by men of ordinary intellectual 
capacity, and especially by a large class of distinguished 
scholars and divines, creates a strong presumption that they 
turn these words, as is common in the case of other words 
when the exigency demands it, from their ordinary meaning 
— that they intend not the same thing by being and person, but 
things so diverse as to exempt the proposition from self-con- 
tradiction, and that these words are the best for the purpose 
which language affords. Should one have occasion to say of 
some particular thing that it is one and three, or one thing in 
three things, the fair construction of his language would be, 
that he did not use the word thing in the phrase one thing in 
precisely the same specific meaning in which he used it in the 
phrase three things, and should he produce a threefold cord as 
the example and proof of the truth of his proposition, every 
honest mind w T oulcl so interpret his proposition as to give it 
an obvious and consistent meaning. So in the present case. 
Though from the words merely, one might not be able to say 
precisely what Trinitarians do mean, it would be a gross viola- 
tion of propriety and fair dealing, to assume that they intend 
the same thing by both words, and to affirm that, in this sense, 
they maintain that one being is three beings, or that three per- 
sons are one person. And yet when will such unfair and un- 
authorized representations of the doctrine of the Trinity cease 
to be made ? 

The words being and person then, in their present application, 
are not used in their precise ordinary import, but in a some- 
what peculiar meaning demanded by the exigency of the case. 

What then is this peculiar meaning % The answer to this 
question must be determined by those laws or principles of 
interpretation which are applicable to the language which the 
sacred writers employ on the subject. As my present object 
is merely to explain my own view of the doctrine of the Trin- 
ity, this is not the place fully to unfold those principles of in- 
terpretation by which I suppose this view of the doctrine to be 
established. And yet it will be of obvious advantage for the 
purpose of explanation, so far to refer to some of these p^iri- 



12 THE TRINITY. 

ciples as to unfold, to some extent, the process by which I am 
led to adopt that view of the doctrine now to be presented. 

To the question then, concerning the peculiar meaning of 
the words being and person, when I say that God is one being 
in three persons, I answer first, that in the most general mean- 
ing, the word being, in its present application, is used to denote 
me substance with such other constituting elements denoted 
dj the word persons, as the exigency of the case requires — 
meaning by this, that which arises from the known nature of 
the subject, and the facts of revelation. When I speak of the 
import required by this exigency, I mean such a conception of 
God as one being, as shall not be inconsistent with what, in 
some peculiar sense of the language, is called his tri-person- 
uMty, or with three persons in the Godhead, and such a con- 
ception of his tri-personality as shall not be inconsistent with 
what is called his oneness of being. In this most general im- 
port of the doctrine of the Trinity, Trinitarians would agree, 
however they may differ in respect to more particular state- 
ments of that which constitutes and determines the oneness of 
the being and his tri-personality. I mean to say, that all Trin- 
itarians, properly so called, or with exceptions which need not 
be noticed, maintain that God is one substance with such other 
constituting elements, that in some consistent, peculiar, and 
yet authorized import of the language, he is, in view of the 
exigency of the case, truly and properly said to be one God in 
three persons. 

Again : in accordance with this general answer to the ques- 
tion proposed, I now give a somewhat more particular answer. 

I remark then, first, in respect to the word being, that in its 
present application it is used in a more extended than its ordi- 
nary meaning. In its ordinary meaning, it is sufficient for the 
present purpose to say, that the word being denotes one sub- 
stance with a phenomenal nature — understanding by substance 
simply a something as opposed to nothing, to which a phenom- 
enal nature pertains, and by a ^phenomenal nature, that nature 
which directly and proximately manifests itself in phenomena, 
and which, in its relations to different phenomena, is commonly 
ccdled the attributes or properties, or the essential attributes or 
•properties of a being. This conception, in the ordinary use of 
the word being, may be said, so far as our present purpose 
is concerned, to constitute the entire meaning of the word. 



DEFINITION OF BEING. 13 

Nothing less than the object of this conception can be properly 
called a being, even in its most restricted meaning. The 
moment we drop either of these elementary conceptions, we 
necessarily drop the other, and so both. The only possible 
conception without these, must be of that which can have no 
subsistence, for it must be either one which is a mere object of 
thought — as of a geometric point — or it must be a conception 
of that which can have no existence, except what depends, 
while it exists, on something as its cause — as the conception of 
a thought or volition. Hence, as it will be admitted that the 
conception of a being is the conception of a real subsistence — 
i. e , of that which, having existence, subsists of itself — it fol- 
lows that the word being, when applied to God, however it 
may be extended beyond its ordinary meaning, must include 
at least one substance with one phenomenal nature — which 
nature, in its relations to different phenomena, is commonly 
called the attributes or properties, or the essential attributes 
or properties of the being. But the word being, in its present 
application, must also from the exigency of the case, have a 
more extended than its ordinary meaning ; that is, its ordinary 
meaning, in view of the facts of revelation, must be so ex- 
tended as to include, in some use of the language, the scrip- 
tural fact of the tri-personality of the being — the fact, in some 
sense, of three persons in one being. In determining the im- 
port of the word being in this application, we must adhere to 
the universal necessary conception of a being, so far as to 
include in it this import ; that is, we must include in our 
conception of the being, at least one substance with one phe- 
nomenal nature. "Without this conception, we can conceive 
of nothing which can be properly called a being. With this 
conception, though under the scriptural exigency, or in view 
of the scriptural evidence of the tri-personality of the being, it 
be extended and modified in any manner within the limits of 
possibility, we may with entire truth and propriety speak of 
him as one being. Facts known, or ascertained by sufficient 
evidence, do and must always control and determine the mean- ' 
ing of words. Hence new or peculiar facts, ascertained in the 
form of knowledge or faith, in respect to any thing or kind of 
a thing — in respect to any being or kind of a being — always 
change or modify, by extending or limiting the ordinary mean- 
ing of words. Accordingly, let it be thus ascertained that 



14: THE TKINITY. 

God, or any other being, consists not only of one substance 
and one phenomenal nature, but one substance and of three 
phenomenal natures of the same kind, or of three phenomenal 
natures of the same kind, each having its own peculiar sub- 
stance, and the whole united in one common substance, and 
all men, with such a conception in the form of knowledge or 
belief, would still with entire propriety speak of him as one 
being, so changing the language from its ordinary meaning, 
that it should express the new or peculiar conception of the 
object. It is true that while this would include our ordinary 
conception of a being, it would also include more ; and there 
being evidence of more, it would necessarily include more. 

The word person, in its present application, cannot be em- 
ployed in more than its ordinary meaning, but must be used 
either in its whole ordinary meaning, or in such a part of it as 
the nature of the subject and the facts of revelation require, 
or as the scriptural use of the personal pronouns, when applied 
to distinguish the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, 
and the fact that God is one being, require. The word person, 
in its ordinary meaning, is not strictly synonymous with the 
word being, for although every person is a being, every being 
is not a person. 

JSTow the use of the word persons,- by Trinitarians, in affirm- 
ing the existence of one God in three persons, is authorized 
solely by the scriptural use of the personal pronouns as applied 
to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit ; and no one of these 
pronouns can be used in any case, either literally or metaphori- 
cally, either in its full, ordinary meaning, or in a part of it, with- 
out implying, in the subject or the person to whom it is applied, 
capacity or qualification for action, in distinction from another 
person, or other persons, or both. If we drop from our con- 
ception the idea of this distinct capacity or qualification for 
diversity of action in the use of either of these pronouns, we 
necessarily drop from our conception the idea of any object to 
which either of them can be properly applied, according to any 
principles of extending or limiting the ordinary meaning of 
words. In such a case, it is obvious that there could be no 
more propriety in using a personal pronoun, than in using any 
other word. Even in any supposed case of personification by 
the use of a personal pronoun, the design must be to express 
an imaginary conception of the distinct qualification for action 



TRINITARIANS NOT TRITHEISTS. 15 

in the subject. It is plain therefore, that whatever else may 
be true of the personal pronouns when applied in the Scrip- 
tures to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, they must be 
employed either literally or metaphorically in personification, 
to express distinct qualification for distinct personal action in 
each of the subjects to which they are applied. 

If now we suppose the Trinitarian, when affirming that God 
is one being in three persons, to use the language in its full, ordi- 
nary meaning, and to understand the personal pronouns to be 
so used in the Scriptures when applied to the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit, — he would not indeed fall into Tritheism any 
more than into Unitarianism, since he would assert oneness of 
being as well as tri-personality, in the ordinary sense of the 
language ; but he would fall into self-contradiction and absurd- 
ity. If we suppose him to mean, by the above statement of 
his doctrine, three persons in the full, ordinary meaning of the 
language, and so including three beings in the ordinary mean- 
ing of the language, united by some common substance so as 
to constitute one being in an unusual and peculiar sense, though 
in this he may assert nothing which is known to be self-contra- 
dictory or impossible in the nature of things, still he may go 
beyond what the scriptural exigency requires or warrants him 
positively to affirm. Again, if we suppose the Trinitarian to 
use the phrase three persons, in the statement of his doctrine, 
to denote simply the most general idea of a threefold dis- 
tinction, or three distinctions in the Godhead, which might as 
well be denoted by the letters x, y, 2, as by the word persons, 
or by the personal pronouns, then he falls short of the Scrip- 
tures, which, in this use of these pronouns, clearly and unde- 
niably exhibit, not merely an unknown threefold distinction in 
the Godhead, but a threefold distinction which these pronouns, 
compared with any other terms in human language, are pecu- 
liarly and well fitted to express ; that is, a threefold personal 
distinction, in some restricted import of these pronouns, in 
which more or less of their ordinary meaning is retained. The 
question then is, in how much of the ordinary meaning of the 
word persons must the Trinitarian use it in his statement that 
God is one being in three persons, to express the meaning of the 
personal pronouns as they are applied to the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit, in the Scriptures ? I answer, according to what 
has been already said, in no more of it than shall harmonize 



16 THE TEINITT. 

with the fact, in some peculiar sense of the language, that God 
is one being, — and in so much of it as shall involve a threefold 
distinction in the Godhead, or in the whole nature of the Deity, 
which is a threefold qualification for performing, in a corre- 
sponding limited sense, distinct, divine, personal, phenomenal 
acts, or distinct, divine, phenomenal acts of the so-called dis- 
tinct persons. In this view of the subject, God is not only one 
being in the ordinary meaning of this language, inasmuch as he 
consists of one substance with at least one phenomenal nature, 
but as one being, he is more — he is one tri-personal being, or 
one being in three persons, inasmuch as he is qualified by the 
peculiar constitution of his Godhead or whole nature, i. e., by 
his tri-personality, for performing distinct, divine, phenomenal 
acts in each person, — which acts are not distinct in every re- 
spect as the acts of three beings are distinct, but in another and 
peculiar respect — distinct as may easily be conceived to be the 
acts of a being of one substance, either with a threefold phe- 
nomenal nature, or some other peculiarity of his entire nature, 
qualifying for the performance of three distinct forms of divine, 
personal, phenomenal action. 

Thus it is believed that all Trinitarians, properly so called, 
maintain that God is one divine being in three divine persons — ■ 
conceiving that sameness and community of substance, with at 
least one phenomenal nature, are essential to the oneness of God 
as a being, and that though they may differ in their more par- 
ticular views of his tri-personality, they still maintain that it con- 
sists in some threefold qualification of the Godhead, for three- 
fold, distinct, divine, and thus, in some sense, personal forms 
of phenomenal action. This too, it is believed, is the scriptural 
doctrine of the Trinity. It is, according to what has now been 
said, in its most general form, and in some peculiar yet au- 
thorized import of the language, that God is one divine being- 
est three divine persons ; or, as now explained, that God is 
one being, in such a modified sense of the terms as to include 
three persons in such a modified sense of the terms, that, by his 
tri-personality r , or by the three persons of his Godhead, he is 
qualified, in a corresponding modified sense, for three distinct, 
'personal, divine forms of phenomenal action j or thus: God, 
in a modified use of the language, is one being in three persons, 
Qualified by the three persons of his Godhead for three distinct, 
divine, personal forms of phenomenal action. 



MORE EXACT STATEMENT. 17 

This, and nothing less than this, it is believed, is that doc- 
trine of the Trinity which is an essential part of substantial 
Christianity, and which not only the Christian Church, but all 
men under the light of divine revelation, are bound to receive 
and maintain. 

I now inquire whether the Scriptures authorize any more 
particular statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, than that 
which has now been given. This question I shall not positively 
decide. While I maintain that the scriptural doctrine of the 
Trinity, in that general form in which, it is revealed to the faith 
of all men, is, in some peculiar yet authorized import of the 
language, that God is one being in three divine persons, it would 
not in my view, be strange, should a more particular statement 
of the doctrine be fully authorized by a more extended and 
thorough investigation of the Scriptures, than can be expected 
of the great portion of their readers. This, it is believed, is 
true in respect to other important doctrines. The great truths 
of revelation are, for the most part, presented in some gen- 
eral forms, as distinguished from particular or minutely full 
forms of statement. This is a signal excellence of the sacred 
writings, as designed for the instruction of the popular mind, 
which is almost exclusively conversant with general forms 
of truth. 

The same general doctrine or truth is however, often presented 
by different writers, and by the same writer, under very differ- 
ent aspects and in very different connections. Not unfre- 
quently also, some one element of a complex truth is presented, 
as necessarily involving yet another element, which is not ex- 
pressed in the general statement of that truth. Hence, by a 
thorough comparative investigation, it will often be found, that 
under general forms of truth, other more particular truths are 
included ; and we may justly, and with more or less confi- 
dence, infer more than is formally announced in general state- 
ments of the doctrine under consideration. In this way, I can- 
not but think it possible at least, that candid and thorough 
investigation might authorize a more particular statement of 
the doctrine of the Trinity than that which, has now been made, 
viz., that God is a being of one substance, with a threefold 
divine nature, or, as already explained, with three classes of 
divine attributes ; and that, in this sense, God is one divine be- 
ing in three divine persons. 

2 



18 THE TKINITY. 

Let me not be understood to affirm that this is the scriptural 
doctrine of the Trinity, nor that it can be even justly inferred 
from the Scriptures as true ; but that possibly, by comparing 
scripture with scripture, it may be found to be authorized as 
an inference more or less, plausible. The use, and only use, 
which I would make of it in the argument, is that of a theory 
or an hypothesis — a mere supposition of a possible truth — and 
as such, sufficient to set aside the Unitarian assumption, that 
the doctrine of one God in three persons, in every possible 
conception of it, is an absurdity and a contradiction. 

After what I have said of the . foregoing hypothetical state- 
ment, I will here briefly intimate some considerations which 
have led me to say, that possibly, by a thorough investigation 
directed to this specific topic, it may be found that the Scrip- 
tures authorize, as an inference more or less plausible, what is 
now proposed as a mere hypothesis. 

These considerations — assuming, as I must for my present 
purpose, the truth of the general statement of the doctrine of 
the Trinity — I will briefly present. That part of the statement 
then, which asserts that God is a being of one substance, will 
not be called in question. The inquiry respects the predicate 
of three persons in one God. The three persons are exhibited 
in the Scriptures as performing distinct divine acts, and in all 
our ordinary conceptions, distinct acts imply distinct natures, 
or distinct classes of attributes. Is it not difficult at least to 
conceive that the Father, the first person in the Godhead, sent 
the Son, the second person, into the world — and that the Son 
came voluntarily, or by an act of will, to do the will of the 
Father that sent him — without conceiving of distinct acts 
which imply distinct powers of acting, that is, distinct attributes? 
Not to specify other acts ascribed to each person, which are 
equally distinct and which seem to carry with them the same 
conception of distinct natures or attributes, I ask, is there not 
here some ground for inferring distinct attributes, unless there 
are other considerations which decisively forbid it ? I might 
further say, that divine attributes are ascribed to each of the 
three persons, and ask whether the natural and fair implication 
is not that these are distinct, unless there is some decisive evi- 
dence to the contrary ? I do not say that the inference is or is 
not authorized by the premises, nor that there is not decisive 
evidence against the inference ; neither am I satisfied that 



THE LANGUAGE EXPLAINS ITSELF. 19 

there is such evidence, but merely regard it as probable that 
there should be none. 

Another consideration is, that the statement as a theory or 
hypothesis, appears to account for the peculiar facts in the 
case. These may be comprised in the uncommon use of lan- 
guage on this peculiar subject. The subject is the mode of the 
divine subsistence ; and the language is as peculiar as the sub- 
ject. Thus, while the Scriptures teach that God is one being — 
which involves at least one substance of one divine nature or 
class of divine attributes — they speak of this one being as the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, under one name ; they 
also ascribe to each divine name the name of God, and teach 
that each is a divine person, by the use of the personal pro- 
nouns, and by ascribing to each, distinct, divine, personal acts, 
if not also distinct, divine, personal attributes. This use of 
language is so peculiar, that the writers cannot be vindicated 
from the imputation either of insanity, or of a mental imbe- 
cility, or perversion, not less incredible, except on the ground 
that the uncommon nature of the subject created the exigency. 
How, for example, could any sane man of ordinary capacity, 
use such a combination of terms as the apostle John employs 
in the first verse of his gospel, on any common subject ? How 
could he say, in the beginning was Peter, and Peter was with 
James, and Peter was James ? How could he speak of a per- 
son by whom all things are made, as made flesh or becoming a 
human being, &c, and expect the confidence or respect of 
those for whom he wrote ? Surely his vindication in respect 
to mental sanity must be founded, if not in his inspiration and 
the singular nature of the subject, at least in the latter and his 
peculiar information respecting it. On these grounds, if on 
any, his readers must award to the writer their confidence and 
respect ; on these also they must regard him as attempting, 
and as authorized to attempt, to impart knowledge to them on 
a peculiar subject ; and this, so far as the peculiar nature of the 
subject would allow, according to the established use of the 
language he uses — a subject so peculiar however, and with 
conceptions of it so peculiar, that it is utterly impossible to ex- 
press these conceptions in that ordinary use of language which 
accords with the ordinary conceptions of ordinary things. 
Hence the further conclusion that, in such an exigency, the 
writer must select such terms and adopt such forms of combi- 



20 THE TKINITY. 

nation as shall involve, not only a departure from prior usage 
on ordinary subjects, but as shall, according to strict gram- 
matical construction, involve absurdity or nonsense, provided 
that even in this way he can convey to his readers, 'as they 
will be led to interpret his language, the conceptions which 
he wishes to convey. Hence again, his readers, justifying 
on the grounds specified, all that is peculiar, and unheard 
and un thought of in his use of language, would, for the pur- 
pose of apprehending his meaning, feel the obligation, not in- 
deed to separate from ordinary terms all their ordinary mean- 
ing, but by restricting, and modifying, and extending that 
meaning into another, made up if possible, of harmonious and 
true conceptions ; and when these were arrived at, would rest 
in the assurance that the designed meaning was attained. Now, 
in view of these principles of using and interpreting the lan- 
guage of the Scriptures on this peculiar subject — the existence 
of one God in three persons — I apprehend that there is not a 
text, to which, in accordance with the theory which supposes 
God to be one being with a threefold divine nature, or with 
three classes of divine attributes, an intelligible, obvious, and 
consistent meaning may not be given, — no text in which the 
language of the writer would not appear the most natural and 
the best for his purpose which could be employed in the case. 
To illustrate in a few particulars : If we suppose a revelation 
to be made to us in respect to some one man, as consisting of 
one substance and of three human natures, like that now sup- 
posed of three divine natures united in one substance and con- 
stituting one God, what would be the effect on the use and in- 
terpretation of our language in respect to such a being ? Can 
there be a doubt that it would be employed in substantially 
the same manner as that in which the sacred writers employ 
language on the subject now under consideration, and its mean- 
ing be determined in accordance with our conceptions of the 
nature of the subject and the manner of use in each instance ? 
The common people, we may safely say, would not coin new 
terms in familiar and ordinary discourse, but would, at least for 
the most part, employ those already in use — relying on the 
connection and manner of speaking to show their meaning. 
Thus probably, as it seems to me, the word man in some cases 
would be applied to the whole being when there was no 
occasion to recognize his tri-personality ; then again, when the 



WHAT MAY BE SUPPOSED. 21 

occasion occurred for speaking of either person as a being, and 
not as a person, he would still, as before the revelation, be 
called man ; and then, when it was necessary to distinguish 
the personal acts of either or of each of the persons, the per- 
sonal pronouns would best answer the purpose ; and so in all 
other predicates, affirmations, and negations, the words already 
in use, modified in import according to the exigency of the 
case, would be employed, and would be understood as so em- 
ployed ; and all this would be done by the common people, 
without a suspicion of any better or any other possible mode of 
using language as the vehicle of their conceptions. If these 
things would be so in the case now supposed, why are they 
not in the case under consideration — that is, if we suppose 
God to be a being of one substance, with a threefold divine 
nature ? And if this, on this supposition, would be the mode 
of using language, then I ask again, what passage of Scripture 
which speaks of God as one being, or of the three persons 
of the Godhead, or of either of these persons, may not, accord- 
ing to the true principles of interpretation, be correctly and 
satisfactorily interpreted in accordance with the hypothesis 
that God is a being of one substance, with a threefold divine 
nature, and in this sense one God in three persons f 



THE TRINITY. 



II.— THE POSSIBILITY OF ONE GOD IN THREE PERSONS. 

The real question at issue between the Unitarian and the Trinitarian. — Opinions of philosophers 
in respect to the definition of Being. — The opinions of common men, and their authority. — 
Eules for interpreting the words Being and Person. — The ordinary conception denoted by the 
word Being. — Is it possible that God, in some authorized use of the language, should exist in 
three persons ?— (I.) Is it possible in the nature of things? — The terms are used in a modified 
meaning, and ought so to be understood. — So understood, they involve no contradiction, even 
when used by those who cannot define the sense in which they use the terms.— (II.) Is it pos- 
sible, stated in its particular form, argued by showing (l.)that several modes of the divine sub- 
sistence are possible, which are not self-contradictory. — Various modes supposed.— (A) The 
doctrine of Spinoza.— (B) The doctrines of Sherlock and Howe.— ((7) That of Leibnitz.— (Z») The 
doctrine of one nature and three forms of action. — (E) The doctrine of three self-active natures 
in one substance. — No necessary self-contradiction in these theories. — Prop. II. argued still fur- 
ther, by showing (2.) the human mind cannot know that this mode of subsistence is impossible. — 
Various suppositions for illustration.— The subject-matter is such, that knowledge a priori is 
impossible. — What we do know, considered. — The assumption that more than this is impossi- 
ble, constantly made by the Unitarian. 

We all believe that there is but one God, or that whatever 
God is as a being, there is not another such being. In respect 
to this doctrine, properly called the doctrine of the unity of 
God, there is no controversy between Trinitarians and Unita- 
rians. Both believe that there is one, and but one God. The 
question between them is — whether this one God is, in any 
peculiar and authorized sense of language, tri-personal, or 
whether the being whom we call God is, in some peculiar sense 
of the language authorized by the peculiarity of the subject, one 
being in three persons f 

This, it is obvious, is a question concerning what the one 
God is as a being, or what constitutes him the being that he is. 
It carries us into the investigation of the constituent elements 
of his being ; and yet it is a question which every one who 
believes that God is a being — the Unitarian as well as the 
Trinitarian — must decide. Both actually decide it, though 
differently, and each forms a conception of what God is as a 
being. 

The Trinitarian readily concedes that in the ordinary mean- 
ing of the words being and person, to say that God is one being 



CONCEPTION OF GOD AS A BEING. 23 

in three persons is a plain contradiction, and that such a mode 
of subsistence is inconceivable and impossible in the nature of 
things. And yet, while making this full and undisguised con- 
cession, the Trinitarian strenuously maintains that God, in some 
peculiar yet authorized import of the language, is a being tri- 
personal, or that God is one being in three persons. This the 
Unitarian denies, and maintains that — according to the only 
authorized conception of a being, and of course of God as a 
being — it is impossible to conceive of God as one being in 
three persons. He ever insists, as the strength of his cause — 
as his grand and decisive argument against the doctrine of the 
Trinity — that the true and only idea of God as one being — the 
only conception of what is commonly called the unity of God, 
authorized by reason and by the Scriptures, necessarily ex- 
cludes the conception of his tri-personality — renders the con- 
ception of one God in three persons a self-contradiction, and 
thus shows the existence of such a being to be impossible in 
the nature of things ; as impossible as that one being should 
be three beings — one God three Gods. 

Whether these things are so or not, most manifestly depends 
on what is the only true and authorized conception of God as a 



It is undeniable that the Unitarian can form at his own 
pleasure, such a conception of God as one being as shall neces- 
sarily exclude the idea or conception of his tri-personality, or 
the conception of three persons in the Godhead. But it will 
not be pretended that any such idea or conception is arbitra- 
rily formed — formed without reason or evidence, or against 
reason and evidence — formed, perhaps, for the purpose of ex- 
cluding the conception of his tri-personality ; that it is the only 
authorized conception of God as a being, or is even authorized 
at all. There must be some other mode of determining what 
this authorized conception of God is as a being. 

Shall we appeal to philosophers on the general question, 
what constittctes a being, in all other cases, and thus determine 
what is the only authorized conception of God as a being? 
But with philosophers of highest repute, this is an open or un- 
settled question. Mr. Locke, whose opinion, as most in ac- 
cordance with common sense, seems to have been generally 
accepted, maintains that the idea of substance and properties, 
or one substance and one class of properties, or a subject and 



24 THE TRINITY. 

its properties, is the true and necessary idea of a being. Spi- 
noza taught that there is but one substance in the universe 
with the different kinds of attributes or properties of matter 
and spirit, so that there is but one being in the universe, which 
is God, or so that God is all things. Bishop Berkeley denies 
substance altogether. Dr. Brown denies the distinction be- 
tween substance and properties. Prof. Norton, of Cambridge, 
maintains that a being is one combination of attributes or 
properties without a substance ; and Prof. Stuart, of Andover, 
affirms that the distinction between essence and attributes is a 
chimera. I might enlarge this specification of opinions on the 
part of philosophers. Now in view of this great diversity of 
opinion regarding the constituent elements of a being, it is 
manifest that the proposition, God is a being, or is one being, 
would have different meanings, or express different conceptions 
in the minds of these philosophers and divines. Nor could the 
meaning of either of them be determined with precision, with- 
out a previous knowledge of his conception of the subject. 
Though they should agree fully in the unity of God, or that 
whatever God is as a being, there is not another such being, 
there would be a diversity of opinion among them on the ques- 
tion, What constitutes God the being that he is ? Differing 
thus widely on this, they would also on another question : 
whether this being — this one God — can be tri-personal, or one 
God in three persons ? It is in vain then to appeal to the au- 
thority of philosophers, to determine what is the authorized 
conception of a being, and of course of God as a being. 

Shall we then appeal to the idea or conception of a being, 
which is formed in all ordinary cases, by common sense % By 
this I mean, that conception which the competent, unperverted 
mind of mankind generally forms of a being in all cases except 
the present ; which men form for the practical purposes of life ; 
which prevails in all languages, in all ages, and in all coun- 
tries, and has been recognized in all the conduct of men since 
the world began. This I shall call the ordinary, or common 
conception of a being. Shall we then appeal to this as the 
sure criterion of determining what is the authorized idea of 
God as a being? I answer, that in some respect we must ap- 
peal to, and to some extent be governed by it. How else can 
we understand — how else take a single step in interpreting the 
language which the Scriptures employ to convey the idea of 



CONCEPTION OF BEING LIMITED. 25 

God as a being ? If we have no idea or conception whatever 
of a being, to what purpose are we told, in any ordinary forms 
of language, that God is a being ? And if we have such an 
idea, what is it but the ordinary notion which the word being, 
or equivalent language in common use, has been employed to 
express ? Plainly, it can be no other. But then is this ordi- 
nary conception of a being, absolutely to control and deter- 
mine our authorized conception of God as a being ? JSTot of 
necessity, by any means. I admit indeed, that if properly 
used, it must as applied to God, be used in some of its ordinary 
meanings. But nothing is more common, or more abundantly 
sanctioned by the laws of usage, than, to turn words from their 
ordinary meaning, and to employ them to express, according 
to the exigency of the subject, in different cases, either more 
or less, good and sufficient evidence being furnished of the 
change. This brings us to a main question — How are we to 
be governed by our ordinary conception of a being, in de- 
termining the authorized conception of God as a being ? I 
answer, that ive are required to adopt its ordinary meaning. 
provided there is no good and sufficient evidence of any modifi- 
cation of its ordinary meaning, either by extending or restrict- 
ing it J and that, provided there is good and sufficient evidence 
of some modification of its ordinary meaning, either by extend- 
ing or restricting it, then ice are required to modify that mean- 
ing, either by extending or restricting it, according to such 
evidence. 

It is important to add, that what has now been said in re- 
spect to the interpretation of the word being, or any equivalent 
term, is applicable to the interpretation of the word person or 
any equivalent term. Indeed, to deny the correctness of these 
principles in the interpretation of language, is to deny that we 
are to be governed by evidence in deciding its import. Xor 
do I suppose that the correctness of the above principles will 
be denied or doubted by the Unitarian. On the contrary, I 
should expect him to hail this announcement of them, as a full 
concession of the very principles which sustain his own in- 
terpretation of the scriptural language concerning God as a 
bein^. 

Further, for the sake of narrowing the ground of debate, I 
here fully concede that there is no good and sufficient reason 
for restricting or limiting the ordinary idea or conception of a 



26 THE TRINITY. 

being, when it is said that God is a being. Whether there is 
good and sufficient reason for extending or enlarging this con- 
ception of a being as applied to God, by the addition of some 
other elementary conception or conceptions, is another ques- 
tion. How this is, we may see hereafter. I now admit and 
affirm, that at least the full, ordinary conception of a being is 
included in the just scriptural conception of God as a being. 

With these things in view, it is manifestly a material ques- 
tion, What is the ordinary conception of a being f And here 
I shall not appeal to philosophers nor to philosophic divines ; 
for the conception is that of common sense, the notion of a 
being formed by mankind generally, in all ages and countries, 
and evinced clearly in all human languages and all human 
conduct. And further, the conception of a being concerning 
which I now inquire, is that which the unperverted intellect or 
reason of mankind generally forms in view of phenomena, and 
not the conception of being as modified or in any degree de- 
termined by revelation, or any supernatural information. The 
human mind, in forming or giving this conception of a being, 
is and must be originally guided and governed by phenomena, 
by effects which fall under the eye of its own observation. It 
is on condition of phenomena or effects, that the mind neces- 
sarily gives its conceptions or ideas of their cause. By these it 
graduates and determines these conceptions or ideas, and all 
that are thus given are to be received as true conceptions. In 
this way, and in this way only — supposing no revelation — it 
gives its ideas of all the beings that come within the limits of 
its knowledge. From these conceptions of individual beings, 
it forms the general abstract idea of a being which is common 
to every individual as conceived and known merely by phe- 
nomena, and which, for distinction's sake, may be called the 
phenomenal conception of a being, or the general conception 
of a being as conditioned on and determined by phenomena. 

This is the conception of which we now seek a definition. It 
is the only ordinary or usual one which can be supposed by 
Unitarians to control or influence the interpretation of those 
scriptural passages which teach that God is a being. In an- 
swer to the question, What is this conception % I deem it suf- 
ficiently particular and precise to say, that it is the conception 
of a substance of a nature which qualifies it to produce phe- 
nomena. 



PHENOMENAL NATURE. 27 

This general conception the mind necessarily gives at first in 
the knowledge of itself. To man, as a spiritual being, we as- 
cribe intellect, susceptibility, and will. In similar forms of 
language we ascribe the same to God, and also creative power, 
comprising in these all conceivable power in absolute perfec- 
tion. Thus a spiritual being is conceived as a substance with 
a self-active nature — a being of that nature which we vaSS. power. 
A self-active nature, differ as it may in different beings, both 
in kind and degree, is that which we call power, and it is this 
nature of a substance, which in the convenient language of 
common life, we speak of in its relations to different phenom- 
ena, and call its essential properties or attributes ; that is, all 
that can with truth be meant when this common form of lan- 
guage is used, is the nature of a substance, which is its power 
or self-active nature in its relations to different phenomena. 
This self-active nature of a substance may be called its phenom- 
enal nature, in distinction from its whole nature — meaning by 
'phenomenal nature, that particular element of its whole nature 
which qualifies it by acting proximately to produce phenomena. 

Such is the necessary and authorized conception of a being 
which the mind gives on condition of mere phenomena, viz., 
the conception of a substance with a phenomenal nature, or more 
particularly, the conception of a something to which co self -active 
nature belongs, qualifying it by acting proximately to produce 
phenomena. This is the ordinary conception of a being, which 
I shall take the liberty to call the phenomenal conception , in 
distinction from that unusual and peculiar conception which, 
as I claim, we are bound to form of God as a being by other 
evidence than that of mere phenomena, even by his own reve- 
lation of the mode of his subsistence. This may be called the 
Biblical conception of God as a being. 

It is readily conceded that this phenomenal conception of a 
being consisting of one substance and of one phenomenal nature, 
is one which the mind necessarily gives on condition of certain 
known phenomena ; that it is a conception, which so far as it 
extends, is truly formed of every species or kind of a being, and ' 
that without evidence of any thing more, it is the only general 
conception of a being which we are authorized to form. It is 
still further conceded, that if this phenomenal conception of a 
being is the only one possible — -or rather, if it be known to be 
impossible, in the nature of things, that any thing more should 



28 THE TRINITY. 

be true, or be known to be true of a being, and of course of 
the divine being, than what is necessarily, on condition of 
mere phenomena, known to be true — then it would be im- 
possible, that even in any peculiar yet authorized use of lan- 
guage, there should be one God in three persons. 

But is this known to be impossible in the nature of things ? 
Is our knowledge of beings by phenomena, the measure and 
limit of all possible knowledge concerning them ? Can nothing 
more be true, and nothing more be known to be true of any 
being, even of the eternal self-existent Being, than is revealed 
to us by mere phenomena ? Can God know nothing more of 
himself — can he make known to us nothing more of the con- 
stituting elements of his being, or of the mode of his subsist- 
ence, than is revealed to us merely by his works of creation 
and providence ? This brings us to a more particular and also 
fundamental question in the present controversy, viz. : 

Is it possible in the nature of things, that God,- in some 
peculiar and yet authorized import of the language, should 
subsist as one being in three persons ? 

Keeping in mind, that by a peculiar and yet authorized 
meaning of the language, is meant that import in which words 
are turned from their ordinary meaning on account of the 
peculiarity of the subject to which they are applied, I propose 
to consider the present inquiry concerning what is possible in 
the nature of things, in the first place, in respect to the general 
statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, — viz., that God is one 
being in three persons / and in the second place, in respect to 
the same statement of the doctrine in the somewhat more par- 
ticular form in which I have explained it. 

In the first place then, is it possible in the nature of things, 
that God in some peculiar and yet authorized import of the 
language, should subsist as one being in three persons f 

In this general form of the doctrine, — viz., that God is one 
being in three persons, in some peculiar import of the language, 
it may be safely assumed that Trinitarians, as a class of Chris- 
tians, would agree. Now there can be no question, that if the 
words being and persons in this proposition, by being changed 
more or less from their ordinary meaning, but still retaining 
some part of it, express as well, and even better than any other 
terms which language furnishes, the mode of the divine sub- 
sistence, they are used in a peculiar, yet in an authorized 



THE ONLY FAIR PRESUMPTION. 29 

import. It is not uncommon thus to alter the meaning of 
words in cases of similar exigency, and therefore the change 
now supposed cannot be improper or unauthorized. The only 
question then must be, whether by such a change in the mean- 
ing of the words being and persons, they can be used to express 
any which will be free from self-contradiction ; or to express 
any thing which can be true in the nature of things. What 
is now claimed is, that they can be ; and that the only fair 
presumption is, that Trinitarians, in this use of the words being 
and persons, turn them from their ordinary import and employ 
them in one which is peculiar, on account of the nature of the 
subject, so modifying the import of each as to avoid all incon- 
sistency or contradiction in their conceptions of oneness of 
being and of tri-personality, and still retaining in the use of 
each term some part of its ordinary meaning. I say that this 
is the only fair presumption. For in all cases in which words 
are used • by men of common intelligence and principle, in 
such a manner that if understood in their ordinary meaning 
they involve manifest contradiction and absurdity, this fact is 
prima facie evidence that the words are turned more or less 
from their usual import, and throws the responsibility on the 
interpreter of judging and deciding whether the words by 
being thus turned, may not and do not express a meaning free 
from all contradiction or absurdity. If this may be so, there 
is a strong presumption that it is ; and the charge of uttering 
contradiction or absurdity is absolutely forbidden. There is 
no law of interpretation more just, and none more imperiously 
binding on the interpreter, than that now stated. That the 
language, for aught that can be shown to the contrary, may be 
used in a meaning which is free from contradiction and ab- 
surdity, is quite sufficient to prevent the charge of contradic- 
tion. Until therefore, every possible meaning of the language 
thus employed — every one which is possible according to any 
law of usage in such cases, by changing or modifying the terms 
in relation to the exigency of the case — is ascertained and spe- 
cified, and shown to be inconsistent or self-contradictory, the 
speaker may, for aught that appears to the contrary, use it in 
a consistent meaning, and the charge of self-contradiction is 
nothing better than slander. Besides, the only contradiction 
charged in the present case, is that involved in conceiving one 
being to be three beings, or one God to be three Gods. But the 



30 THE TRINITY. 

Trinitarian disclaims and denies altogether this or any concep- 
tion which involves it, and avows what he claims to he a very 
different conception of God, — the idea of God as one being in 
three persons, in a peculiar import of the words being and 
persons / — a conception which, as he claims, can be better ex- 
pressed in some modified use of these than any other terms. 
The Unitarian then, in charging contradiction on this state- 
ment of the Trinitarian, does so in defiance of the only fair and 
honorable presumption, that the latter so employs the terms of 
it as to avoid the alleged contradiction ; he does so without 
attempting to show that contradiction is necessarily involved 
in every possible meaning which can be authorized in the case ; 
he does so in the face of the Trinitarian's declaration, that he 
does not use the language in the meaning charged. Such is 
the evidence then, of unjust and calumnious interpretation on 
the part of the Unitarian. Does he say that the Trinitarian 
gives no explanation of his statement to show that it does not 
involve the self-contradiction charged? Be it so ; but he gives 
other evidence enough on this point without explanation, — 
evidence which, as we have seen, absolutely forbids the charge 
of self-contradiction ;— prima facie evidence of no contradic- 
tion. It is not his concern to show that he is not guilty, becar.se 
another is pleased, without evidence or the shadow of it, to say 
that he is guilty. The accuser must either make good his 
charge or retract it. If he does neither, what is he but a ca- 
lumniator? But it may be asked, why not give such explana- 
tion as shall reveal the consistency of the doctrine? I answer, 
by readily conceding that the great majority of those who 
form this general conception of one God in three persons, may 
so form it that it shall involve no contradiction, and yet be 
unable so to define and specify by reflective analysis each 
elementary conception involved in the complex conception, as 
to show the consistency of the two conceptions of oneness of 
being and of tri-personality. Who, without peculiar habits of 
reflection, is able to define with logical precision even his com- 
monest notions, and to show in all cases not only that things 
which are not the same are different, but in what the difference 
consists ? But this inability is surely no proof that such con- 
ceptions as actually exist in the mind are inconsistent or self- 
contradictory. It may be well here to give an illustration. 
Suppose the supernatural influence called inspiration, caus- 



DEFECT OF REFLECTIVE ANALYSIS. 31 

ing the human mind to remember, as in the case of the apostles, 
should be said to be impossible, on the ground that acts of 
memory, and all other mental states, must be caused by the 
mind itself, and therefore cannot, in the nature of things, be 
caused by an external supernatural agency, since this would 
imply that a man's own act is not his own act. Now if one 
who believes in the inspiration of the apostles, is unable by 
reflective analysis and logical definition, so to unfold and de- 
fine the elementary conceptions involved in the complex con- 
ception of an inspired act of memory, as to exempt it from the 
supposed charge of contradiction to the satisfaction of him 
who makes the charge, does this justify the charge, or prove 
the fact of contradiction ? Is this logical disqualification of 
uneducated believers in the doctrine of the inspiration of the 
sacred writers, proof that the doctrine is self-contradictory and 
absurd, and the fact, as conceived and asserted, is impossible 
in the nature of things ? Take another example. One asserts 
that a man cannot think without thinking of something. An- 
other denies the proposition, and claims to prove that it involves 
an absurdity by the following syllogism : A man cannot think 
without thinking of something : a man can think of nothing ; 
therefore nothing is something, and something is nothing. 
Now if the former should be unable to expose the sophistry of 
this syllogism by showing the ambiguity of the terms, and 
giving to each a precise definition, would it follow that in his 
conception of the first proposition a real absurdity is involved? 
So in the present case, if the Trinitarian is not qualified by 
habits of mental analysis and logical definition to unfold the 
elements of his complex conception of one God in three per- 
sons, it is no proof that the conception as it exists in his own 
mind is self-contradictory, as involving either the contradiction 
of conceding that one being is three beings, which he wholly 
disclaims, or any other contradiction. The Trinitarian claims 
to form another and very different conception of one God in 
three persons, from that which the words denote in their ordinary 
use — from that of one being in three beings, one God in three 
Gods ; to form a peculiar conception of the mode of the divine 
subsistence, and to use common terms to express this concep- 
tion in a peculiar sense, as the best terms which he can use. 
And yet the Unitarian, with abundant evidence of the pecu- 
liarity of the conception, and without ascertaining what it is. 



32 THE TRINITY. 

charges self-contradiction on that which he knows, or ought to 
know, is not his conception. And further, it is utterly incredible 
that the Trinitarian should not clearly apprehend the inconsis- 
tency which the Unitarian so abundantly and superabundantly 
charges, viz., the inconsistency of conceiving that one being is 
three beings in the same sense of the word being. He does 
clearly apprehend it — admits it to be a contradiction, and with 
a clear apprehension of it as such, disclaims the conceptions 
and the belief which involve it. Now if this clearly appre- 
hended contradiction actually pertains to his conception of one 
God in three persons, it is incredible that he should not per- 
ceive it ; and if he perceives that it actually pertains to his 
conception, it is absolutely impossible that he should admit the 
truth of that which is contradictory. The mind may indeed, 
without reflection, believe that which involves a contradiction 
without perceiving it ; but it is impossible from the very na- 
ture of the mind, that it should so reflect as to see and know 
the contradiction, and at the same time believe that which it 
knows involves it. Just so much evidence as there is that the 
Trinitarian perceives that the alleged contradiction pertains to 
his conception, so much evidence is there that he does not be- 
lieve the conception to be true. If then we assume — and who 
can doubt ? — that if the Trinitarian's conception involves the con- 
tradiction of one being in three beings, he sees and knows that 
it involves it, he cannot, in the nature of things, believe it to 
be true, and the charge of believing it, or that which involves 
it, must be false. Should it here be said, that they who adopt 
the language under consideration can affix no ideas to the terms 
which they employ to express their faith — be it so. Then what 
becomes of the charge of contradiction between ideas or con- 
ceptions which have no existence ? Besides, on this supposi- 
tion they can believe nothing, for there can be no belief of that 
of which the mind has no ideas. The only alternative there- 
fore, for the Unitarian, is to say, either that Trinitarians believe 
what they intuitively and reflectively see and know, and de- 
liberately and positively affirm, to be self-contradictory and 
false, which it is impossible, in the nature of things, that any 
mind should do ; or, that they actually believe that of which 
they have no idea or conception, which is equally impossible. 
In either case he charges that which cannot, in the nature of 
things, be true, but is necessarily false. Should the Unitarian 



SELF-CONTRADICTION NOT PROVED. 33 

abandon the standing charge of contradiction, and simply say 
that Trinitarians have no belief — nothing which can be called 
faith in the doctrine of one God in three persons — then how do 
Trinitarians differ on the subject from Unitarians ? Plainly, 
the parties are agreed in this : neither believes in the doctrine 
of the Trinity. The difference is, that while one openly pro- 
fesses to believe or disbelieve the doctrine, the other, without 
believing it, with the absolute reflective knowledge of the self- 
contradiction involved in it, with this knowledge familiarized 
to the mind, and constantly and openly avowed, and therefore, 
when under an absolute necessity of not believing but of dis- 
believing it, does with the most arrant hypocrisy — hypocrisy 
fully and perfectly known to themselves — profess to believe 
that there is one God in three persons. Let then this charge 
be substituted for that of believing contradiction and absurdity. 
Every charge of contradiction made by Unitarians on the be- 
lief of Trinitarians is, in the circumstances of the case, necessa- 
rily false. If Trinitarians must be reproached, let it be with 
arrant hypocrisy, which may have at least the semblance of 
possible truth. But can the charge be sustained ? Will it, in 
view of the fact that so many of the wise and good, in every 
age since Christianity blessed the world, have avowed their be- 
lief of one God in three persons, be regarded as in the lowest 
degree credible? And why can it not be sustained? Because 
it may be true that the human mind can and often does form 
the conception of one God in three persons, in some peculiar 
import of the language, which involves no contradiction or ab- 
surdity ; because, by changing the ordinary conceptions of 
oneness of being and of tri-personality, it can exclude from 
each the elementary ideas that result in contradiction, as 
formed into one complex idea or conception of one being in 
three persons. 

Having thus attempted to show how entirely groundless and 
unauthorized is the Unitarian's charge of contradiction on the 
general form of the doctrine of the Trinity, as before stated, I 
now proceed as I proposed — 

In the second place, to show the same thing in respect to the 
more particular form of the doctrine in which it has now been 
explained. 

The doctrine of the Trinity then is, that God is one heing in 
such an extended sense of the terms, as to involve three persons m 

3 2* 



34 THE TKINITY. 

such a restricted sense of the terms, that by his tin-personality, or 
by the three persons of his Godhead, he is qualified, in a corre- 
sponding restricted sense, for three distinct, personal, divine 
forms of phenomenal action. 

That this doctrine involves no known contradiction, is mani- 
fest from the very general and very limited conception which 
the human mind ordinarily forms of the constituting elements 
of a being. This is what I call the phenomenal conception — 
that idea of a being simply, which the mind forms on condition 
of mere phenomena. It is complex, consisting of two elemen- 
tary conceptions — that of a substance and that of a self-active 
phenomenal nature. This elementary conception of a substance, 
in the present use of the word, is merely the idea of a some- 
thing as opposed to nothing, which is the subject or support of 
the self-active phenomenal nature ; and the elementary con- 
ception of this self-active phenomenal nature is simply the con- 
ception of something as opposed to nothing, by which the being 
is qualified to produce phenomena. How very limited then is 
our conception of these elements of a being, and of course 
our knowledge of these elements, as this knowledge depends 
merely on phenomena. I admit and maintain, that what the 
mind thus gives, it gives necessarily ; and that what it necessa- 
rily gives in the form of conception and knowledge, is true. 
But then how many more things may be true of both the sub- 
stance and of the phenomenal nature of the substance, than en- 
ter into our merely phenomenal conception of either ! How 
many of which we have formed no conception, as observers of 
mere phenomena, may be conceived and known to be true of 
the constituting elements of a being, by that Mind which knew 
how to give existence to beings from absolute nothing ! And 
especially how many things of which we can form no concep- 
tion from mere phenomena, may be true of that eternal, self- 
existent Being himself, which he, if he pleased, could make 
known to us by a revelation ! 

What a being is, in his whole nature, — in all that which he 
is as a being, — does not necessarily depend merely on what his 
phenomenal nature is, or on that nature which is evinced to 
our minds by phenomena. Particularly what the nature of his 
substance is in all respects as a substance, — whether it be some- 
thing more than what it is manifested to be by mere phenom- 
ena, — viz., a mere substratum or support of its self-active na- 



THE DOCTRINE XOT ABSURD. 35 

ture or phenomenal properties, and if more than this, what 
more ; what other relations, by virtue of its own peculiar nature 
as a substance, it mar sustain to its self-active phenomenal 
nature besides the relation of a mere subject of that nature; in 
what different ways or modes it may be qualified by its own 
nature as a substance to control, direct, employ its self-active 
nature in the production of phenomena ; whether as a sub- 
stance it can be the subject of only one self-active nature, or 
of more than one of the same hind, or of different kinds : 
what its self-active nature may be besides that which qualifies 
the being to act and to produce phenomena ; of what diversi- 
fied modes of acting it may be capable, and what various 
effects it may produce ; whether, if there be any such nature 
of a substance as qualifies it to sustain other relations to its 
self-active nature viewed as single or manifold, besides the rela- 
tion of a mere subject of that nature, such nature of the sub- 
stance can or cannot manifest itself to us by any possible 
phenomena, and whether it can be known to any other than 
the omniscient Being, and to those to whom he shall reveal it ; — 
these are problems, the solution of which on a priori ground, 
lies entirely beyond the range of the human intellect. Yet on 
this ground must the Unitarian solve them, before he can know 
that the existence of one God in three persons, in some peculiar 
and authorized import of the language, is an impossibility in 
the nature of things. Are such decisions on the part of man 
any thing but those of presumptuous ignorance ? 

But the importance of this topic renders it worthy of a more 
particular investigation. I propose then to show from our 
limited conception and knowledge of the constituting elements 
of a being, and especially of the divine Being, that no contra- 
diction or absurdity in the nature of things can be known to 
be involved in the doctrine of the Trinity as now explained ; 
and this in two ways : 

I. By showing that several particular modes of the divine 
subsistence may be supposed, which involve a plurality of per- 
sons in one being, without involving known self-contradiction ; 
and, 

II. By showing, that if this be not so, still there may be some 
other mode, which we may not be able to discern, or even to 
conjecture, in which a plurality of persons in one being in- 
volves no contradiction. 



36 THE TRINITY. 

1. Several particular modes of the divine subsistence may 
be supposed, which involve a plurality of persons in one being 
without involving known self-contradiction. These supposable 
modes of the divine subsistence, I shall present in the follow- 
ing inquiries : 

(A.) Is it, or is it not possible in the nature of things, that 
there should be, as Spinoza held, but one substance in the 
universe, with the different phenomenal natures, or attributes, 
or properties, of spirit and of matter, so that there is but one 
being in the universe, which is God ; or so that God is all 
things and all things are God ? I do not say that there is the 
shadow of a reason for believing the doctrine of this philoso- 
pher, nor that there is not abundant moral evidence, botli from 
reason and the Scriptures, that it is false; but rather affirm that 
there is such evidence. But I ask, does any man absolutely 
know the doctrine to be false by knowing it to be self -contra- 
dictory and impossible in the nature of things ? Plainly not. 
As I have said, the ordinary conception of a being is a very 
limited, complex conception, consisting of two which are ele- 
mentary — the conception of a substance, and the conception of 
a self-active phenomenal nature pertaining to the substance. 
This conception of a substance is merely of a something to 
which the self-active phenomenal nature pertains. But who 
shall undertake to say on a priori ground, whether any thing 
more can or cannot be true of a substance ; or, if more, what? 
"Who shall in this manner decide how many phenomenal na- 
tures of the same kind, or of different kinds, a substance as 
such is capable of, or what diversity of effects, or diverse modes 
of ucting and of producing effects, can or cannot depend on 
what the substance is as substance ? Who, in this way, shall 
unfold the relations of the substance of the being man to his 
spiritual and corporeal nature, and so exhibit the interior struc- 
ture and elementary constitution of the substance and the 
phenomenal natures of such a being, as to show us the mode 
of action and reaction between the spiritual and corporeal, and 
the ground of their continued union in life, and of their sepa- 
ration in death ? And in respect to the self-active phenomenal 
nature of a substance, what is it but power to act, and by act- 
ing to produce effects or phenomena? Can there in the nature 
of things be only one such nature, or can there be many such 
in the substance ? Can one phenomenal nature act in some one 



DOCTRINE OF SPINOZA. 37 

form of action as one nature, and also in other forms as several 
natures? Man as a spiritual being has what may be called an 
intellectual nature or mental power, but not creative power. 
God is a spirit, and j>ossesses creative power. Is this commu- 
nicable ? If it is, and if it should be communicated to a created 
spirit, would it with his intellectual nature constitute one phe- 
nomenal nature of one substance, or a twofold phenomenal 
nature of one substance? If it is incommunicable, is it be- 
cause in the nature of things it can pertain only to a self- 
existent substance ; and if it be peculiar to such a substance, 
what must be the peculiarity of that substance by virtue of 
which it is capable of such power ? Of what more is it or is it 
not capable in the nature of things ? But not to multiply these 
questions. Who can so penetrate the constituting elements of 
a being of his substance and self-active phenomenal nature, 
that on the ground of a priori knowledge he can unfold these 
elements, and so determine what mutual relations, what unity 
and diversity of action, and what phenomenal effects, can and 
cannot in the nature of things be truly predicated of them, or 
of the being whose whole nature they constitute ? If none can 
do this, then how limited must be man's a priori knowledge of 
the constituting elements of a being? If none can do this, 
who on the ground of his a priori knowledge will pronounce 
the doctrine of the philosopher of Amsterdam self-contra- 
dictory ? The question is not, whether there is not proof enough 
that the doctrine is false, but who absolutely knows it to be 
false on a priori ground, and that it is impossible in the nature 
of things that there is but one substance in the universe, and 
that the only being, if oneness of substance is the criterion of 
oneness of being, is God ? Who would pronounce this doc- 
trine false, were it attested by a divine revelation? Thus 
attested, how would it, and how ought it, to change our con- 
ceptions of things, and with them the meaning and even the 
structure of language ; especially the import of the word being, 
and of the personal pronouns. 

In view of such a priori ignorance on the part of man in 
respect to this subject, I now proceed to propound some inqui- 
ries more directly related to the mode of the divine subsistence, 
which involves a trinity in the Godhead. 

(B.) I ask, is it or is it not possible in the nature of things, 
that God should be — as Sherlock and Howe maintain — three 



38 THE TRINITY. 

beings, in the ordinary sense of the word being, and yet 
the three beings in this sense be so united in one by a com- 
mon substance, as to be called in the most natural and appro- 
priate words which language furnishes, one being; and the 
whole, one being in three persons f "Who does not know, that 
were such a mode of the divine subsistence to be revealed in so 
many words or in equivalent phraseology, the meaning of the 
words being and person would, like other words in similar 
circumstances, be at once modified and changed according to 
the exigency of the case ? I do not say that there is or is not 
any evidence, from the use of scriptural language, that God sub- 
sists as now supposed — one being in three persons. But I sim- 
ply ask, who knows on a priori ground, that he does not so 
subsist ? The question, be it remembered, is not what would 
be absurd or self-contradictory according to our present ordi- 
nary conceptions, or our common confident judgments or opin- 
ions, formed in view of phenomena; but what do we abso- 
lutely know on a priori ground, concerning possibility and 
impossibility in the nature of things ? Do we know the impos- 
sibility of the mode of God's subsistence, now supposed, as Ave 
know the impossibility that two and two should be live ? 

(C.) I ask, is it or is it not possible in the nature of things, 
that God should be, as Leibnitz held, a being of several per- 
sons in an absolute substance, and that three persons are not as 
absolute substances as the whole ? Who knows it to be impos- 
sible in the nature of things, that a being should consist of a 
threefold nature, or three phenomenal natures of the same 
kind, each being what may be called in some limited sense a 
person, or, as some say, an agent, and united with something 
called its substance, as peculiar to a divine, phenomenal na- 
ture, — and yet this substance different from that which is com- 
mon to the whole being, as less absolute than the substance 
which unites the whole, — and so, with the three persons, con- 
stitutes one being? Who absolutely knows that such an exist- 
ence involves a contradiction, and is therefore impossible in 
the nature of things ? 

(D.) I ask, is it or is it not possible that a being should con- 
sist of one substance and of one self-active phenomenal nature ; 
and that while he is capable of one form of action in the exer- 
cise of his phenomenal nature, he is also, by virtue either of a 
peculiarity of substance or a peculiarity of a phenomenal na- 



OTHER SUPPOSITIONS. 39 

tare, or of both, qualified so to act in three distinct forms of 
action, in the exercise of his one phenomenal nature, as to pro- 
duce different phenomena, which a divine phenomenal nature 
only can produce ? We have perhaps conceived and spoken, 
or heard others speak, of the same mind as carrying on at one 
and the same time, two distinct processes of thought — even as 
distinct as would be one process in moral reasoning and an- 
other in mathematical. £sow the question is not one of fact, 
but respects what is and what is not possible in the nature of 
things. Is it then, or is it not possible, that there should be a 
being consisting, according to our present conception of a hu- 
man mind, of one substance and one phenomenal nature, quali- 
fied as the human mind is to perform one complex mental action 
in thinking, feeling, and choosing, in the exercise of its entire 
phenomenal nature, and yet, unlike ourselves, capable, by 
some peculiar threefold qualification of its substance in relation 
to his phenomenal nature, of carrying on in other cases, two or 
three forms or processes of such mental action ; not distinct in 
every respect, — not distinct or different as the acts of three phe- 
nomenal natures of three distinct substances ; but still numeri- 
cally different, and unlike in respect to their objects as the acts 
of any three beings are conceived to be different ; and thus dis- 
tinct by virtue of some peculiarity of one peculiar substance, 
in its relations to the acts of one peculiar phenomenal nature ? 
Who knows enough of the nature of substance, and of the phe- 
nomenal nature of a substance, to decide the existence of such 
a being to be impossible ? 

(E.) Is it or is it not possible that three self-active phenome- 
nal natures of the same kind, each conceived without a sub- 
stance exclusively its own, should be combined in one com- 
mon substance — for who can tell how many kinds of substances 
are possible in rerum natura — thus constituting one being 
with a threefold nature, or what, in the common use of lan- 
guage, may be called three classes of attributes or properties 
of the same kind ; and that this one being, by virtue of the 
peculiarity of his one substance and of his threefold nature, 
should be capable of as many distinct acts — acts as distinct, so 
far as they depend on phenomenal natures, as the distinct acts 
of three beings ? And here I further ask, in respect to the being 
now supposed, whether it is or is not possible, in the nature of 
things, that he should be capable also of acting in some cases 



40 THE TEINITY. 

as one being, in such a manner that his entire threefold phe- 
nomenal nature shall be in exercise in such action, while by 
virtue of his threefold nature he should be capable of acting 
in other cases, in three distinct forms of action ? 

These questions concerning what is and what is not possible 
in respect to the constituting elements of a being and the mode 
of his subsistence, are propounded as questions which, on 
a priori ground, no human intellect can decide. Am I then 
asked, why propound questions which no one can answer ? I 
reply, because they are those which the Unitarian pretends to 
answer — thus deciding, with the confidence of infallible knowl- 
edge, that it is impossible in the nature of things, that, in any 
mode of conceiving of a being, or of the mode of his subsist- 
ence, such a one as the doctrine of the Trinity affirms should 
be conceived to exist ; and that of course the existence of such 
a being is impossible, and cannot be taught even by a revela- 
tion from God. But if it be possible in the nature of things, 
for aught that any man knows to the contrary, that God should 
subsist in any one mode concerning the possibility of which I 
have inquired, then it is possible in the nature of things, for 
aught any man knows to the contrary, that God subsists, in 
some peculiar sense of the language, as one being in three 
persons. And if this be possible, what right or warrant has 
the Unitarian to assert that it is impossible in the nature of 
things ? Does he know, in the form of absolute knowledge, 
that the mode of the divine subsistence supposed in each case of 
the foregoing inquiries, involves a contradiction, and is there- 
fore impossible ? 

This question must be met by the direct and unqualified 
assertion of his absolute knowledge of the alleged contradic- 
tion and impossibility, and by making good the assertion. It 
is not to be evaded by some irrelevant and insufficient reply, 
founded in his preconceived opinions or judgments concerning 
the constituting elements of a being. Particularly, it is not 
enough for the Unitarian to say, that according to the ordinary 
conception or idea of a being, it is impossible that God should 
be, or be conceived to be, one being in three persons. This is 
readily admitted. The ordinary conception of a being is, as 
we have said, a phenomenal conception — a conception con- 
ditioned on and determined by phenomena only. It is the 
conception, in the most limited sense, of a being of one sub- 



SUCH SUPPOSITIONS POSSIBLE. 41 

stance and one self-active nature — of a substance as the mere 
subject of one sucb nature, and capable of but one class of 
acts, and of whom nothing more is true. The impossibility 
that such a being should subsist as one being in three persons, 
is fully conceded. The present question does not respect such 
a being, but the known possibility or impossibility of a very 
different mode of subsistence from that which is the object of 
our ordinary conception. It respects something more in the 
constituting elements of a being than is evinced to our ordi- 
nary conception by mere phenomena — some nature or prop- 
erty which does not manifest itself merely by phenomena, and 
which must be made known by revelation, if at all. It is — 
what does the Unitarian know of this subject, or rather, whe- 
ther he knows it to be impossible in the nature of things, that 
God should subsist in some one of the peculiar modes, con- 
cerning the possibility of which we have inquired ? Does he 
then say that he has no other than the common or ordinary 
conception of a being ? But how does this decide what is and 
what is not possible in the nature of things, in respect to the 
being whom we call God ? If he has never allowed himself to 
form any other than the ordinary conception of the mode of a 
being's subsistence — a merely phenomenal conception — how 
does this show that no other can be formed, or that he is not 
required by the whole evidence in the case — even by a divine 
revelation — actually to form another, and a very different con- 
ception of the mode in which the divine being subsists ? or 
how does it show that he knows any one of the modes of his 
subsistence, supposed in the foregoing inquiries to be impos- 
sible ? Does he then say, that he can form no other than the 
ordinary conception of the mode of a being's subsistence, and 
that of course he can form none of those respecting the mode 
of the divine subsistence supposed in the foregoing interroga- 
tories ? This — admitting iris ordinary intellectual capacity — 
we are constrained to deny. For if he can form the ordinary 
complex conception of the mode of a being's subsistence, he 
can — having the ordinary power of abstracting and compound- 
ing ideas — modify and change his ordinary conception by this 
process, and so form either of the supposed conceptions of the 
mode of the divine subsistence. If he can conceive of a sub- 
stance to which one self-active nature pertains, he can conceive 
of a substance to which two or three self-active natures pertain. 



42 THE TRINITY. 

If he can conceive that a substance with one self-active nature 
should perform one act, or one class of actions, he can conceive 
that a substance to which three self-active . natures pertain, 
should perform three distinct acts, or three distinct classes 
of actions. In this way he can form any one of the concep- 
tions of a being supposed in the foregoing interrogatories. At 
any rate, if he cannot form any one of these conceptions, then 
he cannot pronounce it self-contradictory, and the existence of 
its object impossible in the nature of things. Does he then 
say that the contradiction involved in each of the foregoing 
supjDositions is, that one being is three beings, or three beings 
one being ? I answer, that there is no pretense for such" an 
assertion. For in each supposition the being is supposed to 
consist of one, and of but one absolute substance in three per- 
sons, in some peculiar or unusual sense of the language. Ac- 
cording to each supposition, oneness of absolute substance is 
involved, to which the threefold distinction of three persons 
belongs. And surely oneness of substance — whatever nature, 
simple or complex, single or conrpound, be supposed to pertain 
to it — is the only criterion of oneness of being. Of course the 
word persons, in such a case, is manifestly used, as is claimed, 
not in its usual meaning — not even to imply, nor so that in 
any fairness of construction it can imply, three beings. On 
the contrary, it is plainly used in each supposition in such a 
restricted meaning as to imply at most, some threefold quali- 
fication for distinct personal acts or action, either in the pecu- 
liar substance or in the peculiar phenomenal nature — whether 
the latter be single or compound — or in both substance and 
phenomenal nature. How then is one such being three beings, 
by involving three such distinctions, called persons, in one 
being ; or how are three such persons three beings, when each, 
as a person, is supposed not to be a being in the sense in Avhich 
the whole subsistence is a being, but- to be only one of the con- 
stituting elements of one entire being ? Plainly, such a suppo- 
sition, instead of implying that one being is three beings, or 
three beings one being, most expressly asserts the contrary. 
Neither of the three persons supposed to be included in one 
being, is supposed, as a person, to be identical with the entire 
being ; but as a person, or divine person, is supposed to be not 
the entire being. How then can the supposed one being in 
three persons be, in one and the same sense, three beings ? 



AEE THEY CONCEIVABLE? 43 

Does the Unitarian now say that he cannot conceive how such 
a being can exist, as that concerning which we have hypo- 
thetically inquired ? Such a reply would only show how en- 
tirely he mistakes, and thus evades the point now at issue. 
What if he cannot conceive how such a being can exist ? Is 
the measure of his conception the measure of all possibility in 
the nature of things ? Is nothing possible, unless he can con- 
. ceive how it is possible ? Can he conceive how mind or mat- 
ter exists, or can be brought into being from nothing by the 
power of the Creator ; how a man or an angel can be so con- 
stituted as to develop his nature in all the phenomena of intel- 
ligence and of action peculiar to each ; ay, how the God and 
Maker of all should exist, and be what he is, and do what he 
does? Surely the question is not whether the Unitarian, or 
any one else, can or cannot conceive how a triune being can 
exist, or be what he is, or do what he does, supposing such a 
being to exist and to act ; but it is, does the Unitarian, or any 
one else, absolutely know that it is impossible in the nature of 
things that such a being — in some one of the modes of subsist* 
ence, in respect to the possibility of which we have inquired — 
can exist ? If he does, let him say he does, and make good 
his assertion ; let him intelligibly state the contradiction in the 
conception which involves the impossibility alleged. My ob- 
ject in propounding the foregoing inquiries is not to affirm — 
nor have I occasion to do so — the possibility of such a being 
as I have made the subject of these hypothetical inquiries ; 
but to ascertain whether the Unitarian knows as much con- 
cerning the possible constituting elements of a being — even of 
all that enters into the entire nature of the self-existent God — 
as he pretends to know ; it is to challenge him to show the 
contradiction involved in each of the foregoing suppositions of 
one being in three persons, and thus compel him to fair reason- 
ing, either by showing the contradiction which he asserts, or 
by retracting and never repeating what otherwise must be 
deemed an assertion entitled to no respect. 

Having thus attempted to show that several particular modes ' 
of the divine subsistence may be supposed which involve a 
plurality of persons, or three persons in one God, as this doc- 
trine has been explained, without involving any known con- 
tradiction, I now proceed to show — 

2. That if it be not so — that is, if the human mind be unable to 



44 THE TRINITY. 

suppose any particular mode of the divine subsistence includ- 
ing three persons in one being, which does not involve a con- 
tradiction — it is impossible that man should know that there 
cannot be such a mode of the divine subsistence. 

What if neither Plato, nor Aristotle, nor any other human 
being has been able to devise a mode by which matter can be 
created from absolute nothing, does it follow that man can 
Jcnow that its creation from nothing does involve a contradic- 
tion ? Because man can specify no mode in which matter can 
be thus created which would involve a contradiction, can there 
be no mode, and can God conceive no mode of creating matter 
from nothing which involves no contradiction ? There is a 
plain difference between being unable to decide a priori, that 
a thing does not, and being able to decide that it does involve 
a contradiction. The human mind may be utterly unable to 
decide on a priori ground, that the creation of matter from 
nothing does not ; but this is not being able to decide that it 
does. The mere fact, that the mind has not that full, compre- 
hensive view of the subject which enables it to decide that it 
does not involve a contradiction, is not being able to decide 
that it does. It may be utterly unable to see how it can be 
done ; but this is not seeing that it cannot be done. Or to 
take a more familiar case. What man is able to decide on a 
priori ground, that the supposition of a soul and body united 
in one being, either does or does not involve a contradiction ? 
or whether the supposition that one portion of inert matter 
should possess power to attract another portion, does or does 
not involve a contradiction ? And now what would be more 
preposterous than for one to infer, from his utter inability to 
decide such a question either way, his ability to decide it one 
way ; that is, because he cannot decide, a priori, that the sup- 
position of the creation of matter from nothing, or of the union 
of the soul and body in one being, or of the power of gravity 
in one portion of matter, either does or does not involve a con- 
tradiction, to infer that the supposition does involve a contra- 
diction ? So in the present case. Let it be granted for the 
sake of the argument, that no human mind can suppose any 
particular mode of the subsistence of one God in three persons, 
which does not involve a contradiction, and is therefore utterly 
unable to decide in this way, that the supposition of one God 
in three persons does or that it does not involve a contradic- 



THINGS INCONCEIVABLE AND IMPOSSIBLE. 45 

tion, is it therefore able to decide that it does involve a contra- 
diction ? Plainly, though the human mind were wholly unable 
to suppose any particular mode of the divine subsistence in- 
cluding, according to the explanation given, three persons in 
one being, which does not involve a contradiction, this is not 
knowing that the doctrine* of three persons in one God as now 
explained, does involve a contradiction. There may be for 
aught that appears to the contrary, some particular mode of 
the divine subsistence, in which God actually exists as one God 
in three persons. It is utterly impossible that man should 
know on a priori ground, that there cannot be. Unless the 
human mind can fully and perfectly comprehend all modes of 
subsistence which are possible in the nature of things — and in 
the present case, all the constituting elements which can enter 
into the whole nature of the Godhead, with the relation of each 
element to every other — it must be forever impossible for man 
to know or decide on a priori ground, that the doctrine of one 
God in three persons, as the language has now been explained, 
involves a contradiction. 

Again : this topic may be presented in another light. The 
human mincl necessarily conceives and knows that the suppo- 
sition or assertion of some things — for example, that a part is 
equal to the whole, that two and two are five, that a thing is 
and is not — involves a contradiction ; while it does not neces- 
sarily conceive and know, nor can it decide on a priori ground, 
that the supposition or assertion of some other things, either 
does or does not involve a contradiction ; for example, that 
matter should be created from nothing, that a soul and body 
should be united as they are in one man, that fire should ex- 
plode gunpowder, or burn the hand in contact with it. The 
former instances may be viewed as of two kinds. One is, when 
the proposition is an express contradiction of the plainest form, 
as, that what is, is not, or that one and the same thing is and 
is not. The other is, when the proposition can be reduced to 
an express contradiction, as when it is said that a part is equal 
to the whole ; which is to say, that what is not equal to the 
whole, viz., a part, is equal to the whole, E"ow, when the 
proposition is of the former kind, or an express contradiction 
of the plainest form, then there can be no mistake. The mind 
that apprehends the meaning of the language, necessarily con- 
ceives and knows the contradiction to exist. When the propo- 



46 THE TRINITY. 

sition is of the latter kind — one which involves a contradiction 
without expressing it in the plainest form — it can be reduced to 
an express contradiction. If then, a proposition is not an ex- 
press contradiction in the plainest form, and if it cannot be re- 
duced to such, then no man can know or decide a priori that it is. 
or that it involves a contradiction. Now, in respect to the doc- 
trine of the Trinity as we have explained it, I affirm that it is 
neither an express contradiction, nor can it be reduced to such. 
If then, the doctrine of the Trinity is not and cannot be the 
express contradiction of asserting that one being is three be- 
ings, in the ordinary use of language — if it cannot be reduced 
to this express contradiction, and therefore cannot be known 
to involve it — can it be known to involve any other ? 

On this question, it were perhaps sufficient to say, that in 
view of the facility — not to say the certainty — of detecting and 
exposing the contradiction of a proposition like this, could it 
be known to be of this character, — in view also of the intellec- 
tual strength which has been employed upon it for this very 
purpose, and of the fact that no other has ever been charged, 
except that which, as we have seen, is false, — in view of these 
things, it were sufficient and safe to say, that neither that con- 
tradiction which has been charged, nor any other, can be 'known 
to be involved in the doctrine. 

But not to rest the question on this ground. The nature of 
the subject renders it impossible that the human mind should 
know on a priori ground, that the doctrine of the Trinity, as 
now explained, involves a contradiction. The inquiry respects 
the constitution of the Godhead — the constituting elements of 
an eternal, self-existent being ; and there is nothing which falls 
more entirely without and beyond the range and grasp of the 
human intellect. It is true that man has a distinct, well de- 
fined, and even necessary conception, as far as it goes, of what 
he calls a being — of himself, of every other man, of an angel, 
of God. But what enters into the constitution even of a created 
being beyond a very narrow limit — what it is in all the ele- 
ments, neither more nor less, which constitutes him the being 
that he is, as these are known to Omniscience, the mind of man, 
unperverted by philosophic speculation, does not attempt on a 
priori ground to determine. The inquiry at once associates 
with itself a consciousness of intellectual imbecility, and the 
mind falters in despair before entering on the investigation. 



SUBSTANCE AS USUALLY CONCEIVED. 47 

At the same time it necessarily forms a general limited 
conception of a being, and determines, not that more than it 
thus conceives is not true, but that what it thus necessarily con- 
ceives is true. From the nature of the mind as a knower, it is 
impossible that it should conceive and know a being, without 
conceiving and knowing him to consist at least of one substance 
and one phenomenal nature, or a nature qualifying him to pro- 
duce phenomena. This conception of a substance and a phe- 
nomenal nature, may be said to be the common or ordinary 
conception of a being, and so much at least as is comprised in 
this we may be justly said to know of every being. But how 
little do we know, even of a created being, compared with 
Him who knew how to give him existence from nothing ! How 
many things may be predicated of every being, for aught 
we know or can know to the contrary, on a priori ground, 
or from mere phenomena which, in the nature of things, 
would be credible, and which, supported by proper evidence, 
especially by God's declaration, would demand our unhesita- 
ting belief? 

It is true that the idea of a substance is, of that to which a 
phenomenal nature, commonly conceived as a class of proper- 
ties or attributes, belongs. Reason, the competent, unpervert- 
ed intellect of man, necessarily gives the truth, that every sub- 
tance has a nature qualifying it for the production of all its 
diverse phenomena or effects. Hence the mind, forming this 
conception of a being from mere phenomena, and having no 
evidence of any thing more from mere phenomena than what is 
included in it, regards it in all such cases as a just and true con- 
ception of a being. Such it undoubtedly is. So much as this 
conception involves, is to be received as true in all cases ; and 
on the ground of phenomena merely, and on the authority of 
reason merely, nothing more is to be received as true. But to 
return to the question, Can nothing more be true in the na- 
ture of things ? Can nothing more be true of the whole nature 
of a being than is comprised in this limited conception, formed 
solely on the ground of phenomena ? Can man absolutely know 
it to be impossible in the nature of things, that nothing more 
should be true ? "Were man omniscient, would he know more 
than he can know from mere phenomena ? Could not God if 
he pleased, tell us something more than, in this manner, we 
now know — something which would greatly change and ex- 



48 THE TKINITY. 

tend our conception beyond our ordinary phenomenal concep- 
tion of a being — especially of himself ? 

Let us reflect carefully on the question, What then does 
mere reason, on the basis of phenomena merely, decide respect- 
ing the constituting elements of a being ? I answer as before, 
that a being consists of that something, as opposed to nothing, 
to which a phenomenal nature pertains. But this is not de- 
ciding that nothing more can be true, nor that nothing more is 
true. What reason thus necessarily decides to be true, is true. 
But reason does not necessarily give, nor pretend to give us 
all truth. Eeason is not omniscient. While therefore, on the 
authority of mere reason, it would be, for the want of evidence, 
in the highest degree irrational to believe that a being consists 
of any thing more than one substance and one phenomenal na- 
ture, as we have explained the language, still that nothing 
more can be true in the case, except what is comprised in this 
very limited conception, — nothing more, in respect to his sub- 
stance and his phenomenal nature, except what qualifies him 
for one form of personal, phenomenal action, is not, as the 
Unitarian assumes, a judgment of reason, or a necessary decis- 
ion of the human mind. The assumption of this is obviously 

THE FIRST AND GRAND ERROR OF THE UNITARIAN IN ALL HIS 

reasontng. He assumes, not only that reason necessarily gives 
the ordinary phenomenal conception of every being, but that 
it necessarily excludes from this conception that of tri-person- 
ctlity, or a threefold qualification for three distinct forms of 
personal, phenomenal action, as a false conception ; in other 
words, he assumes that human reason necessarily decides that 
a being having one absolute substance and one phenomenal 
nature, qualifying him for one form of phenomenal action, 
cannot in the nature of things, either by any peculiarity of his 
substance or of his phenomenal nature, or of both, or in any 
mode of subsistence whatever, be qualified for three distinct 
personal forms of phenomenal action. This we say is an unau- 
thorized, because a groundless assumption by human reason. 
I admit that reason necessarily conceives that every being con- 
sists at least of one substance and one phenomenal nature, quali- 
fying him for at least one form of personal, phenomenal action. 
But reason does not necessarily decide either that more is or is 
not true of a being. It is true that, in all ordinary cases — 
even in all cases but one — there is an utter want of evidence 



BELIEF AND DENIAL. 49 

of any thing more than is included in the ordinary conception 
of a being. This want of evidence requires us not to believe, 
or forbids us to believe, that there is any thing more ; but does 
not require nor even authorize us to believe, and thus to assert, 
that there is not any thing more. The entire want of evidence 
of a fact or truth, forbids us to believe the fact or truth ; but 
instead of authorizing us to deny the fact or truth, it forbids us 
to disbelieve it. The entire want of evidence that Saturn has 
more rings than one, forbids us to believe that it has more than 
one ; but it does not authorize ns to believe that it has not 
more than one. It forbids us to disbelieve that it has more 
than one, for evidence of more is quite supposable ; and with 
evidence of more, we should be required to believe more. Be- 
sides, if it be granted that the want of all evidence that any 
being has a threefold nature in some sort, which qualification 
for distinct personal forms of phenomenal action authorizes the 
belief that he has not, still this is mere belief, and not knowl- 
edge — a mere inference, founded solely on the want of evi- 
dence. How then would it be if we had good and sufficient 
evidence, even God's declaration, that some particular being 
possesses this threefold qualification ? If God should reveal on 
this subject something more of himself than human reason 
can discover from mere phenomena, would human reason be 
competent to contradict the revelation % Plainly, no man can 
know on a priori ground, and therefore no man can assert on 
this ground, that it is impossible in the nature of things that 
God should be one being in such a modified sense, as to in- 
clude three persons in such a modified sense, that by his 
tri-personality he is qualified in a corresponding modified 
sense, for three distinct, divine, personal forms of phenomenal 
action. 

In illustration of what has now been said, let us suppose as 
some philosophers and some Unitarians do, that the human 
mind consists simply of one phenomenal nature, or of one com- 
bination of mental properties, without a substance to which 
this nature or these properties belong. Let us now suppose 
any three such minds as we now conceive them to be, each to 
exhibit the same mental phenomena — the same distinct men- 
tal operations and states in its own consciousness — which any 
three minds now exhibit. If now God, in a well-attested reve- 
lation, should declare, contrary to the supposed conception in 
4 3 



50 THE TEINITY. 

one respect, that these three minds were united by a common 
substance, would any man know the declaration to be false ? 
Again, suppose that, in a well-attested revelation and in formal 
and express terms, God should announce to us that every 
three — every triplet of human beings — while they are three 
persons in respect to distinct qualifications for three distinct 
personal forms of mental action, as we now conceive them to 
be, — except that they are so combined in one and the same 
substance that they are as truly, though in a different respect, 
one being, as each of the three in our present conception is one 
being ; — who is the man that knows so much of the elements of 
a being — even of himself as a being — of what is possible and 
impossible in the nature of things, as to be able to pronounce 
the revelation false ? Who would do it with the same assur- 
ance that he pronounces the proposition that two and two are 
five, to be false ? Who can absolutely know that the crea- 
tion of such a being is beyond the power of the Almighty ? If 
you say that it involves a contradiction, specify and make 
it manifest, or learn to be silent on the question of what is im- 
possible to Omnipotence. "What is the soul?" said one to 
Marivaux. " I know nothing of it," he replied, " but that 
it is spiritual and immortal." "Well," said his friend, "let 
us ask Fontenelle, and he will tell us what it is." "No," 
said Marivaux, " ask anybody but Fontenelle, for he has 
too much good sense to know any thing more about it than 
we do." 

Man then, . has not that a priori knowledge of the consti- 
tuting elements of any being, much less of one eternal and self- 
existent, which enables him to decide in all respects what can 
and what cannot be true in the nature of things, respecting 
the mode of his subsistence. In such inquiries the human 
mind is baffled, and falls back in despairing weakness ; and so 
it must be, till man shall comprehend what God only knows. 
The vegetation of a blade of grass, the motions of an insect, the 
simplest organized being, the merest atom of inert matter, pre- 
sent mysteries which human reason cannot penetrate. In 
view then, of the greatness and incomprehensibleness of God, 
what known impossibility is there that he should subsist — what 
a priori presumption in the nature of things against supposing 
him to subsist in a very diverse mode from that of his creatures, 
even in that of one God in three persons, or of one divine being 



CONCLUSION. 51 

in such a modified and peculiar sense, as to include three per- 
sons in such a modified and peculiar sense, thatby histri-person- 
ality he is qualified in a corresponding modified sense, for 
three distinct, divine personal forms of phenomenal action? 
Surely, in respect to the constituting elements of that Being, 
who, himself uncaused, created mind and matter, men, angels, 
archangels, and all from absolute nothing, our feeble intellect 
may well consent to be enlightened by a revelation from him- 
self, and to bow in humble, grateful adoration, before what he 
shall reveal concerning his eternal Godhead. What God re- 
veals of himself, until it be absolutely known to be self-contra- 
dictory and impossible in the nature of things, is credible, and 
must be believed, or God must be made a liar. 

I have thus attempted to show how entirely groundless and 
unauthorized is the charge of contradiction and impossibility, 
ever alleged and insisted on by Unitarians, against the doc- 
trine of the Trinity. I have said the more on this topic, not 
because it would not be sufficient for the Trinitarian to meet 
the gratuitous charge with a simple denial, at least until the 
Unitarian shall specify some other contradiction than that 
which he does specify, but because, by a most unwarrantable 
assumption to which it is necessary to give prominence, and 
thus to call particular attention, he gives plausibility to this 
charge in his own mind, and often in the minds of others. 
This we claim to have shown to be entirely gratuitous, and 
even absolutely forbidden by the laws of rational belief. It is 
forbidden by these laws, even in respect to a created being. 
Man, though required to believe what he necessarily conceives 
to be true, and, though forbidden to believe any thing more, 
for want of evidence concerning the elements of his own being, 
is not required to believe that nothing more is true, but is for- 
bidden to believe that nothing more is or can be true. To sup- 
pose otherwise is to suppose that man, in one set of circum- 
stances may be required not merely not to believe, but to 
disbelieve that which, in an another set of circumstances, may 
be proved to be true. If then, it be gratuitous and unauthor- 
ized to believe that nothing more is or can be true of the 
elements of our own being than what is given by mere phe- 
nomena, how much more so is it to believe that nothing more 
can be true of the elements of God's being than is manifested 
merely by his works ? It is this assumption in respect to God, 



52 THE TKINITY. 

which I consider the grand and fundamental error of the 
Unitarian in all his reasoning. When this shall be clearly 
seen, and not till then, will it be manifest how flagrantly 
gratuitous and unauthorized, not to say irreverent, is his charge 
of contradiction and absurdity, echoed and re-echoed against 
the doctrine of the Trinity. 



THE TRINITY. 

III.— NO PEESUMPTION AGAINST, BUT BATHER A PRESUMPTION FOE 
THE TEUTH OF THE DOCTEINE. 

No such presumption in what man knows to be true of himself, nor in that we judge all other 
beings besides God to be like ourselves in this respect. — No presumption from divine revelation ; 
none from the Unity of God. — The presumption for its truth is founded on the fact, that God is 
administering a Moral Government under an economy of grace. — This requires an Atonement. — 
An Atonement seems to be most easily furnished and explained on the supposition of this mode 
of the Divine subsistence. — Nature of the Atonement incidentally explained. — Temporary suf- 
ferings and death of the Divine-man a sufficient evil. 

A presumption, as the term is now used, may be said to be 
founded on evidence which the mind is authorized to take, 
though of a lower kind or degree than that which is called 
full proof . It may rest in it prior to the inquiry whether full 
proof exists or not. Such a presumption may be greater or 
less, stronger or weaker, at least in two respects, — either as 
that which furnishes it is sustained by more or less evidence, 
or as it is more or less fitted to support the proposition which 
it is alleged to support. Of course, if that which is alleged as 
furnishing the presumption has no existence, or if its existence 
is wholly without evidence, or if on the supposition of its ex- 
istence, it is in no respect fitted to support the proposition, then 
there is no presumption. 

The self-contradiction which Unitarians assert to be involved 
in the doctrine, if the allegation were true, would not be a 
presumption against the truth of the doctrine, but a full and 
unanswerable proof of its falsehood, giving an impossibility, 
which absolutely precludes all evidence of its truth. 

But aside from all consideration of this contradiction, the 
assertion of which I claim to have shown is wholly groundless 
and absolutely forbidden by the laws of reasoning, there is in 
many minds a strong presumption against the truth of the 
doctrine of one God in three persons. This, so far as it exists 
in the view of those who receive it, is doubtless counteracted 
by abundant proof of its truth, while probably, in the view of 
the Unitarian, it is so strong as to be quite sufficient to prove 
that the doctrine is not revealed, and is not true. 

My present design is to show — 



54 THE TEINITY. 

I. That there is no presumption against the truth of the doc- 
trine of the Trinity, as now explained ; and, 

II. That there is a strong presumption in favor of its truth. 
I. There is no presumption against the truth of the doctrine. 
Any presumption which may be asserted against its truth 

must be implied in the doctrine itself, or must arise from what 
the doctrine asserts respecting the mode in which one God or 
one Divine Being subsists ; or, respecting the constituent ele- 
ments of his being, when it is said, in the meaning in which 
the language has now been explained, that he is one God in 
three persons. What then is this doctrine ? It is that God is 
one being in such a modified and extended sense of the lan- 
guage, as to include three persons in such a modified and re- 
stricted sense of the terms, that he is qualified, in a correspond- 
ing restricted sense, for three distinct divine personal forms of 
phenomenal action. ISTow what presumption is furnished by 
this doctrine against its truth ? Does it assert that one God is 
three Gods, or that there are more Gods than one ? It admits 
of no such construction, for it expressly affirms that there is but 
one God, and that the three persons, as persons, are not three 
beings or three Gods. Does the doctrine then, exclude from 
the conception of God the ordinary, necessary phenomenal 
conception of a being ? So far from it, that in asserting that 
God is one being, it includes this conception. Does the doc- 
trine then, include more in the conception of God as one be- 
ing, than is comprised in the ordinary, necessary phenomenal 
conception of a being ? But allowing this, what presumption 
does it afford against the truth of the doctrine ? What shadow 
of evidence can the mind of man discover, that the eternal, self- 
existent God should not subsist in a mode peculiar to himself, 
and quite diverse from that of creatures ? Rather, what evi- 
dence can man possess that nothing more enters into the full 
and true conception which is formed by his own infinite mind 
of himself, than is comprised in the ordinary, phenomenal, and 
very limited conception which man forms of the same being ? 
What evidence has man or can he have, that this limited phe- 
nomenal conception of his own being comprises all that is true, 
and all that God, who made him, conceives and knows to be 
true ? If there is nothing like evidence to his mind that more 
is not, in this respect, true of himself, what presumption can 
there be that more is not true of the self-existent God, even 



NO PRESUMPTION FROM EVIDENCE. 55 

that which constitutes three persons in one God ? More par- 
ticularly, is any presumption against it furnished by either rea- 
son or revelation ? !Not by reason. Reason indeed, gives 
what I have called the ordinary phenomenal conception of a 
being — the conception of one substance and one phenomenal 
nature, and of nothing more. Here obviously, is the radical 
error of those who suppose that there is some reasonable pre- 
sumption against the doctrine of the Trinity. They confidently 
but falsely assume, that because, when they have formed the 
ordinary conception of a being from phenomena merely, nothing 
more can be rationally believed to be true on this ground than 
what is included in the phenomenal conception, they are au- 
thorized to believe that nothing more is true. Whereas they 
are, by the laws of reasoning, absolutely forbidden in such a 
case to believe that nothing more is true, there being not the 
faintest shade of evidence that something more than is proved 
to be true by phenomena, is not true. What right does reason 
or logic give to any man to believe, or even to surmise, that 
his conception of the nature of any being is the exact limit and 
measure of all that is true ? 

But it may here be asked, Is not this phenomenal conception 
a true one, fully authorized and even required by reason and 
evidence, when formed of every other being but God ? and is 
there not also some presumption arising from this fact, that it 
is also a true conception of God as a being? I answer, unde- 
niably. But the question is not, whether this is a true con- 
ception of God and of every other being, nor whether there is 
not a presumption that it is a true conception, for there is the 
most decisive proof that it is ; but does this true conception 
comprise all that is true, either of God as a being, or of any 
other being as a being ? Is it said that every man knows in 
respect to himself, that he is what, in this phenomenal con- 
ception, he conceives himself to be ? and that if more entered 
into the constitution of his being than what he thus conceives 
to be true, he would know that also ? I answer, that nothing 
is plainer, than that if more pertained to his constitution as a 
being than he now conceives, he could not, if the phenomena 
of his mind being in his own consciousness exactly what they 
now are, know that any thing more pertained to it than he now 
conceives. Is it then said, that if more were true than is in- 
volved in his present conception, the phenomena of the mind 



56 THE TRINITY. 

would indicate the fact ? I answer, this is gratuitously said. 
Who can adduce the slightest evidence to show, that he who 
has made any three men, cannot, by a common substance, so 
unite them, that they shall be even more properly said to be 
one being than three beings, and yet the mental operations and 
phenomena of each be exactly in the consciousness of each, 
what they now are ? Xo such evidence can be adduced, and 
when there is no evidence there is no presumption. The erroi 
then is palpable. There is no presumption furnished by the 
phenomenal conception either of God or any being, and there- 
fore none furnished by reason, that God is not one being in 
three persons. 

Further, no presumption against the doctrine of the Trinity 
is furnished by divine revelation. The only one which can be 
supposed, must arise from the assumption, that the sacred wri- 
ters, when they speak — as they confessedly do — of God as a 
divine being, or as one divine being, mean that he is a being in 
the ordinary or usual sense of the word. On this ground if on 
any, a presumption must be supposed against his tri-personality. 

On this topic it is easy for the mind to mislead itself by in- 
definite conceptions and language. Different views of the 
manner in which the sacred writers use language may be en- 
tertained, any one of which may seem to authorize the pre- 
sumption concerning which we now inquire. Some of these 
different views I propose to examine. 

It may be said then, that the sacred writers in all cases 
when they speak of God, mean that he is a being in the usual 
sense of the word, and that this fact, considered in itself, fur- 
nishes a presumption that they do not speak of him as a being 
in any further meaning. It is readily admitted, and fully be- 
lieved, that whenever they speak of God, they mean that he is 
a being in at least the full, ordinary, or usual meaning of the 
word. But this, considered simply in itself, by no means 
proves that they do not, at the same time and in all cases, 
conceive of and use the word being in more than its ordinary 
import. That it may be wammtably said that they do not use 
the language in a more extended meaning, there must be evi- 
dence that they do not; for it is supposable that there should 
be evidence to the contrary, and if it exists, then there is no 
evidence, or presiimption even, that they do not use the lan- 
guage in a further meaning than its usual one. If it does not, 



NONE FEOM THE SCEIPTUKES. 57 

then the evidence that they mean that God is a being in the 
ordinary use of the word, is all the evidence in the case. Bnt 
this is simply evidence that they mean to say that God is a 
being in nothing more nor less than the usual meaning of the 
word. Indeed, without a revelation, asserting or evincing in 
some way the fact that God is not a being in a further than 
the ordinary meaning of the word, the sacred writers could 
have no warrant to mean that he is not, because they could 
have no evidence that he is not. The utter want of evidence 
of the fact is not the slightest proof against it. It is not so in 
respect to any supposed fact, except when evidence of the fact 
exists with it. But it will not be pretended that, if God as a 
being is something more than is involved in the usual meaning 
of the word, he would certainly furnish evidence of the fact. 
That the sacred writers then, according to the present sup- 
position, speak of God as a being, in at least the usual meaning 
of the word, does not furnish the slightest presumption that 
they do not, in every such instance, conceive and speak, and 
intend to be understood as speaking of him as a being in a 
further than the ordinary sense, even as one being in three 
persons. To illustrate by an example : should one affirm that 
God is a being, or one being, in a case in which nothing more 
can be known or reasonably conjectured concerning his par- 
ticular opinion, his assertion ought to be understood to mean 
that God is a being in the usual sense of the word, and nothing 
more. This is all that the language, thus considered in itself 
merely, can be justly said to express. In this meaning how- 
ever, it furnishes not the slightest evidence that the conception 
of the speaker concerning the being of God, is that of the 
Unitarian, nor that of the Trinitarian, nor that it is the particu- 
lar conception of either. If now we suppose the speaker, in 
connection with the supposed assertion, to be known as a 
Unitarian, then he is justly understood to mean, not only that 
God is a being in the ordinary sense of the word, but also that 
he is not a being in any further meaning, or at least in that 
which the Trinitarian maintains. On the other hand, if the 
speaker is known as a Trinitarian, then he is justly understood 
to mean that God is a being not only in the full, usual sense, 
but in a still further meaning of the word. Until some evi- 
dence besides the supposed assertion be adduced, that the 
speaker means to say that God is not a being in any further 

So 



58 THE TRINITY. 

than the usual acceptation of the word, there can be no war- 
rant for asserting that he does mean to say this. It is to assert 
that to be true of which there is no evidence, and when it is as 
likely to be false as to be true, there being no evidence or pre- 
sumption either way. Let the Unitarian and all others see, in 
this view, the palpable injustice which would be done to the 
supposed speaker, were he a Trinitarian, by this interpretation 
of his language, and be sure to avoid the same injustice toward 
the sacred writers. 

Again : it may be said that the sacred writers, by the lan- 
guage which they use in some cases, clearly mean that God is 
a being in the usual meaning of the word, without giving in 
those cases the least supposable intimation that he is a being 
in any extended meaning; and that hence a presumption 
arises, that they in no case speak of him as a being in any 
such. For the sake of the argument let it be admitted that, in 
those earlier periods of divine revelation, when the great design 
was to deny and subvert polytheism, that the sacred writers 
spoke of God as a being, or as one being only in the ordinary 
use of the language, and without giving the least intimation 
that he is a being in any further meaning. But if this be ad- 
mitted, it furnishes no presumption against a further use of the 
same language, sustained by abundant proof, in some subse- 
quent revelation. God, in his wisdom and goodness, has given 
to this world a progressive revelation. It is quite supposable 
therefore, that the only authorized conception of God in the 
time of Abraham and of Moses, was more limited than in the 
time of the later prophets, and in the time of the latter than in 
the time of Christ and of his apostles. If this were so, the 
word God, as denoting the Divine Being, would acquire a 
further or more extended meaning as the conception and 
knowledge of him should be extended. This is unavoidably 
true of all words in analogous cases. The time was when gold 
was not known to be soluble in aqua regia, nor common air to 
be heavy. Subsequent to such knowledge, and as its necessary 
consequence, these words acquired a further meaning than 
what they had before. In like manner, it is altogether credible, 
that when the time arrived to unfold in its full and final form 
the great work of this world's redemption, God should more 
fully reveal than before that grand peculiarity of the mode of 
his subsistence, on which this work, in its provisions for de- 



OBJECTION CONSIDERED. 59 

liverance from the penalty and power of sin, is supposed by 
some to depend. And, on this supposition, what possible pre- 
sumption could arise from speaking of God as a being, or as 
any being, only in the usual meaning of the word, during the 
pefiod of a less perfect revelation, against conceiving and 
speaking of him in a further meaning of the language, under a 
fuller revelation, and with further knowledge of the mode of 
his subsistence ? What possible presumption could be created 
by speaking of God as a being in the usual meaning of the 
word, that nothing more was or could be true of him than what 
is involved in this limited conception ? "Who that knows how 
to estimate evidence, will say that a subsequent revelation of a 
further meaning had to encounter the least presumption against 
its truth, or that God could not announce a certain degree of 
truth concerning himself, and subsequently announce more, 
without, by the latter annunciation, contradicting a belief which 
he had before authorized, and even required. The mere sup- 
position that God, for highly important ends, might in his later 
revelations increase the knowledge of his mode of subsistence, 
precludes every presumption against the fact, arising from the 
prior limitation of such knowledge. 

Is it then affirmed, that the sacred writers when they speak 
of God, mean in all cases that he is a being in the usual sense 
of the word, without deciding or intimating either that he is, 
or that he is not, a being in any that is more extended ; and 
that hence a presumption arises, that God is not a being in any 
further meaning than the usual one ? This view of the language 
of the sacred writers presents the strongest case in regard to 
the question under consideration, which can be supposed with 
any plausibility. There can however, be no pretense that they 
have by any logical definition, or by any philosophical explana- 
tion, in respect to his substance and properties, or essence and 
attributes, shut off all further conception of him as a being 
than what is included in the usual meaning of the word. For 
any distinct, accurately defined, philosophic import of their 
language on this subject, we shall look in vain to their writings. 
The most that can be pretended is, that they speak of God as 
a being, or as one being, in the usual sense of the word, with- 
out deciding or intimating that more is true, or that more is 
not true. Let it then be supposed, that such is the manner in 
which the sacred writers in all cases speak of God. On this 



60 THE TRINITY. 

supposition, I readily admit that nothing more than what is 
included in this ordinary conception of a being can be proved 
from the Scriptures to be true of God ; and that of course no 
one can be authorized to believe or assert that more is true ; 
or that God is one being in three persons. But it is equally 
obvious that there is in this case no evidence nor presumption 
that nothing more is true of God than what is comprised in the 
merely ordinary phenomenal conception of a being. There is 
a palpable difference between no evidence, or the utter want of 
evidence that a thing is, and evidence that it is not. "Who 
then that pretends to reason can say, that the utter want of 
evidence that God, as a being, is any thing more than is com- 
prised in the usual meaning of the word, is evidence even of 
the lowest kind, that he is not any thing more, even one being 
in three persons ? Admitting the utmost that can be supposed 
with the least plausibility, in respect to the language of reve- 
lation concerning God, there is not from this source the slight- 
est presumption against the doctrine of the Trinity. 

But another thing is here to be said. To assume what is 
now supposed in respect to the language of revelation, is, in the 
present stage of inquiry, wholly gratuitous and forbidden by 
the laws of fair reasoning. No one can be authorized to 
assume that the sacred writers always speak of God in merely 
the usual ^neaning of the word being, until the question be first 
decided on independent grounds, whether they do not con- 
ceive and speak of Him in a more extended meaning of the 
word, even as one being in three persons. To assume that this 
is not so, until the contrary is shown to be true on its own in- 
dependent grounds of argument, is to beg a main question in 
debate. It is to assume that the doctrine of the Trinity is not 
revealed in the Scriptures, and that of course there is no suffi- 
cient warrant to believe it. He who asserts that the Scriptures 
do not reveal this doctrine, is bound to prove it. Does he say 
no man can prove a negative proposition ? If so, then he is 
forbidden to assert that it is a true proposition. Besides, if 
there is no evidence from the Scriptures that the doctrine is 
true, then we are bound simply not to believe, or forbidden to 
believe, that it is' true. But this is not being bound to believe 
that it is not true. Besides, the question here is not whether 
the Scriptures do or do not reveal God as one being in three 
persons; but it is whether there is any presumption — any low 



PEESUMPTION FROM UNITY OF GOD. 61 

degree of evidence from the Scriptures, that God is not one 
being in three persons, prior to the inquiry whether there is or 
is not full proof 'from the Scriptures that he is such a being. 
Without then, assuming what cannot be done without gross 
unfairness in the argument, that the Scriptures always speak of 
God as a being in merely the usual sense of the word, the only 
fact in the Scriptures which can be supposed to furnish a pre- 
sumption against the tri-personality of God is, that they speak 
of him in some instances in the usual sense of the word being ; 
a fact quite consistent with their speaking of him in other in- 
stances as a being in a further meaning, even as one God in 
three persons. The only supposable fact in the case cannot 
therefore furnish the least evidence or presumption that God is 
not such a being, nor that the Scriptures do not speak of him 
as such. 

From what has now been said, it follows that there is no pre- 
sumption^ either from reason or revelation, that God is not a 
being in a more extended than the usual meaning of the word, 
even in any which involves no contradiction, and therefore that 
he is not one being in three persons. So far from there being 
any such presumption, the supposition of it must result solely 
from falsely assuming, that when there is not a particle of evi- 
dence either that a thing is or that it is not, there is evidence 
that it is not in the fact that there is no evidence that it is. 

The Unitarian, supposing him as I now do, to abandon the 
charge of self-contradiction as involved in the doctrine of the 
Trinity, would, as I have said, probably consider the presump- 
tion against it arising from what he calls the Unity of God, so 
violent as to authorize the most confident belief that the doc- 
trine is not true. I say probably / for who does not know that 
the Unitarians constantly deny the true reading and Orthodox 
interpretation of Trinitarian texts chiefly, and often solely on 
the ground of what they call the Unity of God ? I suppose this 
fact will be admitted, at least to a great extent ; and if it be 
so, I ask how is it possible that a Unitarian persuades himself 
that there is such a strong presumption from the Unity of God 
against the doctrine of the Trinity? I admit indeed, that the 
simple fact that God is a being in the ordinary meaning of the 
word, furnishes no evidence nor the least presumption that he 
is one being in three persons. But how does this simple fact 
furnish, in the view of the Unitarian, the strong presumption 



62 THE TRINITY. 

that God as a being is not something more, even one being in 
three persons ? Evidence or proof both from reason and rev- 
elation merely to the simple fact that God is one being in the 
usual meaning of the word, is evidence or proof of the simple 
fact, and of nothing more. How then, can the Unitarian re- 
gard it as evidence that God is not a being, or one being in 
three persons ? How is this possible, except that he falsely 
assumes that the utter want of evidence which requires us not 
to helieve that a thing is, is equivalent to evidence which re- 
quires us to believe that the thing is not? Plainly, it is by this 
error in estimating evidence that he finds this strong presump- 
tion against the doctrine of the Trinity. Hence, with the false- 
hood of the doctrine confidently settled and assumed before- 
hand, he o^oes without one miso-ivino: to the work of amending 
and interpreting the sacred text. What a basis is this for a 
Christian's faith ! — that the uMer want of all evidence from the 
Unity of God for the tri-personality of God, is decisive proof 
that God is not tri-personal ! 

If the Unitarian denies that this most unwarrantable assump- 
tion is the first and main premise of his best argument for the 
falsehood of the doctrine of the Trinity, then I ask him either 
to admit that no presumption against it arises from the doc- 
trine of the divine Unity, or to show how such a one can arise 
from this doctrine, except it depend on the specified assump- 
tion. Dislodged, as I have a right to assume that he is, from 
his position that the doctrine of the Trinity is self-contradic- 
tory, if he admits that there is no presumption against its truth 
arising from the divine Unity, then he must admit that the 
doctrine of one God who is tri-personal, is as credible as the 
doctrine of one God who is not tri-personal. With this admis- 
sion, with what success will he oppose the doctrine of the 
Trinity, or assail the scriptural arguments alleged in its sup- 
port ? If, on the other hand, he still maintains that this strong 
presumption from the divine Unity exists against the doctrine 
of the Trinity, then I repeat the challenge, and call on him to 
show how this presumption can arise, except from the mon- 
strous assumption, that the utter want of evidence from the 
divine Unity that God is tri-personal, is decisive evidence that 
he is not tri-personal. 

I have dwelt longer on this topic than the mere exigency of 
the argument requires, because it is difficult in many cases to 



INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD. 63 

hold the mind to the precise point at issue. In such cases 
there is a great want of reflection, resulting in indefinite and 
confused or rather vacillating ideas of the subject, by which 
the mind at most attains only a cloudy conception of something 
very like a Trinity of persons, and very nearly as incredible. 
To secure the mind from this vague and necessarily false mode 
of conceiving of this momentous subject, by giving precision to 
the conception of one God in three persons, by directing atten- 
tion steadily to the import of the terms employed in stating the 
doctrine, and particularly by an examination of every plausi- 
ble ground of a presumption against the truth of it, I have 
attempted to show that no such ground does or can exist, and 
that any and all such must depend on the false assumption, 
that the utter want of evidence from the divine Unity that God 
is tri-personal, is proof that he is not tri-personal ; or, in the 
form of a general principle, that the utter want of evidence that 
a thing is, is proof that it is not, which is a palpable absurdity. 
There was a time when man was ignorant that the loadstone 
had the power of attraction, and another and later time when 
there was no knowledge of its attribute of polarity ; but who 
will say that this want of evidence of these properties of the 
loadstone was evidence that it did not possess them ? It is ob- 
vious that, on the principle of the Unitarian, our knowledge of 
God, supposing it to be limited and inadequate at one time, 
could never be extended or enlarged, even by a revelation 
from himself. 

I only add, that it were enough to say that such are the 
greatness and incomprehensibleness of God, as to remove every 
presumption that he is not a being in a more extended sense 
than the usual meaning of the word, — -a being in a mode of sub- 
sistence quite diverse from that of any of his creatures, — even 
one being in three persons. For who that asks what God is as 
a being, — who that in the attitude of this inquiry ventures to 
look up to such greatness and glory, — shall be incredulous in 
respect to any discovery which such a being can make of him- 
self by his own revelation ? Who that comes to the living ' 
oracles or consults his own reason, and so finds that the God of 
eternity is one being, shall hence decide or even presume that 
he is not one being in that peculiarly sublime and august mode 
of subsistence which qualifies him, in each of three distinct 
divine and personal forms of action, to express his whole Deity ? 



64 THE TRINITY. 

I now proceed to show — 

II. That there is a presumption for the truth of the doctrine, 
that God is one oeing in three persons. 

The facts from which this presumption is supposed to arise, 
may be summarily comprised in these : — that God is adminis- 
tering a perfect Moral Government over men under an econ- 
omy of grace, with the design to reform, to pardon and reward 
sinful beings ; that the accomplishment of this design renders 
necessary the two great provisions of an adequate Atonement 
for sin and an adequate reclaiming influence from its power ; 
and that the mode of divine subsistence in the Trinity fur 
nishes the most, if not the only satisfactory explanation of the 
adequacy of these provisions, which by the human mind is 
conceivable. With these things in view, it is now maintained 
that a presumption arises that the doctrine of the Trinity is 
true. 

It is difficult however, to present to the apprehension of 
many minds the reality and intrinsic force of this presumption. 
The Moral Government of God over this world, as a part of 
natural theology, has been but imperfectly unfolded, or rather 
I may say, in its nature and fundamental principles, has 
scarcely been made a subject of investigation. Hence compar- 
atively few minds, even among those which in many respects 
are well versed in theology, have formed any adequate views 
of the facts from which arises a presumption for the truth of 
the doctrine of a triune God, while by others, and especially 
by our Unitarian opponents, these facts, at least so far a§ they 
are supposed to furnish the presumption now maintained, are 
altogether denied. It is difficult therefore, not to say impossi- 
ble, without a prolonged and labored discussion of the nature 
of God's Moral Government and of the principles of its admin- 
istration under a system of grace — and thus turning aside too 
far from our present main design — to exhibit to the apprehen- 
sion of many, especially of Unitarians, the grounds of the pre- 
sumption which is now maintained. All therefore which I 
now propose, is a brief recapitulation of some facts and princi- 
ples which I have already attempted to establish, respecting 
God's Moral Government over men. I shall also confine myself 
chiefly to showing a presumption for the distinct divine per- 
sonality of the Son. 

That we may better appreciate the kind of evidence which, it 



ILLUSTRATION FROM PLAN OF GOD. 65 

is claimed, exists in the present case, let us look at some exam- 
ples in which it presents itself in a more familiar aspect. 

Suppose then, that one who has long and in vain employed 
his invention on the construction of a watch, abandons the at- 
tempt in despair, being thwarted in his design by an utter ina- 
bility to devise any expedient by which to adjust the relations 
of the spring and the balance-wheel. Suppose now, that he is 
informed that another has devised an expedient by which the 
difficulty which he encountered is surmounted, and has actually 
produced a watch of the most perfect structure. He naturally 
inquires how the difficulty, which appeared to him wholly in- 
surmountable, had been overcome. His informant, without 
being able to answer the iuquiry in respect to the method ac- 
tually adopted, merely describes one which had been suggested 
to him by the maker of the watch, as a possible method which 
would be fully adequate to the purpose. This possible and 
perfect method of attaining the object carries with it its own 
evidence to the mind of the inquirer, and he no sooner appre- 
hends its adaptation and adequacy to the end, than he regards 
it as affording a strong presumption that it is the very expe- 
dient by which the successful watchmaker has given perfection 
to the watch. 

The same thing might be illustrated in cases innumerable. 
The principle is, that when we know another has accomplished 
an object or end, then, so far as we have evidence that there is 
one and only one expedient or means by which that object or 
end could be accomplished, so far we conclude, or at least, as 
the case may be, presume, that he adopted that expedient or 
means. 

But is this principle as applicable to the doings of God as to 
the doings of men ? Let us see. Suppose then, that one were 
well assured that God has given a revelation to this world, who 
as yet has never seen the Bible and knows nothing of its con- 
tents. Suppose now, he accidentally opens a book, and with- 
out a suspicion that it claims to be a revelation, reads the law 
promulged, the moral precepts inculcated, and the plan of 
divine mercy unfolded in the book which we call the Bible ; 
that he closes the book and never sees it again nor learns any 
thing more of its contents ; — could he now reflect on what he 
had read, and especially, with a knowledge of the end to be 
attained by a divine revelation, could he reflect on what he 
5 



Oo THE TKINITY. 

had read in its adaptation to accomplish that end, without re- 
garding it as affording a strong presumption that this is the 
book which contains God's revelation to man ? Let us take 
another example. It has often been said that there is a strong 
presumption, arising from the regularity of nature's laws, 
against miracles, — even a presumption too strong to be ever- 
come by testimony to their reality. Kow let it be admitted 
that there is this presumption against a miracle, when alleged 
as a simple insulated fact, without any connection with or rela- 
tion to any other fact worthy of such divine interposition. But 
how is it when the miracle is alleged as the seal of God's tes- 
timony, — God's own proof of his own revelation given to a lost 
world to accomplish his chief design toward it, the design of 
his mercy ? And especially how is it, when that system of 
truth, claiming to be his revelation, is once understood — the 
necessity of it to the end for which it is given, seen and ad- 
mitted, and the obstacles to its reception on the part of those 
to whom it is given, duly appreciated ? Does not all depend 
on its having, and being received as having, God's authority ? 
Is there then, the shadow of a presumption, that God would 
not work miracles in attestation of the divine origin of such a 
system of truth? Surely, here is an object worthy of God's 
miraculous interposition. Miracles are his own peculiar signa- 
ture, and seal, — a manifestation of himself which cannot be mis- 
taken. Miracles, so far as the human mind can conceive, are 
alone fitted to accomplish the end for which they are alleged 
to be wrought. Nor can any mind understand and appreciate 
the end to be accomplished by miracles, their adaptation to 
the end, and, so far as the human mind can see, their necessity 
for its accomplishment, without admitting that every presump- 
tion against the miracles of Christianity is removed, and that a 
strong presumption is furnished of their reality. 

In like manner, assuming the fact that Christ has made a 
complete Atonement for sin, it is now maintained, that, as on 
the supposition of his divine personality, and on this supposition 
only, his Atonement is seen, and can be seen, in its complete 
adaptation and adequacy to its end, a presumption arises, that 
he is a divine person in the Godhead. By this I do not mean 
to imply that the human mind would ever, of itself, have 
originated the conception of the distinct divine personality of 
Christ ; but I mean to say, that with this conception in the 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 67 

mind, be its origin what it may, and with the fact of an Atone- 
ment admitted, a complete adaptation and adequacy in the 
Atonement to its end is seen, which, without this conception, 
cannot be seen by the human mind, and that hence arises a 
presumption of the truth of this conception. To explain still 
further. Assuming the fact, and the necessity of an Atonement 
to the forgiveness of sin under the Moral Government of God, 
the human mind, once possessed of adequate views of this ne- 
cessity, or of the obstacles to be surmounted that sin may be 
forgiven, finds itself utterly unable to devise or even to conjec- 
ture, under the light of nature, or without a revelation, any 
expedient adequate to this great exigency. How shall sinful 
man he just with God, is not only one of the most momentous 
of all problems, but one of the most intractable to all solution 
by the human mind. Man might know the fact of an Atone- 
ment, he might have full assurance of its adequacy as a ground 
of forgiveness, from the divine declaration, and still have no 
conception of its adequacy to this end, from any knowledge of 
the nature of the provision. I do not say that human confi- 
dence could not rest in the divine declaration of its adequacy. 
But I say that human confidence, — the confidence of a guilty 
mind, of a guilty world, in its sweetest repose, its richest joy, 
and intensest gratitude, — can find its perfect basis only when 
the full and godlike adequacy of the provision is unfolded in 
the nature of the provision. The Atonement of Christianity, to 
be seen in its perfect adequacy to its end, must also be seen in 
its perfect adaptation to its end. My object then, is to show, 
that as the adaptation of this Atonement, so its adequacy can 
be most satisfactorily seen only in view of the divine personal- 
ity of Him by whom it was made ; and hence to infer a pre- 
sumption that he is a divine person in the Godhead. 

I claim then to have shown, that God is administering a 
perfect Moral Government over men, as the best means of 
the best end, or as a system of influence which is dictated 
and demanded by infinite goodness ; that in this high and 
august relation of the Moral Governor of creatures formed 
in his own image, he is under the necessity of establishing his 
authority or right to reign, in the view of his subjects, by de- 
cisive proof; that he cannot do this without proving his moral 
perfection or benevolence ; that he cannot prove his benevo- 
lence, and so establish his authority, by any thing which he 



68 THE TRINITY. 

can do in his other relations, nor by any thing which he can 
do in this relation, without annexing to his law a penalty which 
shall express or manifest the highest disapprobation of disobe- 
dience which he can feel toward any object which can come 
into competition with it as an object of disapprobation ; that he 
must inflict, in the form of penalty, the highest degree of nat- 
ural evil on every transgressor, since otherwise he could not 
show higher disapprobation of his disobedience than of this 
degree of suffering ; and that in case of transgression, he must 
either execute this penalty on the transgressor, as the manifes- 
tation of his highest disapprobation of his disobedience, or 
make an equivalent manifestation of his disapprobation by an- 
other measure or expedient — that of an Atonement. 

In maintaining these principles, I claim to have shown, that 
if any thing is proved by moral reasoning, it is that God as 
a benevolent being, must feel, and must show himself to feel, 
a supreme abhorrence or hatred of sin, which in its true nature 
tends to the destruction of all happiness, and the production of 
all misery in God and his sentient creation. A more monstrous 
incongruity cannot be conceived, than that of a perfectly be- 
nevolent God, who does not feel this supreme hatred of sin, 
and who does not evince to his moral creation by what he 
does, the reality of this feeling. ISTot to feel thus, is to be, and not 
to show that he feels thus, is to show himself to be, a being of 
unqualified selfishness, even of infinite malignity. Indeed, 
form what views we may of God's government over this world 
and other worlds, one thing is most indubitable. If he would 
receive the homage, the love, the submission, the confidence, 
the gratitude of his moral creation, he must evince to them his 
goodness, and thus to evince his goodness, he must do it in the 
form of supreme, immutable, everlasting abhorrence of sin, the 
worst of evils. Not to do this, is to manifest indifference to that 
action on the part of his creatures, which is, in its true nature 
and tendency, the only and the sure means of the highest mis- 
ery of all. Not to do this, is to show himself indifferent to the 
weal and woe, the life and death, of his own creation, — a being 
having no rectitude of principle ; and who, for aught that ap- 
pears, will sacrifice to self-will, to favoritism, to caprice, to 
selfishness in some form, every interest of every creature, — a 
being whose character can excite no love, awaken no hope, in- 
spire no confidence ; whose heart is untouched by pity, un- 



ABHORRENCE OF SIN MANIFESTED. 60 

moved by woe, — a being, the bare thought of whom is enough 
to till the soul with consternation and dismay. Such is the 
God — let sentimentalism think and say what it will of his good- 
ness — such is the God, and such he proves himself to be, who 
does not feel, and show himself to feel, a supreme abhorrence 
of sin, compared with any possible evil that can come into 
competition with it as an object of his practical abhorrence. 

ISTow this manifestation of his supreme abhorrence of sin can 
be made only in one of two ways : either by inflicting on every 
transgressor of law that degree of suffering which shall mani- 
fest or prove it, and thus prove his benevolence, and thus sus- 
tain his authority or right to reign ; or, by an Atonement, that 
is, by some expedient which shall make an equal manifestation, 
or furnish an equally decisive proof of this abhorrence of sin. 

The question then now to be examined, is, whether a 
manifestation or proof of God's supreme abhorrence of sin, 
equivalent to that which would be furnished by the infliction 
of the legal penalty on every transgressor, can be satisfactorily 
seen to be furnished by the Atonement of Christ, except in 
view of his divine personality ? 

In giving a negative answer to this question, let me not be 
understood to assert on d priori ground, that the divinity of 
Christ was absolutely necessary to an adequate Atonement for 
sin. What was possible or impossible with God in the nature 
of things, on such a subject, I pretend not to decide. If how- 
ever, the fact of his divinity be revealed, it would seem alto- 
gether unreasonable to doubt its necessity to the perfection of 
his Atonement. Why should the second person of the Trinity 
become incarnate, and the great end of his incarnation be the 
redemption of a lost world by making an Atonement for sin, 
unless his divinity and incarnation were necessary to his mak- 
ing an Atonement ? Indeed, who shall say, that had God not 
subsisted in the Trinity, the redemption of sinful beings would 
not have been impossible, and that therefore this world would 
not have been created ? Whether however, these things are 
so or not, is not now the question. The question now is, whether 
the most satisfactory view — or the only satisfactory view — to 
the human mind, of the Atonement of Christ, in its adaptation 
and adequacy to its end, does not depend on viewing him as a 
divine person in the Godhead ? 

The end of an Atonement under the perfect Moral Govern- 



TO THE TRINITY. 

ment of God, is to furnish the same decisive proof of God's 
supreme abhorrence of sin as the transgression of law, and in 
this way, decisive proof of his justice as a lawgiver or Moral 
Governor, that is, of his benevolence in the form of a supreme 
regard for his law and authority, as the necessary means of 
the highest happiness of his moral kingdom, which he would 
furnish by the infliction of the legal penalty on a revolted 
world. 

Assuming that an Atonement includes the infliction of suffer- 
ing on an innocent or perfectly holy being, some minds find it 
difficult to conceive how it can express or prove displeasure 
for the sin of transgressors, and so manifest the justice and up- 
hold the authority of a lawgiver. It involves rather, in their 
view, violence to every principle of equity and every senti- 
ment of benevolence. They see — what is indeed, very obvi- 
ous — that it cannot express on the part of the benevolent being 
who inflicts it, displeasure toward the innocent and holy suf- 
ferer. He is not merely faultless, but the object of unmingled 
complacency and love to him who inflicts the suffering. Xo 
fiction of law, no scheme of imputing or transferring the sins 
of the guilty to one who knew no sin, can transfer the abhor- 
rence of infinite benevolence for the guilty perpetrators of sin 
to the immaculate victim. The motive to the infliction surely 
is not furnished by his character. The gross injustice, as well 
as the revolting absurdities of every such scheme, are too obvi- 
ous and have been too often exposed, to require present consid- 
eration. How then can benevolence inflict suffering at all on 
one who is perfectly holy ? and how, if inflicted on him, can 
it manifest or prove abhorrence of the sin of the guilty, and 
thus prove the justice and sustain the authority of the law- 
giver ? 

In answering the first of these questions — how can benevo- 
lence inflict suffering at all on a perfectly holy being — I re- 
mark, in homely but sententious phrase, that circumstances 
alter cases. When the design of the supposed infliction is to 
prevent an immeasurable amount of suffering which must 
otherwise be endured, and to secure an immeasurable amount 
of happiness which must otherwise be lost ; when this end can 
be attained by the supposed expedient, without sacrificing or 
impairing any necessary means of the highest conceivable hap- 
piness of the universe ; and when the suffering is inflicted with 



PUNISHMENT PROVES HATRED OF SIX. 71 

the conseat of the sufferer, then perfect benevolence can and 
will inflict the suffering. 

But it is also asked, how can suffering, inflicted on a per- 
fectly holy being, prove abhorrence of the sin of the guilty, 
and thus prove the benevolence in the form of justice, and sus- 
tain the authority of the lawgiver, even as decisively as would 
the execution of the penalty ?* To give a satisfactory answer 
to this question, we must in the first place see how the execu- 
tion of the legal penalty on transgressors proves the justice and 
thus sustains the authority of the lawgiver. This it does, as a 
full and decisive expression of his supreme abhorrence of trans- 
gression. The act of transgression not onlv tends directly in 
its own nature as action, to destroy all happiness and to produce 
unqualified misery, but utterly to subvert the authority of the 
Moral Governor. It is a direct, unequivocal, and decisive 
declaration or testimony, that the Moral Governor is unworthy 
of submission or obedience ; and as such, if uncounteracted by 
opposing proof, establishes the fact, and thus as effectually 
subverts his authority or right to reign, as were he driven, an 
insulted and degraded exile, from his throne. The Moral Gov- 
ernor therefore, as a perfectly benevolent being, has reason to 
be more displeased with transgression than with the complete 
and endless misery of the transgressor. — and now, to prove his 
benevolence and show that he is worthy to reio-n. is under the 
necessity of expressing the degree of displeasure for transgres- 
sion which as a benevolent being he must feel. Hence when 
transgression occurs, averse, as a perfectly benevolent being 
must be, to the infliction of such suffering, considered simply 
as suffering, the alternative is either to acquiesce in the un- 
counteracted contempt of the transgressor, and in the decisive 
proof furnished by the act of transgression that he does not ab- 
hor transgression as a benevolent being must abhor it, and thus 
forfeit his character for justice, that is, for benevolence, in the 
form of supreme regard for his law and for his kingdom, and 
of course his authority or right to reign ; or he must inflict the 
full penalty of the law on every transgressor, and thus incur 
this immense evil, revolting as it is to his infinite benevolence, 
rather than permit unpunished transgression to disprove his 
supreme abhorrence of the evil of sin, and so disprove his be- 

° Tide West on Atonement, chap. 7. 



72 THE TRINITY. 

nevolence, his justice, and his authority or right to reign. 
There is no other way conceivable, in which, in the single rela- 
tion of a lawgiver or Moral Governor, he can rescue his charac- 
ter, his law, his authority, his throne, from beneath the feet of 
rebellion. Immense as the evil is, and revolting as it must be 
to the heart of infinite benevolence to inflict it, it is made ne- 
cessary for sin. The evil of inflicting the penalty must he in- 
curred, or the means — the only means — of the great ends which 
infinite benevolence has proposed to accomplish, with these 
ends themselves, must be sacrificed and lost. By incurring 
such an evil, in the form of penalty, these means are safe ; his 
character, his law, his authority, his throne, are established for- 
ever, and the great end of his eternal dominion is secured, in 
the highest perfection in which it can be by his infinite attri- 
butes. 

Thus when transgression has occurred under the perfect 
Moral Government of God, it is only by incurring an immense 
evil, that a still greater, far greater evil, can be prevented, and 
the great ends of infinite benevolence be accomplished, in the 
highest perfection possible to him who reigns over all. Now 
if there be another evil than the execution of the legal pen- 
alty, by incurring which the Moral Governor can manifest or 
prove an equal abhorrence of sin, and show the reality and 
sincerity of his determination to punish it as a lawgiver; or 
more particularly, if by inflicting limited suffering on some 
perfectly holy being, with his consent, and for the purpose of 
exempting transgressors from the threatened penalty and of 
showing the degree of evil which he would incur as a lawgiver 
rather than exempt them from the penalty, he can manifest or 
prove his supreme abhorrence of sin, and thus prove his justice 
or supreme regard for his law, and thus his perfect benevo- 
lence, and thus his authority or right to reign, as decisively and 
impressively as by the execution of the penalty, — then can an 
Atonement for sin be made ; for then one great end to be an- 
swered by inflicting the penalty can be answered by another 
expedient. But how it may be asked, can the supposed inflic- 
tion of evil on a holy being prove the lawgiver's abhorrence of 
the sin of transgressors, even in the lowest degree \ This is a 
vital question. God then cannot, as we have seen, either feel 
or manifest the slightest displeasure toward a being so pure 
and holy, either on account of his character, or. by imputing 



HOW THIS ABHORRENCE IS EXPRESSED. 73 

or transferring to him the guilt of transgressors, or by consid- 
ering him as guilty when he is not, or by his standing in their 
law-place, or for any other conceivable reason. Indeed, the 
magnitude of the evil incurred on the part of God in the in- 
fliction, must be measured by the degree of his love to the holy 
sufferer. Nor can God inflict evil on such a being without some 
benevolent design dictating and demanding the infliction ; nor 
with such a design, without the strong and intense aversion 
which infinite benevolence must feel to the infliction of evil on 
the object of its highest complacency and love. How then 
can the infliction of evil on a holy being, manifest or prove 
the lawgiver's abhorrence of the sin of transgressors ? I an- 
swer, that it does so by being set forth as the criterion and meas- 
ure of this abhorrence. 

The infliction of the penalty on the transgressors answers the 
same purpose, by sustaining the same relations or characteris- 
tics. It is presented to God's moral kingdom, not as a specta- 
cle of malice or selfish revenge, but as an expression of his 
benevolence to his kingdom, as being the criterion and meas- 
ure of his benevolence, and therefore just abhorrence of sin. 
Whether the evil be inflicted in the form of penalty on trans- 
gressors, or in the form of an Atonement on a holy being, it is 
done to prevent other and greater evils which would other- 
wise follow the transgression of law, — the evil of God's not 
manifesting or proving his benevolent and supreme abhorrence 
of transgression, — and with this, the evils of subverting his 
rightful authority and defeating the ends of his infinite benevo- 
lence. The evil inflicted in either form is designed as the 
known criterion and measure of his abhorrence of sin, to make 
manifest and evince beyond all denial or doubt the degree of 
his abhorrence. This is done by incurring — and can be done 
in no other conceivable way than by incurring — an immense 
evil to himself as a benevolent being. By inflicting the full 
penalty of his law on a world of transgressors, he would incur 
an immense evil to himself. By inflicting the supposed evil 
on a perfectly holy being, he also incurs an immense evil to 
himself. In either case the immense evil to himself is the 
measure of his abhorrence of the evil inflicted, and therefore 
the true criterion and measure of his abhorrence of that which 
is the cause of the necessity of his incurring such an evil. Sin, 
the transgression of law, is this cause. Sin cannot occur under 

4 



74 THE TRINITY. 

the perfect Moral Government of God, and God as a Moral 
Governor, not be under an imperious, immutable necessity of 
incurring an immense evil to himself, for the purpose of show- 
ing the degreee of his abhorrence of sin. By incurring evil to 
himself in the form of inflicting the legal penalty on transgres- 
sors, as the criterion and measure of his abhorrence of sin on 
account of which it is inflicted, he would show himself as much 
displeased with sin as he is and must be as a perfectly benevo- 
lent being. In like manner, when for the purpose of exempt- 
ing transgressors from the legal penalty, he incurs another im- 
mense evil to himself on account of sin and as the known cri- 
terion and measure of his abhorrence of sin, — the immense evil 
to him of inflicting intense though limited suffering on a per- 
fectly holy being, and which, according to the supposition, is 
an evil to himself equivalent to that involved in the infliction 
of the legal penalty on transgressors, — he shows himself to be 
as much displeased with sin as he is and must be as a benevo- 
lent being — and of course as much displeased with sin as he 
would show himself to be by inflicting the legal penalty on 
transgressors. 

Thus it is obvious hoio it is that God, by inflicting suffering 
on some perfectly holy being, may manifest or prove his ab- 
horrence of the sin of transgressors, viz., by setting forth or 
holding wp to his moral kingdom this immense evil to himself \ 
as the criterion and mea&wre of this abhorrence. 

I may add in the way of inquiry, what other reason than 
that now supposed, can be assigned why God should incur such 
an immense evil as that of inflicting intense suffering and death 
on a perfectly holy being \ What other end can be assigned 
for such an infliction than that now supposed, which would 
even authorize such an infliction '? Aside from this peculiar 
end to be attained, it would involve, so far as the human 
mind can conceive, the most flagrant violation of the truth, 
the justice, and the benevolence of God, as a Moral Gov- 
ernor, toward an obedient subject of his law, — one who has 
an inviolable right to unmingled and perfect happiness from 
his king, — a right which, in any other case than the present, he 
cannot be supposed to relinquish, nor his king to violate. Did 
Christ die as a martyr ? There is not the slightest intimation 
of the fact, — while the perfection of God's Moral Government 
has never been and never will be marred by the martyrdom of 



CONDITION OF MANIFESTING LOYE. To 

a perfectly obedient subject of his law. Did he suffer and die 
to manifest God's love and kindness to the erring and lost 
creatures of his power, — lost only by remaining sinful, — and 
thus to bring upon them this mighty influence to reclaim, and 
in this manner to save ? But if there was no just, and there- 
fore necessary exposure on their part to the penalty of law, — 
exposure with deliverance made absolutely hopeless by the de- 
mands of God's inexorable justice, — where were the love and 
kindness of God to men in inflicting suffering and death on his 
beloved Son ? "What interest, or benefit, or good on their part, 
could be the object of God's supposed love to them, manifested 
by this means ? Their reformation ? But the infliction of suf- 
fering and death on a perfectly holy being, for no other pur- 
pose or end except to reform sinful beings, were in the highest 
degree preposterous. It is easy to see how, on the principle 
that the goodness of God leadeth to repentance, that this inflic- 
tion of sufferings and death on a perfectly holy being for the 
redemption of sinful beings from the penalty of sin, should pos- 
sess a reclaiming influence ; but viewed in any other light, 
how can it possess the least possible reclaiming influence or 
tendency 1 This point demands our careful consideration. 
^Those there are who place the whole efficacy of the infliction 
of the sufferings and death of Christ in its reforming influence 
or tendency to reclaim men to duty. Can this be so ? If the 
infliction has any tendency to reclaim sinful beings, it must have 
it as its own inherent tendency, that is, as a direct tendency of the 
nature of the act, or it must have it as an indirect tendency arising 
from it as an act of goodness to sinful beings, designed for their 
benefit, either in delivering them from the legal penalty or in 
some other respect. Has it then any such inherent tendency, 
any direct tendency in its own nature to reclaim sinful beings ? 
The conception is impossible. !N~o human mind can conceive 
of the least inherent direct tendency to reclaim sinful beings, 
in the simple naked act of putting to death a perfectly holy 
being. So far from it, that the act considered simply in itself 
or aside from its relations to other ends, can be viewed only 
as an act of palpable injustice and cruelty, fitted to dishonor 
its author, and to increase the alienation and disloyalty of every 
rebel. Is it still said that Christ died as a martyr — we reply, 
that on this supposition, his death could only confirm his sin- 
cerity and devotion to his work as a reformer by his doctrines ; 



76 



THE TRINITY. 



bo that at most the tendency of his death to reclaim would still 
be indirect, as so much evidence or proof of his earnest desire 
for their reformation, by the means he had employed for this 
purpose. But further : we say that Christ did not die as a 
martyr. The facts and principles of God's Moral Government 
over this world have settled this point — that none but sinners 
have died or shall die as martyrs. Christ's death too was, in 
every important and every essential respect, unlike that of a 
martyr. Xot only was he forsaken of God and abandoned to 
the terrors of death without alleviation, while other and sinful 
martyrs have died in triumph, but he died without the alterna- 
tive of escaping death by the renunciation of his doctrine — an 
alternative without which no man can die as a martyr, since 
his death can furnish no testimony of his sincerity. Since then 
the death of Christ could possess no inherent direct tendency 
to reclaim sinful men, and no indirect tendency to reclaim 
them as the death of a martyr, it could have no tendency to 
this end at all, except an indirect tendency as an act of good- 
ness to sinful beings. But how or in what respect could it be 
an act of goodness to sinful beings, except as an act designed 
for their benefit in delivering them from the penalty of the 
law? I ask then why, for any other possible reason than that 
now supposed, should a benevolent God incur such an evil as 
that of inflicting intense suffering and death on a perfectly 
holy being ? Such an evil, great as it is, he can be supposed 
to incur in the case under consideration, for the sake of making 
the necessary manifestation of his supreme abhorrence of sin, 
in providing redemption from its penalty. When sin exists, 
God must manifest supreme disapprobation of it, either by 
incurring the evil of inflicting the penalty, or by incurring an 
equivalent evil if the penalty be remitted. By incurring the 
latter for the remission of the penalty, he shows that, were it 
necessary to the full manifestation of his abhorrence of sin to 
incur the evil of inflicting the penalty, he would inflict it and 
incur the evil ; for he incurs an equivalent evil to himself in 
providing for exemption from the penalty, and thus manifests 
the same degree of abhorrence for sin which he would manifest 
by inflicting the penalty on transgressors. 

I have thus attempted to show how suffering inflicted on a 
perfectly holy being may express displeasure for the sin of 
transgressors, and that such suffering, by furnishing an equally 



THE DIGNITY OF THE SUFFEKEB. 77 

decisive manifestation or proof of God's supreme abhorrence of 
sin as would be furnished by the execution of the legal penalty 
on transgressors themselves, would be an adequate Atonement 
for sin under God's perfect Moral Government, inasmuch as it 
would as fully manifest his justice or benevolent regard for his 
law, and thus as fully sustain his authority or right to reign. 

I now recur to our present leading inquiry — whether a mani- 
festation or proof of God's supreme abhorrence of sin, equivalent 
to that which would be furnished by the infliction of the legal 
penalty on every transgressor, can be satisfactorily seen to be 
furnished by the Atonement of Christ, except in view of his 
divine personality ? 

Here, that we may justly make the comparative estimate 
which is now to be formed, it is important to advert distinctly 
to the following considerations : First, that if Christ was not 
divine, he was merely a man, or at least merely a creature. 
Secondly, that his humiliation, sufferings, and death, in which, 
viewed as a comprehensive evil, his Atonement consisted, was 
an evil of short duration. Thirdly, that this comprehensive 
evil is not to be viewed as simply so much evil suffered by 
him who endured it, but also as an evil incurred especially 
by him who inflicted it on such a sufferer. Fourthly, that 
while it is not supposed that the second person of the God- 
head as such suffered, much less died, such was the pecu- 
liar and intimate union between the second person of the 
Godhead and the man Christ Jesus, that the magnitude of the 
evil is to be estimated by this fact, and as immeasurably en- 
hanced by it. 

With these things in view I proceed to say, that the temporary 
sufferings of one who is merely a creature, however intense 
these sufferings, and however exalted in rank the creature who 
endures them, and still less, that any sufferings or evil endured 
by a mere man, should furnish the requisite manifestation and 
proof of God's supreme abhorrence of sin, cannot be conceived. 
Suffering or evil inflicted by the will, and virtually by the 
hand of a lawgiver on an obedient subject, that the transgres- 
sion of another or of others might be pardoned, would doubt- 
less express a greater or less degree of displeasure toward the 
transgressor or transgressors, according to the excellence and 
dignity of the sufferer, and as he should be the object of a 
greater or less degree of affection on the part of the lawgiver. 



78 THE TEINITY. 

Now the present exigency requires in one form, a manifesta- 
tion or proof of displeasure toward sin, equal in degree to that 
displeasure toward sin which would be manifested in 'another 
form. Accordingly, if we suppose an Atonement for an offend- 
ing world to be made by the sufferings of a mere creature, and 
especially by his sufferings for a few hours, or even years, the ex- 
pression or proof of the degree of God's displeasure toward sin 
compared with that which would be expressed by the un- 
qualified and endless misery of our guilty race, is too faint 
and insignificant to be seen or felt to be at all adequate to 
the end to be accomplished by an Atonement. The mind de- 
cides at once without hesitation or doubt, that the degree of 
displeasure expressed and proved in one of these forms is as 
nothing compared with what is expressed and proved in the 
other. The temporary sufferings of the supposed victim fur- 
nish no manifestation or proof of that degree of displeasure 
toward sin on the part of the lawgiver, which would in- 
flict the full penalty of God's violated law on a revolted 
world. No mind could rest in the entire sufficiency of such a 
manifestation to the end, which must be accomplished by an 
adequate Atonement. None could receive from it the same 
impression of God's goodness in its necessary abhorrence of sin, 
and of himself as the determined friend, patron, and benefactor 
of his moral creation through the medium of his perfect Moral 
Government, and therefore the determined and righteous 
avenger of sin, as would be derived from the full execution of 
the penalty of his law on all transgressors, or even on one. 
On the contrary, were the supposed sufferings of a mere crea- 
ture to be presented and received as the criterion and measure 
of God's abhorrence of sin, they would show that he did not 
feel as a benevolent being must feel, and as a Moral Govern- 
or must show himself to feel toward sin, and thus disprove his 
moral perfection or goodness, and thus subvert his right to 
reign ; or rather, they would prove his selfishness, and so reveal 
his malignity to his kingdom, and render him only an object of 
terror and dismay. There is therefore all the presumption, or 
rather all the proof against the fact of an Atonement made by 
the temporary sufferings of a mere creature, which there is of 
God's goodness or moral perfection, and that he is administer- 
ing a perfect Moral Government over men under an economy 
of grace. It is obvious then, that on the supposition that 



SUPPOSE CHRIST A DIYINE PERSON". 79 

Christ was merely a creature, the adequacy of his humiliation, 
sufferings, and death, to the end of an Atonement for sin under 
God's perfect Moral Government, cannot be conceived by the 
human mind. So far from it, that such an evil incurred on the 
part of God, as the criterion and measure of his abhorrence of 
sin, would, at most, decisively show that low estimate of sin as 
an evil which none but a selfish being can form, and which, 
by utterly subverting his authority, would defeat the great and 
only end of an Atonement. 

Let us now contemplate the Atonement of Christ on the sup- 
position of his divine personality. Here our object is, not to 
assume or assert his divine personality, but merely to propound 
it as an hypothesis, or as a possible truth, and thus to present 
the Logos or second person of the Godhead as incarnate, or the 
human and divine natures of Christ united in one complex 
whole, as a fact on which depends the only satisfactory con- 
ception of the nature of his Atonement as adequate to its end. 

Here then, on the present supposition, we have presented to 
human apprehension an object of thought altogether peculiar, 
and to which none other in the universe can be likened, — an 
object still, on the just conception of which, just and adequate 
views of the subject under consideration depend. "Who then, 
or what, according to the present hypothesis, is Christ the Son 
of the living God, the Redeemer, Saviour of this lost world ? 
I answer, that he is a man — a perfect man. He has a human 
body, and a human soul; he knew no sin, but is holy, unde- 
filed, and separate from sinners. He is more ; he is the Logos, 
who was in the beginning, who was with God, and was God. 
He is the second person in the Godhead, distinguished as such 
from the first and third persons, the Father and the Holy 
Ghost. Each person as a being is properly called Gocl. Each 
is distinguished from the other by the personal pronouns. To 
each are ascribed divine attributes, divine works, and divine 
worship. Here is indeed a use of language which involves a 
plain departure from all prior usage of terms employed ; but 
which, supposing the reality of the object, is authorized and 
required by the peculiar nature of the subject, and the laws of 
usage in such cases. 

Further : according to the present hypothesis, the man Christ 
Jesus and the Logos, or second person of the Trinity, are one, 
by a most intimate and mysterious union. We speak in the 



80 THE TRINITY. 

ordinary use of language, of the oneness of two or more, in 
relation to certain results, purposes, or ends, which depend on 
or arise out of it ; and we conceive of the intimacy of the 
union as greater or less in degree, as the results which depend 
on it approximate in a greater or less degree to those of the ab- 
solute oneness of an individual being, or of one self-subsisting 
being — one determinate reality, having his own strict personal 
identity. Thus we speak and conceive of partners in trade as 
one, of friends as one, of husband and wife as one — even as one 
flesh ; of Christ and the Church as one — even as one body ; and 
of a human soul and a human body even as one man.* Every 
one knows how, in such cases, our conceptions and our language 
are modified and changed, as divinity or oneness is the object 
of thought ; and especially when the latter is the more promi- 
nent or even exclusive object of thought, how the inferior in 
our conception is exalted and honored by the superior, and the 
superior lowered or degraded by the inferior, and this in pro- 
portion to the intrinsic difference between them. For exam- 
ple, every one knows how in his own necessary conception 
and feelings, a human body, compared with the body of an 
animal, is exalted by its union with a human soul — a spirit 
bearing God's image. Yet the matter and the spirit which 
constitute the man or human being, are distinct substances ; 
nor can we say that they constitute one being by virtue of a 
union in one of the same substance. The intimacy of the union 
is such, be the mode of it what it may, as to authorize, for all 
practical purposes, the full conception of the body and the soul 
as the man — one being ; and to exalt our conception of a living, 
active human body when before us as a visible object, to the 
conception of a being bearing the image of his Maker. How 
much more exalted, in our necessary conceptions and feelings, 
would be a man whose very being was appointed and fixed 
permanent and immortal, in the closest union conceivable in 
the nature of things, with the most exalted spirit whom Om- 
nipotence could create ; and how much more still were that 
spirit, in all his attributes known to be divine, and the complex 
whole to be presented to us as a veritable object of contempla- 
tion and knowledge. Who could stand in his presence and 
not adore ? 

® Demoniacal Possession. 



UNION OF TWO NATURES. 81 

!N"ow of the mode of the supposed union between the human 
and divine natures in Christ, we pretend to form no direct, pos- 
itive conception, but to conceive of it only relatively, or in its 
relations. We say then, that according to the present suppo- 
sition, the man Christ Jesus and the Logos, or second person of 
the Trinity, are united by a most intimate yet mysterious mode 
of union, — so united, not indeed as to become or constitute 
strictly one being or person, in the ordinary import of these 
terms, but as to render it proper and true to speak of the whole 
as a being or person, in a modified and peculiar meaning, be- 
cause it is the best form of speaking of the object of the con- 
ception which common language furnishes when common lan- 
guage must be employed for the purpose of speaking of him as 
he is, — so united, that by virtue of the union, so intimate and 
peculiar, the complex whole, in respect to all true, just, practical 
conceptions of him, of his relations to the Father, of the Father's 
supreme, intensest love for him, of his vjork as mediator between 
God and men, and especially of his humiliation, sufferings, and 
death, that is, of his sacrifice for sin, is all that he would be, as 
one self subsisting being, one determinate reality, having his own 
strict personal identity. In accordance with this view of the 
union of the divine and human natures in Christ, we further 
say, that according to the present supposition they are so united 
as to render it proper to affirm, in a modified, and in a most 
momentous and august import of the language, the Logos was 
made flesh and dwelt among us ; that being in the form of 
God, he took on him the form of a servant, was made in the 
likeness of men, and found in fashion as a man ; so united, that 
the complex whole is properly and truly called under the 
necessary modification of the terms, either the man Christ Je- 
sus, or God manifest in the flesh, — a descendant of Israel, or 
God over all, blessed forever ; so united, that all essential hu- 
man attributes, as well as all divine phenomenal attributes, are 
properly and truly ascribed to him ; that he is truly and prop- 
erly said to be born of a woman, to increase in wisdom, not to 
know the day of judgment, and also to know all things, and to 
be the creator of all things ; that he is truly and properly spo- 
ken of as the devout and humble worshiper of God, and him- 
self the object of the same worship which is rendered to Him 
who sitteth on the throne, as made under and as obedient to 
the law, and also as the Lord and Lawgiver, Sovereign, and 
6 4* 



82 THE TRINITY. 

Judge of all ; so united, that the human nature of this complex 
whole has all the dignity, excellence, worth, value, which such 
a nature can derive from the most intimate possible union with 
the divine — an exaltation and worth by this peculiar union, 
not less than would result, were that possible, from a strict 
consubstantial union with the second person of the Godhead ; 
so united, that the human nature serves not the less but the 
more in respect to manifestation and impression, by presenting 
the divine nature through the benignant design of the union, 
in the brightest splendors of its glory ; so united, that while 
the divine nature is necessarily prominent to thought, the hu- 
man nature qualifying for the suffering and death demanded 
by redemption, serves to call forth immeasurably higher affec- 
tion on the part of the Father for the Son, than his own perfect 
benevolence can feel toward the guilty world to be redeemed, 
or toward any and every other object of affection ; an object 
which, when revealed in heaven, awoke a song of joy from an- 
gels and archangels unheard and unthought of in that world 
before, and which will be the theme of every song in the eter- 
nal temple, while the glory of God doth lighten it, and while 
the Lamb is the light thereof. Such is the being — for so we 
must speak of him, if we use human language to say what he 
is — by whose humiliation, sufferings, and death, this world's 
Atonement has been made. 

Shall we here be told, that after all, reason, philosophy de- 
cides that it is but a man — a creature — who suffers and dies ; 
and that the amount of the evil is far inferior to the infliction 
of the penalty on every transgressor ? This is readily admitted, 
at least for the sake of the argument. Without affirming or 
denying on the question whether the divine nature of Christ 
suffered, and maintaining only its extreme and unspeakable 
humiliation, we admit that it was but a man who suffered and 
died. But his sufferings were the most intense, his death the 
most ignominious and dreadful. His sufferings were not merely 
corporeal. To say nothing of the insult, the scorn, the reviling, 
the malignant cruelties he received, he endured the most in- 
tense mental anguish. In the garden of Gethsemane his soul 
was exceeding sorrowful, even unto death. Martyrs, who de- 
served only God's displeasure, through abundant mercy died 
in the triumphs of faith and with the foretaste of heaven ; while 
this holy man — the object of perfect complacency to eternal 



DID THE DIVINE NATURE SUFFER? 83 

love — died utterly forsaken of his God. His death, though 
simply considered, it consisted of the separation of a human 
body and human soul, yet how was it attended by every cause 
and circumstance of agony, — how it stands forth signalized by 
the miracles of God, in its nature and design, among all the 
events of earth and time ! Jesus died. The vail of the temple 
was rent, and the Holy of Holies uncovered. The graves were 
opened, the dead were raised to life, the sun was darkened. 
Jesus died, and the God of Christianity is revealed. Jesus 
died, and on that death depend redemption — all that is great 
and good to a lost world — grace, mercy, peace, life, salvation 
with eternal glory — the most stupendous manifestation of the 
Deity — the brightest glories of Gocl, the deliverance of guilty 
myriads from hell triumphing in heaven's purity and heaven's 
joys ! That death, that blood — the price of all — ^is memorial- 
ized of God on earth while time shall last, and made the theme 
of praise to Him that sitteth on the throne and to the Lamb 
while immortality endures. We admit that it was a man who 
died. But is this the whole truth ? Is it not, in more adequate 
language, a divine man ? Is it not the great miracle of omnip- 
otent mercy — Divinity humanized to suffer, humanity deified 
to redeem ? "We suppose this, meaning, not that the Logos 
and the man became strictly identified as one being ; not that 
the Divine Nature, as such, suffered ; but that such was the 
peculiar union between the two natures, that there is no au- 
thorized use of language which so adequately expresses the true 
conception, as to say the Lord of glory was crucified, or that 
He who was equal with God became obedient unto death. In 
this sense, the sufferings and death of the man Christ Jesus 
have, in the true conception of them, all the magnitude and 
moment in respect to our redemption, which would pertain to 
the sufferings and death of the second person in the Godhead, 
had it been possible for him to suffer and to die. This is what 
we suppose. And now whose philosophy shall deny it ?* Whose 
philosophy shall tell us the precise nature of the union between 
the man Christ Jesus and the divine Logos ? Whose philoso- 
phy shall tell us how remote this supposed union of the human 



« Nor is this, in words and in the strictest construction, further from philo- 
sophic accuracy or truth, than to say that a man dies, intending his body and not 
his soul. 



84 THE TRINITY. 

and divine natures is from a strict identity of substance and of 
being ? "Whose philosophy shall measure and determine the 
exaltation and worth which can be given to a human soul, by 
such a union with the second person in the Godhead, as shall 
approximate the nearest possible point of identity in oneness 
of being ? Whose philosophy shall decide that any forms of 
language can adequately express the former, except those 
which in common life would imply the latter, and that even 
those, instead of raising our conceptions above the reality, do 
not necessarily leave them below it ?* We admit that the tem- 
porary sufferings and the cruel death of this holy man were 
not, as so much evil in itself, equal in amount to that involved 
in the infliction of the penalty of sin on a world of transgress- 
ors ? Had they been, they had not been endured ; for nothing, 
in respect to the diminution of evil or the increase of good to 
the universe, would have been gained. The question here is 
not, whether the amount of evil, as such, in the one case is equal 
to that in the other. It is, whether the evil incurred by the 
Moral Governor for the purpose of showing his displeasure for 
sin, of manifesting his justice and benevolence to his kingdom, 
and thus sustaining his authority or right to reign, is not equal 
to what he would have incurred for the same purpose by in- 
flicting the penalty. And we ask again, whose philosophy 
shall decide that the sufferings and death of the man, exalted, 
and excellent, and worthy as he may be in the Divine estima- 
tion by the supposed union with the second person of the God- 
head, — beloved and delighted in with the intensest affections of 
Divine benevolence, — may not be as great an evil to that benevo- 
lence, and be truly regarded by it with as much benevolent ab- 
horrence, as would be the same evil, were the two natures con- 
ceived as constituting one being, or as would be the evil of 
inflicting the legal penalty on a revolted world ? Whose philos- 
ophy shall measure the evil to infinite benevolence of inflict- 
ing such suffering as Christ endured, on so spotless, so perfect, so 
exalted, so holy a being % Aside from the consent of the suf- 
ferer, every principle of law, of justice, of truth and goodness, 
had been violated — the empire of righteousness forever sub- 



* Leo the Great says, ' ' that the effusion of the blood of Christ was so rich in 
price, that had a universe of captives believed in their Redeemer, no devil could 
have retained his chains.' ' 



THE SUFFERER A DIVINE MAN. 85 

verted. Whose philosophy shall decide that the evil incurred 
by divine benevolence in the sufferings and death of Christ, is 
not as great an evil in the estimation of that benevolence, as 
would have been the infliction of the legal penalty on this sin- 
ful world ? We say it is not for human reason to resolve such 
an inquiry in the negative, by assumptions of what is impossi- 
ble in the nature of things like these. We fall back then on 
our supposition, and affirm that there is no pretense, on the 
authority of reason or philosophy, to assert that the union be- 
tween the divine and human natures of Christ is any thing less, 
in the mode of it, or in its relations and actual results, than we 
have now supposed it to be. While the supposed union would 
require us to admit a distinction of the two natures, and au- 
thorize, in some cases, a corresponding use of language, still it 
would involve an intimacy of connection between them in 
what, if it be called any thing, or distinguished as one thing, 
in the use of common terms, must be called a being or a per- 
son, — an intimacy of connection which authorizes the same 
forms of language, though in a somewhat modified sense, which 
the strictest identity of substance and being would authorize. 
Nor would this use of language, — as when it is said that he who 
is equal with God takes the form of a servant, and becomes 
obedient unto death, — raise too exalted a conception, and in 
this respect, a false one, of him who dies. What the inter- 
preter of the language is required to do in such a case, is 
to avoid on the one hand, confounding the two natures, and 
to admit on the other, an intimacy of union between them 
which can be nothing less in all its supposed relations — es- 
pecially in relation to the work of our redemption — than would 
be true were the two natures united as one being in one sub- 
stance. 

Language employed to denote the divine and human natures 
united, would necessitate in every mind that should contem- 
plate the object, an engrossing conception and impression of 
the divine nature of Him who suffers and dies. He would 
not unnaturally be called divine man, or God-man, or by 
other phraseology which would present the magnitude of the 
sacrifice made for sin. On the present supposition, should 
we read that the Lord of glory was crucified, we should be 
obliged to conceive that something more than a mere creature 
had died. Or should we read of the Church of God (I know 



86 THE TRINITY. 

this is a disputed text) which he purchased with his owu blood, 
we should feel constrained to admit that the ransom involved, 
so far as it could in the nature of things involve, Divinity as 
well as humanity in the sacrifice. Or should we read in the 
fuller and more precise form of didactic statement, that 
" Christ Jesus, being in the form of God, thought it not rob- 
bery to be equal with God ; but made himself of no reputation, 
and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the 
likeness of men, and being found in fashion as a man, he hum- 
bled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death 
of the cross," we should hear the voice which saith, " Awake, 

sword, against the man that is my fellow ;" — we should look 
on Him "who is the brightness of the Father's glory and the 
express image of his person," as he bows his head, gives up the 
ghost, and exclaims, " It is finished !" and we should feel that 
there is nothing great besides. 

Now we do not say that these views are scriptural — we do 
not allege that they are any thing more than the fictions of the 
imagination — we present them as a mere hypothesis concerning 
the nature of an Atonement for the sins of a lost world, in view 
of which the adequacy of an Atonement can be satisfactorily 
conceived by the human mind. 

We have seen how entirely inadequate must be any tem- 
porary sufferings of a mere creature to the end of an Atonement 
under the perfect Moral Government of God. But contemplate 
as we may the greatness of the exigency arising from the ob- 
stacles to the pardon of sin, — and who can unduly magnify 
these obstacles and the exigency which they create under 
God's Moral Government — a government which ought to be, 
and will be upheld in all its stability and perfection, though 
rebellious worlds sink forever under his severest displeasure ; — 

1 say contemplate as we may the greatness of the exigency, 
yet the more we consider the greatness of the sacrifice which 
according to the present supposition has been made to meet it, 
the more we ponder the evil incurred by the eternal Father in 
not sparing his own Son, his well-beloved, his only-begotten 
Son — the worthiest object of his supreme love — and in deliver- 
ing him up for us all — the evil incurred by the Son in emptying 
himself of equal divine glory, in assuming humanity, and dying 
on the cross, — the more the equivalency of this evil to that of 
inflicting the legal penalty will appear, the more the perfect 



THE PROBLEM SOLVED. 87 

adequacy of the former to the end of an Atonement will possess 
the mind, and the more the fitness of such an Atonement will 
be seen to impart unfaltering repose to the trust and confidence 
of the guilty world for whom it is made. Let the inquiry be 
put in any form ; — let it be asked how a perfect God, feeling 
that supreme abhorrence of sin which he must feel, and with 
the intensity of infinite beneyolence, becoming, as he must be- 
come, a sin-ayenging God, can ever regard with forgiving 
mercy, complacent love, and rewarding kindness, the trans- 
gressions of his law, — how can a manifestation of an equal ab- 
horrence of sin be made to that which would be given by 
turning a revolted world into hell ? How can God show an 
equal regard for his law, his authority, his throne of moral 
dominion, as he would, by sacrificing for their preservation 
the rebellious hosts of earth in the consuming fire of his indig- 
nation ; how can the holiness of God, who is of purer eves than 
to behold iniquity, in its recoiling and withering abhorrence of 
sin, be displayed ; how can the truth of God, which is as the 
great mountains, be vindicated; how can the justice of God, 
that column of royal majesty, be upheld, and yet the guilty, 
with the defied penalties of sin averted, be received to favor ? 
Here all is mystery — utter darkness to the human intellect. 
Before this great problem, presented in any form, the mind of 
man retires battled — confounded. Xo answer can be given — 
none be conceived. Christianity in its Orthodox interpretation, 
alone gives the solution. Christianity thus interpreted, reveals 
a triune God, and shows the throne of God upheld by the man 
that is his fellow, and a guilty world redeemed. 

Thus is the great crisis met. Law is magnified and made hon- 
orable. The pillars of eternal justice stand unshaken, and the 
splendor of its throne is untarnished, while mercy lavishes all its 
riches on a guilty world. Thus we see the most impressive 
spectacle, the highest achievement of infinite goodness and 
grace, the fullest expression of God in the Atonement of Christ. 
Xo similar event can we suppose has occurred on the theater 
of the universe, or will ever again occur in a coming eternity. 
It has formed a new epoch in the moral administration of the 
Deity, and given birth to a new order of things throughout his 
moral creation. It stands amid the lapse of ages and the waste 
of worlds, a solitary monument, " to the intent, that now unto 
principalities and powers in heavenly places might be made 



88 THE TRINITY. 

known by the Church the manifold wisdom of God." — Yide 
Kobert Hall's Works, vol. i. p. 265. 

Christianity thus interpreted solves the problem which God 
alone can solve. On the most momentous inquiry to a lost 
world — how can man be just with God ? — it removes all rational 
doubt, satisfies all rational inquiry, and gives all rational as- 
surance. The vilest, the guiltiest, even a guilty world, can rest 
and be at peace, in view of the sacrifice of Calvary. 

"We say then, that if there be an adequate Atonement for sin 
(and this our present argument assumes), then the Atonement of 
Orthodox Christianity is the only Atonement whose adequacy 
can be satisfactorily conceived by the human mind. It is this 
Atonement, and this only, which, in view of its nature, can still 
the agitations of guilt, and bring relief to the laboring heart of 
man. I do not here affirm what indeed I fully believe, that 
in its nature and perfection it bears the impress of God as its 
author. But I ask, can man, reasoning from his necessities as 
a sinner against God, and admitting the fact of an Atonement 
for sin, deny the Atonement of Orthodox Christianity ? Can he 
fail to see, in the perfect adaptation and adequacy of such an 
Atonement to its end, a strong presumption that it is the verita- 
ble Atonement which God has provided, and an equally strong 
presumption of the divine personality of Him who hath re- 
deemed us to God by his blood ! 



THE TRINITY. 



IV.— THE MANNER IN WHICH LANGUAGE IS USED IN THE SCRIPTURES 
RESPECTING THE MODE OF THE DIVINE SUBSISTENCE AND THE PER- 
SON OF CHRIST. 

Language of the Scriptures peculiar or self-contradictory. — The result of Unitarian and Trinitarian 
attempts to explain it. — The sacred writers give no indications of embarrassment. — Natural in- 
ference. — Positions stated. — (I.) Important to decide whether the language is peculiar. — Opinion 
of the Infidel. — Is the peculiarity unauthorized? — The first thing to be decided — before the question 
of inspiration.— Is the peculiarity authorized and proper? — If so,it should be settled beforehand. 
— Argued (1.) from known importance in analogous cases ; (2.) from results of overlooking this ; 
(3.) from the ease of ascertaining it.— (II.) The language of the Scriptures is marked by some 
peculiarity. — The contrary unsupported by evidence. — Primary and secondary import of terms. — 
Positive proof decisive.— The common meaning involves absurdity. — An uncommon and peculiar 
import gives a consistent and important meaning. 

It must be confessed, that the language of the Scriptures re- 
specting the mode of the divine subsistence and the person of 
Christ, is either replete with self-contradiction, or characterized 
by some authorized peculiarity. That the scriptural writers 
should teach so unequivocally as they do, that there is but one 
God, and yet employ such language concerning the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and that this language is to be 
interpreted in its literal, common import, cannot be supposed 
consistently with their divine authority. Hence Infidels with 
one consent, assuming that this language is in no respect pecu- 
liar on account of any necessity required by the subject, pro- 
nounce it self-contradictory, and utterly subversive of the claim 
of the writers to divine inspiration.* 

It is in these circumstances that the defenders of divine reve- 
lation — both Trinitarians and Unitarians — are shut up to the 
necessity either of admitting the self-contradictions of the sacred 
writers, or of vindicating them from the charge, on the ground 
of some authorized peculiarity in their language, and on 



e What sort of impostors, it may be asked, were those who invented and ut- 
tered such a palpable absurdity as the Infidel pretends, and yet expected the 
world to receive the known falsehood as truth taught by divine inspiration? 



90 THE TRINITY. 

this, the methods of this vindication adopted by both Trini- 
tarians and Unitarians, though widely different, may be said 
wholly to depend. The words now referred to are those of or- 
dinary use, and have a primary or common and literal import. 
How, for example, can the word God and the word man, as 
they are applied to Christ, — how can the words Father, Son, and 
Holy Ghost, as they are used in the baptismal formula, — how 
can the language concerning the Logos, in the first chapter of 
John's Gospel, — be interpreted in any of the diverse meanings 
adopted by Unitarians, without supposing some peculiar use of 
them — some modification of their common literal meaning? 

It is true, that Unitarians are not agreed among themselves 
in any one method of vindicating the language under consider- 
ation from absurdity, and in giving it what they regard as a 
consistent and authorized meaning. Every method however, 
to which they resort for the purpose specified, will be found 
on close examination, to imply some peculiarity in the use of the 
language. Thus, when the same words and forms of expression 
which are confessedly applied to the self-existent and eternal 
Being to distinguish him from all others, are also applied to 
Christ, the latter is supposed by some to teach that Christ is a 
subordinate Deity begotten of the Father, and as, under the 
self-existent God, creating, upholding, and governing the uni- 
verse ; by some, that he is a super-angelic being employed 
as an instrumental agent in the formation of the solar system, 
or at least of this world ; by others, that he is a mere man or 
other creature, possessing a delegated omnipotence or creative 
power ; by some that while he is a mere man, he is entitled on 
account of his exaltation to the right hand of the Father, to re- 
ligious worship from angels and from men ; and by some, that 
while he is a mere man, and not entitled to such worship, he 
is highly exalted above all creatures by his office as Messiah, or 
Mighty Prince, who reigns over this world, and whose domin- 
ion shall endure for many ages to come. Thus the language 
above specified, when applied to Christ, is supposed by Unita- 
rians to be modified, and to be used in a sense more or less re- 
stricted, according to the peculiar nature of the subject in the 
view of the different interpreters. In like manner, when they 
resort to personification in the use of the word Logos, and the 
phrase Holy Spirit, they suppose a use of language which, 
compared with the primary, literal meaning of the words, is 



ASSEETIONS OF THE TKINITAKIAN. 91 

peculiar on account of the nature of the subject, not to say very 
peculiar also in other respects. 

It is equally manifest, that the Trinitarian construction of the 
language under consideration, not less than the Unitarian, pro- 
ceeds on the supposition of a peculiar use of ordinary terms, 
which results from the nature of the subject. Trinitarians 
maintain, that however the language is to be interpreted, the 
Scriptures, so far as words are concerned, assert that there is 
but one God, and also, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Ghost are three divine persons, that each is God, that each 
possesses divine attributes, that each performs divine works 
and receives divine worship ; that one of these persons was in 
the be^inniuo; that he was with God and was God, that he was 
made flesh and dwelt among us, that he was in the world and 
that the world was made by him, that he was a man, that he 
increased in wisdom, that he was ignorant of the day of judg- 
ment and of the destruction of Jerusalem, that he was a de- 
scendant of Israel, that he knew all things, that he is omnipres- 
ent and omnipotent, that he is the final judge of the world, and 
God over all, blessed forever ; that he was born of a virgin in 
Bethlehem of Judea, that he was before all things, that he had 
glory with the Father before the world was, and was loved of 
the Father before the foundation of the world ; that he was 
equal with God, was made in the likeness, of men, that he be- 
came obedient unto death, that he created all things, that he 
upholds all things by the word of his power, that he rendered 
divine worship to the Father, and was himself the object of 
divine worship ; that he addressed God as his God, and was 
addressed by God himself saying, "Thy throne, O God, is for- 
ever and ever." The Trinitarian not only maintains that these 
things, so far as words are concerned, are asserted in the Scrip- 
tures, but is forward to admit that as many verbal contradic- 
tions, and that if the words be interpreted in their primary 
literal meaning, as many that are real, can be charged upon 
this use of language as the Unitarian and the Infidel are pleased 
to allege. ' 

But while all this, on the present supposition of the primary 
literal use of the language, can be done to any assignable ex- 
tent, the sacred writers themselves furnish not the slightest 
evidence that in their own view they occasion any embarrass- 
ment to their readers. The language is not characterized by 



92 THE TKIXITY. 

the authorized obscurity of enigma, of allegory, of prophetic 
annunciation, or of typical or symbolic representation. It be- 
trays no artistic plan, no dramatic or other contrivance for 
representing that to be real which is not real. It bears none 
of the peculiar marks of figurative or metaphorical language. 
Nor is it the unusual and often occult language of scientific 
refinement and analysis. It is accompanied by no logical defi- 
nitions or explanations, nor employed as needing any to render 
it intelligible, nor with an indication of a suspicion that it 
would be unintelligible or absurd in the view of its readers. 
It is the language of plain men in practical life writing or 
speaking for the instruction of plain men, — the language of com- 
mon life consisting of common words in common forms "of com- 
bination ; language, the meaning of which, in all these respects, 
is fitted to the apprehension of the most ordinary capacity ; 
language which all men know how to interpret and under- 
stand, which the writers themselves obviously expected would 
be correctly interpreted and understood, and which, as we 
hope to show, aside from all perversion, would be so inter- 
preted and understood, without exception, by all its readers. 
At the same time it is language, which if employed by men 
who could be supposed to be weak-minded, or ignorant, or be- 
side themselves and maddened by a learned fanaticism, — men 
careless and reckless in the use of it, having sinister designs 
to accomplish, and conforming to any prevalent opinions and 
prejudices of others ; or by men liable from any cause to pro- 
pound false, contradictory, and senseless propositions, and 
which, if interpreted as ordinary language in all ordinary 
cases ought to be and would be, must inevitably convict the 
writers of uttering the most palpable absurdities and nonsense. 
And yet these confused, incongruous, and inextricably per- 
plexed and perplexing forms of expression — for such they are 
when considered as ordinary forms on an ordinary subject — 
are not of such rare occurrence that they can be accounted for 
as errors of transcription, or as corruptions of the original text ; 
but they are frequent — constantly, as it were, meeting the reader 
in the Old as really as in the New Testament, in inseparable 
alliance with the substantial truths of Christianity. On the 
part of the writers there is no studied design to avoid them — 
no stopping to explain or to vindicate, to reconcile or adjust — 
and especially no solicitude to prevent misapprehension ; but 



SKETCH OF THE ARGUMENT 93 

fearless alike of all misunderstanding or distortion of their ac- 
tual meaning, either by uncandid dullness, captious criticism, 
or malignant perversion, they go on with clear, unqualified, 
unexplained statements of subject and predicate, as the exi- 
gency arising from the course of thought in each instance de- 
mands. Thus they calmly leave all to the honest simplicity of 
the reader, and to his professed submission to their divine au- 
thority, to gather from every sentence and every word the 
intended meaning, as truth coming through the proper and 
authorized forms of human language from the mouth of God 
himself. 

With these things in view it is manifestly a fundamental in- 
quiry in the present discussion, whether there is any peculiarity, 
and especially any authorized and proper peculiarity in the use 
of the language under consideration • and if so, what this pe- 
culiarity is f 

The decision of this must lie at the foundation of the greater 
question, what is truth in respect to the mode of the divine 
subsistence ; for until the former is decided, no satisfactory or 
even plausible attempt can be made to determine the princi- 
ples of interpreting the language, nor of course to ascertain its 
meaning according to these principles. On its decision depends 
nothing less than whether the language has an absurd meaning, 
or none at all, or a consistent and true one — in short, nothing 
less than whether the Scriptures are a divine revelation or not. 
A peculiar importance also pertains to this inquiry, because, as 
it seems to me, both Trinitarians and Unitarians in the contro- 
versy between them, by unwarily overlooking the question, or 
by mistaking an unauthorized and improper use of language 
for an authorized and proper one, have often adopted an in- 
sufficient and unsatisfactory mode of reasoning on the main 
question. 

I propose therefore to show — 

I. The importance of deciding the preliminary inquiry — 
whether the language under consideration is characterized by 
any peculiarity, and especially by any authorized and proper 
peculiarity in its use / and if so, what is it f 

II. Thelanguageis characterized by some peculiarity in its use. 

III. It is erroneously assumed both by Trinitarians and 
Unitarians, as characterized in its use by an unauthorized 
peculiarity. 



94 THE TRINITY. 

IV. It is characterized by a proper peculiarity in its use — 
one which is fully authorized and demanded by the nature of 
the subject, the tri-personality of one God — and by the facts 
and circumstances of the case. 

I proceed then to show — 

I. The importance of deciding the preliminary inquiry — 
whether the language under consideration is characterized by 
any peculiarity, and especially by any authorized and proper 
peculiarity in its use ; and if so, by what % 

It must then be admitted, either that there is no peculiarity 
in the use of the language as compared with the use of the 
same terms in their common literal meaning, or that if there is, 
it is either an authorized or an unauthorized peculiarity. 

The Infidel maintains that there is no peculiarity in the use 
of the language either authorized or unauthorized, but strenu- 
ously insists that the language is that of the ordinary, literal 
use of the words, that it is therefore to be interpreted strictly, 
and to the letter, and that thus interpreted, it is in its actual 
meaning contradictory and absurd, and subversive of the in- 
spiration of the writers. Nor if these premises be admitted, 
can the conclusion be denied. And yet who has shown by 
any legitimate process of reasoning, that these premises are not 
to be admitted? Here then is a preliminary question, which 
must be decided on its own independent grounds, before any 
attempt can be made to interpret the language with success. 
Until this be done, the question whether the scriptural writers 
do not abound in contradictions and absurdities in the use of 
the language, is also undecided. If it be settled in the affirma- 
tive, the charge of numerous contradictions and absurdities 
with their consequences, must be admitted ; if in the negative, 
it involves a peculiarity in the use of the language, and this 
peculiarity is either authorized or unauthorized. 

Shall we then suppose an unauthorized peculiarity? This 
renders the language incapable of any reliable interpretation, 
and all inquiry concerning its import nugatory and useless. 
On this supposition, no meaning can be authorized by any laws 
of interpretation applicable to the case, and therefore none in 
the lowest degree. Both the Trinitarian and Unitarian mean- 
ings on this supposition are wholly arbitrary and groundless, 
and equally remote from vindicating the inspiration of the 
writers. The language, being wholly without any reliable 



INSPIRATION NOT THE FIRST QUESTION. 95 

meaning, is neither less dishonorable to the writers, nor less 
useless to their readers, than contradictory and absurd. If 
then, the interpretation of the language by both Trinitarians 
and Unitarians, proceeds — as I shall have occasion to show 
hereafter — on the ground not merely of a peculiarity, as all just 
interpretation of it must, but of an unauthorized peculiarity in 
the use of the language, the consequence is, that the Infidel, 
unassailed by either party, is strong in his position respecting 
the ordinary use and consequent absurdity of the language, 
and that the truth, whether with the Trinitarian or Unitarian, 
is left undefended. The language, according to the present 
supposition, being incapable of any reliable interpretation or 
meaning, both the Trinitarian and Unitarian meanings are un- 
worthy of respect, and the inspiration of the writers must be 
abandoned. 

Every honest inquirer after truth, before he can consistently 
be either a Trinitarian or Unitarian, must decide in what 
manner the language of the Scriptures under consideration is 
employed. On the decision of this question depends that of 
another, — whether the language admits of any reliable inter- 
pretation and meaning or not. If he decides that the language 
is used in the primary, literal meaning of the words, or is 
characterized by no peculiarity in its use, the consequence, in 
view of its manifold contradictions and absurdities, is Infidelity. 
If he decides that the language is characterized in its use by 
an unauthorized and improper peculiarity, the consequence, in 
view of the language as nothing but a jargon of unmeaning 
sounds, is still Infidelity. Thus, on the supposition of either of 
these decisions, logical consistency shuts up the honest inquirer 
to the denial of the inspiration and divine authority of the 
Scriptures. It is only on the supposition that he decides that 
the language is characterized in its use by an authorized and 
proper peculiarity, and by just interpretation gives a meaning 
free from all absurdity, that he can avoid Infidelity as the true 
logical result. « 

I am aware that many suppose that the first question with 
the honest inquirer after truth is, were the writers of the book 
divinely inspired ? I readily admit that their inspiration must 
be determined before we can decide on their divine authority 
that what they say, that is, that the meaning of their language 
is true. But before we can settle the question of their inspira- 



96 THE TRINITY. 

tion we must decide some others, particularly whether they 
use language in an unauthorized and improper manner ; and if 
not, whether they use it in its primary, literal meaning, — that 
is. in a meaning which is replete with contradiction and ab- 
surdity. On the decision of these questions the proof of their 
inspiration depends, and they must therefore be settled before 
it can be known that there is not decisive evidence against 
their inspiration. The inspiration of the writers being justly 
assumed, they cannot be reasonably supposed to use language 
which, according to the laws of usage, can have no meaning. 
But how can their inspiration be justly assumed as proof that 
their language lias any actual meaning according to such laws, 
when it is presumed to be used in an unauthorized and improper 
manner, which precludes all meaning according to such laws? 
For if the language, according to the laws of usage, is mean- 
ingless on the supposition that they are not inspired, it is equally 
so on the supposition that they are. The supposition of their 
inspiration in such a case is not only wholly admissible because 
the fact is disproved, but it cannot furnish the shadow of 
evidence as to what the meaning of the writers is, or that they 
have any. I further admit, that the inspiration of the writers 
being justly assumed, they cannot be supposed to utter contra- 
diction. But how can their inspiration be justly assumed as 
the proof that they do not utter contradiction, when without 
this assumption, and according to the just laws of interpreta- 
tion, the proof is decisive that they do utter contradiction? 
When the laws of interpretation convict them of uttering ab- 
surdity, how can the supposition of their inspiration exempt 
them from the charge ? If it be said that there is as much 
evidence that the writers do not use either meaningless or con- 
tradictory language, as there is that they were inspired, and 
that this amounts to a strong presumption that they do not use 
the language in either of these modes, it may be fully admitted. 
But such & presumption cannot amount to good proof so long as 
it is or may be balanced or outweighed by opposing evidence. 
And who shall affirm the inspiration of the writers, unless it be 
first made to appear that they do not use language in a manner 
which involves them in abundant and irretrievable self-contra- 
diction ? Especially how can the Trinitarian or the Unitarian 
affirm it, while in interpreting their language, he proceeds on 
the assumption that it is used in that unauthorized and im- 



HOW THE LANGUAGE IS TO BE USED. 97 

proper maimer which necessarily deprives it of all meaning? 
If it he said that the evidence of their inspiration far outweighs 
the evidence either of an unauthorized use of the language, or 
of its absurd meaning, this, in the case as now supposed, that 
is, while the question concerning the manner of use is unde- 
cided, is more easily said than proved. 

Besides, is it credible that God should hold men responsible 
for believing the inspiration of the scriptural writers, when 
their language must either be so 'interpreted as to be replete 
with contradiction and -absurdity, or be assumed to be utterly 
incapable of any meaning according to the laws of usage ? 
Must we thus divest the language of all truth to save the infal- 
libility of the writers — destroy the revelation to preserve its 
divine authority ? Such an expedient is as vain for the pur- 
pose, as it is unworthy of the cause which it is intended to 
subserve. We must admit the reality of the language as a 
vehicle of thought according to the laws of usage, nor shrink 
from a just application of these laws in its interpretation, be 
the consequences what they may. 

It is in vain then that the Trinitarian and Unitarian appeal 
to the inspiration of the scriptural writers for the purpose of 
sustaining their respective meanings of the language under 
consideration, until the previous question concerning the man- 
ner in which the language is used, is decided on other grounds. 
That the Trinitarian and Unitarian should gratuitously assume 
that the writers were inspired, and that the one should arbitra 
rily give one meaning and the other a different one to the lan- 
guage of these writers, and thus both proceed on the gratuitous 
assumption of an unauthorized and improper use of the lan- 
guage, cannot satisfy any candid and enlightened inquirer 
after truth. 

This brings me to consider the third supposition before 
stated, viz., that the language under consideration is charac- 
terized in its use by an authorized and proper pecidiarity. If 
this be so — if the language, instead of being characterized by 
'no peculiarity, or by one which is unauthorized and improper, 
is characterized by an authorized and proper peculiarity — then 
to ascertain the fact, and the nature of this peculiarity, is of 
essential importance in this discussion. This will appear from 
the following considerations : 

(1.) From the well-known importance of ascertaining the 
7 5 



98 THE TRINITY. 

same general fact, arid the nature of it in analogous cases. 
Every competent judge knows that authorized peculiarities in 
the use of language, compared with the common, primary, 
literal use of words, are not only frequent and almost constant, 
but to a great extent necessary to the ends of speaking and 
writing. It is equally undeniable, that language thus used, 
must be as truly subject to fixed laws in its use and interpre- 
tation as any other, and that otherwise it must utterly fail of 
the end for which language is employed. Who does not know 
this to be true in respect to much of the language of prophecy, 
of allegory, and of parable — all metaphorical and figurative 
language — all which is used in a secondary sense ? These pe- 
culiar uses of language vary in different cases, and are author- 
ized and required for different reasons. Hence the knowledge 
of these reasons, and of all the material facts and circumstances 
in each particular case, is indispensable to a correct interpreta- 
tion of the language. The general nature of the subject — the 
character and condition of the writer, and of those for whom 
he writes — the more general or particular ends he has in view, 
and the means of accomplishing them which are available in 
the case, have a decisive influence in occasioning the peculiar 
use of language, and also in determining its meaning. It is 
in vain therefore, to attempt to interpret language when em- 
ployed in a peculiar manner, without regard to these consider- 
ations and the nature of the peculiarity. What is thus true in 
all cases of this kind must of course, according to the supposi- 
tion, be true of the present case. 

(2.) If the language under consideration be characterized in 
its use by a proper peculiarity, the importance of recognizing 
the fact and the nature of the peculiarity, is obvious, from the 
natural and highly probable results of overlooking these things 
in the interpretation of the language. Even supposing, what 
I would by no means deny, that the actual meaning of the lan- 
guage has to no inconsiderable extent been obtained by the 
common-sense process, or when judged of for practical pur- 
poses, still if the speculative or scientific process of critics and 
interpreters has been in any respect erroneous and inconclu- 
sive, then the actual meaning is left without a full and thor- 
ough defense, and viewed in this respect, unworthy of reli- 
ance. On any other supposition than the present — that of an 
authorized peculiarity in the use of language, if this be the 



MISTAKES OF BOTH PARTIES. 99 

true one — the results, being obtained only by some arbitrary 
assumption, would themselves be wholly arbitrary. Infidels — 
assuming that there is no peculiarity in the use of the language, 
and having no respect for the good sense and integrity of the 
writers, much less for their inspiration — would of course find 
in it only contradictory and absurd meanings. Trinitarians 
and Unitarians, maintaining the inspiration of the writers, and 
proceeding by different processes of interpretation, might claim 
to vindicate the language from absurdity. Both processes 
however, depending not on the ground of an authorized and 
proper, but on the assumption of an unauthorized and im- 
projyer peculiarity in the use of the language, would be wholly 
arbitrary, and their results alike exegeticaliy invalid. And 
further — what diversity of meanings would different individ- 
uals of these parties in the controversy be likely to obtain, so 
that it would not be strange if neither, as a party, agree more 
with itself than each should agree with the other. Interpret- 
ing the language on the assumption of an unauthorized and 
improper use, they could be guided in its interpretation by no 
established principles. The process and results must be wholly 
arbitrary, having no other warrant or even plausibility, than 
such consistency as the ingenuity of the interpreters could give 
them. I do not affirm that such have been the actual results 
of both the Trinitarian and Unitarian interpretation of the lan- 
guage under consideration, but I ask, do they not show the 
entire absence of any of those fixed principles which control 
the authorized and proper use and interpretation of language ? 
Have not a large class of interpreters, both Trinitarian and 
Unitarian, employed their ingenuity in arbitrarily obtaining a 
meaning which shall exempt the language from absurdity, ra- 
ther than in showing that it is used in a peculiar and proper 
manner, and in determining its meaning as so used, whether 
it be absurd or not? Hust not such a method greatly mar 
the defense of the meaning obtained by it, in the view of 
the enlightened inquirer after truth, and be deeply calamitous 
to the cause which it is designed to subserve ? And can it be 
rationally expected that these and other evils of interpreting 
the language, as if it were not characterized by any authorized 
peculiarity in its use, will ever be prevented, without ascertain- 
ing its nature, and being guided by it in the interpretation of 
the language ? • 



100 THE TEINITY. 

(3.) On the supposition of an authorized and proper pecul- 
iarity in the use of the language under consideration, its 
meaning may be easily and surely obtained, for language is 
subject to fixed and well-known laws of interpretation. Lan- 
guage used in the primary, literal meaning of the words, is not 
the only kind whose meaning can be determined by such laws. 
Metaphorical and figurative language — that which is used in a 
secondary sense — language turned from its primary meaning 
either by extending or restricting that meaning, and this, not 
only when it is thus turned or modified, but when the new 
meaning, as often happens, becomes by subsequent usage as 
established as the primary — in these cases and in all others, 
language, as the vehicle of thought, is subject to fixed laws of 
interpretation. Such changes are, to a vast extent, necessary 
to the existence and the ends of language, and are made ac- 
cording to certain laws or principles which control them, and 
determine their propriety ; so that however novel or singular 
they may be, if made according to these laws, they axe proper, 
being sanctioned by the laws of usage which control such 
changes. Thus a peculiar use of language becomes in many 
cases as propter a use as the common literal one ; and the mean- 
ing of a word or a sentence when employed in a peculiar 
manner, is as easily and surely determined by the laws of in- 
terpretation applicable to the case, as when words are employed 
in their primary, literal meaning. Indeed almost no important 
words, those of the exact sciences excepted, reveal in their 
actual use, their own meaning. This, in cases innumerable, 
must be determined by circumstantial considerations, which, if 
the language be properly used, will decisively show that some 
one of two or more different meanings which the mere word 
will bear, is the meaning intended. Otherwise the writer is in 
fault, and his language is unauthorized and improper. The 
cases in which a peculiar use of language occurs, by turning 
words from their primary literal meaning, are very diverse. 
The propi iety of such a change in any particular case does not 
depend on any previous use of the same words in the same 
manner. The peculiar use, if conformable to the general laws 
of change, is proper and fully authorized in the first instance, 
or in a single instance of change. Besides those cases of pecul- 
iar use which are familiar to all in what we call figurative 
language, there is another which may be called secondary. 



DIFFERENT SENSES OF WORDS. 103 

Among the important cases of this kind there are two which 
deserve notice. One is, when a word in the first instance of 
change is used figuratively as opposed to literally, and when, 
by subsequent common usage in the same application, it loses 
its figurative character by losing its primary meaning in this 
application, and becomes in this limited, but secondary mean- 
ing, a literal word. This miodit be illustrated bv such words 
as conception, perception, apprehension, stage-post, and a va- 
riety of others. Another case, and one to which we shall here- 
after call particular attention, is, when the change in meaning 
has no connection with any figurative use of the word, but de- 
pends merely on some change in our knowledge or belief, or 
rather in our conception of the subject which is modified by 
this. "Words change their meaning to correspond with our 
conceptions of things of which words are the signs. The 
words heaven and earth have, by the extension of our concep- 
tions in some respects, and the restriction of them in others, 
greatly changed their meaning since Moses wrote, " In the be- 
ginning God created the heaven and the earth." Thus all the 
peculiar uses of words are secondary. Some however, are 
strictly figurative as well as secondary. Others, though at first 
figurative, by use lose their representative character and be- 
come in their secondary use literal terms ; while others without 
being used figuratively, are employed in a secondary meaning 
as opposed to their primary, as our conceptions are modified 
by extension or restriction. Diverse however, as are the cases 
in which language is used in a peculiar manner, it is subject to 
fixed laws in respect to the use and interpretation of the words 
employed. The principles of interpreting such language are 
not, it is true, in all respects the same in all cases, much less 
are they the same as those of interpreting the same words when 
employed in their primary, literal sense. But they are the 
principles of interpreting such words when employed in the 
peculiar manner in which they are used in each particular 
instance, and as such are as familiarly known, and may be as 
successfully applied by mankind generally in each particular 
case, as other principles in any other case. Xor is this all. 
The peculiar use of language in most cases in which it is au- 
thorized and proper, and especially in those in which it results 
from a change in our conceptions of things, is the most natural, 
and for popular purposes the best. With these things in view, 



102 THE TRINITY. 

the supposed peculiarity in the use of the scriptural language 
under consideration can be no sufficient cause for surprise, 
even when the language is considered as designed to convey 
to the popular mind some peculiar truths concerning the mode 
of the divine subsistence and the person of Christ. On the 
contrary, it may be what was to be confidently expected as 
being what the peculiar nature of the subject, the circumstances 
of the case, and the ends to be accomplished, imperiously de- 
manded. Indeed it may appear, with just views of the rea- 
sons for the supposed peculiar use of language in this case, that 
such a use should not be adopted, or that any other in its stead 
should be, would be not only surprising, but incredible. !N"or 
would the supposed peculiarity in the use of the language oc- 
casion any demand for unusual skill in its interpretation ; but 
being fully authorized and made proper by the exigencies of 
the case, the meaning of the language would be as easily and 
surely obtained as that of language used in any other manner. 
What has now been said is deemed sufficient to show the 
fundamental importance of the preliminary inquiry before 
stated, viz., whether there is any peculiarity, and especially any 
authorized peculiarity in the use of scriptural language respect- 
ing the mode of the divine subsistence and the person of Christ, 
as compared with the primary literal use of the same language f 
The bare possibility of such a peculiarity is indeed sufficient to 
show how much may depend on ascertaining whether it be a 
matter of fact. It clearly appears, if I mistake not, from what 
has been said, that if the language is characterized by no pe- 
culiarity in its use, that is, if it is employed in the primary, 
literal meaning of the words, then it involves undeniable and 
manifold contradiction and absurdity ; that if there is no pecul- 
iarity in the use of the language, except one which is unauthor- 
ized, then the language is incapable of any reliable interpretation 
or meaning — any which can exempt it from utter worthless- 
ness in respect to the ends of writing and speaking ; but that 
if there is an authorized peculiarity in the use of the language, 
then its actual meaning, whether contradictory or not, can be 
ascertained, according to the principles of interpretation appli- 
cable to the case, with as much precision and certainty as the 
meaning of any other language. If we make one further sup- 
position — that the meaning thus ascertained should prove con- 
sistent — then on the decision of the preliminary inquiry before 



THE DOCTRINE IMPERFECTLY DEFENDED. 103 

stated, depends nothing less than the question, whether we have 
in the Scriptures a revelation from God or not. From the sup- 
position of no peculiarity, or of an unauthorized peculiarity, or 
of even an authorized peculiarity in the use of the language 
with an absurd meaning, it follows that we have not such a 
revelation. It is only on the supposition of an authorized pe- 
cidiarityin the use of language whose meaning is free from all 
absurdity, that we can pretend that the Scriptures are a divine 
revelation. 



Regarding the language of the Scriptures now under con- 
sideration as used in a peculiar and yet authorized manner, I 
do not propose to enter, to any extent, into what maybe called 
the merely verbal exegesis of those texts which fall within the 
range of the Trinitarian and Unitarian controversy. The im- 
portance and the necessity of this mode of investigation in this 
controversy, whatever defect in one respect may have charac- 
terized it, I do not deny or doubt. It has been however, so 
often adopted, and conducted with so much particularity, and 
in my view, with so much success so far as the defense of the 
Trinitarian exposition requires it, that I regard it as superfluous 
to engage in it minutely in the present discussion. The subject 
in controversy labors more at other points than at those in 
respect to which relief is either needed or to be expected from 
a merely exegetical inquiry guided by text and context, and 
proceeding on the assumption of the inspiration of the writers 
as exempting them from contradiction and absurdity. To what 
purpose is it that the Trinitarian shows from the grammatical 
structure and the context, that one passage after another teaches 
the doctrine of the Trinity or the divinity of the Saviour, if 
this be all? All this, in the view of his opponents, both Uni- 
tarians and Infidels, only serves, in its legitimate bearing, to 
convict the scriptural writers of multiplied contradictions. On 
this ground the Infidel, admitting the justness of the interpre- 
tation, rejects the inspiration of the writers. On the same 
ground the Unitarian, admitting the inspiration of the writers, 
rejects the interpretation. Thus both deny the truth of the 
Trinitarian doctrines ; and will deny it, until they are met with 



104: THE TRINITY. 

something more than what I call a merely verbal exegesis of 
the particular texts in controversy. Something more is plainly 
demanded ; something which shall decisively exempt these 
texts from the charge of contradiction, whether the writers were 
inspired or not ; something which shall show that their meaning, 
when ascertained by those laws and principles which are alone 
applicable to the peculiarities of the case, whether the meaning 
be true or false, is not self-contradictory or absurd. 

The history of the progress of Unitarianism in this country, 
as well as some recent limited tendencies toward it, clearly in- 
dicate the necessity, not only of explaining the doctrine of the 
Trinity, of insisting on the possibility of its truth, and of re- 
moving all presumption against its truth, but of showing how 
the peculiar language of the Scriptures is fully accounted for 
and authorized in view of the nature of the subject and the 
circumstances of the case ; on what principles such peculiar 
language ought to be interpreted ; and what, when interpreted 
on these principles, is its actual meaning. 

Having explained my own view of the doctrine of the Trin- 
ity, and having, as I claim, shown the possibility of its truth, 
and that there is no presumption against, but rather a strong 
hypothetical presumption in favor of its truth, 

I now proceed, as I proposed, to show — 

II. That the language under consideration is characterized in 
its use by some peculiarity. 

By this I mean that the language is turned from its primary 
to a secondary meaning. On this point, the question is exclu- 
sively with those who deny or do not admit the inspiration of 
the scriptural writers, but maintain that the language is char- 
acterized by no peculiarity in its use, and therefore to be in- 
terpreted as literal language in the ordinary meaning of the 
words. 

This opinion, I shall attempt to show, is not only unsupported 
by the slightest evidence, but is contrary to the most abundant 
and decisive proof of which the nature of the case admits. 

It is unsupported by the slightest evidence. A large class of 
words are so often turned from their primary to a secondary 
meaning, that the mere %ise of one of them furnishes no evi- 
dence that it is used in its primary meaning, unless there is 
also an entire want of evidence of any change. Many of the 
words of common use are oftener employed in a secondary and 



USE OF LANGUAGE PECULIAK. 105 

peculiar, than in their primary meaning, — nor is any degree of 
evidence from the mere prior use of such a word in one uni- 
form sense, decisive proof that the word, in a present instance, 
is not used in one that is new and different. This is at once 
set aside by evidence of a change in its import. Hence mere 
prior use is no evidence at all of the primary import of a word 
in a present instance, unless there is also an entire want of evi- 
dence of a change in its meaning. The prior use therefore, of 
the word God, and of the personal pronouns — and the same is 
true of other terms employed on the subject under considera- 
tion — cannot in itself be evidence of the lowest kind, that in 
the application of them in the case before us, they are not used 
in a secondary and peculiar meaning. 

Again : that these words in the case under consideration are 
characterized by no peculiarity in their use, is contrary to the 
most abundant and decisive proof of which the nature of the 
case admits. The absurdity of a primary literal meaning of 
language, though not a p>roof, amounts to a presumption of a 
secondary and peculiar meaning. Words when turned from 
their primary meaning, if interpreted in that meaning, for the 
most part result in contradiction and absurdity. At any rate, 
in view of such changes, and with no opposing evidence of 
such a change in a given case, the absurdity resulting from a 
primary literal meaning always affords a strong presumption of 
a secondary and peculiar meaning. If now we add to these 
considerations the known good sense of the writer or speaker, 
including only ordinary qualifications for using language cor- 
rectly, and if the contradictions of the ordinary and literal 
meaning are too palpable and gross to be attributed to such a 
writer or speaker, the presumption of a peculiar use of lan- 
guage is greatly increased. From this point, the proof, as the 
case may be, may be greatly increased. If it be one in which 
the writer evidently intends to be understood at the time, — and 
I speak only of such cases, — and if the language on the sup- 
position of its peculiar use when justly interpreted, gives an 
obvious, consistent, true, and important meaning, the proof of 
a peculiar use becomes absolutely decisive. And further, if, in 
addition to these things, the language, on the supposition of 
peculiar use and meaning, is not only the necessary language 
for the purpose, but the most natural and the best which could be 
employed for the purpose, then the proof of peculiar use is yet 

5- 



106 THE TRINITY. 

further augmented. And further still, if there is abundant 
proof of the divine inspiration of the writer or speaker, un- 
counteracted by the slightest evidence from any absurdity or 
contradiction in the meaning of his language, on the supposition 
of an authorized and peculiar use, then the proof of it is the 
most abundant and decisive of which the nature of the case 
admits. 

Now all this proof of the peculiar nse of language, as we 
claim, exists in the case under consideration. In the first 
place we have the palpable and superabundant contradictions 
and absurdities involved in the common meaning and use of 
it, which are so strenuously urged by the Infidel and Unita- 
rian, and in this fact we have a presumption against the com- 
mon use and meaning, and in favor of one that is peculiar. 
In addition to this we have the familiar fact of the frequent 
peculiar nse of language, with no opposing evidence in the 
case, and hence a strong presumption of a peculiar use and 
meaning. In connection with these things, we have in the 
third place, the undeniable good sense of the writers, including 
at least all ordinary qualifications for a correct and proper use 
of language. The Infidel must not here assume the contradic- 
tions of the writers as involved in the common use and mean- 
ing of their language, and allege these as proof of their want 
of good sense, and of their utter disqualification to use lan- 
guage correctly. This is begging a main question in debate, 
lie is bound, in view of the common and familiar fact of a pe- 
culiar use of language, to admit the possibility of such a use 
in the present case, and further to admit the exemption of the 
writers, if on the ground of such a use they can be exempted, 
from all absurdity in their actual meaning. The question of 
their good sense and their ordinary qualifications to use lan- 
guage correctly, is not to be decided on the unauthorized 
assumption of a literal use of language and its consequent 
absurdities. And yet it is only on this grossly unauthorized 
assumption, that there is even a pretense for doubt on this 
point. Of the good sense of these men, and their ordinary 
qualifications as writers, we fall back for proof on what they 
have written and the manner of their writing in respect to 
other things than the subject under consideration. We appeal 
to the system of morals and religion which they inculcate, as 
the only one known to man which is not essentially defective, 



QUALIFICATIONS OF THE WEITEES. 107 

absurd, and preposterous in the view of unperverted reason ; 
we appeal to their philosophy as unparalleled for its profun- 
dity and self-evident truthfulness — to their theology as alone 
in exhibiting God as worthy of the veneration and love of his 
creatures — a philosophy and theology which degrade and dis- 
grace all that ever proceeded from the Porch and the Academy ; 
we appeal to their integrity, their sober-mindedness, their sin- 
gleness of aim and absorption of purpose ; we appeal to the 
grace, the pathos, the sublimity of their style — to their simple 
and beautiful narration, their powerful argumentation, their 
weighty conclusions, the grandeur and beauty of their concep- 
tions, the richness and splendor of their imagery ; we appeal 
to their unswerving steadfastness, pressing the conscience of a 
guilty world with the most unwelcome truths, laboring amid 
the fires of martyrdom, standing alone with God for his cause 
and his truth ; — in a word, we appeal to the unparalleled ex- 
cellence of the matter and manner of their writings, their holy 
lives, their successful labors, their triumphant deaths, and af- 
firm that the world has seen no other men, who in respect to 
character and capacity, were so well qualified to put a revela- 
tion of God on record, as the writers of the Scriptures. Or if 
this should seem extravagant, as it may to our Infidel oppo- 
nents, from the want of reflection on the best means of attain- 
ing the ends of giving a revelation to this world, it is sufficient 
for our present purpose to say, that the writers of the Scriptures 
were in a high degree, or if this seems too much, were in an 
ordinary degree as writers qualified for their work. Taking 
even this low view of their qualifications, we affirm that the 
contradictions and absurdities involved in the assumption of 
their ordinary use of the language under consideration are too 
flagrant, too multiform, and too often repeated, to be attributed 
to such writers as these, especially in view of the possibility 
that the language should have a meaning cle usu *loqiiendi, 
exempt from these absurdities, and that therefore the proof 
from their character and qualifications as writers, in connec- 
tion with the strong presumption before stated of some pecul- 
iarity in the use of language, is absolutely decisive. That such 
men as Aristotle, Locke, Reid, Edwards, when treating on sub- 
jects of unusual thought, — subjects difficult if not impossible to 
be comprehended in all their elements or relations, — subjects 
on which themselves can hardly be said to have familiarized 



108 THE TKINITY. 

their own knowledge by an oft-repeated reflective analysis of 
their complex conceptions, should fall into unsuspected contra- 
dictions, is not incredible. But there are some errors supposa- 
ble in the use of language on ordinary subjects, so egregious 
that they are, so to speak, beyond the capacity of men of ordi- 
nary understanding. That such men as the writers of the 
Scriptures should ignorantly or inadvertently fall into such 
palpable self-contradictions as are charged upon them, — con- 
tradictions so entirely on the surface, so multiform, and so 
weakly ridiculous, that the writers must be sure to know and 
avoid them, — is as incredible as that they should have uttered 
with the same frequency and in literal language, the familiar 
absurdity that whatever is, is not, or that a part is equal to the 
whole. The incredibility of this is the exact measure of the 
proof, as thus far presented, of some peculiarity in the use of 
the language under consideration. 

Here also we appeal to familiar cases of merely verbal con- 
tradiction, as obvious, if not as direct, as language can express. 
Such cases often occur in the Scriptures, and not less frequently 
in common life, but who hesitates to admit a peculiar use of 
language, and to interpret accordingly ? Who, in interpreting 
such language as the following — " They twain shall be one 
flesh," " I and my Father are one," " God is love," " God is a 
rock" — does not assume as unquestionable, a peculiar use of 
the language ? Who, in view of the known character of the 
writer or speaker, in connection with the palpable absurdity 
•of a literal meaning, the frequency and established propriety 
of a peculiar use of language in other cases, and the possible 
consistency and truth of a meaning of the language in either 
of these cases when interpreted as used in a peculiar manner, 
does not decide at once that it is used in a peculiar manner 
and is to be interpreted accordingly ? So we say that in the 
case under consideration, the good sense of the writers and 
their qualification to use language correctly, — in view of the 
absurdity of the ordinary use and meaning of their language, 
the frequency and propriety of a peculiar use, and the possible 
consistency and truth of a meaning of it when interpreted as 
used in a peculiar manner, — remove all doubt in respect to the 
fact of a peculiar use as the only basis of its just interpretation. 

Here, so far as the present topic in debate is concerned, we 
might stop in the argument, but the proof, as we claim, is 



CONCLUSION. 109 

cumulative. If the language when interpreted as used in a 
peculiar manner, would give not only a consistent and obvious, 
but a pertinent and important meaning, as we have seen that 
it would, then the proof of a peculiar use is increased. If, in 
addition to these things, and on the supposition that the writers 
designed to teach the doctrine of the Trinity, there is no evi- 
dence that the language, being interpreted as used in a pecu- 
liar manner, is not the necessary or even the most natural and 
best language for the purpose of the writers — and we are au- 
thorized to say that there is no such evidence, there being no 
pretence that there is, — and if, still further, on the supposition 
of the above design of the writers, there is abundant evidence 
that the language, when interpreted as used in a peculiar man- 
ner, not only may be, but is the most natural, the best, and 
even necessary for the purpose of the writers — as I hope to 
show hereafter — then the proof of an authorized peculiarity in 
its use is greatly augmented, for these things are exactly what 
in all probability would be true on the supposition of the pe- 
culiarity of the language for the purpose specified, and what 
could not be true on any other supposition. And further still, 
if we add the most satisfactory proof of the divine inspiration 
of the writers — and this must be admitted in view of their 
possible exemption from all absurdity in their meaning — then 
the proof of a peculiar use of the language under consideration 
is the most abundant and decisive of which the nature of the 
case admits. 



I 



THE TRINITY. 

V.— THE MANNER IN WHICH LANGUAGE IS USED IN THE SCRIPTURES 
RESPECTING THE MODE OF THE DIVINE SUBSISTENCE AND THE 
PERSON OF CHRIST, CONTINUED. 

III. — Erroneous assumption of both parties. — Language so used cannot be interpreted. — Position 
not distinctly avowed. — Both parties improperly assume the inspiration of the writers. — Is not 
the Infidel right? — Language may be modified, but not without warrant — The warrant not 
shown by the Trinitarian.— Trinitarians assume an unauthorized use of language. — Three forms 
of the doctrine of the Trinity adduced.— Four laws of usage stated. — Applied to these forms of 
the doctrine. — Evil consequences of this mistaken assumption. — The Unitarian also modifies im- 
portant terms without warrant, e. g., in insisting that God is applied to Christ in an inferior 
sense. — Principle of interpretation discussed and applied. 

I proceed next to show — 

III. That it is erroneously assumed both by Unitarians and 
by Trinitarians to some extent, that the language under con- 
sideration is characterized by an unauthorized peculiarity in its 
use. 

Language used in an unauthorized and improper manner — 
in other words, in violation of the laws of usage — would, as 
we have seen, be utterly incapable of any reliable interpreta- 
'tion, and must of course fail to accomplish the purpose of lan- 
guage. Such a use of it is therefore one of the most incredi- 
ble of all suppositions. Besides, all those which we have 
alleged to show that that under consideration is characterized 
by some peculiarity of use, decisively prove that it is not an 
unauthorized and improper peculiarity. Indeed, the supposi- 
tion of such a use of language by the scriptural writers, in the 
view of any one who has the least knowledge of their wri- 
tings and their character, is so preposterous, that no one can 
be found to assert the fact. This is not pretended even by the 
Infidel. To whatever other methods he has resorted for the 
purpose of impairing the divine authority of the scriptural wri- 
ters, he has never assumed that they use language in a manner 
which renders it incapable of any meaning, either absurd or 
consistent, false or true. Nor will such a use of language on 



INSPIRATION GRATUITOUSLY ASSUMED. Ill 

the part of these writers be claimed or even admitted by either 
Unitarians or Trinitarians. 

I do not then, charge either the Unitarian or Trinitarian with 
formally maintaining that the language under consideration is 
used in an unauthorized and improper manner ; but I claim 
that both, in no unimportant respects, do actually proceed in 
their interpretation, on the erroneous and groundless assump- 
tion of such a peculiarity in its use. Both, I have no doubt, 
would at once admit, that any meaning of the language which 
depends on such an assumption is wholly groundless and un- 
warranted, and would at once renounce it, could they be con- 
vinced that they actually proceed upon it in their mode of inter- 
preting the language. My object then, is not to dwell on the 
error of making this the basis of interpreting the language, for 
there is no such necessity. The error is palpable and will be 
readily conceded by all. What my present purpose requires, is 
to show, that both Unitarians and Trinitarians in their inter- 
pretation of the language under consideration, do, to no incon- 
siderable extent, proceed on the confessedly erroneous assump- 
tion of an unauthorized and improper peculiarity in its use. 

The unauthorized peculiarity, the assumption of which I as- 
cribe to the Trinitarian, and that, the assumption of which I 
ascribe to the Unitarian, differ from each other, and yet both 
depend or rest on two others, which in the circumstances of 
the case, and as employed in the interpretation of the language, 
are entirely gratuitous. The one is the assumption of the in- 
spiration of the scriptural writers ; the other, the assumption 
of the modified use of terms, either by extending or restrict- 
ing their ordinary meaning. 

Both the Trinitarian and Unitarian then, assume an unau- 
thorized and improper peculiarity in the use of the language, 
inasmuch as they both proceed in their respective interpreta- 
tions of it, on the gratuitous assumption of the inspiration of the 
writers. 

The Trinitarian proceeds on this : It will be admitted, that 
both the Unitarian and the Infidel strenuously insist that there 
is no authorized and proper peculiarity in the use of the lan- 
guage by which it is capable of a Trinitarian meaning, or by 
which any Trinitarian meaning can be freed from absurdity by 
the laws of a just interpretation. This then is the question, 
and on this point the only one, viz., is there such an authorized 



112 THE TRINITY. 

peculiarity in the use of the language, as by the laws of inter- 
pretation will exempt it from the charge of absurdity ? If not, 
the charge of absurdity must be admitted. How then does 
the Trinitarian meet the charge ? He appeals merely to the 
inspiration of the writers to disprove the alleged absurdity of 
their language. Or if he devises a meaning by his own inge- 
nuity which he regards as free from absurdity, he propounds it 
as a possible and not as the actual meaning, obtained by the 
laws of interpretation applicable to a peculiar and proper use 
of language, duly ascertained and determined.* He does not 
show, nor pretend to show, any authorized and proper pecul- 
iarity in the use of the language, as a warrant for so modifying 
and determining its actual meaning, as to exempt it from ab- 
surdity. He therefore proceeds on the assumption of an au- 
thorized and improper peculiarity in the use of the language. 
Instead of showing, on the ground of an authorized and proper 
peculiarity in the use of the language, that it gives a consist- 
ent meaning according to the laws of interpretation applicable 
to the case, he abandons all pretense of its proper use, and 
for the purpose of exempting it from the charge of absurdity, 
relies solely on the gratuitous assumption of the inspiration of 
the writers. He thus virtually concedes that the language, if 
properly used, involves irretrievable absurdity. Denying of 
course its proper use, he proceeds on the assumption of its 
improper use ; in other words, he assumes that it is character- 
terized by an unauthorized and improper peculiarity. This, 
of course, if admitted, would render the language incapa- 
ble of any reliable interpretation or meaning. Such a de- 



* In so doing there is a palpable error. There is an important difference be- 
tween a possible conception of the subject, which is self-consistent, and a possible mean- 
ing of language, which is self-consistent. The mind, in the present case, may form 
a conception of some threefold distinction in the Godhead which shall be self- 
consistent ; but it will by no means follow, that this conception can constitute 
the meaning of the language which the Scriptures employ to express a threefold 
distinction in the Godhead ; in other words, that the language actually employed 
will admit of such a conception, and does not require a very different one of the 
subject, as its only possible meaning. It is quite supposable — not to say that it 
is commonly the fact — that what Trinitarians propound as a possible self- consistent 
meaning of the language, is not so ; but at most, a self- consistent conception of the sub- 
ject which the language will by no means admit of as its actual meaning ; and 
which can therefore, in no respect exempt it from the charge of an absurd mean- 
ing. It is at this latter point that the Trinitarian errs. 



UNITARIANS ASSUME INSPIRATION. 113 

fense of a Trinitarian meaning is utterly insufficient ana ground- 
less. So far as it proceeds on the assumption of the inspiration 
of the writers, it is a mere ex concessis argument with the Uni- 
tarian, which can have no weight with the Infidel who denies 
their inspiration ; while, so far as it proceeds on the assump- 
tion of an unauthorized and improper peculiarity in the use of 
language, it is wholly without foundation, and can give no satis- 
faction to a candid and enlightened inquirer after truth. 

In a similar manner, at least in one respect, the Unitarian 
proceeds in maintaining his interpretation of the language. 
In defending his own, he is under the necessity of setting aside 
the Trinitarian meaning. This he does ultimately on the ground 
of the inspiration of the writers. He assumes the absurdity of 
the Trinitarian meaning, and denies it to be the actual one, 
because it is inconsistent with the inspiration of the writers. 
The Infidel also assumes the absurdity of the Trinitarian mean- 
ing, but maintains it to be the one intended by the writers, 
according to the laws of usage, and as such, decisive proof 
against their inspiration. Thus the Unitarian argument for the 
rejection of the Trinitarian meaning, is merely an ex concessis 
argument with the Trinitarian. It leaves the Infidel unassailed, 
and for aught that appears to the contrary, strong in his posi- 
tion, and can have no influence to establish the Unitarian doc- 
trine. It is true that the latter claims to interpret the language 
as used in an authorized and proper, though peculiar manner, 
and on this ground to exempt it from all absurdity of meaning. 
But I am not speaking of the method which he adopts in de- 
fending his own doctrine, but of the ground on which he 
rejects the Trinitarian meaning of the language under consid- 
eration. This, I say, is simply the absurdity of this meaning, 
and its inconsistency with the inspiration of the writers. He 
avows the principle, that the absurdity of the meaning is a 
sufficient reason for rejecting it, though we cannot decide what 
the actual meaning is. It is plain then that he rejects, and 
regards himself as entitled to reject, the supposed absurd 
meaning of the language in view of the inspiration of the 
writers, though he could devise no authorized and proper 
use of it which would result in a consistent meaning. Here 
I might ask, does the Unitarian even pretend that what he 
claims to be an authorized and proper use of the language, and 
which results in a consistent meaning, would ever reveal itself 
8 



114: THE TEINITY. 

to an unbiased interpreter of the language, who did not first 
assume the absurdity of a Trinitarian meaning? Would he 
resort to this ground except to avoid what he deems an absurd 
meaning, as that which is inconsistent with the inspiration of 
the scriptural writers ? If he did not assume and believe their 
inspiration, would he not take common ground with the Infidel, 
and deny their inspiration on the ground of this absurdity ? 
Be this as it may — and we may see how it is hereafter — when 
the Unitarian presses his Trinitarian opj^onents with giving an 
absurd meaning to the language of inspired men, and urges 
them to abandon it, though they cannot decide what its actual 
meaning is, — when he places his whole reliance on this argu- 
ment as decisive against a Trinitarian meaning, — what is this 
but rejecting that meaning solely on the ground of the inspi- 
ration of the writers, and thus assuming an unauthorized and 
improper use of their language ? This surely, is not meeting 
the argument of the Infidel. It is at most a mere ex concessis 
argument with the Trinitarian, resting on the assumption of 
the inspiration of the writers, one which can have no influence 
to lead the Infidel to abandon the charge of absurdity against 
the writers, nor his denial of their inspiration. He insists that 
if the language, being interpreted in the usual manner, gives 
an absurd meaning, then to reject this merely on the ground 
of the inspiration of the writers, is to assume that they use 
language in a grossly unauthorized and improper manner, — a 
manner palpably inconsistent with their inspiration. And what 
can be more just? If the language of the scriptural writers, 
according to the laws of usage, and irrespective of their inspi- 
ration, will give no other but an absurd meaning, then such is 
their actual meaning. To say otherwise is to assert that an 
absurd meaning, which is fully proved by the laws of interpre- 
tation to be the actual meaning of the writers, and which being 
thus proved to be so, is the most decisive proof that they are 
not inspired, is proof that it is not their actual meaning because 
they are inspired. It is to deny a fact which is fully and de- 
cisively proved, — viz., absurdity of actual meaning, because it 
is inconsistent with another assumed fact, of which, from the 
nature of the case, there can be no proof. Surely, if the scrip- 
tural writers use language in such a manner, that by the laws 
of just interpretation, and irrespective of their inspiration, it 
gives only an absurd meaning, and yet expect to be exempt 



ARE EITHER IN THE RIGHT? 115 

from the charge of absurdity, only on the ground of their 
character, or of their inspiration, they use language in a grossly 
unauthorized and improper manner, — a manner not less incon- 
sistent with their inspiration than is the absurdity of their 
actual meaning. 

Thus both the Trinitarian and the Unitarian, the one in adopt- 
ing and the other in rejecting a Trinitarian meaning of the 
language under consideration on the assumption of an unau- 
thorized peculiarity in its use, proceed on ground utterly insuf- 
ficient. This the Trinitarian does in denying the absurdity of 
his meaning solely on the ground of the inspiration of the 
writers ; and this too, the Unitarian does by rejecting the 
Trinitarian meaning solely on the same ground. In both cases, 
the premises are insufficient to meet the objection of the Infidel, 
or rather, as involving the assumption of an unauthorized and 
improper use of language, are utterly insufficient to establish 
the truth of either meaning. 

It is true indeed, that if either the Trinitarian or Unitarian 
be supposed to be in the right, the other must Be supposed to 
be in the wrong. But there is another question, — whether 
either is in the right. The Infidel claims that both are in the 
wrong, — that they alike fail in their attempts to extricate the 
scriptural writers from the charge of absurdity, and to establish 
truth. Till this claim is fairly met, it is to no purpose that 
either the Trinitarian or Unitarian, in the controversy between 
themselves, should bring the other to adopt his meaning of the 
language by the mode of reasoning commonly adopted by these 
parties. This is not all which the exigencies of the case de- 
mand. There is yet a common enemy in the field to be van- 
quished, before either party can achieve a victory for truth, 
which ought not to be lost sight of in the controversy between 
them. This common enemy is the candid and successful in- 
quirer after truth. To what purpose is it, that either the Trin- 
itarian or Unitarian puts the other in the wrong, if neither is 
in the right ? — that one defeats the other in their mutual con- 
flict, only to secure a more signal triumph to a common ad- 
versary ? 

The truth is, that the meaning of the scriptural writers, 
whether absurd or not, false or true, must be determined, if at 
all, on other grounds than those adopted by the Trinitarian or 
Unitarian. To convince an unbiased inquirer after truth, by 



116 THE TRINITY. 

a valid process of reasoning, that the meaning of the language 
is not absurd, and that either a Trinitarian or Unitarian is its 
actual meaning, it is not enough to rely on the inspiration, and 
direct proofs of the inspiration of the writers. The proofs 
against their inspiration, claimed by the Infidel, must he over- 
thrown. It must be shown that the language is not the ordinary 
language of men using terms in their primary literal meaning, 
and that it is characterized, not by an unauthorized and im- 
proper, but by an authorized and proper peculiarity in its use. 
It must then be interpreted according to the peculiar principles 
applicable to language when thus used in a peculiar manner. 
The meaning thus obtained, whether absurd or consistent, false 
or true, will be the actual meaning. This being thus ascer- 
tained, then if it be shown to be free from all absurdity, and if 
thus the direct proof of the inspiration of the writers be shown 
to be unimpaired by the alleged absurdity of the actual mean- 
ing, then and then only will the truth of that meaning be es- 
tablished. 

Having thu*s considered the unauthorized peculiarities in the 
use of the language which are assumed by both Unitarian and 
Trinitarian, as they may be said to rest on the assumption of 
the inspiration of the writers, I now proceed to consider them 
as they rest on the assumption of a modified use of some of the 
important words. 

On this point let me not be misunderstood. I do not say 
then, that the assumption of a modified use of the language is 
unauthorized. There is, in my view, the most decisive reason 
for maintaining that some of the important words are used in a 
modified meaning. What I maintain is, that the Trinitarian 
assumes some particular modified meaning of the language 
without showing or pretending to show, de usu loquendi, the 
warrant or reasons for so doing, and when in some cases no 
such warrant exists. Proceeding, as I claim, in his interpreta- 
tion of the language, on such insufficient ground, he not only 
subjects himself to the successful assaults of his opponents, but 
leaves a Trinitarian meaning of the language unsupported and 
undefended. Strongly impressed with the proofs of the inspira- 
tion of the writers, having to contend for a Trinitarian meaning 
chiefly with those who also admit their inspiration, and re- 
garding the mode of interpretation adopted by his opponents 
as entirely groundless, the Trinitarian has been satisfied to in- 



TRINITARIAN INTERPRETATIONS. 117 

sist on the alternative either of adopting a Trinitarian meaning 
of the language, or of going openly into the ranks of Infidelity. 
Pressed in return however, by the Unitarian and Infidel, with 
the charge of those absurdities and contradictions which result 
from interpreting the language in its primary literal meaning, he 
resorts (without pretending to show the least sufficient warrant 
for so doing) to a modified use of some of the principal words, 
and of course to an interpretation of them, which for aught he 
shows to the contrary, is wholly gratuitous and arbitrary. In 
this way, as I now claim, he has failed effectually to vindicate, 
as he might have done, a Trinitarian meaning of the language. 

This I shall now attempt to show from the manner in which 
Trinitarian writers have proceeded in interpreting the language 
under consideration. 

Trinitarians then have interpreted the language of the Scrip- 
tures as teaching in some general import that there is one God 
in three persons. Individuals however, though agreeing in 
this general result, have differently modified the word God, 
and the word person, or the personal pronouns as applied to the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, — some giving one, and 
some another more particular meairing to these terms. With 
this fact in view, two material questions arise, viz., whether this 
class of interpreters, or any of them, have shown, or attempted 
to show, that de usu loquendi, there is any sufficient toarrantfor 
modifying the meaning of these terms as they have done / and 
whether the particular modified meanings which they have given 
to these terms are not made to rest on an unauthorized and im- 
proper use of the language f 

In respect to the first of these questions, I know of nothing 
which can give the least plausibility to an affirmative answer. 
It will be sufficient on this topic to refer to the distinguished 
Trinitarian writers, whose views we have already stated. Who 
then of them all, from Bishop Bull to Professor Stuart, how- 
ever he may have modified the import of the terms, and how- 
ever he may have supposed that by his ingenuity he has rescued 
the language from the charge of absurdity, has even attempted 
to show, de usu loquendi, any sufficient warrant for modifying 
its meaning as he has done ? And here the question is not, 
whether by gratuitously assuming the inspiration of the writers, 
Trinitarians have inferred that there can be no contradiction in 
the actual meaning of the language ; nor whether by modify- 



118 THE TRINITY. 

ing its meaning in a manner wholly arbitrary, they have been 
able to devise a possible conception of the subject which is 
exempt from contradiction ; nor whether there is in fact a suf- 
ficient warrant for modifying the meaning of the language ; 
nor whether, when duly modified, its meaning is free from all 
contradiction. But the question is — have Trinitarians even 
attempted to show that, according to the laws of usage, there 
is any sufficient warrant for modifying the meaning of the lan- 
guage as they have modified it ? It is undeniable that words 
may be properly turned from their ordinary use to a new and 
before unheard-of meaning, and thus be used in either a more 
extended or limited sense. These changes are subject to cer- 
tain fixed laws or rules, and when made according to these 
laws, there is in every case, not only good and decisive evidence 
of the fact of a change, but also of what the change is. On 
these principles, very different specific changes of this general 
class are fully authorized, and constitute as proper a use of lan- 
guage as any other. Now that the word God, or the phrase 
one God, and the personal pronouns as applied to the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Ghost, have in the use of the scriptural 
writers been changed into their actual from their primary 
meaning, all Trinitarians will admit. But what advocate of the 
Trinity has ever attempted to show this fact, — to show what the 
changes are, on what principles of usage they are authorized, 
and having clone this, to fix the precise import of the language 
in its changed and yet authorized and proper use? I can only 
say, that I know of no such attempt on the part of any Trinita- 
rian author, and I do not believe that any has ever been made. 
On the contrary, so far as I know, Trinitarians confessing and 
obliged to confess, that the language, if used in its ordinary 
meaning, is replete with absurdity, instead of first showing an 
authorized and proper peculiarity in the use of it, and then by 
a just interpretation of its meaning exempting it from absurdity, 
whether the writers were inspired* or not, have relied solely on 
the assumed inspiration of the writers for exempting their lan- 
guage from this charge. Thus to rest the vindication of the 
writers from this charge solely on the ground of their inspira- 
tion, is to proceed on the assumption of an unauthorized and 
improper use of the language. 

I next inquire as proposed, whether the modified meanings 
which Trinitarians have given to the language under consider- 






THREE TRINITARIAN THEORIES. 119 

ation, at least to some extent, do not proceed on the ground of 
an unauthorized and improper' use of the language. I do not 
affirm that all the modified meanings given to the language by 
Trinitarians imply an unauthorized and improper nse of it on 
the part of the scriptural writers : nor do I regard all the 
modified meanings adopted by Trinitarians which I consider 
as exegetically groundless, as necessarily false. What I main- 
tain is, that some prominent Trinitarian meanings proceed 
upon and imply an unauthorized and improper use of the lan- 
guage by the scriptural writers. 

The Trinitarian meanings of the language which are now 
under consideration, constitute what may be called certain par- 
ticular forms of the doctrine of the Trinity, which are adopted 
by different classes of Trinitarians. I select the three following 
as examples for my present purpose, — viz., that which asserts 
the eternal generation of the Son, and the eternal procession of 
the Holy Spirit ; that which asserts that the three persons of 
the Godhead are three distinct divine minds or agents, each 
being a complete subsistence ; and that which asserts a three- 
fold distinction in the Godhead denoted by the personal pro- 
nouns, without describing affirmatively at all what this threefold 
distinction or tri-personality is. 

In respect to each of these forms of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, the question now is, — whether the meaning given to 
the word God, or the phrase one God, and that given to the 
word person, or to the personal pronouns, do not proceed upon 
and imply an unauthorized and improper use of the language 
by the scriptural writers ? 

In the first of these forms, the word God, or the phrase one 
God, is used to denote the Divine Being, or one Divine Being in 
three persons, — the Father, who from eternity begat the Son ; 
the Son, who from eternity was begotten of the Father ; and 
the Holy Ghost, who from eternity proceeded from the Father 
and the Son. Can then, the words God and person, or the 
personal pronouns, be turned by the scriptural writers from 
their primary literal meaning, to that which is here given them, 
according to those laws of usage which control such changes 
in the meaning of words ? 

What then are the laws of usage? Among them are the 
following, the specification of which will be sufficient for my 
present purpose, — viz. : 



120 THE TRINITY. 

1. That there is good and sufficient reason for the change. 

2. That when a word is turned from its primary to a second- 
ary meaning, it must be used either in a more restricted or in 
a more extended sense than its primary meaning. 

3. That when the word is thus changed, it must admit of an 
obvious, definite, and consistent meaning. 

4. That in the case supposed, there must be good and suffi- 
cient evidence of the new and modified meaning of the word. 

The foregoing laws of usage, in turning words from their 
primary to a secondary meaning, are so obviously indispensable 
to the purposes for which language is employed, that I deem it 
quite unnecessary to illustrate or to confirm their authority. 
The mere statement of them is sufficient to show, that if the 
violation of them, or of even the second and the third, is in- 
volved in the use of language in a secondary meaning, that nse 
is unauthorized and improper, and the language incapable of 
any reliable interpretation. 

I proceed then to say, that if the scriptural language under 
consideration is used to express the present form of the doctrine 
of the Trinity, it is used in violation of each of the foregoing 
rules or laws of usage. And first in respect to the word God. 
The word God, in its primary distinctive meaning, denotes a 
self-existent, eternal, independent, immutable Being. These 
ideas of God are essential elements in any and every authorized 
conception of him as a Being. But according to the present 
form of the doctrine of the Trinity, the one God is neither self- 
existent, nor eternal, nor independent, nor immutable. The 
second and third persons of the Godhead have a derived and 
dependent existence, or distinct subsistence, and yet the three 
persons are the one God, and this Being is self-existent, eternal, 
independent, and immutable. This conception is plainly im- 
possible to the human mind, and for such a use of the word 
God, or for so turning it from its primary meaning, no good and 
sufficient reason can be given. Nor is the word, according to 
this form of the doctrine of the Trinity, used in any part of its 
primary distinctive meaning only, nor in the whole of that with 
some additional meaning. Nor does it admit of the supposed 
meaning as obvious, definite, and consistent ; for the meaning 
is one of the most unobvious, palpably indefinite, and self- 
contradictory, conceivable. Nor is there the least evidence 
from the Scriptures, the only source of evidence in the case, 



FIRST THEOEY. 121 

that it is used in this meaning. We know indeed, that the 
advocates of this form" of the doctrine of the Trinity have their 
proof-texts to allege. We shall only say, that in view of the 
circumstances of the case, and of the results of enlightened 
and unprejudiced interpretation, we do not think that an ex- 
amination of this class of texts is required in the argument. 

We now come to the supposed use of the word person, or of 
the personal pronouns, as these are applied to the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Ghost, in this form of the Trinitarian doc- 
trine, in which the distinct personality of each of the persons 
in the Godhead consists in or depends on a peculiar fact ; in 
the case of the Father, that he from eternity begat the Son ; in 
the case of the Son, that he was from eternity begotten of the 
Father ; and in the case of the Holy Ghost, that he eternally 
proceeded from the Father and the Son ; each of the persons 
being in essence and attributes identically one and the same. 
Now, by what law of usage can the personal pronouns be 
changed from their primary to such a secondary meaning as 
this ? By what law can they be properly employed to express 
the facts of eternally begetting, of being eternally begotten, and 
of eternally proceeding from, rather than the words circle, tri- 
angle, or quadrangle, or than the letters x, y, and z % Plainly 
no possible reason can be given. Nor can it be pretended that 
this new meaning in either case is any part of the primary 
meaning of the word, and much less the whole of it with some 
additional meaning. Still less, if possible, can there be a pre- 
tense that the alleged new meaning is either obvious, definite, 
or consistent, or that there is the slightest evidence of its being 
the actual meaning. Thus every law which we have specified, 
as regulating the changes of words, is violated by the supposed 
use of the personal pronouns as they are applied to the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Ghost, in the Scriptures. Having shown 
the same thing in respect to the use of the God as interpreted 
by this class of Trinitarians, it follows, that in their interpreta- 
tion they proceed on the assumption that the scriptural writers, 
in changing this language from its primary to a secondary 
meaning, have violated the fundamental laws of usage which 
regulate such changes, and have of course used it in an un- 
authorized and improper manner, which renders it incapable 
of any reliable interpretation whatever. 

I now recur to the second form of the doctrine of the Trin- 



122 THE TRINITY. 

ity above specified. This affirms that the three persons in the 
Godhead are three distinct divine minds or agents, each being 
a complete subsistence.* Understanding this language in its 
only possible meaning, it does not affirm but denies the exist- 
ence of one God, or of one divine being ; inasmuch as it does 
not affirm but denies the existence of one divine substance 
with even one divine phenomenal nature. If it implies, what 
it does not assert, viz., one common substratum or substance 
in which the whole is united as one thing, still this whole does 
not include one substance with even one phenomenal nature, 
and something more, — not one substance with three phenome- 
nal natures — but one substance (which cannot be properly 
called a substance) with three distinct divine minds or agents, 
each of which being affirmed to be a complete subsistence, is 
necessarily conceived to be a distinct divine being in the or- 
dinary import of the word. This is affirming three Gods in 
one God. Thus the meaning of the word God, or the phrase 
one God, or one divine being, instead of being an extension or 
restriction of the ordinary meaning of the language, and so 
including the essential primary conception of a being, and any 
part of the primary meaning of the language, "is wholly a new 
one. It is true that in this case, the full, ordinary meaning of 
the word person, even that of a being, is retained. But then 
the word being in the phrase one divine being, entirely loses its 
primary, ordinary meaning; for what is now called a being, 
instead of including the essential idea or conception of a sub- 
stance as that to which a phenomenal nature directly pertains, 
excludes this conception, and substitutes for substance in this 
necessary import, a mere vinculum or bond by which three 
distinct divine beings are united or combined, not into one 
being, but into one thing. Now for such a use of the terms 
God, one God, one divine being, there can be no good and suf- 
ficient reason. It does not imply a unity which need be or 
can be for any purpose characterized as oneness of being, nor 
is there any reason why the fact, supposed in this mode of the 
divine subsistence, would not be, but decisive reason why it 
should be expressed by other language. At the same time, as 
we have shown, the supposed use of the language excludes 



e This form of the doctrine should be distinguished from that which affirms 
that three persons are incomplete subsistences. 



THIED THEOEY. 123 

every essential conception in the primary meaning of the word 
being, and involves in every possible authorized meaning of it, 
obvious self-contradiction. Nor will it be pretended that there 
is or can be any evidence that when the Scriptures speak of 
the existence of only one God, they mean three Gocls so united 
by something, that the whole is not one beiug in any possible 
meaning of the word. According then to what has been said, 
it is plain that the advocates of the present form of the doctrine 
of the Trinity proceed on the assumption that the scriptural 
writers, in turning language from its primary to a secondary 
meaning, violate the fundamental laws which control such 
changes, and of course use language in that unauthorized and 
improper manner which renders it incapable of any reliable 
interpretation. 

Let us now consider the third form of the doctrine of the 
Trinity before specified, which having obtained considerable 
prevalence, claims consideration. In respect to the unity of 
God it may be thus stated, — that God is one being — numeri- 
cally one in essence and in attributes; that the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Ghost, has numerically the same perfections ; 
that the Son possesses not simply a similar or equal essence 
and perfections, but numerically the same as the Father and 
the Holy Ghost * 

This conception of God as one being is simply the ordinary 
conception of one being, as consisting of one substance or es- 
sence, and one nature, called his attributes. The error in re- 
spect to this language is not that its use is characterized by an 
unauthorized and improper peculiarity, but that it is charac- 
terized by no peculiarity at all. They who affirm this view of 
the divine unity also affirm that God, — not in respect to his re- 
lations, or modes of acting or revealing himself, but as a being, 
■ — is tri-personal. It is obvious then, that as there is no change 
in the use of the phrase one God or one divine being from its 
ordinary use, there must be such a change in the use of the 
word person, or the doctrine of one God in three persons is no 
other than the palpable self-contradiction of one God in three 
Gods. Nor is this all. No supposable change in the meaning 
of the word person, from its ordinary meaning, can exempt this 
form of the doctrine of the Trinity from self-contradiction, for 

* Stuart's Letters to Charming, 



124: THE TEINITT. 

still tri-personality is made a predicate of God as an element of 
his being, i. e., of the mode of his subsistence. While therefore 
it affirms that God is numerically one being in essence and in 
attributes, — in other words, that his whole being consists of one 
essence and one nature, called his attributes, — it asserts that 
something more pertains to his being, viz., tri-personality ; 
that is, that the whole of the being is not the whole of the 
being. This definition of the unity of God therefore, pre- 
cludes all possibility of tri-personality as a predicate of his 
being, and subverts the Trinitarian doctrine of one God in 
three persons. Tain therefore, is the attempt to maintain the 
existence of one God in three persons, without proceeding on 
the ground of some authorized and proper peculiarity in the 
scriptural use of the terms one God. Trinitarians must either 
take ground with the Infidel, and with him impute self-con- 
tradiction to the scriptural writers ; or they must abandon the 
doctrine of the Trinity as taught in the Scriptures ; or they must 
show some authorized and proper peculiarity in the scriptural 
use of Trinitarian language, that is, of the phrase one God, and 
of the personal pronouns as applied to the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Ghost. The latter they are bound to do according to 
their own principles. For if the tri-personality of God was 
revealed to scriptural writers for the purpose of being com- 
municated to others, — and that such was the fact every Trini- 
tarian maintains, — then the scriptural writers could not use the 
phrase one God in such a meaning, as in the view of others 
would exclude and deny the tri-personality of his being, with- 
out using the language in an unauthorized and improper man- 
ner. They were bound by the laws of language to use the 
phrase one God in such a meaning as would accord with their 
knowledge of the subject, and of course in such a manner as 
not to exclude and deny the tri-personality of the Godhead. 
With the extension of their knowledge of God's mode of sub- 
sistence, their meaning of the word God, and of the terms one 
God, would extend. To suppose them then to use this language, 
— as this class of Trinitarians do, — in simply its primary mean- 
ing, — to denote a being consisting of one and only one substance 
or essence, and one nature called his attributes, so that the es- 
sence and attributes of the Father, and of the Son, and of the 
Holy Spirit, are numerically the same, as we conceive the 
essence and attributes of a man to be numerically the same, is 



USE OF PRONOUNS. 125 

to suppose them not only to utter contradiction in asserting the 
unity and tri-personality of God, but to use the word God, and 
the phrase one God, with their knowledge of the subject, in an 
unauthorized and improper manner. It is true, that on the 
present supposition, the writers would not use the language in 
an unauthorized and improper manner by turning it from its 
primary meaning ; but by not turning it from that meaning 
when the exigency of the case required. The erroneous as- 
sumption then which I ascribe to this class of Trinitarians, is 
not that these writers turn it from its primary to an unauthor- 
ized and improper use, but that they employ it in an unauthor- 
ized and improper manner by using it in its primary meaning. 
In respect to Xke personal pronouns, I claim that this class 
of Trinitarians assume an unauthorized and improper peculiarity 
in their use, as they are applied by the scriptural writers to the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. I have already presented 
what I regard as a full account of the meaning which this class 
of Trinitarians give to the language now under consideration. 
Whatever may be thought of the consistency or inconsistency of 
the different forms in which this view of the tri-personality of the 
Godhead is presented, one thing seems quite undeniable, — that 
it proceeds on the assumption, that the personal pronouns are 
not used to express either the whole or a part of what must be 
considered their distinctive primary meaning, but only the very 
general idea or conception of a threefold distinction in the 
Godhead. It is true, that it is said that there is a distinction 
which lays a foundation for the application of the personal pro- 
nouns I, thou, he, which renders it proper to speak of sending 
and being sent, &c. At the same time however, "separate 
consciousness, will, power," &c, are denied. It would be im- 
possible then, that this class of Trinitarians should consider the 
personal pronouns, in their present application, as used in any 
other manner than to express the very general conception of 
a threefold distinction in the Godhead. Now, if this be so, 
these words are not only turned from their primary meaning, 
but they are turned from it in violation of every law of usage 
which regulates such changes. In the first place, there can be 
no good and sufficient reason for the supposed use of these pro- 
nouns rather than of any other words, or than merely algebraic 
signs. Again, according to the supposed use and meaning of 
them, they retain no part of their primary distinctive meaning, 



126 THE TRINITY. 

by which a person is distinguished from that which is not a 
person, or one person from another. Nor do they admit of any 
obvious, definite, and consistent meaning in the supposed use. 
For as we have shown, in view of the definition of the unity of 
God adopted by this class of Trinitarians, these pronouns can 
express no meaning, no conception of any thing which can be 
called tri-personality, or a threefold distinction in the Godhead, 
the existence of which is possible in the nature of things. And 
further, instead of any evidence of the supposed meaning, which 
is wholly precluded by the impossibility of the thing to be 
proved, there is decisive evidence to the contrary. Nothing 
can be plainer, than that the scriptural writers use the personal 
pronouns, in their present application, in at least some of their 
distinctive primary meaning ; that is, in some of that meaning 
by which a person is distinguished from that which is not a 
person. Even those whom we now oppose, admit that the 
threefold distinction which they affirm, renders it proper to 
speak of sending and of being sent, &c. They even claim that 
these distinctions, notwithstanding they disclaim any affirma- 
tive description of them, and deny all distinction in respect to 
essence and attributes, may exist in regard to attributes or 
essence. 

It. thus appears that many Trinitarians, in their interpretation 
of the Trinitarian language of the Scriptures, proceed on the 
assumption of an unauthorized and improper peculiarity in the 
use of that language. Such a use of language admitting of no 
reliable interpretation, it follows that the meaning given it, 
and of course the doctrine derived from it, is utterly ground- 
less. The meaning given to the language in each instance is 
wholly arbitrary — given at the pleasure of the interpreters ; 
given' w T hen the words interpreted furnish no possible reason 
for the meaning actually given rather than any other ; given 
when any other words would have furnished as much evidence 
of the same meaning, on the part of the writers, as these ; given 
when the w r ords are so used, that according to the laws of usage 
they no more admit of or require one meaning than an- 
other ; given when the words cease to be words, by being so 
used as to convey no possible meaning whatever ; given when 
the same ideas and conceptions respecting God's mode of sub- 
sistence, might as well be imputed to the scriptural writers, 
had they used no words on the subject. 






DISASTKOUS CONSEQUENCES. 127 

Again : the error which we are now considering has not 
been unconnected with consequences to the cause of truth 
which are much to be regretted. It is to this error, as it exists 
on the part of Trinitarians, that in the present connection T de- 
sire now to call attention, and this in relation to only one of its 
consequences. To say nothing then of the extravagance, the 
deficiency, the inclefiniteness, the unintelligibleness, and even 
the absurdity which characterize different statements of the 
doctrine of the Trinity, and which in view of their authors 
seem to be required by the language and authority of inspira- 
tion itself, Trinitarians generally have placed such an exclusive 
reliance on this authority for successfully maintaining their 
doctrine, that they have clone almost nothing adapted to the 
purpose of exempting it from absurdity in the mind of the 
Unitarian, and still less in the mind of the Infidel. They have 
scarcely attempted to unfold any authorized peculiar use of 
scriptural language on this subject or the peculiar principles 
of its interpretation, and in this way to ascertain its precise 
import and vindicate it from the charge of absurdity. This, 
though it does not justify or palliate the charge of absurdity 
against every Trinitarian meaning of the language, leaves the 
plausibility of the charge unremoved, and is, in my estimation, 
a serious deficiency in the mode of defending the truth. A 
more plausible mode of assailing the Trinitarian would be to 
show that he does not justify, by the laws of interpretation, 
even any consistent meaning which he contrives to give to 
scriptural language. Another general principle however, will 
show how inadequate is the mode of reasoning adopted by the 
Trinitarian. If, in a case in which the writer or speaker in- 
tends to be understood, no proper and peculiar use of language 
arising from the nature of the subject or other cause will au- 
thorize the rejection of a contradictory and absurd meaning, 
or the adoption of any other as the actual meaning, then we 
are not at liberty to reject the former or to adopt the latter. 
"Whatever presumption against the absurd as the actual mean- 
ing may arise from the character of the writer, it cannot be 
good proof against its being the actual meaning where there is 
no other evidence against, but abundant other evidence for its 
being so, in the just interpretation of the language. It is on 
this principle only that respectable and even the ablest writers 
can be, as they often are, convicted of uttering absurdity. On 



128 THE TRINITY. 

the same principle the Trinitarian rejects the inferior or limited 
sense of the word God, given by Unitarians to the word when 
applied to Christ. For so doing he assigns two reasons : that 
there is in the instances of snch an application of the word no 
evidence for, but decisive evidence against its being the actual 
meaning ; and that the Unitarian adopts it as the actual instead 
of the Trinitarian meaning, for an insufficient reason, viz., be- 
cause regarding the Trinitarian meaning as absurd, it is incon- 
sistent with the inspiration of the writers, whereas he ought to 
receive the Trinitarian as the actual meaning, if the laws of 
interpretation give it as such, and this notwithstanding that in 
his view it is inconsistent with the inspiration of the writers. 
But if the Unitarian is forbidden thus to fall back on the inspi- 
ration of the writers, and merely for this reason to deny that 
an absurd meaning is their actual meaning, why is not the 
Trinitarian forbidden to deny, merely for the same reason, 
the absurdity of the meaning itself? He is; and is as unpro- 
tected from the assault of the Infidel as the Unitarian is in 
his position. Both the Trinitarian and Unitarian are bound 
by logical consistency, either to be Infidels by denying the 
inspiration of the scriptural writers, or to show, — after hav- 
ing ascertained b} T the laws of usage and just interpretation, 
irrespectively of the inspiration of these writers, the actual 
meaning of their language, — that this meaning is free from all 
absurdity. If these things are so, then in the unauthorized 
uses which the Trinitarian and Unitarian make of the inspira- 
tion of the scriptural writers in obtaining the meaning of their 
language, there is no substantial difference, though in another 
material respect there is between these parties an important 
one. The Unitarian, as it may appear, in defense of his mean- 
ing of the language under consideration, has no valid ground 
on which to stand, and therefore, little as he suspects it, takes 
the position of an unauthorized use of the language and of 
arbitrary interpretation, and at the same time absurdly main- 
tains the inspiration of the writers. It may also appear that 
the Trinitarian, in maintaining his meaning of the language, 
has valid ground to take, viz., that of an authorized peculiarity 
in the use of the language, according to which its meaning can 
be ascertained and exempted from all absurdity by the just 
laws of interpretation, the inspiration of the writers be de- 
fended, and the doctrine of the Trinity in its true form estab- 



UNITARIAN ASSUMPTION. 129 

listed. If there is such ground for the Trinitarian, he is bound 
to take it. Not to do so, is at best to furnish an inadequate 
defense of what he regards as revealed truth, and even to 
abandon the Scriptures to the ruthless desecration of the In- 
fidel. 

I now proceed to show as I proposed, that the Unitarian 
resorts to a modified use of some of the important terms under 
consideration, without any sufficient warrant for so doing ; in 
other words, that in changing the meaning of some of these 
terms from primary to secondary, he assumes an unauthorized 
and improper peculiarity in the use of them by the scriptural 
writers. It is true that in thus modifying this language, he 
claims to proceed on the ground of an authorized and proper 
peculiarity in its use ; that in respect to some of the terms, 
they are properly and warrantably employed in an inferior or 
restricted sense, and in respect to others, that they are properly 
used oy personification. 

"We say then, that Unitarians, in this mode of interpreting 
the language, proceed on the presumption of an unauthorized 
and improper use of it by the scriptural writers. This they do 
in maintaining that the word God is applied to Christ in the 
Scriptures, in an inferior and limited stn«e. Xow if this be so, 
— if the scriptural writers use the word God in this application 
to denote that Christ, as a being, is any thing less than a divine 
being, — then we claim that the manner in which they use it for 
this purpose is unauthorized and improper. "We admit that 
the word may be and is properly, in some cases, turned from 
its primary literal use, and employed in an inferior sense. But 
then this turning of words from their primary to a secondary 
meaning is, in all cases, subject to some fixed law or principle 
which cannot be violated without using it in an unauthorized 
and improper manner. What we claim then is, that if the 
scriptural writers use the word in its present application in an 
inferior sense, as maintained by Unitarians, they violate the 
principle or law of change which is applicable to the case, and 
so employ the word in an unauthorized and improper manner. 
This will appear by recurring to this principle, and to those 
which are adopted by Unitarians in the interpretation of the 
language. 

The general principle or rule then, which is applicable to 
such cases, is, that a zoord is to he considered as used hi its corn- 
9 6* 



130 THE TRINITY. 

mon literal meaning in every case, unless good and sufficient 
evidence to the contrary is furnished by the case itself. The 
justness of this principle is manifest at once, if we reflect that 
to suppose a word turned from its primary literal import, to 
another, without good evidence of the change and of the new 
meaning in which it is used, is to suppose the language not to 
convey the meaning of the writer or speaker, and therefore not 
to be properly used. Whatever may be the meaning of the 
writer or speaker in such a case, his language conveys none. 
If we are led by some accidental circumstance to conjecture 
or guess concerning it, still his language, furnishing no suffi- 
cient evidence of what it is, is plainly used in an unauthorized 
and improper manner. The question then arises, what is good 
and sufficient evidence that language is used, not in its primary 
but in a secondary meaning ? I answer, negatively — 

First — That the mere absurdity or falsehood of its primary 
literal meaning, is not such evidence. Unitarians maintain the 
principle, — and a very convenient one it is, with their gratui- 
tous assumption of the absurdity of a Trinitarian meaning, 
for their purpose in this controversy, — that we may reject 
the primary literal meaning of language if it be absurd, 
when the mere words will bear it, though we cannot decide 
what is the actual meaning. This may be true in some rare 
cases, as in the utterance of a prophecy whose import is to be 
understood only in its fulfillment ; or in certain other cases, 
when the design is present obscurity which is to be removed 
by future explanation ; or when the antiquity of a book, or 
various readings, or errors in transcription, &c, deprive us of 
those means of deciding the actual meaning of language which 
were possessed by contemporaries of the writer. But what has 
this to do with the case in hand, — a case in which the writers 
are divinely commissioned to reveal truth for the instruction of 
all mankind, and in which they profess, and plainly design, to 
convey a meaning through the language which they employ ? 
Here the principle can have no application. Mere absurdity 
or falsehood, whatever presumption it may do in other cases, 
can afford none in this, much less become proof of another 
meaning than that which is absurd. The writer not only may, 
but the proof is decisive that he does utter an absurdity. The 
language, justly interpreted, either expresses an absurd mean- 
ing or it does not. If it does, then an absurd meaning is its 



CHAKG ; E OF ABSURDITY. 131 

actual meaning, and cannot be rejected as such. If it does 
not, then the absurd meaning is not the actual meaning, and is 
to be rejected, not because it is absurd, but because it is not, 
by just interpretation, the actual meaning. Why then talk of 
rejecting a meaning which is given by the laws of interpreta- 
tion, merely because it is absurd ? Is it said, that nothing is 
more common in the correct mode of interpreting language, 
than to reject a supposed meaning merely because it is absurd ? 
I answer, never. Aside from the character of the writer, the 
manner of writing, and other considerations, the absurdity of a 
meaning can never be reason for rejecting it as the actual one. 
Language is capable of being used in a definite meaning, and 
when properly employed, gives that which is intended. "When 
therefore, a writer intends to convey a definite meaning, if 
his language justly interpreted does convey such an one, and 
can convey no other, and when the meaning thus conveyed is 
absurd, he is charged with uttering absurdity. In what other 
way can any one ever be convicted of uttering absurdity \ 
How else can Unitarians, even with a show of honesty in their 
own view, charge Trinitarians with absurdity in affirming that 
there is one God in three persons ? And if the sacred writers 
use language properly when using it in this manner, why does 
not the Trinitarian use it properly in conforming to their ex- 
ample ? and why is not his language to be interpreted accord- 
ingly ? "Why is not the Unitarian, and every other interpreter 
of the Scriptures, to conform to the same inspired model of 
propriety ? And then what a revelation from God would that 
be, the language of which, according to just laws of interpre- 
tation, expresses only an absurd meaning, and must therefore 
be supposed to have another actual meaning, though none can 
tell what ! If this is not to suppose the language to be used 
in a peculiar manner, which is altogether unauthorized and im- 
proper, it is difficult to say what would be. It is to no purpose 
to say that the writers were divinely inspired. What warrant 
have inspired writers more than others, to use language for the 
instruction of mankind in such a manner, that according to the 
laws of just interpretation, it expresses only an absurd mean- 
ing ? What vindication is it, when it is once conceded, that 
correctly interpreted, they actually utter absurdity, that they do 
not utter absurdity, because they were inspired ? Would it not 
be more consequential to say, they were inspired to utter 



132 THE TRINITY. 

absurdity ? Be this as it may, if they utter absurdity according 
to a correct interpretation of their language, they do the same 
whether inspired or not inspired. Absurdity is as good evi- 
dence against inspiration, as inspiration is against absurdity. 
Inspiration can have no influence as evidence against an absurd 
actual meaning in any case, unless the language according to 
correct interpretation, will express another meaning than the 
absurd one. 

The principle of interpretation we are considering, is one of 
those vaunted principles of Unitarians — and the more entitled 
to examination on this account — by which divine revelation is 
to be rescued from the contempt of the Infidel. We cannot 
but think however, that to reject an absurd meaning as the 
actual, and when it is proved by the only evidence on the ques- 
tion to be the actual meaning solely because it is absurd, or 
solely because it is absurd and because the writers are supposed 
to be inspired, is the last expedient that a wise advocate of a 
divine revelation will adopt in its defense. By so doing, the 
Unitarian not only adopts a principle which is preposterously 
and flagrantly false, but he subjects himself to the charge of 
weakly begging a main question in debate with the Infidel, 
and the sacred writers, to the charge of utter incompetence for 
their work. He begs a main question in debate with the Infi- 
del, by assuming the inspiration of the writers, while the Infidel 
alleges, as proof against their inspiration, the conceded absurd- 
ity of their writings according to the just principles of inter- 
pretation. Thus the Unitarian concedes the absurdity in 
the meaning of the language justly interpreted, and denies the 
absurd meaning to be the actual meaning, not on the ground 
of any law of interpretation, but only on the ground of the in 
spiration of the writers. The Infidel claims, that the language, 
correctly interpreted, and independently of the inspiration of 
the writers, abounds in absurdity. This being conceded by 
the Unitarian, he assumes the inspiration of the writers when 
conceding the fact which disproves it, and on this assump- 
tion denies the absurd meaning to be the actual meaning, 
when conceding the fact which proves it to be such. With 
how much respect for revelation will such advocacy inspire 
the Infidel? Further: the Unitarian subjects the scriptural 
writers themselves to the charge of incompetence for their 
work. He concedes that they use language which, according 



CHAKGE OF ABSURDITY. 133 

to the only just principles of interpretation applicable to the 
case, expresses only an absurd meaning. This he denies to be 
their actual meaning in direct defiance of decisive proof that it 
is their actual meaning, and solely on the ground of its ab- 
surdity, and of the inspiration of the writers, and affirms another 
to be the actual meaning, which lies far beyond the reach of 
human discovery. And thus the sacred writers use language 
for the purposes of revelation ! They so use it that when cor- 
rectly interpreted, it expresses nothing but absurdity, and this, 
thus clearly and decisively expressed as the only meaning of 
the language, is their complete vindication from the charge of 
absurdity — they mean nothing which can be understood by 
what they say, and yet what they say is to be received by the 
world as a revelation. Is this an authorized and proper use of 
language, or is it an unauthorized and improper use of it, which 
comports rather with idiocy than with competence to write a 
revelation from God ? 



II. 

HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

I. — ALL MEN AEE TOTALLY DEPRAVED. 

I. The doctrine explained.— What the doctrine is not,— Distinguished from total depravity by 
nature. — Must be consistent with just views of the nature of holiness and sin. — II. The doctrine 
proved (1.) from Scripture. — Kemark on man's enmity to God. 

I shall, I., explain the doctrine of the total depravity of all 
men. By this doctrine, I mean that 

All mankind {without the interposition of divine grace) are, 
in respect to their first moral character, wholly and positively 
sinful. 

To prevent misapprehension, I remark still more particularly, 
that in this proposition I do not intend to assert that 

Every thing which pertains to man, and to which a name 
may be given in the classification of mental phenomena, is 
sinful ; nor that all men are as bad as they can be ; nor that 
they are equally wicked ; nor that they are simply destitute of 
holiness in distinction from any thing positively sinful ; nor 
that there are no men in the world who through grace are good. 

It is, if I mistake not, in respect to the particulars now speci- 
fied, that errors in stating the doctrine of human depravity 
most frequently occur. I have designed to avoid these in the 
statement which I have given. Thus it cannot be said, that 
the representation is that every thing that pertains to man is 
sinful, for the predicate of sinfulness is confined to his moral 
character. This, it is true, involves all those complex acts to 
which the words moral or sinful can be properly applied, but 
it does not include what in more analytical language may be 
properly called acts or states of mind. The acts of the intel- 
lect and of the will — the excitement of constitutional suscepti- 
bilities — may be properly spoken of as distinct acts, but of no 
one of them analytically considered is moral quality predi- 
cable. In all cases, as we have before shown, when we predi- 



TOTAL DEPKAVITY EXPLAINED. 135 

cate moral quality of an act, we denote one which is complex, 
or made up of what may be properly spoken of as distinct 
mental acts. "Nov can it be objected to the statement now 
given, that it represents all men to be as wicked as they can 
be, or to be equally wicked, since it is too plain to be denied, 
that all men may be wholly sinful, and some be far worse than 
others. It is indeed true that the practical governing principle 
of men, if our doctrine be true, most be the same in kind, and 
to a certain extent the same in degree in all men. Beyond 
this however, there is room for indefinite diversity in the de- 
grees of this principle. Nor. does the statement now given 
countenance the error, that the depravity of men consists in the 
destitution of holiness, for it asserts positive sinfulness. !Nbr 
is it consistent with another opinion, that the moral character 
of man is partially good and partially bad, for it predicates 
entire sinfulness of his moral character. ]Nor does it deny that 
there are good men in the world, for there may be many 
through the interposition of divine grace, and yet without such 
interposition the moral character of all may be wholly sinful. 

In further explanation of the present statement I remark, 
that it distinguishes the doctrine of the total depravity of men 
from the doctrine of the total depravity of men by nature. 
The importance of this remark results from the fact, that some 
divines have made substantially the statement now given of 
the former doctrine as the true statement of the latter. They 
suppose that to say that man is depraved without the interpo- 
sition of grace, is the same thing as to say he is depraved by 
nature. This however, is not only shunning a main point in 
the controversy, but it is obviously incorrect. For although it 
be conceded that all men are depraved without the interpo- 
sition of divine grace, and although it may follow as an infer- 
ence that this depravity is by nature, yet the fact is not speci- 
fied in the language of the statement, since the depravity may 
be, for aught that is asserted to the contrary, — as our opponents 
have maintained it is, — owing to the circumstances of men, and 
not to their nature;* i. e., unless it be assumed that the interpo- 
sition of grace is not included in their circumstances, since if 



" 5 Adam became depraved without the interposition of grace, or it may at 
least have been so. But he did not become depraved by nature, but by cir- 
cumstances. 



136 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

it should be assumed as included, it would be properly ranked 
with the influence of bad example, bad education, &c. Whe- 
ther therefore, the depravity of men is to be ascribed to their 
circumstances or to their nature is not settled, but is designedly 
left undetermined by the present statement. It also leaves the 
question concerning the sinfulness of infants untouched, since 
it confines the predicate of sinfulness to moral character with- 
out deciding when that commences. 

Further : to a right apprehension of the doctrine now stated, 
it is necessary that we form just notions of what constitutes 
moral character, or rather what constitutes it wholly and posi- 
tively sinful. Generally speaking, moral character consists in 
a man's governing purpose, evinced to us by that course of 
specific action or conduct to which it leads. When therefore, 
we speak of it as wholly and positively sinful, we intend that 
the man is the subject of that supreme love of the world — that 
preference of worldly good to all other, which leads to that 
course of specific action or conduct which is the appropriate 
result of such a governing principle. It is however to be re- 
marked, that strictly and properly speaking, the governing 
principle itself constitutes moral character, since we never hes- 
itate to decide on character where the governing principle of 
a man is clearly evinced, whether it be by a course of conduct 
or by a single action, or even in some cases by words merely. 
When therefore I say, that the moral character of mankind is 
wholly and positively sinful, I mean that they are the subjects 
of that supreme love of the world, — that preference of earthly 
good, or that selfishness, or that selfish principle, or that cor- 
rupt and wicked heart, or that sinful disposition, call it by 
what name you will, — which governs its subject in all his spe- 
cific actions or conduct. 

II. I proceed now to prove the doctrine. 

The proofs are derived from the Scriptures, also from obser- 
vation and experience.* 

From the Scriptures. — Gen. vi. 5 : " And God saw the wick- 
edness," &c. This, though generally given, is not of itself 
perfectly decisive, for from the connection it admits of being 
viewed as spoken only of the men of that particular age — the 



* The remainder of this lecture was taken from the notes of one of Dr. T.'s 
pupils. 






PKOOFS FROM SCRIPTURES. 137 

antediluvian — though it admits also of being considered a uni- 
versal declaration. But in connection with the text we find 
(Gen. viii. 21), " The imagination of man's heart," &c. This 
is a conclusive proof-text, for it gives the fact as universal. 
Ps. xiv. 5, x. 36, cxl. 53, and Is. lix. are on this point as Paul 
explains them and applies them in Rom. iii. 9-19, to all men, 
where also the argument for universal Justification is founded 
on the fact of universal sinfulness. These are very decisive. 
Jew and Gentile are alike here. The only attempt at evasion 
of the strong description in these texts, is on the ground that 
the Psalmist in some cases includes good men of whom he 
could not mean to predicate total depravity, while Paul says 
there are none. " All men are not so wicked — all do not curse 
and steal." But if the Psalmist included them, it is no proof of 
contradiction, for some are renewed. The exceptions to his 
declarations are so few as not to need a formal notice, or to 
constitute a warrant against his making a general declaration. 
Writers seldom make exceptions when they are few or trivial. 
But how is Paul to be justified? I answer, the principle of 
moral action in men is one y it is adequate to any degree of 
wickedness. Paul does not mean to say that all are guilty of 
murder in overt deed, and the texts should not be so inter- 
preted. In them positive sinfulness as well as negation of ho- 
liness is asserted of all, for " none do good," but all are active 
in sinning. Jer. xvii. 9 : " The heart is deceitful," &c. This 
is a strong passage. Heart means the heart of man. It is a 
universal proposition without qualification, and needs none. 
Eccles. ix. 3 : " The heart of the sons of men is full of evil." 
A universal proposition. 

The universal call of the Gospel upon all men to repent is 
proof of total, universal depravity. What is the repentance 
required? Not a change from one degree of goodness to an- 
other, but a change of moral character. This implies a previous 
deficiency in moral character. God commands all men every- 
where to repent ;-— why, if not sinners ? " The whole need not 
a physician" (Matt. ix. 12). But the Bible calls none sinful * 
but those who are wholly so. It characterizes them as those 
that believe not the Gospel — " loving the world" — " not loving 
the Father" — " not for him but against him." These qualities 
it predicates of all renewed persons,' and hence calls on all to 
change this nature. The Scripture doctrine of Regeneration 



138 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

proves this doctrine. This involves the same change — an en- 
tire new moral character in kind — and implies previous entire 
sinfulness. Thus, " if any man is in Christ, he is a new crea- 
ture : old things are passed away," &c. (2 Cor. v. 17 ; Col. 
iii. 9; Eph. iv. 22.) "Old man corrupt," an entire change 
from old to new man ; now holy — before sinful. The doctrine 
of Justification also. This is represented as the Justification of 
the ungodly — of sinners, of enemies. (Rom. iv. ; Gal. iii. ; 
Eom. v. 6-10; Heb. ii. 9.) "Christ tasted death for every 
man." "What then are all men but sinners, enemies, &c. ? 
For Christ came to call not the righteous, but sinners to re- 
pentance (elg fierdvoiav). The Scriptures divide men into two, 
and only two classes, viz., the righteous or imperfectly holy, 
the wicked or the positively and wholly sinful. They repre- 
sent the renewed as sanctified in various degrees — some pos- 
sessing the very least degree of holy principle that can be 
called so, and yet views these as among the righteous and as 
possessing a positive, decisive, and essential distinction from 
the wicked. If then the least degree of holy principle ranks 
its possessor among the righteous, how much can any other 
possess ? Evidently something less than the least possible. If 
the wicked have not the least possible good principle, are they 
not totally depraved? Eph. ii. 1-5 : "And you hath he quick- 
ened," &c. This is a strong passage, the language of which is 
figurative but not the less obvious and precise — " originally 
children of disobedience" — " fulfilling the desires of the flesh" 
— " wherein ye walked," a walking, living death, " by nature 
children of wrath, even as others." There is only one attempt 
at evasion here. Unitarians say that Paul reckoned himself 
among the wicked that his language might not sound harsh. 
John vii. 7 : " The whole world hateth me," &c. The world in the 
Bible is used to represent the wicked, all in their natural state, 
as in 1 John v. 19. So other passages. The Scriptures do not 
say men hate God^r se / the devils said, " We know thee that 
thou art the Son of God," but they hate me " oecause I testify." 
Remarks. — In representing the depravity of man, preachers 
should use much caution. There has been much erroneous 
and injudicious preaching on the enmity of the heart towards 
God. It is too generally considered to be overt hatred of God, 
and when presented to many minds where that state of feeling 
does not exist because they may never have had such distinct 



ENMITY TO aOD 139 

views of God as to call it out, they know from their own con- 
sciousness that they have not that state of heart, and you can- 
not convince them of the contrary. The Bible never so repre- 
sents the matter. You must adopt the Bible sense of the words 
hate, enmity. See Dent. xxi. 15; Matt. vi. 24; Luke xiv. 26; 
Prov. xiii. 24 ; Matt. i. 3 ; Rom. ix. 13 ; John xii. 25, where 
hate is used in the sense of a less degree of love. This less 
degree of love, leading the person exercising it to treat the 
less esteemed object in some respects as an enemy, is properly 
termed " enmity," " hatred." Luke xiv. 26 : " Hateth not his 
father," &c. Whenever their interests come into competition 
with God, they are to be sacrificed, thus in a sense treating 
these persons as enemies. So loving God subordinately is 
properly called hatred, and the nature of such subordinate love 
to God, love leading us to disregard all his great and benevo- 
lent designs, is equivalent in its effect to positive hatred. 
James iv. 4 explains this so. Sinners do not hate God for his 
own sake. Even Satan would not. Unitarians and Universal- 
ists love God amazingly — that is,' their God. 

But in some minds it is true that there is overt enmity to- 
wards God, and this enmity, secret and lurking as it may be, 
can be presented so that the subject of it shall see, feel, and 
admit it. And thus to present it, tasks the skill of the preacher. 
Exhibit to sinners a pure and just God who testifies that their 
works are evil — the God of the Bible as ever present with 
them, and determined eternally to punish them for their sins, 
— suppose him ever at their side, witnessing every act, reprov- 
ing every sin, and they will feel troubled at his presence — they 
will wish to be rid of such a being — they will be conscious of 
the overt enmity of their hearts rising against God, a feeling 
of hatred which is more than a less degree of love. They will 
then acknowledge that the carnal mind to (jypovrjfia rfjg oapnog, 
" friendship of the world is enmity against God" — that the 
principle tending to sacrifice God and his interests to self is 
hatred. But without such exhibition, sinners will complain of 
false, slandering accusations, and hence go away enraged rather 
than softened by the truth. 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

II.— ALL MEN AEE TOTALLY DEPEAVED.— (Continued.) 

(2.) The argument from experience and observation. — Certain traits of character are adduced 
against its truth. — Considered under three particulars. — Traits specified,are innocence of child- 
hood, honor, gratitude. — They are shown to be not morally good. — Argument on the application 
of the words good, lovely, &c. 

That this argument is relied on by both the contending par- 
ties, is quite decisive of its insufficiency on one side of the ques- 
tion or the other. 

On one side, it is maintained that there are certain traits of 
character belonging in greater or less degree to all men, even 
the worst, at some period of life, which are morally good, and 
that these are decisive proofs that the first moral character of 
men is not wholly depraved. I propose — 

1. To ascertain what these things are ; 

2. To show that they are not morally good ; and, 

3. That so far as moral quality can be supposed to pertain to 
them, they are sinful. 

1. What are these things % 

And here my object will be to show, that they are either in- 
voluntary constitutional propensities simply / or they are sub- 
ordinate volitions — acts of will — choices to gratify constitutional 
propensities. Here we have to encounter the ambiguities of 
language in one of its most perplexing forms. The difficulty 
is, to ascertain with precision what is meant by the language 
in a case in which the words employed in different applications 
have different meanings. The following catalogue of names 
may be sufficiently extensive for our purpose : " The innocence 
and purity of early childhood, natural affection, compassion, 
kindness, honesty, veracity, fidelity, gratitude, honor, patriot- 
ism, humanity." 

The first, " the innocence and purity of early childhood," is 
phraseology having a generic import. What then is meant 
by it ? So far as I can conceive, it must mean at least some 



NATUKAL AFFECTION. 141 

one of the following things : an entire exemption from sin and 
moral defilement previous to moral agency, and of course, to 
moral character ; or perfect obedience to the divine law after 
moral agency commences ; or some specific virtues which are 
not included in the specific enumeration ; or these specific vir- 
tues themselves ; or exemption from all sin without positive 
obedience to the divine law ; or exemption from some particu- 
lar sins. These are the only senses in which I can imagine the 
writers who speak of " the innocence and purity of childhood," 
to use the language. 

I now inquire, what are the things meant in the more specific 
part of the catalogue ? Some of these terms are ambiguous, 
that is, are used by good authority in different senses. Thus 
the phrase natural affection often denotes the feeling or emo- 
tion which a man has toward his offspring or other kindred, 
and which is merely a constitutional feeling or emotion. Thus 
viewed, it is an involuntary state of mind which, like our pro- 
pensity for food or drink, may or ma} 7 not precede a given act 
of choice, but which, in its own nature, is not an act of choice. 
In like manner we use the words compassion and humanity, to 
denote the same thing as we express by the terms compassion- 
ate and humane feelings, meaning states of mind which are not 
voluntary — not acts of choice, but which may or may not be 
the basis of particular acts of choice. In each of these uses 
we designate simply constitutional propensities, excited in view 
of their objects, as distinguished from any act of the will, and 
this without deciding whether there is a subsequent act of 
choice to gratify or to deny the propensity, or whether the man 
gives dominion to the propensity, or subordinates its gratifica- 
tion to other and more worthy objects of affection. 

But we use the same terms to denote different things. Thus 
a man may love his reputation, or his wealth, or his Maker, 
more than he loves his child, and yet truly love the latter; and 
this love we call natural affection. So he may love his child 
more than he loves his reputation, or his wealth, or his Maker, 
and still we call this love natural affection. The same thing is 
true respecting the use of the words compassion and humanity. 
The specific object of these emotions is suffering, that is, each 
is a propensity or desire to relieve suffering in the primary im- 
port of the term. But a man may love the public good more 
than the relief of the culprit condemned to punishment, and still 



142 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

feel compassion for the sufferer ; or his compassion may lead 
him to relieve the sufferer at the sacrifice of public good. 

The same things may be said of the word patriotism or love 
of country. A man who loves his Maker or a universe more 
than his country, may still love his country and be the best of 
patriots ; or he may love his country more than God and a 
universe besides, and still be applauded for his patriotism. 

The word honor may be used in a similar manner. A man 
may love God more than the honor which cometh from men, 
and still love his reputation or character ; or he may love honor 
more than God, and though a duelist and a murderer, be ex- 
tolled as a man of honor. The same things are true of the use 
of the words kindness and benevolence. There is, as we have 
seen, a constitutional propensity in every man which can find 
its gratification in the happiness of others ; and a man may 
choose to impart happiness to others for the pleasure of seeing 
them happy, when to do so interferes with no other and higher 
selfish interest of his own, although he has not fixed his heart 
in supreme affection on the highest happiness of the universe, 
or on the glory of God ; and although the act itself only fur- 
nishes the means of vice. This is that species of kindness 
which gives money to the mendicant drunkard. Or a man 
may show kindness because his chief object is to secure the 
greatest amount of happiness to others ; or to glorify God. Or 
he may perform the same act from a regard to reputation, or 
to any other private personal end ; and the name of kindness 
may, according to an authorized use of the word, be applied to 
describe the act in each instance specified. 

Gratitude is another word which may be properly used in 
very different meanings. Sometimes it denotes merely the 
love of the gifts of a benefactor, or of him for his kindness, 
without any love of his character ; or it may denote the love 
of his gifts as this love blends with the love of his character. 

It is then quite obvious, that some of the principal terms in 
the above catalogue may, on the authority of usage, be em- 
ployed to denote widely different things. 

The other words, though used in various senses, are never 
used to denote merely constitutional propensities, since their 
objects are external acts ; but always a voluntary purpose or 
principle, or at least to include such a state of mind. Thus 
honesty denotes either a purpose to render to every one his due, 



PLEASTJKE IN GOOD ACTIONS. 143 

or the external act itself, or both. Veracity, a principle or 
purpose to speak truth, or the speaking of truth, or both ; but 
when these terms are used to denote the principle of honesty or 
of veracity, they often denote things in some respects essentially 
different. Thus, a man may purpose to be honest, and true, 
and faithful, to promote his reputation or his pecuniary interest, 
or to avoid the evils of disgrace, or poverty, or civil punish- 
ments ; or he may form this purpose from a supreme regard to 
the will and the glory of God. Nor can any one fail to see, 
that while honesty and veracity may, with propriety of lan- 
guage, as usage decides this propriety, be applied to such pur- 
poses, be the object or end of the purpose what it may, the 
purposes themselves essentially differ as their object or end 
differs. 

Should it here be said, that a man may purpose to be 
honest and truthful for the pleasure of being so, and in this 
sense be governed by the purest and best principle, I readily 
admit, that in popular language a man may be said to be hon- 
est for the pleasure he takes in being so. But the question is, 
what is the meaning of this language ? And to settle this, we 
must decide on the object which affords the pleasure. This 
must be the acts of honesty. But what is there in acts of hon- 
esty to afford pleasure to the mincl ? I answer, that they give 
pleasure as acts which, in their true nature and tendency, sub- 
serve the highest good or the glory of God. And if this be 
the pleasure proposed, his ultimate end is the glory of God, 
i. e., his principle is the same which I before described. Be- 
sides this import of the phrase, for the pleasure of being holiest, 
there is one other, — the avoidance of self-reproach in being dis- 
honest, or securing self-complacency in acts of honesty. If 
this be the motive in an enlightened mind — a mind which has 
just views of the ground of self-complacency in right moral 
action — then it implies the same thing, for no mind can find 
true self-complacency in such acts, except as they are the dic- 
tate of a supreme regard to the will and glory of God. If the 
motive be simply to avoid the fears of punishment or the pains 
of remorse, which a guilty conscience often inflicts, this is as 
truly a selfish consideration, as when the motive is worldly ad- 
vantage or any other good short of the glory of God. So that 
in whatever language we may describe the motive, the prin- 
ciple of honesty must be, as it may, either a purpose to promote 



144 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

reputation or profit, that is, some worldly inferior interest, or a 
purpose to glorify God. 

Thus it appears that the terms in the foregoing catalogue 
which have a specific import, denoting particular acts or states 
of the mind, may, according to usage, be employed to denote 
either, 

Involuntary states of the constitutional propensities sim- 
ply ; or, 

Specific volitions — acts of will — choices in which the mind 
chooses the gratification of some of its constitutional propen- 
sities. 

Besides these, I know no other meanings of these terms. 

I now proceed to show — 

2. That these things are not morally good. 

Before however, I enter into the direct examination of this 
topic, it is requisite that we decide on the true standard of 
moral goodness. After our previous discussion it is not neces- 
sary^ that we dwell long on this point. I would remark then, 
that reason and the Scriptures alike decide, that the lowest de- 
gree of moral excellence in man consists in supreme love to God. 
Eeason so decides ; for nothing is more obvious than that any 
other practical principle will sacrifice the greatest good to that 
which is less. The Scriptures so decide ; for saith our Lord, 
" He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy 
of me." And again, " He that is not for me is against me." 

Again : it must not be forgotten that man is bound to be 
actuated and governed by this great principle of supreme love 
to God, in every particular voluntary action. " Whether ye 
eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." 

Once more : the man who does not habitually act under this 
principle of supreme love to God, does uniformly and without 
exception act under the principle of the supreme love of the 
world, or of the selfish principle. No man can have two ob- 
jects of supreme affection ; and since there is no third object, 
God or the world must be supreme. " No man can serve two 
masters, for he will either hate the one and love the other, else 
he will hold to the one and despise the other. Ye cannot serve 
Gocl and mammon." 

The arguments of our opponents to show that the things in 
question are morally good, are derived from three sources, — ■ 
from an ambiguous and undefined use of the words good, lovely, 



' USE OF GOOD, LOVELY, ETC. 145 

<&c, as applied to these things / from, the nature of the things 
themselves, and from their practical results. 

(1.) Let us then examine the argument from the use of 
the words good, lovely, &c. It is then readily admitted that 
these epithets are often applied, and in real and proper im- 
port, to the things in question. But it is a vital question, 
what is this meaning ? There is a beauty in sights and sounds 
which may be called lovely • there is a natural grace in per- 
sonal accomplishments of body and mind which may be called 
lovely / but no one supposes that there is the least moral 
loveliness or excellence. A particular medicine may be pro- 
nounced good in respect to its salutary efficacy in particular 
diseases, and yet were it used as a universal nutriment of the 
human body, it might be universal death. " Fire is a good 
servant, but a bad master." So kindness and fidelity among 
a company of highwaymen may be jDronounced good by them 
in reference to their intercourse, and yet be enforced for pur- 
poses of plunder and assassination. When these terms are 
thus used, it is plain that they do not denote moral excellence 
or moral beauty. I ask then, what they mean when applied 
by our opponents to the things under consideration, and I 
insist on an answer. I am not to abandon the argument in 
deference to mere words. I concede that these things may, ac- 
cording to the authorized usage of terms, be called good, and 
lovely, and useful, and so on. But what then ? Is the beauty 
of a landscape moral loveliness f Is the goodness of an article 
in the materia medica moral goodness f Is the utility of kind- 
ness and truth practiced by a band of assassins moral excel- 
lence f 

So it is not denied that these things, contemplated as objects 
of natural beauty, and fitness, and utility, may be very justly 
pronounced lovely and good. 

If they are considered, as some of them may be, as merely 
constitutional propensities, there is in them an obvious fitness 
to the present condition and well-being of man ; for example, 
without a constitutional affection or regard for his offspring, 
what a wretched world would this be ! So too, considered 
as subordinated propensities, i. e., subordinated in their in- 
dulgence and gratification to the will and glory of God, they 
are objects of beauty and of great utility. In this form they 
are not only duly regulated and directed by the supreme love 
10 7 



14:6 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

of God, and therefore harmless, but in fact blend with it, and 
constitute together a state of mind or practical principle of 
greater power than could otherwise exist. For example, such 
love for children thus united with love to God in the parental 
bosom, is an object which we justly contemplate with an almost 
unparalleled delight, and without this associate, the love of God 
would itself be a less efficacious principle than it is in practical 
life. 

Further : the things now under consideration, received as 
voluntary states of mind, or principles of action which respect 
simply the insulated gratification of constitutional propensities, 
without any reference to the will and glory of Gocl, may in a 
comparative respect be pronounced good, although when con- 
sidered as practical principles in their true nature and ten- 
dency, and especially as compared with the purer, higher 
principle of supreme love to God, they are deformed and base, 
yet compared with other practical principles which might be 
substituted for them, they are in a high degree useful, and in 
this respect may be spoken of as good. They prompt to many 
external acts which are right, so far as external acts can be 
right without rectitude of principle — acts which in external 
form are the same which the purest, best principles would dic- 
tate. They contribute largely to the peace and happiness of 
the community in which they prevail, compared with the 
amount which would result from baser principles. Man with- 
out them, unless the love of God were to take their place, 
would be far more depraved than he is with them. They 
operate also as mutual checks on each other in respect to the 
outbreakings of crime and the desolations of human happiness. 
For example, how much sensuality and profligacy are pre- 
vented by avarice ? how much fraud and violence and murder 
by a supreme regard to reputation ? In short, were they to 
give place to any practical principle, the love of God excepted, 
the world would be w r orse than it now is ; and while men re- 
fuse to act from the only principle which is pure and holy, the 
wisdom and the goodness of God are conspicuous in render- 
ing by these principles our existence on earth so comfortable 
and happy. All this we readily concede; we feel bound to 
gratitude toward our Maker in view of it, and we welcome our 
opponents to the concession in its full length and breadth. 

It is here however to be remarked, that the concession that 



EIGHT CONCEPTION OF GOODNESS. 147 

we have just made concerning the tilings in question does not 
amount to an admission of moral excellence. Admit that they 
may with entire propriety be called good, and lovely, and ami- 
able, and charming — is there nothing which these epithets may 
be used to describe but moral excellence f Is every thing which 
is properly termed good — either as the means of good, or as 
compared with something worse, or as it prevents evils which 
something else would produce — morally good? If so, then I 
ask what is there in the universe that may not, in some one or 
all of these senses, be pronounced morally good ? For what is 
there — what sin is there which is not morally good in some one 
of these respects ? Not only are the sins of men in this world 
good in some one of these respects — for any sin might be 
worse — but the sins and the woes of the damned, as subser- 
vient to the ends of divine justice, may in this sense be pro- 
nounced good. What then is there in the fact that these things 
may be pronounced good, which shows that the word is not 
applied in a sense as remote as possible from that of moral 
goodness f And what appears in respect to our opponents 
who resort to this use of the word good as the basis of their 
argument? Nothing to show why we are not to adopt Mr. 
Hume's standard of moral excellence, and plead in extenuation 
of the charge of total depravity, the utility of athletic limbs 
and broad shoulders, or of the beauty of taper legs, or of an 
aquiline nose ; nothing to show that they do not either through 
ignorance or perverseness confound all moral distinctions, and 
like this prince of Infidels substitute a moral standard for that 
of God's revelation, according to which, moral excellence as 
truly pertains to the features of the face as to the love of God 
in the heart. 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

III.— ALL MEN AEE TOTALLY DEPRAVED.— (Continued.) 

Argument from experience and observation continued. — Traits in question are not morally good. — 
Argument on the nature of the features adduced.— Considered as simply constitutional affec- 
tions.— Eeply to objection, that not to have them is sinful —The same considered as voluntary 
practical principles.— Third source of argument— from external action.— Habitual obedience to 
God the only legitimate evidence. — Habitual violation of one command decisive against good- 
ness.— The good adduced may result from selfishness 

In the preceding lecture, I entered upon the argument to 
show that certain things in the character of unrenewed men 
are not morally good. I examined the argument of our oppo- 
nents derived from the application of the words good, lovely, 
&c, to the things in question. Two remaining sources of ar- 
gument before specified, now claim consideration. I proceed 
then — 

(2.) To examine the argument of our opponents, derived 
from the nature of the things in question. 

The first on the catalogue is " the innocence and purity of 
early childhood." Here I shall examine the various meanings 
of this phrase. If then by innocence and purity our opponents 
mean perfect obedience to the divine law, then in ascribing this 
to any human being, they contradict their own repeated decla- 
rations that all men sin — declarations which imply that none 
are innocent. Besides, they assert what they cannot prove, for 
not a human being can be found to testify that in early child- 
hood he perfectly understood and perfectly obeyed the law of 
God. If by innocence and purity they mean certain specific 
virtues which are not included in the specific enumeration, we 
have no means of ascertaining what these virtues are, nor whe- 
ther they exist, and the assertion of something undefined and 
"unknown is unworthy of notice ; or if any or all of the virtues 
included in the specific enumeration be meant, then the terms 
" innocence and purity" ascribe nothing additional to the char- 
acter, and leave us to decide simply whether these supposed 
specific virtues are real. Or if by " innocence and purity" be 



INNOCENCE AND PURITY. 149 

meant an entire exemption from sin in a moral agent without 
positive obedience to law, this is absurd and impossible, since 
in such a being innocence and purity can consist in nothing- 
short of perfect obedience to law. Or if by " innocence and 
purity" be meant exemption from some particular sins, this 
may be admitted, and yet sin may reign in the heart. Or if 
we are to understand by " innocence and purity" an entire ex- 
emption from sin or moral defilement, — previous to moral 
agency, and of course to moral action and moral character, — 
then they are not proof that the first moral action, when it is 
done, and the moral character when it is formed, is not wholly 
sinful. I now ask, whether the terms i; innocence and purity" 
can denote anv thins; but some one or more of the things which 
have been supposed ? If not, then they can describe nothing 
which can be alleged in mitigation of the charge of total de- 
pravity in the first moral character. 

I now come to the specific things in the enumeration; and 
as we have shown, some of the terms of this part of the cata- 
logue, as natural affection, compassion, kindness, honor, &c, 
may according to usage denote either simply constitutional 
propensities, whether subordinated to the glory of God or to 
some other chief end ; or voluntary acts — choices to gratify these 
propensities without any regard to any higher end. 

Considered then as constitutional propensities, we say there 
is nothing morally good in them. Common sense decides that 
no moral quality pertains to a mere constitutional desire for 
the welfare of a child, or for reputation, or for the relief of suf- 
fering, for the promotion of others' happiness — more than to 
such a desire for food or drink, or than to the circulation of 
the blood, or the operation of the digestive organs. Again: 
substantially the same propensities belong to the irrational 
animals — to the lion and the tiger, the sheep and the dove, as 
well as to man. Further : if moral goodness pertain to these 
constitutional propensities, then the greater their strength and 
the more they are excited, and the greater their practical in- 
fluence, the greater the degree of their moral goodness. A 
parent who sacrifices his country from the strength of his affec- 
tion for his child, has more of this virtue than if he loved his 
child less ; and the hero or conqueror who devastates king- 
doms from the love of glory, is more virtuous than if he loved 
his reputation less. If it be said that this is excess in these 



150 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

propensities, I admit it ; still it shows either that moral good- 
ness is in its own nature liable to excess, even to that which is 
sinful, — in other words, that either moral goodness ma) 7 exist 
in so great a degree as to become itself sin, or that in these 
constitutional propensities there is no moral goodness. Once 
more : that considered simply as constitutional propensities 
they have no moral quality, is evident from the consideration 
that they do not decide whether the subject will duly regulate 
them in reference to the supreme good, or seek their insulated 
gratification. The fact that a man has a constitutional appe- 
tite for food does not make it certain that he will be a glutton, 
so neither does his constitutional love of his offspring determine 
whether he will love them excessively or not. He may do the 
one or he may do the other with the same constitutional pro- 
pensity. Let him do which he will, the constitutional propen- 
sity remains with all its inherent moral excellence, if it possess 
any such excellence ; and however much of a glutton or sot 
he may become, the constitutional propensity that prompts 
to his vicious indulgence is morally excellent. The same re- 
mark applies to every other constitutional propensity. If the 
constitutional propensities as such are morally good, they are 
so whether they be indulged to excess or restrained within due 
limits. Of course, as man cannot commit wickedness without 
proposing the gratification of some constitutional propensity, — 
nor of course without being the subject of such propensity, — 
he cannot therefore commit a crime without being the subject 
of some degree of moral excellence in the very act. Yea, ac- 
cording to a previous principle, the stronger the constitutional 
propensity which leads to the wicked choice and deed, the 
greater in this respect is his moral excellence. Thus there is a 
physical impossibility that a man should be wholly sinful in 
the perpetration of any crime ; and not only so, but the more 
violent the constitutional propensity that prompts to it, the 
greater is the moral excellence which in this respect adorns 
his character. And then how good and lovely such propensi- 
ties appear when they exist in the highest degree, and acquire 
such strength (for of such they are susceptible) as shall prompt 
both the purpose and the deed, which shall sacrifice God and 
the universe to their own insulated gratification ! 

But it will be said that Paul (Bom. i. 31, and 2 Tim. iii. 3) 
has decided that the destitution of these things is sinful, and 



PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES. 151 

that it follows therefore that they are morally good. I answer 
that the apostle has not affirmed that the absence of these 
things is sinful ; mere destitution is nothing, and to speak of 
it as mere destitution, and as implying no positive state of 
mind, and yet as sinful, would be to talk nonsense. So does 
not the apostle talk, nor any other sound moralist. He asserts 
nothing more, than that to be without natural affection is proof 
of great wickedness. But does it follow from this, that if they 
had not been without it, they would have possessed moral 
goodness ? Suppose a man has destroyed his constitutional 
appetite for food by intemperate drinking — does this prove 
that if he had not destroyed it, that it would have graced his 
character with some degree of moral excellence ? Plainly not ; 
he may still consult its gratification in gluttonous excess. 
Doubtless to extinguish or to smother into absolute inactivity 
any of our constitutional tendencies is sinful. It implies some 
voluntary act, the object or tendency of which is to destroy 
that which ought to be consecrated to useful purposes. To 
destroy any of my bodily members voluntarily evinces a sinful 
purpose, but shall we therefore concede to the casuistry that 
pronounces our features or our limbs, if well-formed, actual 
virtues ? Man may doubtless so smother, perhaps extinguish, 
his natural affection for his offspring by debauchery and ex- 
cess, that it shall have no practical influence, and thus be guilty 
of great wickedness ; but he may also cherish that propensitv 
of his nature, and consult supremely its gratification, and blas- 
pheme God for crossing it, and be as wicked as had he destroyed 
it. If the want of natural affection then proves a high degree 
of wickedness, its existence is consistent with an equal degree 
of it. How then is it shown to be morally good ? 

It remains now to examine the things under consideration as 
vohmtary practical principles, in which the mind fixes its pref- 
erence on the gratification of some constitutional propensity 
without the least regard to the supreme good. We have al- 
ready shown that the terms used to describe these " good 
things," as they are called, may denote simply such acts of 
preference. The question is, are these morally good? This 
cannot be pretended, in view of the true standard of moral ex- 
cellence. According to this, no act or state of mind can be 
morally good, unless it be the supreme love of God, or in its 
complex meaning involve and be dictated by such love. But 



152 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

the acts now spoken of, it will not be pretended, are either the 
love of God itself, or that they involve it, and are dictated by it. 

They do not in their own nature essentially imply or include 
the love of God, or even a thought of him. May not a man 
love his parents, or his children, or his neighbors, — may he not 
prefer to be honest, temperate, true, &c, without the least re- 
gard to God ? Every one's own consciousness answers this 
question. Of course these affections, purposes, or principles, 
designated by the terms natural affection, temperance, veracity, 
kindness, &c, do not in their own nature necessarily imply the 
least moral goodness. I go further, and ask whether these 
principles and affections, as their nature is evinced to every one 
by his own consciousness, are not consistent with overt or direct 
enmity toward God ? May not a man, for example, love his 
child so much as to hate any being who should take away from 
him the object of his affection, though that being be God him- 
self ? Now, without insisting on the positive sinfulness of such 
an affection for a child, I ask, has it, in its own nature, any 
moral goodness 1 Has an affection in its nature any thing 
morally good which is consistent with enmity to God ? Plainly 
not. Here then our opponents have no alternative but either 
to deny the law of God to be the standard of moral excellence, 
or the universal decisions of human consciousness. If they 
deny the former, we shall leave them to a willful denial of the 
plainest of all truth, which exempts us from the obligation of fur- 
ther argument. If they deny the latter — the decision of human 
consciousness — we ask them to produce their witness, the man 
who will testify that he never could love his child at all, without 
also loving God supremely ; or rather that, in his experience, 
the former affection necessarily involves the latter. 

(3.) I proceed to examine the third source of argument, the 
practical results / in other words, the argument from external 
action. This is considered by our opponents as quite decisive 
of the goodness of the principles. Thus Dr. \Yare asserts with 
confidence, that he has seen in children much to approve ; and 
with the same positiveness, that even in the worst of men good 
feelings and principles predominate. It is hardly supposable 
that Dr. Ware should pretend to any knowledge of the nature 
of these principles as they exist in children and the worst of men, 
by direct inspection of their hearts. . The question then is con- 
fined to external action, as the expression of internal principle s, 



HABITUAL OBEDIENCE. 153 

and is simply this, whether the external acts of kindness to 
kindred, friends, neighbors, and fellow-beings — acts of honesty, 
veracity, cv/c, in the common intercourse of life, are legitimate 
evidence of the least moral" goodness. 

1. Obedience habitually universal to God's commandments 
being known to ks, is the only legitimate evidence of holy prin- 
ciple (John xv. 14, and xiv. 15-23 ; 1 John v. 18). Such is 
the nature of the human mind, that right moral principle will 
maintain an habitual influence on the external deportment. 
At the same time, incidental or occasional aberrations from the 
path of duty are not inconsistent with the existence of right 
moral principle. This is the only criterion by which we are 
authorized to pronounce any man good, or as having any cor- 
rect moral principle. That we may apply the principle of judg- 
ing in any case, so much of the deportment of an individual 
must fall under our observation, as to satisfy us that he habitu- 
ally renders a universal obedience to God's commandments. 
Our mere ignorance that he does any thing inconsistent with 
such habitual obedience, through a partial and limited knowl- 
edge of his deportment, will not authorize us to pronounce 
him influenced by correct moral principle. TTe must have 
positive evidence, and this must be furnished by such an ac- 
quaintance with the general course of action or conduct, that 
there shall be no room for rational doubt that good moral prin- 
ciple governs the man. 

There is a certain course of external deportment which, in 
itself, as it falls under our observation, is no evidence for or 
against correct moral principle, and forbids us to form a deci- 
sive judgment. So far as it falls under our observation, it may, 
on the one hand, be quite unexceptionable, and yet we may 
see and know so little of the man, as to be utterly unable to 
pronounce concerning his principles of action ; i. e., according to 
the first rule now given, we may not know that he does or that 
he does not render an habitual, unreserved obedience to all 
God's commandments. On the other hand, some single act 
may fall under our observation, which in itself is decidedly 
sinful, and yet a more extended acquaintance with the deport- 
ment of the individual might require us to believe him habitu- 
ally governed by rectitude of principle. In such cases we are 
bound not to judge at all. 

2. Anv allowed or habitual violation of one of God's com- 



154: HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

mandments, is decisive proof of the total want of correct moral 
principle (James ii. 10). The equity of this test rests on the 
fact, that allegiance to God is but one and a universal principle ; 
one allowed act of disobedience shows therefore an utter des- 
titution of such a principle, and that when the will of the crea- 
ture and the will of the Creator come into competition, the 
right of superiority is awarded to the former, and God de- 
throned from the supremacy which belongs to him. 

It ought here to be remarked, that in many cases in which 
we are authorized to decide nothing positively, we may so far 
presume that a man is or is not governed by right principles, 
as to regulate our own conduct in reference to him according 
to such a presumption. But such a presumption is widely 
different from a pretended infallible judgment, founded on 
legitimate evidence. 

In the admission of members into the Christian church, we 
proceed not on the principle that we can pronounce or even 
form a confident judgment of the personal piety of the individ- 
uals, but on the ground that they propose to perform an act 
appropriate to real Christians, and that we have no evidence 
that such is not their character. 

I now proceed to the inquiry, whether according to these 
only legitimate rules of judging of the moral principles of 
others from their external conduct, we are authorized to pro- 
nounce the particular external conduct under consideration, 
evidence of such principles in the heart. 

1. In applying the first rule, the question is, whether allow- 
ing all that can be claimed, it will furnish the requisite evi- 
dence of an habitual universal obedience to God's command- 
ments. And I answer, that the acts themselves obviously do 
not amount to that which the rule requires. 

2. In applying the second rule, the question is, whether it 
does not, in the case supposed, absolutely forbid us to pro- 
nounce the principle of the conduct to be good or bad, i. e., for- 
bid us to form an opinion. It certainly must be admitted on the 
one hand that the external conduct now alleged in proof of cor- 
rect moral principle may exist, and as it falls under our obser- 
vation be no proof of a bad moral principle. All that we see 
may be quite unexceptionable. We go further (since the case 
now supposes that we know the moral history of the individual 
but imperfectly), and readily admit that all that we do know of 



MO HAL GOODNESS NOT PROVED. 155 

him is quite consistent with correct moral principle, — that it is 
that which does mark the deportment of every good man, and 
therefore forbids us to pronounce that the subject of it has not 
such a character. But does it at the same time authorize us to 
pronounce that he is a good man f This is the question, and 
the one on which the main inquiry chiefly depends. I answer 
then, that the simple facts now alleged, being all that is known, 
we are not authorized, but forbidden to pronounce that the 
subject possesses the least moral goodness. 

This position rests on the principle, that all that we know of 
the individual may be the dictate of mere selfishness. This I 
prove — 

First, from the Scriptures (Matt. x. 37, and Luke xiv. 26). 
Now these and similar declarations undeniably prove that nat- 
ural affection may be supreme in the heart, and thus preclude 
the least regard to the authority of God. 

The story of the young ruler seems to have been put on 
record for the express purpose of correcting the error of our 
opponents on this subject. Never did all that is attractive and 
imposing in the natural character of man blend in higher per- 
fection than in that of this lovely youth. Yet when the Sav- 
iour applied to his heart the true test of allegiance to God, how 
was the emptiness of all his boasted virtues detected ! Did he 
yield a ready compliance — a cheerful submission to an ac- 
knowledged command of the Most High ? ^Was he ready to 
sell all and give to the poor, and take up his cross and follow 
Christ \ He was sad at the utterance of such a requisition, and 
went away grieved, for he had great possessions. The com- 
ment of our Lord was, " How hardly shall they that have 
riches enter into the kino-dom of God I" Here then is brought 
out the most determined ungodliness of heart — a selfish, sordid 
attachment to riches — which rejected a known command of 
God, and showed that his authority was excluded from the 
whole inner man. The same amiable qualities then, with the 
same fatal deficiency, may exist in other men. 

The apostle has carried this principle still further. Thus he 
says, " though I bestow," &c. (1 Cor. xiii. 3). 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

IV.— ALL MEN AKE TOTALLY DEPRAVED.— {Continued.) 

Argument continued from experience and observation. — The good characteristics alleged are con- 
sidered in childhood and in adults. — Shown to be positively sinful, so far as they have any 
moral quality, by the nature of moral action and the true principles of judging of it. 

The object of the present Lecture is to show, that the argu- 
ment from experience and observation fully and unanswerably 
supports the doctrine of the total depravity of man. 

This I shall attempt to show from the nature of those things 
which are alleged to the contrary, and from the true rule of 
judging of moral character. 

It is here proper to remark, that that class of men who pro- 
fess to be, or may be supposed to be, the subjects of a change 
of moral character by grace, are not to be included in the argu- 
ment. They are exceptions according to the statement of our 
doctrine. 

I shall pursue the argument in reference to children and 
those of more advanced age. 

I. In reference to children. 

We are told that " innocence and purity" are characteristics 
of early childhood ; and the meaning is, that they are innocent 
and pure before they form a moral character. This allegation 
then, has nothing to do with the question, since we can form 
no estimate of moral character before moral character exists. 

Again : it is said that infants early show affection, and grati- 
tude, and attachment to those from whom they receive kind- 
ness. And who does not ? It is the striking characteristic of 
sinners, that they love those that love them ; and though these 
terms may denote other than mere selfish affections, yet we 
have shown that we are not authorized from such ambiguous 
manifestations, .to assert that the things thus described proceed 
from a right moral principle. We must know something more 
then of children before we can, with a proper warrant, decide 
the question at issue. What then is the fact, when there is a 



CHILDREN WITHOUT MORAL GOODNESS. 157 

full development of the governing principle to our observation ? « 
They show affection and attachment, it is said, to those who 
show them kindness, which they would do on the supposition 
of their total depravity. But how is it with respect to those 
who do not show them kindness — when even those who give 
them the highest proofs of affection cross their inclinations ? 
We see a decided spirit of selfishness, manifested in acts of dis- 
satisfaction, resistance, and violence ; and not only no manifes- 
tations of right principle, but such manifestations of the selfish 
principle as oblige us to pronounce them wholly under its in- 
fluence. 

It is said that infants are not cruel, but that a child takes 
pleasure in torturing insects from gratification afforded by wit- 
nessing violent motion, &c, and that by an appeal to his com- 
passion he is easily made to desist. The fact implied, that a 
child never tortures an insect with a knowledge of its suffer- 
ings, is palpably false. That peculiarly forcible appeals to their 
compassion and sympathy will often overcome the power of 
the temptation, at least for the moment, is admitted. If the 
assertion, that a child never tortures an insect from mere 
cruelty, mean that he never does it from the pleasure felt in 
mere suffering, this is also admitted ; and it is also admitted 
and maintained, that no such principle exists in any human 
bosom. There is no such thing as cruelty or malignity consist- 
ing in delight in mere suffering. Every human being has a 
constitutional susceptibility to the happiness of all sentient be- 
ings. To suppose a corresponding susceptibility to the misery 
of other beings per se, is to suppose a contradiction ; that is, we 
should be capable of loving and hating the same thing in the 
same respect. But cruelty, if it exist at all, must proceed from 
the purpose to gratify, as it is supposed to do in the present 
case, some innocent propensity. What then shall we say of 
such a purpose to inflict torture on insects ? "What is the dif- 
ference, in point of principle, between this and the purpose to 
take the life of a fellow-being, to gratify our innocent propen- 
sity for wealth or honor ? In both cases it is barefaced selfish- 
ness. I need not say that it is a selfishness always witnessed in 
children, and the objection admits it. ISTor need I add, that 
thus witnessed, it obliges us to affirm that they are completely 
selfish. 

Again : the proneness of children to falsehood, it is said, is 



158 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

•the result of example, education, and circumstances. The reply 
to this is, that example and education are a part of the circum- 
stances ; and if children in their circumstances, as soon as they 
discover the connection between falsehood and their own sel- 
fish interests, lie and deceive, then it is proof which obliges us 
to decide that they are supremely selfish. 

"Without considering other particulars in the conduct of chil- 
dren, these are enough for our purpose. Taking then the very 
account given of these things by our opponents themselves, 
they are selfishness in as palpable forms as it can exist. That 
these characteristics are to be found in all children, at least so 
early as we are warranted from observation to form any judg- 
ment at all of their moral character, will not be denied. But 
they are acts which bespeak the entire selfishness of the heart, 
and require us so to judge according to the rule which the 
Scriptures give and reason sanctions. 

In confirmation of the supreme selfishness of children, I might 
refer to the constant and indispensable necessity of an appeal to 
their selfishness, in some form, to prevent its outbreak in others. 
" He that spareth the rod, hateth his son," &c. (vide Prov. xiii. 
2-A). An analysis of all that influence which restrains children 
and youth from vice, would show that it consists wholly in those 
considerations which address the selfish principle, and that the 
love of God is not in them. 

TVe might also rest an argument equally conclusive on the 
decisive manifestations by children of an indifference and aver- 
sion to God. 

"We say then, that the very characteristics of children which 
are alleged as virtuous, are mere operations of the selfish prin- 
ciple, and that, according to the rule of judgment which we 
have stated, the proof is absolute and decisive of the supreme 
selfishness of the human heart in early childhood. 

I proceed to consider — 

II. The moral character of man in more advanced age. 

Here it is to be remarked, that some of the characteristics 
alleged in extenuation of the charge of depravity, are them- 
selves mere operations of the selfish principle. But while some 
of these characteristics are mere operations of selfishness, and 
as such decisive of the selfish principle, there are others, as 
honesty, truth, and kindness to neighbors, which cannot be 
pronounced, from the nature of them simply, to be the effects 



ADULTS HATE XO MOKE. 159 

of selfish principle. They may be selfish or they may not be, 
so far as the nature of them determines. To prove that they are 
so, we must resort to collateral evidence and the application of 
the true rule of judgment. 

This is true of the so-called natural affections. These are 
merely selfish so far as they have any moral quality. For it is 
to be remarked, that natural affection, contemplated as a physi- 
cal property, or as subordinated to the love of God as it is 
in good men, has no more moral quality than the propensity 
for food. The want of it is not sin, but only an evidence of a 
sinful heart, as refusing to take food would be. 

Here the precise question is (with the exception already 
made), whether, in every case in which we are authorized to 
judge of moral character, we are not obliged to pronounce on 
the existence of the selfish principle to the exclusion of all love 
to God. X ow to authorize a positive judgment, our knowledge 
of the individual must be either perfect, extending minutely to 
his whole moral history, or if imperfect, it must extend to 
something which in its own nature is decisive of moral prin- 
ciple. 

That we have that perfect knowledge of any individual which 
will enable us to judge of his moral principle on the ground of 
such knowledge, cannot be easily believed. Imperfect how- 
ever as it is, have we not known in the most faultless of those 
of our acquaintance, in whom there is no reason to believe that 
renewing grace has produced any change of moral character, 
something which amounts to unequivocal proof that the love of 
God is not in them ? Yiewing their moral character as it is by 
nature, as it has been independently of any transformation 
from the commencement of moral agency, has not a moderate 
familiarity furnished us the knowledge of some known, habitual 
sin, either of omission or of commission ? With all that is fair 
and unexceptionable, with the exactest honesty and truth, with 
great liberality to the poor, with compassion for the suffering, 
and great assiduity in promoting the temporal well-being of a 
family or neighborhood, have we not found a neglected closet 
or Bible, or some habitual sensuality, or an utter worldliness of 
spirit, or insensibility to the spiritual and eternal interests of 
fellow-beiugs, or constant violation of the duties of the Sabbath, 
or at the least, a decisive indifference or aversion to all com- 
munion with God in the ways of his appointment ? If our 



160 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

knowledge has extended to these things (and if not, we are 
not competent to make a decision), have we not actually found 
some one or more of them palpably marking the deportment of 
the individual, and proving beyond a doubt that his hear: U 
not right with God ? There can, I think, be but one answer to 
this question. "What then is the legitimate conclusion from our 
experience and observation, with respect to the moral character 
of man ? When so moderate a familiarity with others as we 
have now supposed, detects in those of the most blameless ex- 
ternal deportment such decisive marks of ungodliness of heart, 
when all our acquaintance whom we know equally well are 
below these in the scale of morality, when there are other hun- 
dreds or thousands of whom we know still less, furnishing still 
more unequivocal proofs of the same fact, what is the legiti- 
mate conclusion respecting the moral character of man from 
experience and observation ? Does not the mind at once rest 
in this result, that similar knowledge of all would detect 
similar proof of ungodliness, which this degree of knowledge 
discovers in the most faultless of those who are known ? Shall 
we be told that the fairest specimens have not fallen under our 
observation, and that others have witnessed what we have not? 
But this is denying the evidence of our experience, and making 
the experience of others, or rather their testimony concerning 
their experience, the test of truth. But we will admit the tes- 
timony, and challenge our opponent to produce the individual 
whose moral character by nature is unstained by any allowed 
or habitual sin. If he is to testify concerning his experience, 
this must be his testimony. He must not say that there are those 
whom he does not knoio to be thus guilty, unless he testifies 
that he does know their entire moral history, for this would be 
testimony of mere ignorance, when it must be the result of a per- 
fect knowledge of the whole man, and positive to the point of 
his entire exemption from any known habitual sin. But such 
testimony cannot be adduced. The proof then from our own 
experience remains unimpaired. It is all to one single point. 
the entire selfishness of 'the heart, and that in cases, so far as 
there is any evidence to the fact, of the most faultless human 
characters, and there is not a particle of evidence to the con- 
trary. All that can be said with any pretense of weakening 
our conclusion is, that there are cases to which our knowledge 
does not extend, and concerning: which, from actual knowledge. 



THIS PRINCIPLE CONCEDED IN PRACTICAL LIFE. 161 

we come to no conclusion. But what does such ignorance 
amount to ? "What if all that I know of one individual is, that 
he is externally blameless in regard to honesty, and truth, and 
charity ; and that knowing more of another who in these respects 
is equally blameless, I know that he is without the love of God, 
does this prove that the former possesses it ? And if, in every 
similar case in which my knowledge is more extended than in 
regard to the first individual, I find all with the moral charac- 
ter of the second, have I not good reason to conclude that the 
first is in the same predicament I 

Here an important principle which the human mind unper- 
verted, unavoidably adopts, and which the Scriptures teach, 
may be introduced as giving absolute conclusiveness to the 
argument : ;i As in water face answereth to face, so the heart 
of man to man " (Prov. xxvii. 19). 

On the foregoing principle rests the conclusiveness of the 
argument from the history of man, as made known to us by 
written records or oral testimony. In these ways we come to 
the knowledge of facts which prove depravity, and we find none 
which impair the evidence from those which are known. — (Ed- 
wards on Original Sin, chap, i sees. 6, 7, 8 ; D wight's Theology, 
Serms. 29, 30.) 

Having thus shown the proper application of the true rule 
or principle of judging of moral character, I shall now attempt 
to show, that all men adopt this principle and make this appli- 
cation of it in reference to the very characteristics under con- 
sideration, in all cases in which they can be supposed to form 
an impartial judgment of human character. 

On this subject it is believed that there is no want of evi- 
dence, but rather a want of candor — not so much error in what 
men in fact believe, as there is difficulty in bringing them to 
confess it. We are not willing to criminate others when our 
sentence condemns ourselves. Still we believe the truth and 
the evidence may be obtained, and that it may be made to ap- 
pear, that notwithstanding the common denial of our doctrine 
in words, the actions of men. which speak louder than words, 
decisivelv show the belief of it. Xow there is such a thins: as 
what we term a knowledge of human nature — a knowledge of 
man as man. It supposes certain laws of voluntary action, cer- 
tain principles which are common to all ; and the science of 
human nature is especially conversant with these laws and 
11 



162 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

principles, and presupposes that here is a field capable of be- 
ing explored, and that in it actual and certain discoveries may 
be made. The field is actually explored by every man, and to 
a certain extent with entire success, so that there is in fact 
no subject better understood by mankind generally, than the 
commanding practical principle of human nature. The key to 
the discoveries is, that " as face answereth to face in water, so the 
heart of man to man." And while each possesses such a knowl- 
edge of his own heart, and traces the actions of others in their 
true bearings, he discovers in these unequivocal manifestations 
a perfect accordance between one heart and every other. The 
knowledge is of great practical utility, and is in fact the basis 
and the directory of all the intercourse between man and man. 
Nor in making this estimate of human nature, that is, of man, 
is the uniform conclusion respecting his governing principle at 
all weakened by any exceptions in the case of the sanctified. 
These are so few in number, and the manifestations of another 
and a better spirit are so feeble, fluctuating, and doubtful, that 
to keep on the safe side of the question, in all practical judg- 
ments, these exceptions are not taken into the account. Here 
then let the inquiry be made, what is the estimate which men 
form for all the practical purposes of human intercourse, of the 
commanding practical principle of human nature ? Let the in- 
quiry be made in reference to the manifestation of that principle 
in those acts of honesty, truth, and kindness, which are regarded 
by many as such lovely features in human nature. If it appear 
that they do in fact decide, and that they decide according to 
the true rule of judgment, that these are the dictates of pure 
selfishness, and in as palpable forms as in acts of rapine and 
murder, then the question must be settled 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

V.— OEIGINAL SIN.— VIEWS. 

Imputation as a general term.— Not held by the Jews.— Nor by the Greek Church.— Originated in 
a mistake of Augustine.— Imputation as now used has five significations.— General form in which 
original sin is received by the Orthodox. — Five different forms in which it is taught. — Import- 
ance attached to some of them by some parties among the Orthodox. 

The doctrine of Original Sin lias been held by theologians in 
a variety of forms. So different have been these particular 
forms of the doctrine, that it is difficult to present one which 
is general and shall be common to them all. The most general 
form in which it has been held is, that as a consequence of the 
sin of Adam, a corrupt or depraved nature is propagated to all 
his posterity. Some who advocate the truth of this general 
statement, maintain that this corrupt nature is sinful and ill- 
deserving, while others deny its sinfulness and ill-desert, and 
regard it as corrupt or depraved only as leading to sin with 
its ill-desert. Those who maintain this propagated nature to 
be sinful and ill-deserving, have adopted different views of the 
mode in which it becomes thus sinful. These, or the more 
prominent and important of them, may be comprised under 
the general doctrine of Imputation y at least as some have 
chosen to use this word, though as I think, improperly. 

It has been claimed that the doctrine of the Imputation of 
Adam's sin to his posterity was held by the Jews. The Old 
Testament however, gives not the least support to such an opin- 
ion ; while the Chaldaic Paraphrases go no further in the lan- 
guage which they use on the subject, than the idea that tem- 
poral death comes on his posterity, on the principle that had 
they been in the same circumstances as Adam, they would have 
done as he did, — a principle, as some may suppose, like that of 
Paul in Heb. vii. 9, 10 : " And as I may so say, Levi also, 
who receive th tithes, paid tithes in Abraham ; for he was yet 
in the loins of his father," &c. How far this quasi assertion 
of the apostle can have any thing to do with any doctrine of 
imputed sin, it may be difficult to see. 



164 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

In the ancient Greek Church, the doctrine of Imputation can- 
not be found. Origen, Chiysostom, and Cyril considered tem- 
poral death in this world, not as the punishment but as a con- 
sequence of the sin of Adam. " The Latin Church, on the other 
hand," sajs Knapp, " was the proper seat of the strict doctrine 
of Imputation." This writer, after ascribing the origin of 
the doctrine to the false mode of interpreting the words of Paul 
in Kom. v. 12, 13, and particularly to the rendering of i<f>' w, in 
quo by the Vulgate, says, " This opinion was then associated 
with some peculiar philosophical ideas then prevalent in the 
West, and from the whole, a doctrine cle Imputatione was 
formed in a sense wholly unknown to the Hebrews, to the New 
Testament, and to the Grecian Church." He adds — " We may 
hence see the reason of the fact, that the Grecian teachers, e. g., 
those in Palestine, took sides with Pelagius against the teachers 
of the African Church." 

As the word Imputation lias been and is still used, there are 
several different forms of it. The more prominent of these are 
the following: — (1.) The proper doctrine of Imputation as 
taught by Augustine, and maintained by the western churches, 
and in their symbols. (2.) The doctrine of Imputation by rep- 
resentation or federal headship, as taught by some Lutheran 
theologians, and by Witsius in his Economy of the Covenants. 
(Yide Knapp, vol. 2, p. 19.) (3.) The doctrine of Imputation 
as founded on the scientia media of God, or his foresight of the 
consent of posterity in Adam's sin. (1.) The doctrine of Im- 
putation by the sovereign transfer of Adam's sin to his pos- 
terity, as taught in a work highly recommended by some divines 
in this country, published under the title of " Gethsemane." 
(5.) The doctrine called by Dr. Owen, Putation — that God con- 
siders and treats the posterity of Adam as if they were guilty, 
or had committed his sin ; meaning, that they are guilty of 
that sin only as being liable to punishment on account of it. 
How these different forms of the doctrine called the Imputa- 
tion of Adam's sin to his posterity may, as they have been ex- 
plained by their different advocates, run into each other, it 
may be difficult if not useless to determine. I propose such 
notice of each, by fuller explanation, and also by some par- 
ticular examination of them, as shall at least enable you to 
j^.dge of their truth by comparing them with the teachings of 
the Word of God. I shall begin with what I consider the more 



IMPUTATION. 165 

proper form of the doctrine. This I deem an important pre- 
liminary inquiry to our investigation of the doctrine of the total 
depravity of man by nature. 

The object of our inquiry then, is to ascertain the general 
form of this doctrine as taught by the Reformers and those who, 
after them, have adopted their views, and also the changes and 
modifications it has undergone by a class of Orthodox theolo- 
gians within the last forty or fifty years, especially in Xew 
England. The general form of this doctrine as taught by the 
Reformers, and as it has extensively prevailed among the Ortho- 
dox since their time, may be thus stated, viz., that all men 
have a corrupt and sinful nature by birth, which nature is cor- 
rupted in Adam. 

Rightly to understand the import of this statement of the 
doctrine, it is necessary to consider it in two parts : one, the 
corrupt nature of men, which, though considered in itself, or 
abstractly from our connection with Adam, is not sinful and 
deserving of punishment, is yet considered as evil and perni- 
cious, as it tends infallibly to that sin or moral evil which does 
deserve punishment. The other part of the doctrine respects 
the manner in which this nature is truly and properly esteemed 
sinful by our connection with Adam. This connection with 
Adam, according to this doctrine, amounted to a constituted 
oneness between Adam and all his posterity, so that when Adam 
sinned by knowingly and freely transgressing the divine law, 
and thus corrupting his nature, all his descendants did in God's 
estimation also sin in the same manner, thus corrupting their 
nature. Hence they, being one with Adam, quoad hoc, though 
very diverse from him in other respects, are born with a nature 
which is sinful and corrupt, and which has become so, exactly 
in that manner in which Adam's nature became corrupt. 

While this form of the doctrine of Original Sin, or depravity 
by nature, has been most prevalent among the Orthodox since 
the time of Augustine, yet it has been held and taught under 
some diversity of modification by different individuals of the 
same school at different periods. So far as I know, it had how- 
ever not received any important modification as adopted by 
any considerable portion of the Orthodox community, until 
since the time of Dr. Hopkins and Dr. Edwards. For the last 
forty or fifty years, the doctrine has undergone considerable 
modifications in this country, especially in Hew England, till 



166 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

the Orthodox clergy in New England almost universally, and to 
a considerable extent in other parts of this country, have re- 
jected at least one important part of the doctrine, viz., that 
which represents Adam's posterity as one in him and sinning 
in him. While these have agreed in the rejection of this part 
of the doctrine, and would also agree in some very general 
forms of stating the doctrine of total depravity by nature, they 
would differ widely in respect to their more specific forms of 
statement. 

The more prominent and different specific forms of the doc- 
trine of Original Sin, so far as, in my view, they demand par- 
ticular notice, are the following : 

1. The doctrine of Imputation as taught by Augustine.* 

2. The doctrine of Putation as taught by the Princeton 
school, by Storr, and others. 

3. The doctrine of a created or propagated sinful nature, 
sometimes called Physical Depravity. 

4. The doctrine of a corrupt nature not sinful, but resulting 
in sin in all cases. 

5. The doctrine of voluntary sin, traced by some to divine 
efficiency, and by others to the innocent constitutional propen- 
sities of man in his circumstances. Whether however, this 
fifth form, in either of its more specific forms, can be properly 
called original sin, may be supposed by some to admit of a 
question. Dr. Emmons maintained the first sin of Adam to be 
the only original sin. As the sin with which the subsequent 
sin of the race is in some manner connected as a consequence, 
the New Haven divines would probably consent to call it the 
original sin. But in respect to any original sin as a predicate 
of Adam's descendants, they would perhaps agree to call the 
first sinful volition, or act of each individual, original sin. 
Hitherto they have designated nothing by the phrase. They 
maintain still the general doctrine, that all men are totally de- 
praved by nature, and this in its true Orthodox meaning ; and on 
this ground claim, on this subject, an Orthodox standing. 

In respect to these different specific views, it cannot be pre- 
tended, in my own opinion, that, strictly speaking, any one of 



* The doctrine of " Spermatic Animalcules," as maintained by some, or that 
the race were seminally in Adam, as taught by Dr. Gill and others, I shall pass 
without further notice. — (Vide ' ; Knapp's Theology," vol. ii. p. 49.) 



WHAT IS ESSENTIAL TO ORTHODOXY. 167 

them is essential to Orthodoxy, since they are each of them 
adopted to the exclusion of every other by those who are 
ranked among the Orthodox, and since they all agree in that 
general form of the doctrine which is opposed by the anti- 
orthodox. When the question is, what is Orthodoxy on this 
point? the answer should be such as all who are properly 
esteemed Orthodox would subscribe to ; since, on any other 
principle, the Orthodox are distinguished from the Orthodox, 
and not from the opposers of Orthodoxy. 

The general forms of stating the doctrine to which the Ortho- 
dox as a class or party would subscribe, are such as these, viz., 
that all men are depraved hy nature / that all mankind come 
into the world in such a state, that without the interposition of 
Divine grace, they will sin in every instance of moral action. 
All who should subscribe to these would be Orthodox quoad 
hoc, all who should deny would not be. 

With respect to two of the above-named specific statements, 
viz., physical depravity and constitutional propensities, I know 
not that any have pretended that either is essential to Ortho- 
doxy, whatever they may have supposed to be essential to 
truth. With respect to the^s^ and third, viz., that of our one- 
ness in Adam, and that of physical depravity, etc., each is 
strenuously maintained by the opposers of Orthodoxy, and by 
some among the Orthodox themselves, to be essential to Ortho- 
doxy. Whether it be so or not, seems to be the only point 
which it is necessary to decide that we may answer the ques- 
tion before us, viz., what is the Orthodox doctrine of Original 
Sin ? The inquiries are two, viz. : First, is the doctrine of our 
oneness in Adam and sinning in him essential to Orthodoxy ? 
This inquiry is answered by the fact already stated, that this 
doctrine has not only been denied for a long time by the Ortho- 
dox of New England, but is also denied extensively, probably 
by a majority of the Orthodox clergy of the United States. 

The other inquiry, viz., whether physical depravity be essen- 
tial to Orthodoxy, is the topic of principal interest. Decided 
by the undeniable fact, though very many of the Orthodox 
ministry and Churches have believed and strenuously inculcated 
this doctrine, there is no pretense that it has obtained the sanc- 
tion of any Orthodox Confession of Faith, or is to any extent 
worthy of the notice of standard Orthodox writers. To the 
representation that some of this class of theologians held this 



168 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

doctrine, some plausibility may perhaps be given by garbled 
quotations from their writings, or by unguarded passages which 
are plainly inconsistent with fuller statements of their views. 
The doctrine never became a test of Orthodoxy even in New 
England. It was indeed taught by Dr. Burton, of Vermont, 
who published a volume in its defense. It was however, 
strenuously opposed by Dr. Hopkins and Dr. Emmons, and 
their disciples, among whom were many of the more prominent 
divines of the country, who, though maintaining that all sin 
consists in the volitions or voluntary exercises of the mind, 
never suffered in their reputation for Orthodox}'. Indeed, they 
themselves strenuously insisted that they were the only con- 
sistent Calvinists. Hopkinsionism was indeed strongly disap- 
proved by many of the Presbyterian Church, but chiefly on 
the ground of other peculiarities of doctrine, resignation and 
Divine efficiency, rather than for holding the exercise scheme. 
These different forms of the doctrine of Original Sin, I pro- 
pose to examine hereafter. I deem it however highly impor- 
tant, in the mean time, to ascertain with precision the form ot 
this doctrine, as taught by Augustine, and maintained by the 
Reformers and the Reformed Churches, with unimportant ex- 
ceptions, till the present time, and as uncontradicted by any 
considerable portion of this Church, except in New England, in 
the time of Hopkins, Emmons, the younger Edwards, and 
others who followed them. 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

VL— OEIGINAL SIN. 
Views of Augustine, Calvin, and Edwards. 

"What I now call the proper doctrine of original sin is, gen- 
erally speaking, the doctrine of the Imputation of Adam's first 
sin to all his posterity, on the ground of a constituted per- 
sonal identity of Adam and his posterity. I have already 
given a general explanation of this doctrine. The more full 
and particular form of this doctrine may be unfolded as fol- 
lows : Gocl, in creating man, created not merely Adam, but 
mankind, human nature, Adam and his posterity, as one moral 
whole, one moral person, determining this oneness or identity 
by his sovereign constitution. The human race, man as thus 
created and constituted one moral person, was created morally 
upright, so that, as God's work, what Adam was as created, his 
posterity were also as created. The first sin of Adam was thus 
the sin of all his posterity — their voluntary act as truly as it 
was his. They committed the same sin which Adam com- 
mitted, both in number and in kind, and on the only equitable 
principle of imputing sin to any being, it was imputed to 
Adam and to his posterity, — to Adam because lie committed 
it, and to them because they committed it. Thus the only 
original sin of Adam's posterity is the sin which each of them, 
as one moral person with Adam, being like him created up- 
right, committed, and as truly as did Adam commit his original 
sin, and being then committed by each just as it was by Adam, 
it was imputed to each just as it was imputed to him. It was 
the act of each, the sin of each, the fall of each, the apostasy 
of each, and of all his posterity, just as it was of Adam him- 
self. It is this sin, with all its corruption and guilt, and with 
this only, that each of the posterity is horn, not created / for, 
as a creature, he, like Adam, was made morally upright / so 
that man, each individual of the race, not God, is the author 

of his own sin. 

8 



170 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

Such is the ancient and proper doctrine of Original Sin, 
which first received its definite and permanent form in the 
statements of Augustine, in his controversy with Pelagius, 
early in the fifth century, which by Pope Zosimus, after having 
pronounced Pelagius sound in the faith, was decreed to be 
Orthodoxy, was afterward generally adopted by the scholastic 
theologians, then by the Keformers — by such men as Gomar- 
rhus, Stapfer, Turretin, and others — was introduced into the 
confession of the Westminster divines, and has been thus per- 
petuated in the Orthodox church, to a greater or less extent to 
the present time, having been more ably defended by Jonathan 
Edwards than by any other advocate. 

The first error on this subject began earlier in the Christian 
church, in the unauthorized assumption, that the apostle in 
"Romans v. 12, &c, asserts, that infants are sinners, or that all 
men are born sinners. Thus Origen and others of the earlier 
fathers, to account for this sin and' depravity of all, before 
actual sin was supposable, resorted to the theory of pre-exist- 
ence in another world, when each individual sinned in his own 
proper person. Augustine however,found as he supposed, the 
true origin of this depravity or sin in all men at birth, in their 
prior existence in Adam, as created in him in the manner ex- 
plained. 

Augustine's Language and Yiews.— He says (on Eph. x. 6), 
" Quicunque ex illo uno multi in se ipsis futuri erunt, in illo uno 
nnus homo erant" — " They who from that one shall be many 
in themselves, in that one were one man." Again : " We 
were all in that one man, since we were all that one man who 
fell into sin, through that woman who was made from him pre- 
vious to transgression. The form in which we were to live as 
individuals had not been created and assigned to us, man by 
man, but that seminal nature was in existence from which we 
were to be propagated" (De Civ. Dei., xiii. 14). "In Adam all 
have sinned, as all were that one man" (De Pec. Mer., i. 20). 
" Infants belong to human nature and are guilty of original sin 
because human nature sinned in our first parents." Again : 
" All sinned in Adam ; the human race were in the loins of 
Adam." And also, " Infants derive from him the guilt of sin 
and the punishment of death." These passages from Augus- 
tine are deemed sufficient to unfold his view of original sin. 
In confirmation of the view ascribed to Augustine, I refer to 



AUGUSTINE'S VIEW OF IDENTITY. 171 

Tholuck and Meander. Tholuck says : " Augustine proceeded 
on the realist view that God did only once create, placing the 
whole of each species in the first individual, so that all subse- 
quent existence is nothing more than the manifestation and 
development of what has a previous being. Inasmuch then 
as at the first the man Adam was, when he fell, both indi- 
vidual and species, the species also fell in him. Acute exposi- 
tions of this view, and a philosophical application of the Aris- 
totelian principles de universalities in re to the doctrine of 
Imputation, are to be found among the schoolmen, e. g., An- 
sekn and Odoardus, in ' De peccato originali.' " — (Tholuck on 
Eom. v. 12— 'E6' J), pp. 158-9.) Meander in his Church Hist., 
vol. ii. p. 609, says : " Augustine supposed, not only that this 
bondage under the principle of sin, by which sin is its own 
punishment, was transmitted by the progenitor of the race to 
his posterity, but also that the first transgression, as an act, 
was to be imputed to the whole human race ; that the guilt 
and penalty were propagated from one to all. This participa- 
tion of all in Adam's transgression, Augustine made clear to 
his own mind in this way : Adam was the representative of the 
whole race, and bore in himself the entire human nature and 
kind in the germ, since it was from him it unfolded itself. 
And this theory would easily blend with Augustine's specula- 
tive form of thought, as he had appropriated to himself the 
Platonico- Aristotelian Realism in the doctrine of general con- 
ceptions, and conceited of general conceptions as the original 
types of the kind realized in individual things. Furthermore, 
his slight acquaintance with the Greek language, and his habit 
of reading the Holy Scriptures in the Latin translation, led 
him to find a confirmation of his theory in a falsely translated 
passage of the Epistle to the Romans, viz., v. 12." 

Thus it appears that the ancient and the prevalent doctrine 
of the Imputation of Adam's sin, until a recent period received 
its form, as well as derived its origin from the false speculative 
philosophy of a converted heathen philosopher, who from his 
ignorance of Greek, and of the use of universal forms of ex- 4 
pression, misinterpreted the apostle in Rom. v. 12 ; supposing 
him to speak of infants, he applied his ingenuity and philoso- 
phy to show that Adam and all his posterity were, ex ordine 
Dei, one man, one moral person, infants included, and so com- 
mitted the same sin which Adam committed. 



172 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

Calvin's Views. — I speak of his views as given in his Insti- 
tutes, which were written in early life ; for, in his Commentary 
on Kom. v. 12, written in his maturer age, he expressly affirms 
that the apostle had no thought of infants.* The proposed 
exhibition of his views will be given, by reading selected pas- 
sages from his Institutes. 

Calvin says, Inst., B. ii. ch. i. sees. 5, 6, p. 299, " We are 
fallen from our original dignity," i. e., we were all created in 
Adam " upright," for this was the decisive proof-text ; " but 
we all sinned before we were born, and when born we have 
the corruption which each contracted in the sin in Eden." 
There was a vast difference, in the view of the Keformers, be- 
tween the character in which we were created, and that in 
which we were born, for we all, on the realistic theory, were 
created in Adam, and were as pure and holy as he. They use 
such phrases as " the honors bestowed on us at our creation ;" 
" God at the beginning formed us ;" " we cannot think on the 
primeval dignity," &c. ; " in the person of the first man we are 
fallen," &c. But we are born depraved on account of the 
transgression which intervened. When Calvin in this chapter, 
uses the term " man" he means the race as. existent in Adam. 
" He suffered not alone, but involved all his posterity." " This 
is that corruption which the fathers call original sin, meaning 
by sin the depravity of a nature originally pure." Again : 
" Even before we see the light of day, we are in God's sight 
impure and sinful." " Adam was the root, and we were neces- 
sarily vitiated in him." Speaking of our corrupt nature, he 
distinguished it thus : " Our nature, not as created but as vitia- 
ted in Adam." "]STowlet us dismiss those who dare to charge 
God with their corruptions, because we say that men are natu- 
rally corrupt." He says our sin proceeds not from God, and 
speaks of " our sin in Adam." He speaks of a "natural deprav- 
ity which did not originate from nature, but is an adventitious 
quality not innate, but natural in the sense of belonging to all ;" 
" and therefore infants themselves, as they bring their condem- 
nation into the world with them, are rendered obnoxious to pun- 
ishment by their own sinfulness, not by the sinfulness of another." 



* I admire Calvin's intellectual greatness and candor ; and especially in 
changing his opinions on this subject, and on that of limited Atonement, after 
he had acquired a high theological reputation by his Institutes. 



CALVIN'S VIEW OF IDENTITY. 173 

It is plain that Calvin held to no transfer of Adam's sin and 
guilt to his posterity, they being innocent, but only an imputa- 
tion, charging, reckoning, as in Rom. v. 13, of each one's own 
sin to him, the sinning agent. The other, viz., the reckoning 
of one person's sin to another, as though he committed it, and 
holding him liable for an act he never perpetrated, is not7?/i- 
putation but putation, as Tan Mastricht, who knew well the 
doctrine of Calvin, says (Lib. iv. ch. ii. sec. 10): "Imputatio 
autein, non consistit in mera j?utcdione, qua Deus putet foedi- 
fragium protoplastorum, non ab ipsis tantnm perpetratum 
fuisse, sed actualiter et personaliter, etiam ab omnibus eornm 
posteris : esset enim in hoc error manifestos,' 3 <irc. 

So that the doctrine of the Princeton professors, who give 
up oneness with Adam, yet retain the sin and liability of his 
transgression in each of his descendants, is not the Imputation 
of the Reformers, nor Imputation at all. 

President Edwards stated the objection to the doctrine of our 
oneness or identity in Adam, thus : " That it implies falsehood, 
and contradiction to the true nature of things, as hereby they 
are viewed and treated as one who are not one, but wholly 
distinct" (p. 4AS). 

ZSow if the doctrine of Edwards is, that Adam and his pos- 
terity are viewed by God as one, or what is the same thing in 
effect, that Adam and his posterity are one, when in truth 
they are not one, but wholly distinct, then his doctrine does 
imply falsehood, and a contradiction to the true nature of 
things. 

'•But,-' says Edwards, H this objection is founded in a false 
hypothesis and wrong notion of what we call sameness or one- 
ness anions created things : and the seeming force of the ob- 
"jection arises from ignorance or inconsideration of the degree 
in which created identity or oneness with past existence, in 
general, depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the 
supreme Author and disposer of the universe." 

The question then is, what is this wrong notion of what we 
call sameness or oneness among created things, which Ed- 
wards ascribes to his opponents? It is plainly, what may be 
called the common idea or notion of oneness, when applied 
to any thing or being. What then is the true meaning of the 
language, what the idea or notion which the mind forms and 
expresses, when we say of a thing, it is the same now that it was 



174 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

before ? Plainly this, that what it was and was not, as a thing, 
it is now that thing and not another, so that nothing can truly 
be predicated of it at one time which cannot be at another, 
except difference of time. If therefore, Adam and his pos- 
terity are one thing or being, and if identity or sameness can 
be truly predicated of them at different times, then of that one 
being nothing can be truly predicated at one time of its exist • 
ence, considered as a being or tiling, which cannot be truly 
predicated of it at another time of its existence, except differ- 
ence of time. Now we know that Adam existed before his 
posterity, and that what he was and all he was as Adam, as a 
being or thing, he was while his posterity had no existence ; 
and that of course as a being or thing, and in all that he was 
as a being or thing, he was wholly a distinct and another being 
from each and all his descendants. 

We also know that each one of the posterity of Adam existed 
after Adam derived existence from Adam as a progenitor or 
father, and what each was, and all he was as a being, he was 
distinct from Adam, and not the same being but another. Now 
with this notion of identity and distinctness, Adam could not be 
his posterity nor could his posterity be Adam. Of course to 
say that Adam and his posterity are one moral being, is a con- 
tradiction to the true nature of things. 

But says Edwards, " Created identity or oneness with past 
existence, in general, depends in degree on the sovereign con- 
stitution of the Supreme Author and Disposer of the universe." 
But how is this ? He says : 

" Some things being most simply considered are entirely dis- 
tinct and very diverse, which are yet so united by the estab- 
lished law of the Creator in some respects, and with regard to 
some purposes and effects, that by virtue of that establishment 
it is with them as if they were one." This is very guarded 
and very equivocal language, when the question is about the 
truth and reality of things. Why does not he say absolutely, 
as the case required, that they are in truth one and the same 
thing ? Instead of this he says, " it is with them as if they were 
one." What is with them as if they were one? Does he mean 
that we conceive of them and speak of them as if they were 
one when they are not so in truth ? Then while he predicates 
diversity and distinctness of them, he also affirms that while we 
falsely conceive them to be one they are in truth not one. 



EDWAKDS' VIEW OF IDENTITY. 175 

But in the next sentence he comes to the point in an exam- 
ple of a tree a hundred years old, and which has not perhaps 
one atom of matter the same. He says directly, that " this 
tree is one plant with the little sprout that first came out of the 
ground." Here then, with what he calls entire distinctness and 
diversity in things, — viz., of the present component atoms of 
the tree from the atoms which composed the sprout that first 
came out of the ground, — we have the oneness of two, viz., the 
tree and the sprout, unequivocally asserted. But then, as if 
afraid to risk his own assertion in this unqualified form, he re- 
treats, in the conclusion of his sentence, from an absolute asser- 
tion of oneness to the conditional proposition, as if it were one! 

But he comes back in the next sentence to this form of state- 
ment, viz., that it has been the pleasure of God to constitute a 
union in these respects and for these purposes, naturally lead- 
ing us to look upon all as one. 

He gives another example of the same kind in the body of 
man at forty years of age, as being one with the infant body 
which first came into the world, from whence it grew, though 
now constituted of different substance, and the greater part of 
the substance probably changed scores if not hundreds of times, 
and though it be now in so many respects exceeding diverse, 
&c, &c, yet God deals with it as one body. He gives other 
examples to show that a thing which when most simply consid- 
ered is entirely distinct and very diverse from another thing, 
and yet is by divine establishment or constitution, as he says, 
as if it were one and the same thing, or, as he says, is one and 
the same thing, or as he says, is treated by God as if it were 
one and the same thing. Now here four very different predi- 
cates are made of the thing which is entirely distinct and very 
diverse from another thing, viz. : first, that it is with them, 
that is, with the thing which is entirely distinct from another, 
and that other from which it is so entirely distinct, " as if they 
were one ;" the second, that they are naturally looked upon by 
us " as one /" and third, that they are dealt with by God as one; 
and fourth, that they are one. 

Let us look at these different predicates. One is, that in 
respect to two things which are entirely distinct and very 
diverse, " it is with them as if they were one thing." This is 
certainly true in many cases. We conceive of the supposed 
sprout and the tree a hundred years old, and speak of them, 



176 HUMAN SINFULNESS 

and in many respects act in regard to them, as if they were one 
and the same thing, and in these respects it is with them as if 
they were one and the same thing, though in the truth and 
reality of things, most simply considered, they are not one and 
the same thing. This is a case in which our conception is that- 
involved in an acquired perception, as when we conceive of 
the rising and setting of the sun, and involves a rash and false 
judgment concerning the truth of things, which is corrected by 
our reason, or a true knowledge of things as they are in truth 
and reality. The language we use in the case is the language 
of mere appearance, and our conduct proceeds on a false con- 
ception and judgment, as it does in a thousand cases, in which 
the rash and false judgment, as the basis of our conduct, 
answer all the purposes of practical life as well as the true con- 
ception and judgment. £Tow what does this amount to ? Why 
simply to this : that the things which are conceived of and 
spoken of, etc., as one and the same thing at different times, are 
not in truth one and the same thing at different times, but very 
different things, and that we in so regarding them, regard that 
to be true and real which is false, and involves a contradiction 
to the true nature of things. I ask then, is this the oneness 
and identity of Adam and his posterity intended by Edwards ? 
If so, it is not real, — it is a oneness and identity only in appear- 
ance, and to assert a oneness and identity as real and true is to 
assert a known falsehood ; as if one were to say, in view of the 
known facts in the case, that the sprout and the tree a hundred 
years old are one and the same thing, or that the sun rises and 
sets. Though in such cases the mind assents to the truth of 
the false proposition without reflection, yet the moment we 
reflect on our actual knowledge we necessarily pronounce the 
proposition in these cases false. 

The second predicate of things entirely distinct and very 
diverse is, " that they are naturally looked upon by us as one." 
If it can be properly said that it is natural to us to judge rashly 
and falsely in respect to certain objects of perception, as we in 
fact do to a great extent, as when we predicate sweetness of 
sugar, cold of ice, &c, then in the present case it may be truly 
said, " that the things so entirely distinct are naturally looked 
upon by us as one." But then, natural or not natural, in so 
looking upon them, i. e., in so conceiving them, we conceive 
falsely. They are not, and we know that they are not one. 



EDWARDS' VIEW OF IDENTITY. 177 

The third predicate of things entirely distinct, &c, is, that 
they are treated as if they were one by God. This we admit. 
But then to say that they are treated by him as if they were 
one, is to concede that they are not one. And the question is, 
how is it proper or fit that God should treat a human body, 
which we know is not the same that existed at a previous time, 
as if it were the same ? I answer, — the present distinct and 
different body is connected with the same soul ; the object of 
inflicting evil on the body is to inflict evil on the same soul 
which committed the sin for which it is inflicted, and this is 
accomplished by producing certain effects on the present though 
different body, as truly as were it the same as that which ex- 
isted in connection with the soul when the sin was committed. 

The fourth predicate is, that things which are entirely dis- 
tinct and very diverse are one. This we deny without qualifi- 
cation, maintaining that there is no sense or meaning of the 
language in which it can be true. The tree a hundred years 
old is not one with the sprout from the acorn ; the body of a 
man is not one with the body of the infant ; and so of every 
example which Edwards gives of distinctness and diversity, 
and also of oneness. It is true, and this is all that is true in 
this case, we, in common modes of conceiving and speaking of 
these things which we know on due reflection to be entirely 
distinct and diverse, conceive falsely and speak falsely ; just as 
when we say the water runs, the kite flies, the sun rises and 
sets, sugar is sweet, and ice is cold. The error in the mind of 
Edwards, in predicating oneness of things entirely distinct and 
diverse, consists in assuming that the language which men 
adopt to describe appearances merely is the language of truth, 
or rather, that the conceptions of things which we form in our 
rash and hasty judgments of reality, and which rest on mere 
appearances, are true conceptions of reality — in other words, 
that what on due reflection we know to be false, is also true, 
and known to be true. 

Edwards, Calvin, and others, have yet another mode of pre- 
senting the subject of the identity of Adam and his posterity ; 
as when they speak of God as having formed or created us, or 
the species, or human nature, when he created Adam and Eve. 
Calvin, B. ii. sees. 1-3, and other places. Edwards when he 
speaks of the sin by which the species rebelled (p. 437), and of 
man as made upright, meaning, as he says, the species which 
12 8* 



ITS HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

God at first made upright. Now this must mean one of these 
two things : either that God, when he created Adam and Eve, 
created them upright, and iu so doing created that kind or sort 
of a being whom we call man, upright ; or it must mean that 
when he created Adam and Eve, he created the individuals 
who constitute the human species, and so created the species, 
all men, upright. In the first meaning all that is said is, that 
the two individuals of a species were created upright, without 
intending to predicate the same fact in any sense or in any 
respect of the posterity of the two individuals. "Was this then 
their meaning? Plainly not. The mere assertion of such a 
fact simply respecting Adam and Eve, was not at all to the 
purpose of these writers. The object of asserting that the spe- 
cies (that man, &c.) was created upright, was to assert a fact 
which should clear God from the charge of creating the de- 
scendants of the first pair sinners, and so being the author of 
sin; a fact which would bear them out in saying that " God 
formed us in his own image " (Calv., pp. 258, 260, 265, et. al.) ; 
that the sin of one was common to all (p. 263) ; that our 
nature, when spoken of as corrupt, is not characterized as cre- 
ated by God (p. 265) ; that this corruption is not the work of 
God, but the consequence of ora degenerating from ouk 
primitive condition ; that man was favored with rectitude by 
the divine goodness (p. 269) ; that it is a depravity which did 
not originate from nature, but an adventitious quality or acci- 
dent, and not a substantial property originally innate (p. 270) ; 
that it was the same sin in number and in kind as committed 
by Adam and his posterity ; that it is not a guilt additional 
to that of the first apostasy, but identical with it — the sin by 
which the species rebelled ; that moral dispositions must be 
concreated with human nature, though God did not create a 
sinful disposition, &c, &c. (vide Edwards). Now to what pur- 
pose does Edwards say these things, " the sin by which the spe- 
cies rebelled, if the act of rebellion was only that of Adam 
and Eve, as human beings, and in no respect that of their pos- 
terity?" To what purpose that the sin of the first apostasy 
became the sin of the posterity, their sin, in reality and propri- 
ety, by virtue of a union, &c. ; that this sin is not theirs merely 
because God imputes it to them, but is truly and properly theirs, 
and on that ground God imputes it to them ? 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

VII. — TOTAL DEPRAVITY BY NATURE. 

Plan of discussion. — Different theories explained. — (1.) Imputed sin. — (2.) Putative sin. — 
(3.) Want of original righteousness. — (4) Divine efficiency. — (5.) Physical depravity: argu- 
ments against this.— (a.) Does not explain the fact— (&.) Is self-contradictory. — (c.) Disproved 
by the proof alleged in its support. — (d.) Makes God the author of sin. — (e.) Inconsistent with 
acknowledged truths. — (/) Not taught in the Scriptures. Gen. v. 3; Job xiv. ; xv. 14; 
Ps. li. 5; lviii. 3; John iii. 6. 

The present inquiry assumes the fact of the total depravity 
of all men, and respects simply the ground or reason of 
the fact. 

Those who have maintained the general doctrine of de- 
pravity by nature, have understood the phrase by nature in 
different senses, and thus have ascribed the fact to different 
specific causes, or have adopted different specific theories to 
account for the fact. 

My design is — 

I. To refute some of these theories ; and, 

II. To state and defend what I regard as the true account oi 
the universal sinfulness of mankind. 

I. To refute some of these theories. 

1. The theory or doctrine of imputed sin. This doctrine I 
have already described. I propose to consider it in another 
place, viz., when I come to inquire into the connection between 
Adam's sin and that of his posterity. 

2. The theory of putative sin. This theory maintains that 
men are born depraved, without ill-desert, and are neverthe- 
less justly liable to punishment on account of Adam's sin. A 
theory which maintains an innocent depravity, sinless sin, 
guiltless guilt ; a just liability to punishment without ill-desert 
deserves no further consideration. (Yide Storr's Biblical Rep- 
ertory.) 

3. The theory which represents the depravity of man as con- 
sisting in the want of righteousness, and this to be sinful or ill- 
deserving. We have already exposed the unsoundness of this 
theory, by showing that the want of righteousness is nothing, 



180 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

and that sin can be predicated only of positive mental exercise 
or action. 

4. The theory of direct divine efficiency. This theory con- 
cerning the origin of human volitions, considered as a philo- 
sophical theory, I have already examined, and have attempted 
to show that it is both unphilosophical and contrary to the de- 
cisions of common sense. If this be so., and if the language 
of the Scriptures which is supposed to teach this theory or 
doctrine will bear any other meaning, then this is not its true 
one ; since we must not do violence to both common sense and 
sound philosophy, by giving to the language of the Scriptures 
a meaning which both forbid. 

According to this principle I remark, that the language oi 
the Scriptures which is supposed to support this theory, does 
not support it ; for it will bear another meaning, and there- 
fore requires it. The language of the Scriptures is the lan- 
guage of common use, and is to be interpreted as such. But 
nothing is more common in all languages, especially that oi 
the Bible, than to ascribe to one that which he does, not by his 
own direct efficiency, but by the direct agency of another. 
Quod facit per alium, facit per se. Solomon built the temple, 
but not by his own direct agency. God is said to have given 
the law on Mount Sinai, but Stephen says (Acts vii.) that it 
was given by the ministry of angels. In 2 Samuel xxiv. 1, 
we are told that God moved David to number Israel ; but in 
1 Chron. xxi. 1, the same thing is ascribed to Satan.* Similar 
instances might be cited. These are enough to show that the 
mere form of expression decides nothing on the point before 
us, and that we are left to the decisions of common sense and 
sound reason. If these decide against the doctrine of the pro- 
duction of sin by direct divine efficiency, and we have shown 
that they do, the point is settled. The language of the Bible 
does not teach this doctrine. 

That God, as providential Governor, purposes all sin, and 
that this is consistent with his moral perfection and the free 
agency of man, we have already shown. Such being the 
providential purposes of God, it is in perfect accordance with 
the usage of language, in similar cases, to ascribe the event of 



* In respect to the point at issue, vide Eph. ii. 2. The spirit that now 
worketh in the children of disobedience (h epyv). 



THEORY OF DIRECT DIVINE EFFICIENCY. 181 

sin to God ; and this, while the form of the phraseology is not 
designed to ascribe, and the nature of the subject forbids us to 
ascribe it to him in any respect which is dishonorable, and 
still less the least direct efficiency in the production of sin ; 
nay, even while in other instances, and for other purposes, it 
also perfectly accords with usage to deny in terms equally ab- 
solute, that God purposes sin rather than holiness in its stead. 
(Ezek. xviii.) As the foundation for submission, confidence, 
and joy under the government of God, it were immeasurably 
desirable that the providential purposes of God should be 
known to extend, in some respect, to all actual events. To 
exhibit for these useful practical purposes this truth, is the 
obvious design of those scriptural declarations which we are 
now considering. At the same time when this truth is per- 
verted, or rather to prevent its perversion, it is in other instan- 
ces, so far as the mere phraseology is concerned, though not 
really, absolutely denied. ~Nor is such a use of language either 
unusual among men in like cases, nor in any respect unjusti- 
fiable or to be wondered at. The known nature of the whole 
subject, what God is and what he is not, as a providential and 
moral Governor, what holiness and sin are, what men are as 
free moral agents, together with common sense and common 
honesty, are sufficient to prevent a false interpretation of the 
language in either case ; to prevent, on the one hand, the de- 
nial of God's providential government as the basis of confi- 
dence and joy under all the evils of life ; and on the other, such 
views of the mode of its execution as are palpably inconsistent 
with the perfection of his Moral Government over free and 
accountable agents. Language, words, are nothing ; they may 
be, according even to. the best usage, contradictory in the most 
palpable form, provided the meaning be plain and consistent. 
It may be said, that according to some of the principles now 
adopted, the doctrine of divine influence in the production of 
holiness must be rejected. This I readily concede, provided 
there are no peculiar reasons for receiving it, which do not 
exist for receiving the theory under consideration. That there 
may be such reasons is apparent, since in the first place the 
nature of holiness and sin are so essentially different, that God 
may do that consistently with his moral perfection, to render 
holiness certain, which he cannot do to render sin certain. If 
we suppose God to have established that general form of Moral 



182 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

Government over men, which, as applicable to the whole race, 
is best fitted to the ends of infinite wisdom and goodness, we 
may still suppose such occasional changes in it, even by mirac- 
ulous interposition, as shall render holiness certain when sin 
had otherwise existed, without any impeachment of the divine 
character. But to suppose God thus to interpose to render sin 
certain when holiness had otherwise existed, is to impute to 
him the character of a tempter to sin, or of the autliQr of sin, 
in a manner highly dishonorable, and even criminal. In the 
second place, the mode of divine influence in the production of 
holiness may be very diverse from that which the present 
theory asserts respecting the production of sin. This renders 
sin necessary by a physical necessity, and destroys therefore its 
nature. That may secure the existence of holiness in men in 
perfect consistency with the nature of holiness. If it be said 
that God can also produce sin in the same mode of agency now 
supposed, I answer, that this is to abandon the theory of effi- 
ciency now under consideration. Besides, to suppose a divine 
interposition to produce sin, like that which is now supposed in 
the production of holiness, implies that otherwise there had 
been holiness, and holiness in the circumstances in which God 
required it, — a supposition which is liable to the objection that 
it makes God a tempter to sin, or a blameworthy author of it. 

If it be asked here, whether there is no conceivable mode in 
which divine influence may render the existence of sin certain, 
consistently with the moral perfection of God and the account- 
able agency of man, I answer, that I know not but there may 
be. To suppose such an influence, which in the mode of it 
should be a part of the established system of things, and 
which man as a moral agent under the motives to holiness has 
power to resist, may, for aught I know, be as consistent with 
God's perfection and man's free agency, as an influence which, 
though resulting from motives or constitutional propensities 
merely, renders sin certain. But to suppose such an influence 
is not only wholly gratuitous in regard to evidence, but is use- 
less for every purpose of doctrinal consistency, and so perplex- 
ing, so difficult of explanation, and so remote from the ordi- 
nary notions of the human mind, that we may safely say that 
it cannot be found in the Bible ; that it ought never to be 
introduced into popular instruction, or to become in any in- 
stance an article of faith. But, in the third place, there may 



THEORY OF PHYSICAL DEPRAVITY. 183 

be a peculiar phraseology adopted by the sacred writers respect- 
ing the agency of God in the production of holiness, which shall 
oblige us to ascribe holiness, though we do not ascribe sin, to 
such agency. What is true in this respect we shall have occa- 
sion to inquire hereafter. 

5. The theory of physical depravity. 

This theory, according to our preceding remarks, has not 
been adopted to any such extent by standard Orthodox writers 
as to entitle it to special consideration. So many however 
among the Orthodox have adopted it, and even strenuously 
contended that it is the only rational and scriptural account of 
human sinfulness, that it deserves some attention. 

The theory is, that God creates man with a physical or con- 
stitutional property or attribute of the soul, which consists in a 
propensity, taste, relish, or disposition to sin, and which is in 
itself sinful, and the cause of all sin. (Yide Woods' Essay.) 

We have already had occasion so far to consider this theory 
as to show that sin is not predicable of any physical or consti- 
tutional property of the soul. It may be well however to 
examine it still further, as a theory designed to account for 
human sinfulness. Considered as a theory, it is in my own 
view liable to the following objections: 

First— It gives no account of what it professes to account for. 
The object of the theory is to account for sin. But how is this 
done by tracing all sin to a previous sin ? If this constitutional 
propensity, taste, relish, or disposition is itself sin, how is it the 
cause of all sin ? This plainly cannot be, unless this sin be the 
cause of itself, which is absurd. Nor is this all. According to 
strict truth all sin consists in a sinful disposition. Neither ex- 
ternal specific acts, nor the specific volitions to perform them, 
have any moral quality, viewed abstractly from the disposition 
which prompts them. The inquiry therefore, iv hence is sin, 
can have no real and proper meaning unless it include the sin- 
ful disposition itself. The present theory then, teaches that 
all sin is the cause of all sin, and therefore gives no rational 
account of any sin. Besides, every theory which professes to 
account for sin must either involve the palpable absurdity of 
making sin the cause of all sin, or give no account of the cause 
of all sin, or trace it to some cause which is not sin. The 
present theory therefore, view it in what light you will, leaves 
the inquiry, whence comes sin or depravity in man, just where 



184: 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 



it finds it. The only import which the language used can 
have is, that all sin except the sinful disposition is to be traced 
to the sinful disposition. But all sin consists in the sinful dis- 
position itself. But how can this be, except all sin be traced 
to all sin ? But to the main question, or rather to the only 
real and proper question, viz., whence comes this sinful dispo- 
sition? it does not even in pretense give an answer. 

Secondly — This theory asserts what is self- contradictory and 
absurd, and therefore impossible in the nature of things, and 
this in two respects. It asserts that a created property of the 
soul is sinful ; and also that this created property is a propen- 
sity to sin, meaning by the latter, that sin as such is the object 
of the propensity ; the absurdity and impossibility of both we 
have already sufficiently shown. 

Thirdly — The only argument alleged in support of this theory 
proves it to be false. This argument is relied on with so much 
confidence that it claims a careful consideration. It consists 
in appeal to the decisions of the common sense of mankind in 
all nations and ages, and of the Scriptures also, by which it is 
claimed that all actions, whether virtuous or vicious, are to be 
traced to an antecedent disposition, temper, or affection of the 
mind, which is before action as a tree is before the fruit, and as 
a fountain is before the stream.* To the truth of this proposi- 
tion I most unhesitatingly and unequivocally subscribe. Bea- 
son, common sense, and the word of God fully support it. 
But then the question is, what is the import of the proposition, 
as one sanctioned by common sense and the Scriptures? Par- 
ticularly, what is meant by cdl actions f This term is in com- 
mon use applied to what we have had occasion to denominate 
subordinate actions, whether mental or external, and if we ask 
for facts which evince the truth of the proposition before us, 
we are and must be exclusively referred to those instances in 
which the actions that proceed from the disposition are subor- 
dinate. For example, we are told that acts of fraud and lying, 
of theft and murder, which are perpetrated for the attainment 
of money are to be traced to an avaricious disposition j the 
acts of the hero and conqueror to an ambitious disposition, and 
the acts of men, the object of which is to obtain worldly good, 
to a worldly disposition. Now these are the facts, and in kind 

8 Yide Edwards on Original Sin, p. 259, sqq. ; compare p. 166. 



THEOEY OF PHYSICAL DEPEAYITY. 185 

the only facts that can be appealed to in support of the propo- 
sition before us. The}- show beyond all question that the 
actions which proceed from the disposition are of that class 
which we call specific acts ; and also, that the disposition, tem- 
per, or affection of mind is itself an act of preference. For 
what is an avaricious disposition but a preference of money ; 
and what is an ambitions disposition but a preference of fame 
or honor ; and what a worldly disposition bnt a preference of 
worldly good? I ask for an instance, in which, according to 
popular use, the word disposition, temper, affection of mind, or 
any synonymous term, is used to denote that which is moral, 
and as the cause or source of moral actions, and in which it 
does not denote a mental preference ? ~No such instance can 
be adduced. Of course the very argument, or rather the facts 
appealed to in the argument for the theory under consideration, 
overthrow this theory. They show that the disposition, tem- 
per, affection of mind, call it what you' will, which is univer- 
sally acknowledged to be antecedent to actions, and which is 
itself moral, and determines also the moral quality of actions, 
is itself a mental preference. It is then a mental act, — as really 
an act of the agent as are the acts which it dictates. It is 
therefore not a constitutional property of the soul. The theory 
which maintains that it is such is therefore false, and is deci- 
sively shown to be so by the very argument and the only argu- 
ment which is alleged in its support. 

The argument derived from the Scriptures on this point is 
substantially the same as that now considered. It is founded 
in those texts which trace specific actions to the heart ; such as 
these : " Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adul- 
teries, fornications, thefts, false- witness, blasphemies" (Matt. 
xv. 19). " A good man out of the good treasure," &c. I ask 
then, what do the Scriptures mean when they speak of the 
heart in such a connection ? What does such language mean 
in common usage ? What but the governing purpose or affec- 
tion of the man ; that supreme regard for some object or end 
as his chief good which controls and dictates the whole course 
of specific moral action. What is a proud heart, or an avari- 
cious heart, or a worldly heart, but a heart whose supreme af- 
fection is fixed on the objects specified by the epithet connected 
with it, i. e., on reputation, on wealth, on the world? But the 
supreme love of an object is a preference for that object to all 



186 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

others. It is of course an act of a voluntary agent ; and 
therefore is not and cannot be a constitutional property of that 
agent. While therefore the Scriptures and common sense 
concur, the world over, in tracing all subordinate actions to 
the heart, to the disposition, &c., there is nothing like evidence 
to the point, that this thing called heart, disposition, &c, is a 
constitutional property of the soul. On the contrary, the mean- 
ing of the language in every such case, and therefore the fact 
is, that there is a mental preference, a real choice, an act of 
the voluntary agent, in which some one object or end is pre- 
ferred to every other. The Scriptures and common sense then 
concur in the decision, that the theory of physical depravity is 
false. 

Fourthly — This theory exhibits God as the author of sin in a 
manner most dishonorable to himself and revolting to the hu- 
man mind. The mode in which it represents him as producing 
sin in his creatures is not that of temptation (which, whatever 
may be the guilt of the tempter, does not of course exonerate 
the sinner from blame), but it is by a creative act. Of course 
it excludes wholly and absolutely all agency and action on the 
part of the sinner — every thing of the nature of co-operation 
and concurrence ; and he becomes a subject of sin, as the mere 
passive recipient of it, by the act of his Maker. Such a mode 
of production implies also, on the part of him that produces 
the sin, an unqualified preference of the sin produced to holi- 
ness in its stead. And what a view of God is this ! Allowing 
that sin, guilt, really pertains to the created property of the 
soul, to what agent does the guilt of it belong? That the 
question may be truly answered, I ask, who designed it, — who 
produced it ? Not man, but his Maker. Why ? From a di- 
rect and unqualified preference of sin. How ? Not in a man- 
ner that involves the least particle of responsibility on the part 
of the creature, since he has no more power to avoid sin than 
to avoid existence. No demon can be conceived to be so ex- 
clusively and so criminally the author of sin in others as God 
is represented to be by this theory. The force of this argu- 
ment is derived from the alleged mode of God's producing sin, 
viz., that it is a mode which necessarily involves on his part a 
preference of sin to holiness, all things considered. We have al- 
ready seen that he may decree sin without this dishonorable pref- 
erence of sin to holiness. Not so, if he creates or propagates it. 






TWELVE CONTRADICTIONS. 187 

Fifthly — This theory is inconsistent with many acknowledged 
truths. 

1. It is inconsistent with natural ability, and of course with 
human responsibility — no natural ability to act right. 

2. It is inconsistent with moral inability, for this implies 
natural ability. 

3. It is inconsistent with total depravity. There cannot be 
total depravity without accountability. 

4z. It is inconsistent with the principle, that the will is as 
the greatest apparent good. JSFo good in sin jper se, or as 
distinguished from natural good, and of course no apparent 
good. 

5. It makes sin good in itself, and the only real good to man 
as a moral being. 

6. It is inconsistent with facts — e. g., the first sin of Adam. 

7. It is inconsistent with law. God should prohibit the pro- 
pensity. 

8. Motives, the terms of salvation, &c., are a mockery. 

9. It is inconsistent with the necessity of Regeneration by 
the Holy Spirit, the only change necessary being not a moral, 
but a constitutional change. 

10. It involves the Arminian dogma of grace to make man a 
moral agent. 

11. It supports the Arminian doctrine of the self-determin- 
ing power of the will ; the object of the propensity being a sin 
ful volition or choice, we cannot choose to gratify this pro 
pensity but by choosing a sinful choice. 

12. To sin must be the chief end of man. (Tide " Christian 
Spectator," 1832, p. 156.) 

Lastly — The passages of Scripture which are supposed to 
teach this doctrine do not teach it. Before I proceed to ex- 
amine them, I would state a principle of interpretation which 
is applicable to all, and which I shall have occasion to apply 
in the argument, viz., that the language will hear another mean- 
ing than that which asserts the doctrine of physical depravity* 
and that this fact, in connection with the ahsurdity of the doc-* 
trine and the law of usage, is decisive that they require another 
meaning. By applying this principle to this class of texts, I 
would not intimate, that if we allow the doctrine of physical 
depravity not to be an absurdity, that the texts alleged would 
support it. On the contrary, I shall attempt to show that if it 



188 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

be admitted that the doctrine is free from all absurdity, they 
furnish it no support. 

I now proceed to examine these texts. 

Gen. v. 3 : " And Adam begat a son in his own likeness, 
after his image." It is wholly gratuitous to assert, that " like- 
ness" or " image" in this text denotes a resemblance or same- 
ness in moral character, for it may be that of constitutional 
properties as distinguished from moral character. Nor would 
it be a mark of weakness in the historian, as some pretend, to 
tell us that man who was at first created in this respect, like 
his Creator, begat a son like himself. It has been often said, that 
we cannot suppose Moses to utter so trivial a fact as that Adam 
begat a son, who was, in kind, the same being, &c. But this 
is contrary to fact in other cases. (Yide Gen. i. 24, &c.) The 
writer did think it important to tell us, that like produced like 
in other things. Nor is the statement of this universal law 
trivial. Let the objector read Gen. ix. 6, 1 Cor. xi. 7, James 
iii. 9, and Acts xvii. 28, and then say whether it be a mark of 
weakness to utter the truth, that man has a nature that likens 
him to God. Yide Doederlein : " Gen. v. 1-3, teaches that man 
who bore the likeness of the Divinity, begat a son like him- 
self, exalted by the same endowments and privileges" (vol. i. 
p. 578). According to the principle stated then, this text re- 
quires another meaning than that now opposed. For the third 
verse asserts that Adam begat a son " in his own likeness," i. e. 
(ver. 1) in the likeness of God. Again, if we admit likeness in 
moral character to be intended, the text teaches nothing like 
the doctrine of physical depravity. It does not decide in what 
the moral character consisted, what was the proximate cause 
of it, nor when it commenced. Nor, if it be conceded that it 
decides that it commenced at birth, does it affirm that it con- 
sisted in physical depravity, rather than in voluntary action. 
If we are obliged to suppose one or the other, the latter is by 
far the most rational. But to say that a father begat a son 
who, in moral character, was like himself, is not saying that 
which obliges us to discard both reason and common sense in 
order that we may understand what is said. Accordingly, such 
men as Calvin, Edwards, &c, who held that we are born sin- 
ners, believed that we become sinners by sinning in Adam, 
being one with him ; nothing being more remote from their 
thoughts than created sin. 



TEXTS EXAMINED. 189 

Job xiv. 1 and xv. 11 : " Who can bring a clean thing out 
of an unclean ? Not one." " What is man that he should be 
clean, or he which is born of a woman, that he should be 
righteous ?" The interpretation given by Morns of the former 
of these texts is, " Who can make that holy, which is so plainly 
unholy?" But conceding that these texts assert, as we will 
admit the last clause of the latter does, the moral impossi- 
bility that sinful parents should have any but sinful offspring, 
that is, that they certainly will be sinners, still this amounts 
merely to the fact that all who are born into the world become 
sinners ; and neither fixes the time nor the manner in which 
they become so. The import of these passages is therefore 
fully exhausted, without supposing them to teach the doctrine 
of physical depravity. 

Ps. li. 5 : " Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did 
my mother conceive me." David here uses figurative phrase- 
ology. If the language be literally interpreted, it is rather an 
imputation of sin to his mother than a confession of his own, 
and contradicts all those texts which teach that sin begins at 
birth. Besides, if sin consist in acting or doing, then the lan- 
guage cannot be literally interpreted without contradicting the 
apostle, who decides that children, before they are born, do 
neither good nor evil (Rom. ix. 11). Or rather, interpreting 
this declaration of the apostle correctly, it is an unqualified 
denial that children before birth are the subjects of sin at all, 
since otherwise his reasoning in this instance amounts to noth- 
ing. We are then obliged to consider the language of the 
Psalmist as figurative, and either to exclude wholly the notion 
of sin prior to birth, or else deny the principle laid down by 
the apostle. For, if there is another kind of sin than doing 
evil, then he reasons inconclusively, and contradicts himself, 
according to the common interpretation of Rom. v. 12. Ob- 
viously then, the Psalmist here uses figurative phraseology, in 
which he confesses that he had sinned from a very early period 
of life, as it were from the very beginning. (Vide Morus, 
vol. i. p. 418.) 

Conceding however that the passage does, in violation of 
every dictate of sound reason and common sense, assert the 
existence of sin before birth, still it does not decide in what 
the sin consisted, but leaves us with what of reason and com- 
mon sense may remain, to decide whether it consisted in phys- 



190 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

ical depravity, or in voluntary action ; and this, if indeed it 
must consist in one or the other, with a strong balance of 
probability in favor of the latter, since the former involves a 
contradiction in the nature of things. 

Ps. lviii. 3 : " The wicked are estranged from the womb, 
they go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies." If this 
passage is to be literally interpreted, still it does not teach the 
doctrine of physical depravity, for the sin ascribed to the 
wicked is that which consists in action, viz., in going astray 
by speaking lies. But the language is obviously figurative, 
since children neither go nor speak at their birth. Common 
sense therefore, which must determine the true meaning of the 
passage, limits it to this general and indefinite import, that the 
wicked are estranged from God at a very early period, even as 
early as the commencement of moral agency and moral action. 
On the true import of the Hebrew phrase, " from the womb," 
see Morus, vol. i. p. 447. He supposes that this language de- 
noted that the thing spoken of showed itself early, had become 
inveterate, that it had not lately begun, or in one instance, but 
was of very frequent occurrence. He cites (Ps. xxii. 9-11, 
and Job xxxi. 18) some objections to this application of the 
first of these texts; particularly, the marginal rendering is, 
" thou keptest me in safety." John ix. 34, he considers as a 
strong description of a man very wicked ; and as a form of 
speaking which shows the design and import of such phrase- 
ology among the Jews. Xuinoel thinks differently of this pas- 
sage. (Yide his Comment, on John ix. 2.) 

John iii. 6 : " That which is born of the flesh, is flesh." 
(Yide Kuinoel in loc.) " In supposing yourselves the partak- 
ers of the blessings of Messiah's kingdom, because you are the 
children of Abraham, you greatly err. He that is born of 
men, is a man ; you therefore, as Jews, have no superior ex- 
cellence, nor are better fitted for the happiness of Messiah's 
kingdom than others. You therefore must be born again, 
since the qualifications for this kingdom are very diverse from 
any thing that comes by natural descent." That the passage 
will bear even this import I see no reason to deny. At the 
same time a further meaning, viz., your natural birth secures a 
sinful character, and therefore you must be born again, will, I 
think, better accord with the analogy of faith. The word 
odp^ in the last instance, has probably the same signification 



LANGUAGE OF THE BIBLE 191 

as aaptciKov, and the meaning of the passage is, that every man 
who is born into the world falls under the dominion of his 
constitutional appetites ; in other words, becomes a sinner. I 
need not say how remote such a doctrine is from that of phys- 
ical depravity. 

If the language of the Bible was even more direct, if it as- 
serted that men sin as soon as they are born, it would not admit 
of the doctrine of physical depravity, nor even properly un- 
derstood, assert the very instant in which sin begins. 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

VIIL— TOTAL DEPEAVITY BY NATUEE.— (Continued.) 

True account— II. Theory explained.— 1. No property of the soul sinful— 2. Nature not corrupted 
by oneness with Adam.— 3. Constitutional propensities not sinful.— 4. Excitement of propensi- 
ties not sinful. — 5. Disposition, which is the cause of sin, not sinful. 

I proceed to consider as I ]3roposed — 

II. The true account of tlie universal sinfulness of mankind. 

Remarking then, that the Orthodox universally will sub- 
scribe to the general proposition, that mankind are depraved 
by nature, while all others would deny the truth of it, and 
while the Orthodox would differ among themselves in regard 
to the specific import of the phrase by nature, I now propose, 
first, to explain what I understand to be the true import of the 
phrase in the proposition, that mankind are depraved by nature; 
and, secondly, to vindicate the explanation. 

First — To explain the phrase by nature. 

When then I affirm, that all mankind are totally depraved by 
nature, I mean, that suchis their constitution or nature that in all 
the appropriate or natural circumstances of their existence, they 
will uniformly sin from the commencement of moral agency. 

It is here to be remarked, that according to this explanation 
of the doctrine of depravity by nature, the depravity or sin- 
fulness of mankind does not consist in any thing which can be 
called nature, in the primary sense of the word. Nor can this 
be said without the most palpable impropriety in the use of 
language, nor without the most palpable absurdity in things. 

When it is said that mankind are depraved by nature, or are 
sinners by nature, (fee, the obvious design is to describe the 
cause, ground, or reason of their depravity, and the language 
specifies this cause, ground, or reason to be nature. The de- 
pravity is therefore said to be by nature, not to consist in 
nature ; to result from nature as its cause or reason. To say 
then that nature is depraved, or that depravity consists in na- 
ture, is to confound the effect with its cause. If the proposi- 
tion that mankind are depraved by nature is true, in the only 



WHAT THE DOCTRINE DOES NOT MEAN. 193 

possible meaning of the language, then the proposition that 
nature or their nature is depraved or sinful, if the word nature 
be used in the same import, is most palpably false ; since this 
is to say, that the cause of depravity or sin, i. e., of all sin in 
man, is itself sin. More particularly I would say, that the 
proposition that mankind are depraved by nature cannot mean 
either of the following things : 

(1.) It cannot mean that any attribute or property of the 
soul — any thing which is either created or propagated as a 
property of the human mind, is sinful. Aside from the mon- 
strous and revolting absurdity of supposing God to create a 
sinful nature in men, and to damn them for the very nature he 
creates, the Scriptures unequivocally teach that all men are 
now created in the image of God (James iii. 9). 

(2.) The doctrine cannot mean that mankind have a sinful 
nature which they have corrupted by being one in Adam, and 
by acting in his act, or sinning in his sin. To believe that 
Adam and his posterity are one moral person, or one moral 
being, and that by virtue of this personal identity, all Adam's 
descendants acted in his act or sinned in his sin — as truly in 
God's estimation committed the first sin of Adam as he did — 
are as truly guilty of that sin, as justly exposed to punishment 
on account of it, as Adam himself, and did as really by acting 
in that act, corrupt their nature as Adam corrupted his, — I say 
to believe this, I must first renounce the reason my Maker has 
given me, and then disbelieve the oath of God to the contrary, 
entered upon the record, (Ezek. xviii. 3, 4.) 

(3.) Nor can the doctrine imply that any of the constitutional 
propensities of the mind are sinful. Sin is not predicable of 
constitutional propensities, but only of the choice to gratify 
them in contravention of the divine will. All these propensi- 
ties were in Adam when perfectly holy, — they would belong 
to every human being if perfectly holy. The man Christ Jesus 
possessed every one of them, for " he was tempted in all points 
like as we are, yet without sin." 

(4.) Nor does the doctrine teach that any degree of excite- 
ment in these propensities, or any desires for their gratification, 
prior to the choice or preference of it, is sinful. The man who 
always triumphs over the excitement of them — who duly subor- 
dinates all his desires of inferior good to the will of God, is a 
perfect man. This form of self-government is .the substance of 
13 9 



194 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

all duty ; and the greater the propensity, the stronger the desire 
for the forbidden good ; if governed, controlled, denied by the 
will, the nobler the act of obedience. "He that ruleth his spirit 
is better than he that taketh a city." " The trial of your faith 
is precious." " Blessed is the man that endureth temptation." 
(5.) Eor does the doctrine teach that there is any disposition, 
propensity, or tendency to sin, which is the cause of all sin, 
and which is itself sinful. There is an obvious difference be- 
tween a disposition, propensity, or tendency to sin which is 
prior to all sin, and a sinful disposition. There are in fact 
both. There is what may be truly and properly called a dis- 
position, or tendency, or propensity to sin, which is prior to and 
the cause of all sin in man. And there is also, as a conse- 
quence of this disposition or propensity to sin, what with equal 
propriety may be called a sinful disposition, which is the true 
cause of all other sins, itself excepted, i. e., all that can be called 
wrong-doing in executive action. Now of the former disposi- 
tion or propensity to sin which is the cause of the latter, i. e., 
of the sinful disposition, I say it is not sinful ; all the sin per- 
tains to the latter. All sin must have a cause. The first sin 
must have a cause ; which cause can neither be morally right 
nor wrong — cannot itself be sin. The cause of all sin, even of 
the first sin, itself sin ! Whence then came the first sin ? Do 
you say from a previous sin, as its cause ? Then you say, there 
is a sin before the first sin. The fallen angels and our first 
parents were once holy. Whence came their first sin ? Do 
you still say from a previous sin ? And what sort of philoso- 
phy, reason, or common sense is this ? A sin before the first 
sin — sin before all sin ! Do you say there must be difficulties 
in theology ? I ask, must there be self-evident absurdity, even 
the most palpable nonsense?* 

* The whole embarrassment on this part of the subject results from the differ- 
ent senses of the words disposition and propensity, in their various applications and 
connections. Thus if we speak of a disposition or propensity to sin as the cause of all 
sin, or as Edwards says, " as a prevailing liableness to sin," the disposition and sin 
are so distinguished as cause and effect, the former being spoken of as the cause 
of all sin, that it is perfectly plain that we cannot mean that the disposition to sin is 
itself sin. But if we speak of a disposition to sin as the cause of overt acts of sin, 
as acts of fraud, falsehood, &c, &c, then we mean a sinful disposition, a disposi- 
tion involving the preference or choice of its object ; this latter disposition being 
the sum and substance of all sin, and the consequence or effect of a disposition 
to sin in the former import of the word. This is the true usw loquendi, a due at- 
tention to which only can save theologians from the most palpable absurdities. 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

IX.— TOTAL DEPRAVITY BY NATURE.— (Continued.) 

True theory further explained.— Theory thus explained, defended.— (1.) Exempt from absurdity. 
—(2.) Explains the facts.— (3.) Consistent with the universality of human sinfulness.— (4) Is 
Orthodox.— Quotations from Edwards.— (5.) Supported by the Scriptures.— Objections consider- 
ed.—^.) Universality of sin does not prove depravity by nature. —Objection considered under 
several particulars. — (a.) Occurrence of sin in Adam. — (&.) Freedom of will. — (c.) Bad example. 
— (d.) Circumstances. — (<?.) Necessity of trials.— 2d Objection : Inconsistent with free agency. — 
3d Objection: Inconsistent with the moral perfection of God. 

Having examined and attempted to refute some of those 
theories respecting the fact of human depravity which I deem 
false, I now proceed to consider, as I proposed, the true account 
of the universal sinfulness of mankind. 

Remarking then, that the Orthodox universally will sub- 
scribe to the general proposition that mankind are depraved by 
nature, while all others would deny the truth of it, and while 
the Orthodox themselves would differ in regard to the true im- 
port of the phrase, by nature, I propose to state and explain what 
I understand by this phrase, and to vindicate the statement. 

When I say that mankind are depraved by nature, I mean 
that the depravity which I have already described aud proved 
to pertain to mankind,^ truly and properly traced to the physi- 
cal or constitutional propensities of man for natural good 
which belong to man, as a man, in the circumstances of his ex- 
istence as the cause or occasion of it / or thus : that certain 
properties of man for natural good, which constitute a part of 
his nature whether he be sinful or holy, with the appropriate 
circumstances of his existence, are the groicnd, reason, cause, or 
occasion of his depravity. 

By this however, I do not intend that these propensities be- 
come the cause or occasion of sin, viewed abstractly from their 
objects, or from the circumstances of temptation in which man 
is placed; since it is obvious, that propensities without objects 
to excite them, can neither evince their existence nor become 
the occasion of sin. Nor do we ever in common speech, when 
we ascribe an event to the nature of any thing, exclude the cir- 



196 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

cumstances in which that thing is placed, or in which its nature 
acts and shows itself. JSTor, on the other hand, when in com- 
mon speech, we ascribe an event to the circumstances of a 
thing in distinction from its nature, do we exclude its nature 
from all connection with the event ; since neither the nature of 
the thing without its circumstances, nor the circumstances of 
the thing without its nature, would be followed by the event. 
So that, in strict metaphysical or philosophical language, both 
nature and circumstances are the cause or occasion of the event 
spoken of. In proper phraseology however, we are accus- 
tomed to speak of nature and of circumstances as if one ex- 
cluded the other ; and to affirm that the nature of a thing and 
not its circumstances, or its circumstances and not its nature, is 
the ground or reason of a given phenomena. Thus it may be 
said of one tree, that it is owing to its circumstances that it bears 
bad fruit ; and of another tree, that it is owing to its nature. 

Now this popular mode of speaking not only conveys a very 
precise and definite meaning, but is of great utility ; and the 
question is important, what is its meaning, and to what cases 
or facts is the one form of phraseology truly and properly ap- 
plied, and to what the other ? I answer, that it is truly and 
properly ascribed to the nature of a thing when it is its inva- 
riable consequence in the appropriate circumstances of its 
existence ; and that it is truly and properly ascribed to the 
circumstances of a thing when merely, by any change of these 
circumstances, there is a change in the event. To illustrate by 
example. A tree, which in all possible circumstance or under 
every variety of circumstances within its proper place of exist- 
ence, bears bad fruit, is by nature bad; or the badness of the 
fruit is properly ascribed to the nature of the tree. Another, 
which in one set of circumstances bears bad fruit, and in 
another set of circumstances good fruit, is not properly said to 
be a bad tree by nature ; but its bearing bad fruit is properly 
ascribed to its circumstances. Now here arises a very impor- 
tant question in respect to a tree. And who does not see the 
practical utility of the distinction denoted by the phraseology 
under consideration, or of deciding whether a tree's bearing bad 
fruit is owing to nature or to circumstances ? In the one case, 
the natural course would be to cut down the tree and burn it ; 
in the other, to preserve it with care, and to bestow on it a 
more perfect culture. 



THINGS EXCLUDED. 197 

Xow these forms of phraseology, modified indeed so far as 
the different nature of physical and moral phenomena de- 
mands, are applied to the latter. Thus we ascribe the sin of 
our first parents to temptation ; i. e., to certain external circum- 
stances and not to nature, because it resulted obviously from a 
change of circumstances. But we ascribe the depravity of 
their descendants to nature and not to circumstances, on the 
supposition that under all circumstances essential to their 
proper state uf existence they become depraved. 

Again : when I ascribe the depravity of man to nature , I do 
not mean that nature is an efficient natural cause, nor an occa- 
sional natural cause of human sinfulness. This, the nature of 
the predicate forbids, whether the sin be ascribed to nature or 
to circumstances. We are speaking of sin, i. e., of moral 
action, which of course implies moral agency ; a fact which 
obliges every one to understand the language under considera- 
tion, with the requisite limitation. Besides, to say that one 
thing is by another, does not designate the latter as the efficient 
natural nor an occasional natural cause of the former. Indeed, 
this form of expression is probably used more frequently to 
denote an occasion or causa sine qua non, than to denote an effi- 
cient cause, while nothing is more common than to use it to 
denote an occasional moral cause. When therefore I say that 
depravity is by nature, I mean simply that nature is the occa- 
sional moral cause of the universal sinfulness of mankind. I 
mean that nature is a cause therefore, which, though certainly 
followed with depravity, is yet as truly subject to man's pow- 
ers of moral agency, as it would be were all his acts perfectly 
holy. 

These remarks may sufficiently explain what I intend by the 
general phrase by nature. In regard to the specific statement 
which ascribes the depravity to our constitutional propensities 
for natural good, I remark that I do not intend to exclude the 
weakness or imperfection of our intellectual powers from all 
connection with human sinfulness. It may be true that greater 
perfection in these powers at the commencement of account- 
able existence would, even with our present propensities for 
natural good, prevent this depravity ; and that in this respect 
the imperfection of our intellectual powers is in some sense 
connected with it. Nevertheless, this connection is indirect 
and remote, since the degree of excitement in the propensities 



198 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

for natural good, and not voluntary action, is the direct result 
of this intellectual imperfection, and voluntary action the 
proximate result 'of excitement in these propensities. These 
propensities therefore are the immediate springs of voluntary 
action; they are its proximate cause, rather than any state or 
acts of the intellect. It is therefore, in respect to this more 
direct and proximate relation of our constitutional propensities 
for natural good to voluntary acts, that I speak of them as its 
cause. It is for the proximate cause or occasion of human de- 
pravity that we are inquiring. 

To vindicate the theory now stated and explained, 1 remark : 

1. It is exempt from all philosophical absurdity and em- 
barrassment. It is possible, that God should create free 
moral agents with such propensities for natural good, that in 
the circumstances essential to their proper place of existence, 
they should uniformly sin. The truth of this remark will ap- 
pear in answering objections. 

2. This theory accounts for all sin ; i. e., for the first sin of 
all the descendants of Adam, and for their continuance in sin. 
This may be fairly assumed until the contrary is proved. I 
would observe however, that the theory before us does not 
profess to account for all sin, and of course for the first sin in 
men, by ascribing it to a previous sin, or rather, as we have 
before shown, by ascribing all sin to itself as its cause. It 
traces sin to a cause which is not itself sin. To say that volun- 
tary agents may be led uniformly into sin by the strength of 
propensities and appetites which are not in themselves sinful, 
is certainly, when considered in itself, not an unphilosophical 
account of the fact. If so in one case, it may be so in all. 
What becomes of the assertion that it cannot? Angels — Adam 
sinned. 

3. The theory is proved to be correct by the universality of 
human sinfulness. The fact of the universal sinfulness of man- 
kind we have already proved, be their circumstances what they 
may. The question in view of this fact is, whether this de- 
pravity is to be ascribed to the nature of men, or to their cir- 
cumstances ? I answer, if this inquiry is to be understood and 
answered in a manner strictly metaphysical, we must say that 
the depravity of man is to be ascribed to both his subjective 
nature and his circumstances. Indeed, I will not say that it is 
wholly contrary to a correct popular mode of speaking to say 



PKOOF OF THE THEORY. 199 

this. (Yide James i. 14r> 15.) At the same time I maintain that 
it is also a correct popular mode of speaking, to ascribe this 
depravity to nature, and that when the object of the inquiry is 
to decide to which of the two causes it is to be ascribed, im- 
plying what is undoubtedly true, that it may with perfect truth 
and propriety be applied to one or the other exclusively, ac- 
cording to the usage of terms, the only correct answer is, that 
it is be ascribed to nature. This, as we have seen, is always 
done in those cases in which no change of circumstances 
changes the result ; and the present is such a case. We have 
therefore precisely the same reason, and all the reason, to 
ascribe the depravity of men to their nature, which we have 
or can have in any case, to ascribe any phenomenon or conse- 
quence to this cause. Why, for example, is it proper to say 
that a stone is by nature heavy, or that by nature when unsup 
ported it tends toward the earth ? Simply because in all cir- 
cumstances of its existence we know that such is the fact. It 
is therefore to no purpose to say, if mankind were to be placed 
in some supposable circumstances, the result might be holiness 
and not sin. Be it so. In like manner, if a stone were placed 
in some other circumstances than those which pertain to its 
proper place in the system, — for example, within the attraction 
of the sun, — it would not fall, but rise, and it could no longer 
properly be said that it was by nature heavy. So it might be 
true of mankind, that in some other circumstances than those 
which pertain to their proper place of existence, they might be 
holy. This however, affects not the truth nor propriety of 
ascribing their sinfulness to their nature, since in all the cir- 
cumstances which belong to their proper place in the system, 
they all become sinful. If therefore it be proper and true, as 
the language is used, in any case whatever, to ascribe any phe- 
nomena or effects to nature, then it is both proper and true to 
ascribe the sinfulness of man to the nature of man. 

The force of this argument depends on the incontrovertible 
principle, that uniformity of event proves the cause to be uni- 
form. The event in the present case therefore, cannot be 
properly ascribed to any particular circumstance or combina- 
tion of circumstances in the case of any of the human race, 
because it is the same in all circumstances which essentially 
belong to their proper state of existence. To suppose what 
would be or would not be, were man's state of existence essen- 



200 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

tiallj changed, is wholly nugatory and vain, amounting only to 
conjecture, where nothing can be known or determined. The 
only proper method of reasoning is, to take man as we mid him, 
and to adopt in reference to his actual state and to the known 
phenomena, the true principles of reasoning. If these conduct 
to the conclusion that man is by nature depraved, this conclu- 
sion we are bound to adopt. 

To the preceding argument many objections are made which 
demand examination. I ought however to remark, that some 
at least of these objections are made not against the theory now 
stated and explained, but against that which asserts that the 
nature of man is itself sinful, and that against such a theory 
the validity of these objections must be admitted. 

4. This is the true doctrine of Orthodoxy. 

In support of this position I give the following extracts from 
Edwards on Original Sin : 

" If any creature be of such a nature that it proves evil in 
its proper place, or in the situation which God has assigned it 
in the universe, it is of an evil nature. That part of the sys- 
tem is not good which is not good in its place in the system ; 
and those inherent qualities of that part of the system which 
are not good, but corrupt in that place, are justly looked upon 
as evil inherent qualities. That propensity is truly esteemed to 
belong to the nature of any being, or to be inherent in it, that 
is the necessary consequence of its nature, considered together 
with its proper situation in the universal system of existence, 
whether that propensity be good or bad. It is the nature of a 
stone to be heavy, but yet if it were placed, as it might be, at 
a distance from this world, it would have no such quality. 
But seeing a stone is of such a nature that it will have this 
quality or tendency in its proper place here in this world 
where God has made it, it is properly looked upon as a pro- 
pensity belonging to its nature ; and if it be a good propensity 
here in its proper place, then it is a good quality of its nature ; 
but if it be contrariwise, it is an evil natural quality. So, if 
mankind are of such a nature that they have a universal, 
effectual tendency to sin and ruin in this world where God 
has made and placed them, this is to be looked upon as a per- 
nicious tendency belonging to their nature." — (Part I. ch. i. 
sec. 2.) 

" A propensity to that sin which brings God's eternal wrath 



» THIS THE TRUE DOCTRINE OF ORTHODOXY. 201 

and curse (which has been proved to belong to the nature ot 
man) is evil, not only as it is calamitous and sorrowful, end- 
ing in great natural evil, but as it is odious and detestable, 
for by the supposition, it tends to moral evil, by which the 
subject becomes odious in the sight of God, and liable as such 
to be condemned and utterly rejected, and cursed by him. 
This also makes it evident that the state in which it has been 
proved mankind are, is a corrupt state in a moral sense, that 
is, that it is inconsistent with the fulfillment of the law of God, 
which is the rule of moral rectitude and goodness. That ten- 
dency which is opposite to that which the moral law requires 
and insists upon, and prone to that which the moral law utter- 
ly forbids, and eternally condemns the subject for, is doubtless 
a corrupt tendency, in a moral sense." — (Part I. ch. i. sec. 3.) 

" In order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, 
a total native depravity of the heart of man, there is not the 
least need of supposing any evil quality infused, implanted, or 
wrought into the nature of man by any positive cause or influ- 
ence whatsoever, either from God or the creature ; or of sup- 
posing that man is conceived and born with a fountain of evil 
in his heart, such as is any thing properly positive. I think a 
little attention to the nature of things will be sufficient to satisfy 
any impartial, considerate inquirer, that the absence of positive 
good principles, and so the withholding of a special divine 
influence to impart and maintain those good principles, leaving 
the common natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, 
&c. (which were in man in innocence), leaving these, I say, to 
themselves, without the government of superior divine princi- 
ples, will certainly be followed with the corruption, yea, the 
total corruption of the heart, without occasion for any positive 
influence at all. And that it was thus indeed that corruption 
of nature came on Adam, immediately on his fall, and comes 
on all his posterity, as sinning in him, andfallino; with him." — 
(Part IV. ch. ii.)* 

The Bible accords with this theory. Eph. ii. 3 : " And were 
by nature,0uorei, children of wrath," &c. This is popular phra- 



* Quere ? Does the Bible authorize such assertions as those of Edwards, con- 
cerning "propensity to sin," "proclivity to sin," " tendency to sin." — or does it, at the 
utmost, only assert the uniformity of the fact, and that it is by nature, or that 
the antecedent is in the hiBvjiiai, &c ? — (Ephes. ii. 3 ; Jas. i. 14, 15.) 

9* 



202 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

seology, and the only place where sin is said to be by nature. 
It was common among the Greeks to say (pvoitt&g, as we say 
naturally in a loose, popular acceptation of the term. But in 
the same verse Paul shows that he did not mean a nature sin- 
ful yper se, for he states the sin to have been actual, voluntary. 
It was " having conversation among sinners," "fulfilling the 
desires of the flesh and of the mind," noiovvreg ra OeXr/fiara (and 
this though dead, "dead in sins," and yet walking), doing, 
acting out the promptings of the carnal propensity, but not in 
feeling or having them. Paul was an advocate for voluntary sin, 
if any. Eom. ii. 14 : " For when the Gentiles do by nature,0v<7ei," 
&c, has been employed by Pelagians as a proof that all are not 
depraved by nature, but that some do right by nature. Some 
Orthodox attempt a defense by saying that the apostle speaks hy- 
pothetically, i. e., when the} 7 do it — i. e., should they do it. But 
this is hardly fair, and cannot be believed. He speaks of actual 
cases. I answer : If it did show that some few by nature were 
not depraved, it would not disprove the general doctrine of 
depravity. We say " all men are mortal" — " all have died," 
and yet Enoch and Elijah did not. So in this case, had there 
been a few exceptions, Paul would not feel a need of stopping to 
specify them in stating the general doctrine of human depravity. 
Universal propositions are rarely true to the letter. But the 
apostle here is only showing what men did without a revela- 
tion by the light of nature, which shows that he could use 
the term nature out of its strict philosophical sense, i. e., not 
to denote the subjective nature. He was contrasting the Gentiles 
with the Jews under a revelation. But in Eph. ii., " among 
whom we all" — Jews and Gentiles — " had our conversation." 
Texts which trace sin to propensities which are plainly invol- 
untary. James i. 13, 15 : This is a metaphysical account of 
the process of sinning. " But every man is tempted when ; " 
tempted in the sense of tried. Then when lust (tmOvfila), which 
means simply desire, good or bad, fixing the mind upon any 
thing. See Luke xxii. 15 : t:~idv[j,la enedvfincja (payelv, tc. t. A., 
i. e., I have greatly desired to eat, &c. Phil. i. 23 : e-idvpiav 
eX^v elg to avaXvoai, a. r. A., I am in a strait, &c. It is then a 
generic name for desire, and not necessarily lust in a bad sense. 
In this passage then, the apostle enters into the cause, ground, 
or reason of sin. He supposes a nature with propensities, and 
objects appealing to them and dictating the preference of 



THE BIBLE ACCORDS. 203 

themselves to God. Here is a nature in its appropriate cir- 
cumstances. From these results the emOvfiia^ the desire of the 
good preferred by the objects of the propensities. But this 
state is not sin, for not till lust or desire hath conceived doth 
it bring forth sin. This ovXXafiovoa tlktec, conceiving and 
bringing forth sin, is only a figurative expression for yielding 
to or gratifying that desire : philosophically expressed, it would 
be the volition or elective act of the mind by which the for- 
bidden object was 1 taken instead of God. So accurately has 
the inspired apostle given the common-sense, metaphysical ac- 
count of the mode and reason of sin. See also 1 John ii. 15, 
17 : t\ emdv{iia rfjg aapubg real 7] ETudvjiia r&v ocpdaXjjiCjv, tc. r. X. The 
passages that speak of the flesh and the snirit, oap% teal nvev^a, as 
opposed to each other. Gal. v. 16-20 : ©is say I then, walk in 
the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfill, eTudvfiiav oapabg ov p/ reXeanrs, 
and these are contrary the one to the other, so that which ye 
would, ye do not : Iva fir] a av deXvre ravra nocrjrs. There is no 
cannot in the Greek. He then enumerates the works of the 
flesh, and we shall find that they are all in view of objects which 
appeal to some constitutional propensity in itself not wrong. 
The perverse indulgence of some natural propensity, leads to 
each of these sins without supposing an hereditary propensity, 
having for its object an independent sui generis gratification 
in sin itself, for its own sake. Rom. viii. 5, 6 : to (frpovrjfia rrjg 
aapKog. If there is a propensity to sin per se, how is it that the 
apostle never mentions it ? Those texts represent Regeneration 
as a moral change mostly, not a change of physical constitu- 
tion. The nature of sin is everywhere represented in the Bible 
to be the preference, choice, in some form of mammon, to God. 
The Bible is unintelligible if this is not the meaning. The ob- 
jections to this theory prove it true. 

^Remarks. — The terms " nature," " innate," &c, applied to 
depravity in our common acceptation of them, are apt to mis- 
lead our minds as referring to something constitutional. But 
not so with the word natural. Hence in speaking of depravity, 
we have used the word physical instead of natural. In ab- 
stract propositions, where it is difficult to judge by the nature 
of the subject, &c, the primary meaning of words should be 
given them. It is on these terms that controversy has its be- 
ginning, middle, and end. 



204 HUMAN SINFULNESS, 



THE OBJECTIONS DO NOT DI8PKOVE THE DOCTRINE. 

Obj. — It is said that universality of sin in man is no proof of 
depravity by nature. 

This objection is supported by the opposers of the natural 
depravity of man by several arguments. 

1. It is alleged, that the occurrence of sin in Adam utterly 
invalidates the proof of the depravity of man by nature, de- 
rived from the universality of sin. The force of this objection 
depends wholly on what is meant by the depravity of man by 
nature. If this means that man is the subject by nature of a 
sinful disposition previous to all sinful acts or volitions, the 
objection is unquestionably valid ; for, as Dr. Woods admits 
(and thus abandons the entire argument from the universality 
of sin, to prove depravity by nature in his sense of the lan- 
guage), the case of Adam proves that a holy being may change 
from holiness to sin. It is to no purpose to say, that there 
must be even in a holy being a sinful disposition previous to 
any sinful acts or volitions. For still there is in fact a change 
implied from holiness to sin, and therefore a state of holiness 
previous to a state of sin, and of course, previous to a sinful 
disposition. But if one man, and that the parent of our race, 
may change from holiness to sin, without a previous sinful 
disposition, then the whole race may sin without a previous 
sinful disposition. Of course the supposition of depravity by 
nature, meaning a sinful disposition by nature as a created 
attribute, is not necessary to account for the universal sinful- 
ness of man. 

But by the doctrine of total depravity of all men by nature, 
we do not understand a sinful disposition as the foundation of 
all sinful volitions. We mean by depravity, a sinful volition 
itself, or rather, a sinful elective preference which becomes 
predominant in the soul, and comes into existence through that 
in the physical constitution and in the circumstances of men, 
which is the ground or reason of the fact, and in reference to 
which reason, such depravity may be properly said to be by 
nature, or to be natural. The question then is, whether the sin 
of Adam shows that it is unnecessary to suppose that the 
above cause or reason of the universal sinfulness of men ac- 
tually exists. 



OBJECTIONS ANSWERED. 205 

To decide this question, it is necessary to settle two others, — 
whether Adam sinned without any reason existing for the fact 
in his constitution and circumstances ; and whether we can 
suppose that his posterity become universally sinful, and only 
sinful, without any such ground or reason of the fact. 

As to the first of these questions, it is no other than whether 
man can act voluntarily, without some reason for the existence 
of the particular act rather than for the existence of its oppo- 
site, which we have already discussed and decided. Whatever 
this reason may be, we have also seen, that it must be resolved 
into the constitution and circumstances of man. 

As to the second question, this is easily determined when 
we have decided the first. For if we cannot suppose a single 
event like that now under consideration, without some ground 
or reason for it, we certainly cannot suppose a constant uni- 
formity of the same event without some ground or reason for 
such uniformity. The only question that can remain is, whether 
this necessary ground or reason of the uniformity of the event 
is such, that the event itself may be said to be by nature, or to 
be natural. By the event, we mean a predominant sinful vo- 
lition in all men, and the reason of this fact we have already 
shown to lie in the constitution and circumstances of man ; 
and we have also shown, that to say that an event which uni- 
formly results from such a cause may, according to the strictest 
propriety, be termed natural, or be said to be by nature. It 
follows therefore, that the universal depravity of man proves 
that he is depraved by nature. 

If it be asked, why may not the sin of Adam, resulting as it 
did from the same cause as that from which the sinfulness of 
his descendants results, be said to be ~by nature, I answer, be- 
cause there is an important difference in the two cases. Adam 
did not sin in all the appropriate circumstances of existence ; 
but his descendants do sin in all the appropriate circumstances 
of their being. Had those in which Adam was placed re- 
mained unaltered, there is no evidence that he would have 
sinned at all. But let those of his posterity change as they 
may, within any limit in which they can be said to be the ap- 
propriate circumstances of their being, and they uniformly sin. 
But we have before shown that the phrase ~by nature, in this and 
in all cases, assumes that the being of whom we speak is in the 
appropriate circumstances of his being. While therefore, there 



206 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

would be no propriety in saying that Adam was a sinner, or 
became depraved by nature, there is the most perfect propriety 
in saying that his posterity, on the present supposition of uni- 
versal sinfulness, are depraved by nature. 

2. It is said that the universality of sin may be accounted 
for by man's free will, without supposing depravity to be by 
nature. Free agency or the free agent is the efficient cause of 
sin, but the question is, why does he choose wrong instead of 
choosing right in all cases % 

3. It is said, that the universality of sin may be accounted 
for by bad example. In addition to the arguments of Edwards 
it ought to be remarked, that bad example and bad education 
are only circumstances of our being, and whatever may be sup- 
posed to be their influence, it only amounts to our doctrine ; 
for, as we have seen, if man is depraved in the appropriate cir- 
cumstances of his being, then his depravity is owing both to his 
constitution and his circumstances, and in our meaning of the 
terms he is depraved by nature. 

4. It is said that the universality of sin may be accounted 
for by the circumstances in which men come into existence ; 
these being such that the passions get the start of reason. So 
undoubtedly it may be, but what is this but saying that men be- 
come depraved or are depraved by nature, in the proper sense 
of the term? Thus Edwards answers this objection by saying 
that the strength of appetite and passion which this hypothesis 
assigns as the cause of prevailing wickedness, amounts to a 
prevailing propensity to sin, and is altogether equivalent to a 
natural tendency (p. 236). 

5. The necessity of trials in order to virtue are said to be a 
sufficient account of the sinfulness of man. This objection 
differs not substantially from the former, and is refuted in the 
same manner. 

Obj. 2. — It is said that the total depravity of man by nature 
is inconsistent with the free moral agency of man. 

The force of this objection, if it have any, must lie either in 
the fact that man's depravity is certain, or in the nature of 
that which is the ground or reason of such certainty. 

1. The former topic we have largely investigated, and if I 
mistake not, have fully shown that certainty of action is con- 
sistent with the most perfect freedom of action. I shall not 
here formally resume the consideration of this part of the sub- 



OBJECTIONS ANSWERED. 207 

ject, but supposing the principles of the argument to be well 
understood, shall rather inquire whether our opponents, espe- 
cially Dr. Ware,* has not decisively admitted the truth of our 
main principle — that certainty of action is consistent with free- 
dom of action, and thus in this respect abandoned his objection 
to our doctrine. 

In his " Answer," &c, p. 51, Dr. Ware expressly asserts, that 
it is possible that a being constituted as man is, may depart 
from the path of duty and become a sinner at any moment ; 
that by such an act he becomes a sinner in the sense in which 
it is said in the sacred writings, that there is no man that doeth 
good and sinneth not. 

Here then two things are conceded ; the one is, that man 
may in perfect consistency with his moral agency become a 
sinner, and that every man will in perfect consistency with his 
moral agency certainly sin once. But if it be consistent with 
his moral agency that every man should certainly sin once, 
then it is consistent with his moral agency that he should cer- 
tainly sin twice, thrice, indeed, in every instance of accountable 
action. 

Nor is this a solitary concession of Dr. Woods. On p. 53 he 
says, "There may be what we term a moral certainty respecting 
any child that is born into the world, that if it live to become 
a moral and accountable being it will become a sinner." 

On pages 95, 96, Dr. Ware has still more explicitly and fully 
asserted that the certainty of action is consistent with moral 
freedom. Thus he says : " Upon the supposition of that moral 
freedom, which I maintain to be the true ground upon which 
man is justly accountable for his actions, deserving of praise 
or blame, and a proper subject of reward and punishment, 
every action of every human being is as certain before it is 
performed as afterward. Suppose men to have that liberty 
which the scheme 1 advocate attributes to them, it is as certain 
beforehand how they will act as upon the scheme of necessity ; 
that is, it is absolutely certain how they will in fact use that 
freedom. And speaking of it merely as an abstract truth, we 
may say it is impossible that they should not use their freedom 
as they actually will use it." 

Now what more than this have the Orthodox contended for 

* In his reply to Dr. Woods. 



208 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

in respect to the certainty of human action as consistent with 
praise and blame ? Has Dr. Ware ever read the writings 01 
the Orthodox ? Does he know what their views of this subject 
are ? If not, he is inexcusably ignorant. If he has, then he 
has read in the famous works of the two Edwarclses that " meta- 
physical or philosophical necessity is nothing different from 
certainty." "In this sense I use the word necessity, when I 
attempt to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty." 
(President Edwards' Works, vol. v. p. 26.) " Certainty," says 
Dr. Edwards, " is the necessity in question." (Diss., p. 39.) 
Necessity then as used by the Orthodox, is the self-same thing 
which Dr. Ware calls moral certainty. Why then does he 
pretend that there is a difference between them ? But not to 
reproach him with ignorance or falsehood, he has abundantly 
conceded that certainty is perfectly consistent with account- 
ability and freedom, and on this point fully agrees with the 
Orthodox. 

But we may carry this point a little further, and ask, have 
the Orthodox used any stronger language on the subject than 
Dr. Ware uses and professedly vindicates ? " It is impossible" 
says he, " that they should not use their freedom as they actu- 
ally will use it ;" and yet he also maintains the accountability 
of man as deserving praise or blame, and as a proper subject 
of reward and punishment. Let Dr. Ware now assume the 
task so triumphantly assigned by him to Dr. Woods, that of 
showing how " a being may be justly required to do what in 
all the circumstances in which it is placed, it is impossible for 
it to do" (p. 63). 

Thus on one page Dr. Ware has declared one thing, and on 
another declares the contrary. Are the Orthodox chargeable 
with any grosser contradiction ? But is Dr. Ware fairly charge- 
able with real contradiction ? Certainly with contradiction in 
terms, but we think not with contradiction in ideas. The solu- 
tion of the matter is, that in the one instance he has used the 
word impossible in a sense totally unauthorized, and which 
totally misrepresents the opinion of the Orthodox which he 
professes to state ; in the other instance, he is driven to use the 
word impossible in the same sense in which the Orthodox use 
it on this subject, to denote moral certainty. Thus he has ex- 
plained our terms as he ought, and as we explain them, and 
thus he uses them ; and by this very simple and equitable pro- 



DR. WARE. 209 

cess has perfectly unfolded our consistency. TTe say then, if 
Dr. Ware understands the sense in which he uses terms, if he 
will interpret the same terms when used by the Orthodox in 
the same sense as that in which he uses them himself, and if 
he will keep the fear of God before his eyes, he will never 
again (vide Dr. W.'s Ans., p. 63) charge the Orthodox doctrine 
of depravity with being inconsistent with moral freedom, on 
the ground of moral necessity. 

From the abundant concessions of this principle by a late 
controvertist of our doctrine, we may safely affirm, that the 
certainty of sinful action in man is not inconsistent with his 
free moral agency, and from the illustrations formerly given of 
the principle, that certainty of action is consistent with freedom 
of action. 

2. The next inquiry is, whether the nature of that which is 
the ground or reason of the certainty of sinful action is not 
inconsistent with moral freedom ? 

The answer depends wholly on what that is supposed to be, 
which is the ground of the certainty of sinful action. If it be 
that which has the nature and influence of a physical cause, 
the objection is valid. But we have abundantly shown that 
such is not the nature and influence of that which is the reason 
of the certainty of man's sinfulness. 

According to our statement of the doctrine of depravity by 
nature, the ground or reason of man's depravity lies in his in- 
nocent physical propensities, and his circumstances. The ques- 
tion therefore is, whether such a ground of certainty of action 
is inconsistent with moral agency ? 

This question in its abstract form, it is supposed, has been 
already sufficiently discussed. Indeed, if we admit the cer- 
tainty of human action, and who does not admit it, then we 
ask what can be the original ground or reason of such cer- 
tainty but that which we have now supposed ? "Without pur- 
suing this subject in the manner in which we have already 
considered it, it may be more useful to inquire on this point 
into the actual state of the controversy as it exists at the pres- 
ent time in this country, taking Dr. Ware's views of the sub- 
ject as the medium of representation. 

In his Letters (pp. 23, 21), Dr. Ware says, that all the wicked- 
ness which the Orthodox ascribe to men, supposing it to be 
real, may be satisfactorily accounted for on the ground of the 

14 



210 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

innocent physical propensities of our nature and the circum- 
stances in which we are placed. Here then the ground or 
reason of human sinfulness supposed, is precisely that which 
we say is the real ground or reason ; and this Dr. Ware tells 
us is a satisfactory account of the matter. 

Nor is this a solitary instance in which Dr. Ware lias at- 
tempted to show that this specific ground of sin in man is per- 
fectly consistent with man's moral agency. (Yide Letters, p. 
21, et al. ; Ans., pp. 51, 53, and 89.) In doing this, the fact is, 
that Dr. Ware has adopted an hypothesis which, so far from 
being one which he can claim, is of Orthodox invention, and 
was adopted in this self-same controversy by some of the ablest 
defenders of Orthodoxy long before Dr. Ware was born. It 
would not be difficult, it is believed, to show that Augustine 
and Calvin maintained substantially the same view of the sub- 
ject which Dr. Ware adopts, and would have believed to be 
purely Unitarian. It is sufficient however for our purpose, that 
President Edwards maintained it in its full extent. — (Works, 
vol. vi. pp. 427, 431.) 

It is true that in one respect between this hypothesis of Ed- 
wards and that of Dr. Ware there is one circumstantial differ- 
ence. President Edwards supposes the withdrawing of a 
divine influence, the presence of which would prevent the sin 
of men. But he does not suppose such influence to be essential 
to moral agency, nor that the withdrawing of it does not leave 
man as perfectly a free moral agent as Dr. Ware can imagine. 
This divine influence withdrawn, Edwards supposes the ground 
of the certainty of man's sinfulness to consist in his innocent 
natural appetites and passions, and so does Dr. Ware. 

Eow how it looks for a man in the attitude of a controver- 
sialist on this subject to set himself forth, I do not say as the 
author of an hypothesis of this kind, but to claim it as exclu- 
sively Unitarian, or rather as anti-Orthodox, when the same 
subject has been so long in controversy, and when the most 
distinguished Orthodox writer on the subject had propounded 
the same hypothesis in an essay of universal celebrity, long 
before Dr. Ware knew his right hand from his left. Whatever 
explanation Dr. Ware might give of this fact, one thing is cer- 
tain, — if this hypothesis be just and satisfactory when adopted 
by Dr. Ware, it is equally so when adopted by the Orthodox. 

Obj. 3. — It is said that the doctrine of total depravity by na- 



DE. WARE. 211 

ture is inconsistent with the moral perfection of God. The 
force of this objection, if it have any, must like the former lie 
either in the certainty of man's sinfulness, or in the nature of 
that which is the ground of this certainty. 

How the certainty of sin in man is consistent with the moral 
perfection of God, we have already attempted to show. 

This being admitted, it only remains to show that that which 
constitutes the ground or reason of this certainty is consistent 
with the moral perfection of God, and this is done by showing 
as we now have, that this ground or reason of the certainty 
of sin is consistent with the free moral agency of man. If 
God for some end worthy of his infinite benevolence, has seen 
fit to give man existence in such circumstances that sin is the 
certain consequence, and if at the same time the certainty of the 
event results from a cause which is perfectly consistent with the 
moral agency of man, then the justice of God in the punish- 
ment of man is undeniable. For if such a being thus rebelling 
against the holy laws of his Maker ought not to be punished, 
it is impossible to conceive that the punishment of a creature 
by his Creator can be just. 

The two objections against the doctrine of the total deprav- 
ity of man by nature, which we have now been considering, 
have ever been the chief reliance of the opposers of this doc- 
trine. Such is strikingly the fact in the late controversy in 
this country. Dr. Ware, whether he adduces an argument 
from reason or from Scripture in opposition to the Orthodox 
doctrine, scarcely fails to present in some form the supposed 
inconsistency of the doctrine with the free agency of man and 
the moral perfection of God, as the basis and strength of his 
argument. Now it is very unfortunate for these grand objec- 
tions of Dr. Ware, as it was for the same objections when made 
by Dr. John Taylor, that the doctrine against which they are 
brought is not the doctrine of the Orthodox. By this I do not 
mean, that none of the Orthodox have maintained those views 
of man's depravity against which these objections are brought. 
But I mean, that many of the Orthodox have not maintained ' 
such views — I mean more — that the Orthodox as a class or 
party have not. Those who have, I cheerfully abandon to Dr. 
Ware's animadversions, with the hope, and I may say with 
the expectation, that to some extent he and his associates in 
this cause will correct their error. But why should the Ortho- 



'2V2 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

dox party be held responsible for opinions which only some of 
that party have embraced ? Why should this be, when some 
of the ablest defenders of Orthodoxy have explicitly disclaimed 
the views thus charged upon them ? If the question respect 
the sentiments of individuals, let the individuals who embrace 
it be called to answer for themselves. If it respect the doctrine 
of the Orthodox as a class or party, let it be stated in a form to 
which they as a class or party either have assented or will as- 
sent. The fact is, that the controversy on this subject respects 
not the inquiry, whether the doctrine opposed by Unitarians is 
not liable to the objections which they allege against it, but 
whether this be the real doctrine of the Orthodox. This pre- 
vious question must be settled, or the controversy will have no 
very satisfactory or successful termination. The contending 
parties will continue to fire oy and not at each other, and either 
keep the field, waxing bolder in fight, or retire alike confident 
of victory. 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

X.— TOTAL DEPRAVITY BY NATURE.— {Continued.) 

Objections to the theory. — (4.) Infants are sinners. — The position of the author defined. — That in« 
fants are sinners inconsistent -with this on one supposition. — I. Opinions of Orthodox writers.^ 
II. The doctrine of the Scriptures. — 1. Supposed proofs for the doctrine. — 2. It i's claimed that th« 
Scriptures teach that infants are sinners at the moment of birth. — Eemarks on classification of 
proof-texts.— (1.) This cannot be true.— (2.) It contravenes common sense.— (3.) Violates the 
laws of usage. 

I hate examined the three principal objections to the doc- 
trine of total depravity by nature alleged by the opposers 
of this doctrine, viz. : that universal depravity can be accounted 
for without tracing it to nature ; that it is inconsistent with 
the free moral agency of man ; and also with the moral per- 
fection of God. These are the objections of Pelagians and 
Arminians, — objections which, we have seen, lie in full force 
against certain forms of stating the doctrine of depravity by 
nature, but which, as I trust, have no force, nor even plausi- 
bility, when alleged against that form of this doctrine which 
is maintained in these lectures, The importance of this view 
of the doctrine as the only one which can be defended against 
Pelagian or Arminian objections is obvious. 

There is however, another class of objections which are al- 
leged, not by the opposers of the doctrine of depravity by 
nature in every form of it, but by some Orthodox writers, 
against that maintained in these lectures. Most of these ob- 
jections we have already had occasion to examine in the de- 
fense of our doctrine. There is but one more which requires 
further notice, viz. : 

Objection 4. — That infants are sinners. 

It has been then extensively maintained, that the Scriptures 
clearly teach that infants are sinners, and that this fact is in- 
consistent with the doctrine of depravity by nature advanced 
in a former lecture. 

Those who have advocated this doctrine have held it under 
very diverse forms From the time of Augustine (for before 



214: HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

there is no pretense that there was any settled Orthodoxy 
on this point) to the time of Dr. Edwards and Dr. Hopkins, 
it was held by the Orthodox generally under that form of 
Imputation which exhibits Adam and his posterity as one 
moral person, and his posterity as sinning in him, i. e., in his 
first transgression, by acting in that act as truly as Adam him- 
self, and so corrupting their nature just as Adam did his, and 
thus, though created holy, as born with this sinful or corrupt 
nature. 

Since the time of the younger Edwards and Dr. Hopkins, 
this doctrine has been very materially modified and changed 
by many Orthodox divines. These writers led the way in these 
changes, maintaining that all sin consists in the voluntary 
mental exercises of the sinner, the latter tracing all such exer- 
cises to divine efficiency producing or creating them. Others 
of this class of divines, none indeed however who are entitled 
to consideration, have held this doctrine under the form of 
physical depravity ; others, under that of mere liability to pun- 
ishment, including a corrupt nature without ill-desert, and 
calling this the doctrine of Original Sin by Imputation. All 
these maintain that sin begins in all men at least as soon as 
they are born. There is yet another class who hold the doc- 
trine of depravity by nature, as stated in a former lecture, viz., 
that such is the nature or constitution of the human mind, 
that all mankind in all the appropriate or natural circum- 
stances of their existence will uniformly sin from the commence- 
ment of moral agency. 

Of the several theories or forms of this doctrine which I 
deem groundless, except that of imputed sin (which I propose 
to examine hereafter), I have already said sufficient. 

My present object is to inquire whether the Scriptures teach 
the doctrine of infant depravity, in that particular form of it 
which affirms in exact literal language that infants either at or 
oefore oirth are sinners. I say, in that particular form of it j 
for I wish not to be misunderstood on this point. I would then 
distinctly affirm, that in my view the Scriptures do teach that 
all mankind do and will in fact sin from the commencement of 
their moral agency ; that they sin so early, that in popular 
language it may be properly said that they sin from the first, 
from the beginning, sin as soon as they can ; that there is no 
such interval between birth and sin as rendered it necessary, 



AEE INFANTS SINNERS AT BIRTH? 215 

that in the popular language of the Bible that interval should 
be specified. The doctrine which I oppose is that form of it 
which is derived from pressing the language, the mere words 
of the Scriptures, to their utmost possible meaning as mere 
words; and maintains that the object of the sacred writers 
was to assert, in exact literal language, that sin in all men be- 
gins at the very moment of or before birth. 

The question then now before ns, is not so much what de- 
pravity consists in as when it begins. It is not whether man- 
kind may be properly said to be sinners from the first, &c, in 
the loose and indefinite language of common life, but whether 
the language of the Bible is to be interpreted on this subject 
to the letter ; and whether therefore the popular language of 
the Bible, as thus interpreted, is the precise and exact form of 
statement which is to be adopted in scientific theology. 

Before I proceed to discuss this question, I will answer the 
objection to our doctrine of depravity, which is derived from 
infant depravity, on the admission of the fact. Conceding 
then that infants are sinners either before they are born, or at 
the very moment of birth, how is this inconsistent with the 
doctrine which I have advanced ? Plainly in no respect, un- 
less it be assumed that they are not moral agents at or before 
birth. The objection which maintains that it is impossible 
that they should be moral agents so early, and that therefore 
they are sinners in some other way than by committing sin, 
we have answered already. As to that form of the objection 
which maintains that they commit sin either at or before birth, 
and thus asserts their moral agency when they sin, there is 
plainly no inconsistency between this fact and the doctrine 
that they sin as soon as moral agency begins, for it neither 
affirms nor denies the period when moral agency commences. 

I state this answer as sufficient, provided we take no more 
definite position in respect to the character of infants than 
what is implied in our statement of the doctrine of depravity. 
I cannot however but think, that the cause of truth — of scrip- 
tural doctrine — requires that we go further on this subject. 
What I propose then in the present lecture, after a brief view 
of the opinions of some Orthodox writers, is to inquire what 
God in his word requires us to believe on this controverted 
subject. 

I. I will briefly as may be, ascertain the opinions of some 



216 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

Orthodox writers. The views of Dr. Dwight, as given in his 
Theology, I have attempted to exhibit in a tract already pub- 
lished.* Amid some apparent and only verbal incongruity, 
sufficiently guarded however by explanations to prevent mis- 
apprehension, he, I think, very clearly maintains, that infants 
are sinners by voluntary exercises or acts. Dr. Edwards ob- 
viously held also, that all moral quality pertains exclusively 
to voluntary exercises or acts, and probably that these are 
produced by divine efficiency, although I find nothing very 
definite in his writings respecting the time when they begin. 
The old Calvinists, properly so called, from Augustine to Dr 
Green, agree with President Edwards in affirming that "in- 
fants are not capable of moral action at all ;" incapable of 
what they called actual sin. This is true of the Westminster 
Catechism and other Orthodox formulas. 

Dr. Hopkins says, " that as soon as they begin to act, they 
(infants) sin, and that it cannot be precisely determined how 
soon this is." (Syst., vol. i. p. 327.) 

Dr. Emmons says, " It is certainly supposable that children 
may exist in this world some space of time before they become 
moral agents ; but how long that space may be, whether an 
hour, a day, a month, a year, or several years, as many suppose, 
we do not presume to deteraiine. But during that space, 
whether longer or shorter, they are not moral agents, nor con- 
sequently accountable creatures in the sight of God or man." 
(Sermons, 1825, p. 257.) 

Dr. Woods says, after affirming again and again that all sin 
" is the action of a rational and accountable being," " I make 
it no part of my object in the present discussion to determine 
precisely the time when moral agency begins. There are diffi- 
culties in the way which I feel myself wholly unable to sur- 
mount. My position is, that as soon as they are moral agents 
they are sinners." (Reply to Ware, pp. 83-88.) 

Prof. Stuart goes still further, as do many others, affirming 
that infants are not sinful. 

I now proceed — 

II. To the doctrine of the Scriptures. 

Here I propose — 



* An Inquiry into the Nature of Sin as exhibited in Dwight' s Theology, by 
Clericus. New Haven, 1829. 



SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE. 217 

1. To examine the supposed proofs of infant depravity from 
the Scriptures ; and, 

2. To offer proof to the contrary. 

1. Under the supposed scriptural proofs of infant depravity 
the first thin or that claims our attention is — 

(1.) The proof-texts alleged in support of the doctrine. 

These however, I have already had occasion to examine, 
and have shown that they do not admit of the interpretation 
which supports the doctrine of infant depravity, but require 
an interpretation which is opposed to this doctrine. The pas- 
sage in Horn. v. 12, I shall examine hereafter. Instead of a 
minute examination of these supposed proof-texts, I propose to 
specify some of the more prominent, and to show that, accord- 
ing to the true method and principles of interpreting them, they 
do not teach the doctrine of infant depravity. These princi- 
ples I am more disposed ' to examine at some length, on ac- 
count of their bearing on other controverted doctrines. 

The question then is one on which diversity of opinion is ob- 
viously the result of adopting different principles of interpreta- 
tion. It would seem indeed, that the true principles of inter- 
preting the sacred volume, at least in respect to those more 
common modes of expression which occur in all languages, 
and in regard to which, mankind, except in cases of contro- 
versy, are universally agreed, ought to have been settled among 
professed theologians long before this. To what purpose is it 
that we read the same Bible, and make it the supreme and 
ultimate standard of faith, if we interpret its language by no 
fixed, but by entirely different principles ? Plainly, correct 
principles of interpretation alone can give correct results, and 
nothing but the established authority and controlling influence 
of such principles can produce harmony of sentiment among 
the professed believers in divine revelation. I have long be- 
lieved that the grand source of error and of diversity of re- 
ligious belief lies in this, — that the interpreters of the sacred 
volume have no settled and controlling laws of interpretation. 
"Were these laws fixed and applied as they might be, we should 
see an end to most of the theological controversies. 

The passages relied on by the advocates of infant depravity 
may be reduced to two classes, viz. — first, that class which 
teach the universality of sin in men ; secondly, that class which 
speak of the thn-e of its commencement. They are such as the 

10 



218 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

following : The whole world is guilty before God ; that all are 
under sin ; that all have sinned / that the wicked are estranged 
from the womb y that they go astray as soon as they be born * 
that the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth ; 
that which is bom of the flesh is flesh. 

2. It is claimed that these and similar passages of Scripture 
teach that infants are sinners at the indivisible moment of 
birth. 

To this interpretation I proceed to state the following objec- 
tions : 

(1.) This interpretation cannot be true. 

It will be admitted, that a meaning which cannot be true — 
which involves known absurdity or self-contradiction — cannot 
be the real meaning of an inspired declaration. This is as ob- 
vious as it is that the Word of God cannot teach falsehood. In 
deciding then the real meaning of any scriptural passage, it 
must first be ascertained that the one proposed expresses what 
may be true, or does not express a known falsehood. On this 
preliminary decision all interpretation of the sacred oracles 
must proceed, since otherwise we are authorized to give a 
meaning to the Word of God which. we know cannot be true, 
i. e., to ascribe to it known falsehood. On this preliminary 
decision the interpretation given by the advocates of infant de- 
pravity to their proof-texts depends. They assume that theii 
doctrine may be true, or that it is not a known falsehood, and 
rest this assumption of course solely on the authority of their 
own reason — their philosophy. With what propriety then do 
they reproach their opponents with deciding the same question 
on the same authority ? Why accuse them, as if it were a 
crime, "of sitting in the chair of philosophy and prejudging 
the case ?" They do the same thing — decide it on the author- 
ity of their philosophy. While we, on the authority of reason 
or of philosophy, believe that infants are not capable of sinning 
at the precise instant of their creation,* they decide on the 
same authority that they are. I say then, in their own lan- 
guage, " this is a very compendious way of settling the ques- 
tion. The man who makes this decision, sits in the chair of 
philosophy and prejudges the case.' 1 But says Dr. Spring, 



6 This argument applies only to that form of the doctrine maintained by Dr. 
Spring, viz., that infants sin as soon as (literally) they are created. 



ABSURDITIES SET ASIDE. 219 

(whose doctrine I have now especially in view, and whose lan- 
guage I quote), " who knows best whether infants are capable 
of sinning — God, only wise, or the presumptuous objector?" 
Here Dr. Spring infers that infants are capable of sinning, on 
the assumption that God has decided that they are sinners. 
But this he could not do without first assuming that it may be 
true, and having done so, determines that the Scriptures teach 
that they are sinners, and thence infers that they are capable 
of sinning. He therefore not only begs a main premise in his 
argument, but he sits in the chair of philosophy, and falls un- 
der the same rebuke which he administers to the presumptuous 
objector, "Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest 
thyself." 

But the question is not, whether an interpreter of the Word 
of God must first decide on the possible truth of the meaning 
which he adopts. This he must do. This Dr. Spring does ; 
and if he may and must do this, so may his opponents. The 
question therefore is this — whether this prior decision, made on 
philosophical grounds, is rightly made, — it is, whether that is 
a possible truth which is decided to be such? This is the ques- 
tion on which the correctness of the interpretation depends. 
If it is not a possible truth that infants are sinners, in the sense 
maintained by Dr. Spring, then his interpretation must be re- 
jected. The principle is law, that no meaning can be the real 
meaning of the Word of God unless it can be true. 

We say then, that the meaning given to the passages of 
Scripture under consideration is not a possible truth. It can- 
not be true that the exercises or acts of the soul are its essential 
properties. The position is absurd and self-contradictory, and 
therefore must be false. It supposes a soul with all its essen- 
tial properties, and thus qualified to act, while it is yet without 
one essential property, viz., action ; i. e., a soul with all its es- 
sential properties, without its essential properties — a soul which 
is not a soul — a thing that is, and yet is not. The Bible surely 
does not teach such an absurdity. 

The same thing is true of the doctrine that infants are born 
guilty of Adam's sin, by virtue of being one with Adam. That 
Adam and his posterity are one moral person, or one moral 
being, and that the latter committed the self-same sin which 
Adam committed while as yet they were not in existence, is 
not a possible truth. It involves the palpable contradiction 



220 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

that beings who are not the same being, are the same being ; 
that those who did not exist and act, did exist and act. 

The doctrine of a created or constitutional propensity to sin, 
which is itself sinful, is also fraught with self-contradiction. 
We know what sin is, and what it is not. We know that sin 
can no more pertain to the created properties or constitutional 
propensities of the mind, than to the features of the face, or 
the form and structure of the human body. To say therefore 
that a constitutional propensity of the soul is sinful, is as ab- 
surd and self-contradictory as to say that the soul is solid and 
extended, or that matter thinks and wills : it is saying that 
that is sinful which is not and cannot be sinful. But we need 
not dwell on this topic. Our opponents all disclaim this form 
of the doctrine of infant depravity. 

JSTor is there any form in which the doctrine that infants sin 
at the precise instant of their creation or of birth, can be true. 
Sin is predi cable only of that state of mind which we call 
preference or choice. Every act of preference or choice in- 
volves the perception of the objects which it respects, a knowl- 
edge of their nature and relations, a comparison of them as 
sources of good or happiness to the mind. These mental acts 
must precede the act of will, analytically considered. To sup- 
pose that there can be an act of choice or preference without 
them, is to suppose that man can choose without perceiving 
the object chosen, and prefer it to another object without per- 
ceiving that also which is absurd and impossible. But if 
these mental acts are necessary to an act of choice or prefer- 
ence, then it is plain that such an act cannot in every sense be 
simultaneous with the soul's existence. In other words, the 
existence of an agent, and of the acts of perceiving, &c, must 
in some sense precede the analytic act of the will ; i. e., pre- 
cede the act of sinning. The doctrine then, that infants are 
sinners at the precise instant of existence, in every conceivable 
form of it, is self-contradictory — cannot be true, and therefore 
is not taught in the Word of God. 

(2.) The interpretation which we oppose contravenes com- 
mon sense. It will be admitted that every unbiased mind, 
supposing the Scriptures to be silent on the subject, would 
decide that infants do not and cannot transgress a known rule 
of duty at the very instant they are born. Do the Scriptures 
then contradict this decision, and oblige us to abandon this 



COMMON SENSE. 221 

judgment of common sense ? We answer, that there is a strong 
presumption against this. It is setting the Bible against those 
decisions and judgments of the human mind, in which we do 
and must repose, as the basis of human action in all the affairs 
of life. Is the Bible then such a book I Does it do the same 
violence to common sense, which it would do had it declared 
that all infants are born accomplished mathematicians or ora- 
tors ? Does the Word of God thus task human faith \ Is this 
the book which its divine Author consents shall be tried at the 
bar of human reason, and which demands only a rational faith 
of rational beings \ Can it be supposed for a moment that 
any passage of the divine Word, which will even admit of 
another meaning, actually teaches that infants knowingly trans- 
gress a rule of moral action at the precise instant of birth I 

But not to rest the matter here. What is common sense \ 
It is the competent, unperverted reason of the human mind, 
whose decisions, in the interpretation of the Scriptures, are to 
be relied upon as infallible. Man must know some things 
beyond the possibility of mistake, or there is an end to all 
knowledge and all faith. Otherwise, all his deductions and 
all his faith have no sufficient basis. He cannot prove the 
being of God, his perfections, nor the inspiration of his Word, 
nor decide on the import of a single sentence it contains. An 
infallible conclusion must depend on infallible premises. If 
there are no judgments or decisions of the human mind which 
are entitled to unhesitating confidence, then is universal skep- 
ticism authorized. But if there are such judgments, the ques- 
tion is, what are they ? Plainly those in which the human 
mind is competent to decide correctly, and does decide without 
perversion. Thus the common decision of the unbiased mind, 
that the bread and wine of the Eucharist are not the literal 
body and blood of Christ, — that infants are not born with the 
muscular strength and intellectual acquirements of manhood, 
are decisions of the competent, unperverted reason of man. 
They are to be relied on as infallible judgments. So in the 
present case. The human mind is competent to decide whether 
infants at the moment of birth are capable of transgressing a 
known rule of duty. If not, all attempts of our opponents to 
support their decision must pass for nothing. If not, no con- 
fidence is due to other like judgments, and the very foundations 
of faith are subverted. But if the mind is competent to de- 



222 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

cicle in one or the other of these opposite decisions, it is per- 
verted ; and the question is, in which ? We say, in the decision 
that infants are sinners at the precise moment of birth. This 
doctrine is a theological peculiarity. Its origin can be traced 
to theological controversy. It was unknown in the early Chris- 
tian Church ; was derived probably from the philosophic doc- 
trine of Realism in the fourth century ; was devised to carry a 
point in polemic theology, and has therefore no other or higher 
authority than a speculation of heathen philosophy. We 
might specify other adequate causes of mental perversion in 
this case. We might show also, that in forming the opposite 
decision, no possible cause of mental perversion is even sup- 
posable, and that the mind is as prone to judge correctly in 
this matter,as in deciding that an infant at the moment of birth 
has not the qualifications of a general or a statesman. Indeed 
our opponents themselves, if they would not constantly assume 
that the Bible contradicts this decision, i. e., if they would not 
always beg the question, must admit, that the judgment of the 
unbiased mind in all ages and in all countries, would be, that 
infants are not and cannot be sinners at the moment of birth. 
This then is the decision of common sense, — the judgment of 
that competent, unperverted reason which God has constituted 
the ultimate umpire on every vital question of truth, — those 
which relate to his own being — his perfections — his character 
— the divine authority of his Word, and the import of every 
sentence it contains. 

Is it said that we make an undue use of reason and exalt 
reason above revelation ? But is it an undue use of reason to 
employ it honestly and without perversion in deciding ques- 
tions for which it is fully competent ? Then reason has no 
place. Man is not to use it. None of its decisions are entitled 
to confidence. We know indeed, that reason may be perverted 
where it is competent ; that it may judge even confidently 
where it is utterly incompetent to decide, and that from the 
abase of reason great evils result. But does it therefore follow 
that it has no legitimate use, or that such an one is exalting 
reason above revelation ? Can the decisions of competent, un- 
perverted reason contradict God's revelation ? Then are the 
foundations of all rational faith swept away. Then let the 
frank avowal be made, and the Infidel exult in the concession, 
that the pretended revelation of God cannot stand when tried 



LAWS OF USAGE. 223 

by human reason. Not so its divine Author. His triumphant 
challenge to an unbelieving world is, " bring forth your strong 
r reasons ;" " come now, and let us reason together" Here we 
take our position and affirm, that common sense — the compe- 
tent, unperverted reason of man — is an umpire whose decisions 
the Word of God neither does nor can contradict. The ques- 
tion then is this : Is not the doctrine that infants are sinners 
at the precise instant of their creation, contrary to common 
sense ? Is it not absolutely incredible to the unsophisticated 
mind, that infants at the precise instant of birth have that 
knowledge of right and wrong, and of those moral relations 
which are requisite to moral responsibility and accountable ac- 
tion ? We answer yes ; and are therefore confident that the 
Bible does not teach that infants transgress known law at the 
precise moment in which they are born. 

(3.) The interpretation which we oppose violates the great 
principles and laws of usage. Laying aside the impossibility 
of the truth of this interpretation, and the infallibility of the 
decisions of common sense, we now appeal to those principles 
which regulate the use and interpretation of the language of 
common life. We say then, 

In the first place, the language of the Scriptures is to be in- 
terpreted, not on the basis of an unusual philosophy, but in ac- 
cordance with those ideas or conceptions of things vjhich are 
common to the minds of men. That the Bible is designed for 
the instruction of mankind generally, is a fact which must have 
a most important and decisive influence on the subject-mattei 
of the book. This must lie entirely within the limits of the 
apprehension of the minds whose instruction is designed. All 
those elementary ideas, notions, or conceptions of the nature of 
things which constitute its comprehensive statements of truth, 
must therefore be those which are common to mankind. The 
Scriptures do indeed reveal complex truths, which are beyond 
all possible as well as beyond all actual discovery by the un- 
aided mind of man. This they do however, not by conveying 
any new elementary ideas or notions of the nature of things, 
but by compounding and abstracting, and otherwise modifying 
those which have been already acquired by the mind. Limi- 
tations do indeed necessarily pertain to every revelation made 
to our finite minds ; while some of these result from the limita- 
tion of our faculties, others arise from the perfect adaptation of 



224 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

the revelation itself to the end for which it is given. General 
and popular forms of truth, compared with scientific abstrac- 
tions and analyses, are not only the most useful, but the only 
intelligible forms of truth to the common mind. Since then it 
is but a self-evident proposition, that whatever is revealed to 
the common mind is intelligible to that mind, it follows that 
the Scriptures have nothing to do with any unusual, unobvious, 
far-fetched, and unnatural notions of the nature of things. So 
far as the revelation goes, that elementary philosophy which 
the people possess — those ideas or conceptions of the nature of 
things which are common to the minds of men — absolutely re- 
strict the use, and therefore control the interpretation of scrip- 
tural language. 

The same thing may be shown in another way. Words are 
the signs of the ideas or conceptions of things. Of course they 
can be used and understood no further than the ideas or con- 
ceptions of which they are the signs have been already acquired 
by the mind. Hence also, that language may be the vehicle 
of thought or meaning from one mind to another, the words 
used must be signs of the same ideas or conceptions in both 
minds. For example, we cannot understand the import of the 
law, " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," 
without having first acquired just and adequate ideas or con- 
ceptions of the things signified by the words, God, heart, love, 
&c, according to the intention of the Lawgiver. Here then a 
very important question arises, what are the ideas or concep- 
tions which the Lawgiver intends to excite in our minds by 
this language ? In other words, what and how much meaning 
belongs to these words in the intention of Him who uses them ? 
In respect to the word God, the design is not to convey to our 
minds that vast and comprehensive conception in all its full- 
ness, which the infinite Being forms of himself. Here is neces- 
sarily some limitation. So in respect to the words heart and 
love / and the design is not to send the mass of mankind to the 
schools of philosophy, — to the subtle metaphysician, the pro- 
found analyst of mental properties and mental phenomena, — to 
learn what things are meant by these words of the divine law. 
If this law is intelligible to the common mind, then that mind 
possesses all that knowledge of the nature of things which is 
requisite to the correct understanding of the language of the 
law. The same remark, with some unimportant exceptions, 



LAWS OF USAGE. 225 

applies to the entire revelation of God. This revelation being 
designed for the instruction of mankind generally, is not con- 
cerned with those scientific abstract notions or conceptions 
which are peculiar to philosophers, nor with any notions of 
things that lie without the track and range of ordinary minds. It 
deals in truths more extensively known — in things less minute, 
more palpable, and more familiar. It employs those more 
general ideas and notions of things which are common, which 
lie within the limits of ordinary research, and whose truth or 
accordance with the reality of things is tested by the practi- 
cal business of human life, and settled as a matter of certainty 
by the common mind. These are the ideas or conceptions of 
the nature of things with which the Bible is conversant. They 
constitute the common stock and property of the common 
mind in all ages and all countries ; the only medium through 
which the Bible can, according to its design, become intelligi- 
ble to all people ; the grand materials of extending and im- 
proving our knowledge on the most important of all subjects. 
These high ends the Word of God proposes, not by imparting 
new elementary ideas to the human mind, but by combining, 
abstracting, and variously modifying those which already exist, 
in forms level to common apprehension. The peculiar notions, 
the far-fetched and out-of-the-way conceptions of philosophic 
inventors, have no place in the sacred volume. It deals exclu- 
sively in those obvious, natural, and easy ideas and notions of 
the nature of things which are common to mankind generally. 
These, and these alone, are the ideas or conceptions which hu- 
man language, from its very nature, can possibly render intel- 
ligible or useful to the mass of mankind. These therefore alone 
constitute the meaning of that book which is designed for their 
instruction. We are brought then to this important and irref- 
utable principle in deciding the meaning of the sacred Scrip- 
tures — that the meaning must not include any unusual philos- 
ophy, hut must exclude it, and he confined most rigidly to those 
elementary ideas or conceptions of the nature of things which 
are formedhy the common mind. 

In view of this principle, we now ask whether the doctrine 
of infant depravity, at the precise moment of birth, in any of 
its forms, ever entered the common mind as one of its obvious 
and natural conceptions ? Laying aside all the speculations of 
philosophic minds, and all the theories devised for controver- 
15 10* 



226 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

sial purposes, is it a natural, obvious, common conception of 
the human mind, that infants are sinners at the precise instant 
of birth, by voluntarily transgressing known law, and this as 
an essential property of the soul ; or by having sin either cre- 
ated or propagated in them as a constitutional propensity of 
the mind, like our constitutional propensity for food or drink ; 
or by committing, as one and the same moral being with Adam, 
the self-same sin which he committed ? Would either of these 
notions or conceptions ever have entered the head of any plain 
man of ordinary understanding? Would such a man ever 
think or conceive that mental acts are mental properties, any 
more than that all causes and effects are identical ; or that con- 
stitutional propensities are sinful any more than bodily mem- 
bers ; or that we committed Adam's first sin by being one with 
him, any more than that he, by virtue of the same connection, 
committed all our sins ? Does that Book which is designed to 
instruct, reform, and save mankind, thus depart from the track 
and range of human thought, and confound and perplex all 
sober sense and sound reason ? 

With these views of the subject-matter of the Scriptures, 
the language of the book is, as we should expect it would be, 
in perfect accordance. We proceed then to say, 

In the second place, that the language of the Bible is to be 
interpreted, not to the letter in defiance of the plain dictates of 
sound reason and common sense ; not with the minute accuracy 
of philosophic statement or verbal exactness j but only with that 
degree of precision which pertains to all popular speech and 
writing, and which the nature of the subject, the connection, and 
other circumstances determine. The book which we call the 
Scriptures was written chiefly by plain men, and was addressed 
to plain men. While therefore it deals in the generalities of 
popular truth, it also of necessity adopts popular language. It 
adopts it, with all its remoteness, so far as mere words are con- 
cerned, from technical and philosophic precision. For the 
most part the sacred writers are even careless of every thing, 
except so to exhibit truth as to secure its influence on the pop- 
ular mind. Provided their general meaning, or more correctly, 
some general comprehensive truth, be clearly and impressively 
presented, it betrays no concern to guard against captious ob- 
jections, subtle misconstructions, nor even verbal incongruities. 
Words, so to speak, with them are nothing. Meaning is every 



CUTTING TO THE QUICK. 227 

thing. If this he obvious, true, consistent, important, their 
object is attained. Accordingly they present the weightiest 
truths in popular forms of speech, and commit them, though at 
the risk of being perverted and explained away, to the sound 
discretion and honest simplicity of the reader. ~Nov is the pop- 
ular language of the Bible the least of those circumstantial 
proofs which confirm its divine origin. Instruction in this form 
is obviously best fitted to the great end for which a revelation 
is given ; and while an honest mind, aided by its previous knowl- 
edge of things, and guided by that incidental evidence which 
always attends the use of such language, will be sure to dis- 
cover its actual import, the very structure of popular language 
precludes all other safeguards against misconstruction. The 
law which governs its interpretation is emphatically common 
law — law which results from no statute enactments or arbitrary 
dictation of any man or any body of men. It is the law of 
custom, the law of usage — law which is generally understood 
and successfully applied in the language of common life — law 
which conducts the honest mind to infallible results, and which 
is therefore clothed with infallible authority. To interpret the 
Scriptures then with the minuteness of special pleading, or with 
the precision of philosophic or technical phraseology, — to press 
the language to the letter, or to the utmost precision of meaning 
which the mere words will bear, and thus to' violate the law of 
common usage — is an outrage on the dignified simplicity of the 
Word of God from which every well-informed and candid mind 
must revolt. 

In confirmation of these views of the subject we might ap- 
peal to the highest authorities. The great principle of Ernesti, 
ne resecemios ad vivum — do not cut to the quick — a principle, the 
violation of which has brought more dishonor upon the Word 
of God than every other false mode of interpretation, applies 
here. Mr. Burke, than whom there is not a more competent 
judge, says, " I do not conceive you to be of that sophistical, 
captious spirit, or of that un candid dullness, as to require for 
every general observation or sentiment, an explicit detail of the 
correctives and exceptions which reason will presume to be in- 
cluded in all the general propositions which come from a rea- 
sonable man." We have still higher authority. Paul himself 
once found occasion, in the character of an interpreter, to recog- 
nize and apply the very principle for which we are contending. 



228 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

" But when he saith, c all things are put under him,' it is manifest 
that he is excepted who did put all things under him." As if 
he had said, the language is not to be interpreted to the letter. 
Reason and common sense decide that the exception, though 
not specified in words, is to be made. 

But let us appeal to the language of the Scriptures itself. 
" Let the dead bury their dead" (Matt. viii. 22). u God did 
tempt Abraham" (Gen. xxii. 1). " Neither tempteth he any 
man" (Jas. i. 13). " By the works of the law shall no flesh be 
justified" (Gal. ii. 16). " Was not Abraham our father justified 
by works ?" &c. " Was not Rahab the harlot justified by works V 
(Jas. ii. 21, 25). " As having nothing, yet possessing all things" 
( 2 Cor. vi. 10). " Whosoever shall keep the whole law and 
yet offend in one point, is guilty of all" (Jas. ii. 10). " And . 
she was a widow who departed not from the temple, but served 
God with fastings and prayers night and day. And she, com- 
ing in at that instant, gave thanks," &c. (Luke ii. 37, 38) These 
passages are cited as specimens of scriptural usage which show 
beyond all question, that the language of the Bible is not to 
be interpreted to the letter. Indeed no other book probably 
would suffer so much as this from this mode of interpretation. 
The reason is, that it is written pre-eminently in the language 
of common life — in language of great looseness so far as mere 
words are concerned, and in the interpretation of which the 
reliance, instead of being on words merely, must be chiefly on 
the connection, the nature of the subject, and on those diversi- 
fied circumstances which decide the meaning. Is then the 
meaning of this language obscure or doubtful? Eot at all. 
Are these real contradictions, i. e., contradictions in the mean- 
ing ? By no means. Let the real meaning of any two pas- 
sages, or of any single passage containing a verbal incongruity, 
be ascertained, as it easily may be, and we always find a per- 
fect harmony of import. But how shall such consistency be 
made out if we interpret to the letter ? How is this, if with a 
" sophistical, captious spirit," or with " uncandid dullness," we 
cut to the qtdck, giving to every word the utmost meaning it 
will possibly bear ? In the passages just cited, we should have 
literally dead men required to bury literally dead men ; God 
tempting no man, and yet tempting Abraham ; absolute pov- 
erty, and yet the possession of all things ; a man keeping the 
• "hole law, and yet in one respect not keeping it, and thus not 



PRECISION OF POPULAR LANGUAGE. 229 

keeping it in any respect ; a woman who never departed from 
the temple, coming into it, and engaged in fasting and prayer 
without sleeping night or day during her life. If all this is 
ridiculous, it only shows what the principle of interpretation is 
from which it results. 

When however we speak of the want of philosophic preci- 
sion in the language of the Scriptures, we are sure to excite 
alarm and call forth contradiction. The very men who never 
fail to appeal to the same fact when they have occasion to ex- 
pose the errors of others, deny and execrate it when turned 
against their own favorite opinions. We are at once told, " if 
the language of the Scriptures is to be interpreted with such 
indefiniteness and want of precision, then its import becomes 
altogether uncertain, nothing can be decided respecting it with 
confidence, and every one is left to give what meaning he will 
to the sacred oracles." We might answer to this, that if these 
formidable consequences follow from the want of rigid and 
exact verbal precision in the language of the Bible, still the 
fact itself is undeniable and notorious — so notorious, that the 
refutation of the present charge is called for only because per- 
versenes.s can make it, and because ignorance and credulity 
can be imposed on when it is made. 

But the charge is groundless. For what is this so-called in- 
definiteness of popular language, which is deemed so portent- 
ous to the cause of truth ? It is not indefiniteness in respect to 
any thing — not in respect to one idea which is of the least im- 
portance to be expressed or determined by the use of such lan- 
guage. The only possible pretense is, either that the language 
does not express something of which we know nothing, — or 
something which is absolutely of no moment in regard to the 
object or end of speaking or writing, and therefore not worth 
expressing, — or which no one can be rationally supposed to 
think of, and the very expression of which would be so entirely 
useless or unnecessary, as to disgrace the writer and to insult 
the reader by supposing that he had not the requisite discern- 
ment and integrity to make the proper exceptions and limita- 
tions. And what if such indefiniteness does belong to the 
language of common use, and to that of the Bible ? Is there 
therefore nothing definitely said, when all is said which is 
worth saying, and said too with all the precision of meaning 
which is requisite to the ends of popular speech or writing ? 



230 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

Indeed what higher degree of precision is either desirable or 
practicable '. How could the great purposes of language be 
answered, it 1 every conceivable exception or qualification per- 
taining to the common forms of expression were to be formally 

specified 1 What if, in speaking oi' some general characteristic 
of num. or of a nation, we should always encumber our state- 
ments with the exceptions and qualifications which the case of 
some individual man. woman, child, or new-born infant might 
require, it' truth to th ! " were requisite \ What it' we may 
never name the date oi any great event in this world, nor even 
that of its creation, unless we specify the precise instant, even 
the indivisible moment, in which the event occurred \ What 
if we could never give the hour of the day with sufficient pre- 
cision and truth, without specifying minutes, seconds, and half- 
seconds \ And will any one gravely say, that in these common 
forms of expression there is an objectionable indefiniteness, — a 
want of precision which renders the import uncertain, and de- 

- the verv end for which language is used \ But is it so I 
Is there even the least indefiniteness or uncertainty in regard- 
to the meaning, and all the meaning which the writer designs 
to express 1 Is not what he intends to say. and what he does 
not intend to say, as obvious to the candid and discerning, as 
had he seated, explained, qualified, and expounded after the 
manner of a plea in chancery \ Would this expedient of cum- 
brous additions have rendered the meaning more precise, def- 
inite, or obvious \ Is it not as accurately conveyed, bo; 1 ! neg- 
atively and positively, as it can be by any other use of woi 
We think even more so : especially to the popular mind. If 
we appeal to facts, we find that no other use of language is 
exempt from misapprehension to such an extent among man- 
kind generally. The moment a writer departs from ordinary 
usage by his d« -. qualifications, and exceptions, the 

-non reader, if he is not lost in the labyrinth, is led to in- 
terpret by dismissing the judgments of common sense — those 
conceptions of things which are common to the human mind, 
and which cons;:: surest possible criteria of the import of 

language, together with all the ordinary circumstantial means 
of ascertaining the meaning of language : and to place his 
dependence on mere words. He thus substitutes one of the 
most uncertain and doubtful kinds of evidence for the highest 
and best which the nature of the case admits. 






UNIVERSAL EXPRESSIONS. 231 

We now appeal to the usual forms of expression in common 
life and in the Scriptures. Take the following: Men- reason, 
brutes do not. All men value their reputation. Everybody 
was there. All Europe was agitated by the conquests of Bona- 
parte. The French nation are distinguished for affability and 
politeness. " Preach the Gospel to every creature." * ; Behold. 
the whole city went out to meet Jesus, and besought him" 
(Matt. viii. 34, xxi. 10 ; Mark i. 33). " And set oil the city in 
an uproar " (Acts xvii. 5, xxi. 30). " Live peaceably with all 
men." We entered on the business as soon as we met. ' : As- 
soon as the clays of his ministration were accomplished, he de- 
parted to his own house" (Luke i. 23). " Him therefore I hope 
to send presently, so soon as I shall see how it will go with me" 
(Phil. ii. 23). He has always sustained a bad character. He 
was a liar from the beginning. " Showed him all the kingdoms 
of the world in a moment of time" (Luke iv. 5). "Our light 
afflictions which are but for a momenta " I have guided her 
(the widow) from my mothers vjornb" (Job xxxi. IS;. u JProm 
a child thou hast known the holy Scriptures (2 Tim. iii. 15). 

The reader will perceive that these examples comprise two 
forms of phraseology — that the one affirms universality and the 
other describes time / and that to ascertain the true mode of 
interpreting these forms of expression, is to determine the true 
interpretation of those scriptural texts which are now under 
discussion. 

How then are the above forms of expression to be inter- 
preted? "We answer, not to the letter — not with metaphysical 
or verbal precision. Let them be reviewed individually, and 
let such an interpretation be given, and how obvious, and how 
flagrant the perversion of the language ! One form of expres- 
sion thus interpreted, will assert that every new-born infant 
reasons, — that every new-born infant values his reputation, — 
that every infant in Prance is affable and polite, — that every 
infant in Jerusalem came out of the city to meet Jesus, — that 
Paul forbade all contention with infants at the very instant of 
birth, — and that all of this description were actually engaged 
in the uproar at Thessalonica ! The other class thus inter- 
preted, will assert, that in a meeting of gentlemen for busi- 
ness the common salutations of civility were omitted, — that 
Zacharias, when his ministration ended, without one interven- 
ing act, mental or bodily, departed to his house, — that Job be- 



532 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

came the benefactor of the widow the instant in which he was 
born, and that Timothy at the same moment actually pos- 
sessed important knowledge of the written Word of God ! 
More need not be said to show how remote from all correct 
usage of language, and how repulsive to common sense and 
sound reason, is this ad literam interpretation of the sacred 
oracles. "We even feel that we owe an apology to our readers, 
to be derived from the " uncandid dullness" of some men, for 
thus extending our refutation of such a principle. 

The question then returns, how are such forms of expression 
to be interpreted ? We answer, according to the known or 
acknowledged nature of the subject, and the predicate — the 
connection, and other circumstantial evidence which may at- 
tend the case. By these, in all instances of the proper use of 
language, the meaning may be determined with great facility 
and entire success. In most instances, the nature of the sub- 
ject and predicate will be sufficient for the purpose. Thus 
when we are told that certain men " set all the city in an up- 
roar," the known incapacity of the new-born infant to partake 
in the tumult forbids the interpretation which includes them 
as engaged in it. When Paul speaks of his light afflictions 
for a moment, the known duration of his sufferings shows that 
he meant the whole of life. And when Job represents himself 
a benefactor from his mother's womb, the nature of the case 
shows that he means from that early period in which the per- 
formance of acts of kindness are supposable. 

To apply these principles then to the case before us. When 
it is said that all have sinned, or Jews ' and Gentiles are all 
under sin, the language can no more be supposed to include 
infants at the precise instant of birth, than when it is said, that 
all men value their reputation, or all men reason, &c. When 
it is said that " the whole world is guilty before God," the 
language can no more be understood to include infants, than 
when it is said " the whole city went out to meet Jesus, and 
besought him," &c. When it is said that " the wicked are 
estranged from the womb — they go astray as soon they be 
born," the language no more predicates sin of infants at the 
moment of birth, than Job, in the same form of expression, 
predicates of himself active beneficence toward the widow at 
that instant. 

But we shall be asked, how soon do the Scriptures on these 



TESTIMONY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 233 

principles decide that mankind sin ? Onr answer is, as soon as 
the known or acknowledged nature and circumstances of the 
case will allow any reasonable man to suppose that they can 
sin. In our view, very early — so early, that their first moral 
character is sinful — so early, that God in his Word has not 
thought proper to make any account of the interval between 
birth and sin, nor to give ns any more definite knowledge on 
the subject. 

The true principle of interpreting the popular language of 
the Scriptures in those passages in question is, that all sin who 
can sin, and as soon as they can. The importance of this prin- 
ciple in its bearing on the denial of human depravity by Uni- 
tarians and others, compared with the ad literam interpretation, 
is obvious. 

. But we need not say more on this part of the subject. All 
we ask is, that the question may be fairly met on the grounds 
where we have placed it. 



HUMAN SINFULNESS 

XI.— TOTAL DEPRAVITY BY NATURE 



Fourth objection to theory (continued), viz., that infants are sinners.— Other supposed Scrip- 
ture proofs examined. — (II.) Argument from Justification. — (III.) From Kegeneration. — (IV.) 
Sanctification from the womb.— (V.) Destiny at death.— (VI.) Argument from their sufferings 
and death.— (VII.) Argument from infant baptism.— Proofs against infant depravity. ♦ 

In the preceding lecture I began an examination of the sup- 
posed proofs of infant depravity, and considered the principles 
of interpretation which apply to the proof-texts alleged in sup- 
port of this doctrine. I now propose to examine other sup- 
posed scriptural arguments for the depravity of infants. 

II. The argument from Justification may be thus stated: 
The Scriptures teach that all who are justified, are justified 
through the blood of Christ. As none but sinners can be jus- 
tified through the blood of Christ, it follows that infants must 
be sinners, or that they cannot be justified at all. Here the 
objection might be left, it being as obvious that infants are no 
more included under this universal necessity, or even thought 
of in such scriptural declarations, than they are when we are 
required to preach the Gospel to every creature, or to live peace- 
ably with all men. But this is not all. Infants, unless they 
can believe, cannot be justified through Christ, even if they are 
sinners. The doctrine is as broadly laid down in the Scriptures, 
that faith is as truly necessary to Justification, as the blood of 
Christ. " He that hath not the Son hath not life." " He that 
cometh to God must believe," &c. If it be said that infants 
are capable of believing this concerning God, I have only to 
say, that if any can receive this, and choose to receive it 
without any proof either from reason or the word of God, they 
are welcome to their faith. 

•III. The argument from Regeneration is substantially the 
same as the preceding, deriving all its plausibility from the 
universal forms of scriptural language, which, any novice in 
interpretation knows are not to be construed as extending to 



SANCTIFICATION FROM BIRTH. 235 

infants. Besides, what is Regeneration ? It is a moral change 
produced by the Spirit of God. It is, through this divine influ- 
ence, " putting off the old man and putting on the new man ;" 
it is ceasing to do evil and learning to do w T ell ; it is making 
ourselves a new heart and a new spirit — an intelligent, free, 
voluntary mental act, and none the less so because it is pro- 
duced by a divine influence. It is therefore an act which is 
as impossible in the case of infants, as that of faith or repent- 
ance, or of calculating an eclipse. Besides, if we suppose it to 
be some other change — one which may be wrought in the in- 
fant mind — still, if actually wrought, the subject cannot be 
saved without faith ; nor can a change in the structure of the 
mind be a moral change, — a change from holiness to sin. 
This necessarily implies a degree of intelligence of which 
infants are not capable, involving the knowledge of God, of 
the nature of sin and of holiness. I ask then, if any infant as 
such — an infant born at one moment and dying the next — is 
capable of such knowledge, and therefore capable of the change 
which necessarily involves such knowledge ? 

IY. It is claimed that some infants have been sanctified 
from the womb, and this is proof at least of their capacity for 
holiness. This argument rests on two false assumptions, — the 
one that the phrase from the womb denotes the very moment of 
birth ; the other, that sanctified denotes, made the subject of 
holiness or moral excellence. The first assumption has been 
shown to be groundless. The second needs only a brief exam- 
ination. The first text I notice is in Jer. i. 5. This is obvi- 
ously a mere declaration of God, that he had appointed or sep- 
arated Jeremiah, in his divine purpose, to the office of a 
prophet before he was born. (Compare Gal. i. 15 ; vide Rosen- 
muller, in loc. j Lev. xx. 26, and xxvii. 21 ; vide Schleusner, 
A-Qopiop.) Besides, if the passage teaches that he was made 
holy, it teaches that he was so before birth, and of course he 
was not born a sinner, and could not be regenerated. There is 
then one exception to the universality of the facts contended for. 

Another passage relied on is Luke i. 15 (vide verse 41), in 
which John the Baptist is said " to be filled with the Holy 
Ghost even from his mother's womb." Here it may be grant- 
ed that " filled with the Holy Ghost " means regenerated or 
made holy ; still the phrase " from his mother's womb," as we 
have shown, is indefinite, and leaves the precise moment of 



236 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

time undecided, and at most only shows that he was regenerated 
in very early life. (See Kuinoel, in loc.) 

Y. It is asked what becomes of infants, if they die without 
sin. I answer first, that they are as well off, — that their state 
is as desirable if they die without sin as if they die with sin. 
If they sin at the very moment of birth we have no evidence of 
their conversion, it being impossible to hold any communica- 
tion with their minds ; and the Bible being silent as to any 
assertion that they are saved. Nor is this all. On the scheme 
of our opponents they are infallibly lost, for they are sinners. 
JBut we have seen that they cannot repent, believe, or become 
holy ; and the Scriptures decide that all sinners who do not 
repent, believe, &c, must be damned. If that large portion 
of the human race who die in early infancy are born sinners ; 
if none of them can be saved except they repent and believe — 
except they put off the old man and put on the new — then how 
many of these are born, sin, die, and perish forever under the 
curse of God, before it is possible, that with any adequate 
knowledge of sin, of duty, of God, or the Saviour, they should 
renounce their iniquity by turning to God, or believe in him 
as a rewarder of those who seek him ? 

But a presumptuous curiosity still asks what becomes of those 
who die in infancy ? I answer, a wise and benevolent God 
disposes of them without telling us how. Why should he tell 
us ? Qui bono f We have no access to their minds, and can 
do nothing to instruct them, or in any way to contribute to 
their salvation, except in prayer and confidence to commend 
them to God. This we can do whether we know or not the 
precise moment when sin commences in the human mind. To 
give us knowledge merely to gratify our curiosity, and espe- 
cially when by so doing, the occasion for the high and useful 
duties of submission to his will, and confidence in his gov- 
ernment, would be either impaired or taken away, is not 
the manner of God. That we may, with unhesitating confi- 
dence, and with prayer for his blessing, commit such children 
to his hands, should be the great, the only object of solici- 
tude to the Christian parent. It is certainly possible that 
children who die in infancy, should, in another state of being, 
wake up in angel purity, and their song forever speak of the 
grace that saved them alike from the character and the doom 
of a sinful world. 



INFANTS SUFFEE AND DIE. 237 

YI. The argument from the sufferings and death of infants 
is briefly this, — that suffering and death are the consequences of 
sin in the subject, and therefore .infants are sinners. In sup- 
port of the principle that all earthly calamities, and especially 
death, are the consequence of sin in the subject, the following 
texts are cited. The words of Eliphaz in Job iv. 7, " Who ever 
perished, being innocent ?" and Eora. v. 12. The latter passage 
I shall consider hereafter. The former is not a divine declara- 
tion, though I hesitate not to admit the truth of it in real im- 
port. I only say respecting it, that it is one of those universal 
forms of expression, in which the speaker had no thought of 
an infant. Again, the principle which constitutes the premise 
of the present argument is contradicted by our Saviour in 
John ix. 2, 3. Here it is plainly asserted that this great calam- 
ity was not on account of the sin of the unhappy subject of it. 

That the death of children in infancy is no evidence of their 
becoming sinners at birth, is decisively shown by the fact that 
they die before birth. If it be said that they sin before birth, 
then the doctrine that they first sin at birth is given up. And 
not only so, but that they sin before birth is denied by Paul, 
Bom. ix. 11. If now it be said that they are not human beings 
before birth, I answer, that in the language of the Scriptures 
and of all other usage, they are. The Mosaic law regarded 
the killing of an infant before birth as shedding man's blood, 
and so do the laws of every civilized people. Paul calls them 
children before they are born. 

But it is claimed in this argument, that the object of Paul 
in Bom. v. 12, is to teach that sin is as universal as death 
among human beings, and that we have no w T arrant for deny- 
ing the absolute universality of sin, in view of the absolute 
universality of death. I might say that even death is not abso- 
lutely universal in this world, for Enoch and Elijah did not 
die. But not to insist on this, I readily admit that if we have no 
warrant for denying the absolute universality of sin, viz., in the 
case of infants, then the above reasoning would be valid. But 
we have such a warrant, as we have sufficiently shown, — one 
which obliges us to make the exception in the case of infants. 
But I shall show hereafter, that the apostle in this passage, 
neither spoke of the death nor of the sin of infants ; that he 
had not a thought respecting them. 

YH. The argument from infant baptism claims that baptism 



238 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

is proof of the sin of the subject. On this assumption the 
argument entirely depends. I answer then, that baptism, as a 
divine ordinance, affords no such proof. 

First. Christ was baptized, though not a sinner. This is de- 
cisive that the ordinance, as such, does not prove sin in the 
subject. If it be said that this was a peculiar baptism, a cere- 
mony of consecration to his priestly office, I answer, this is 
gratuitous. But whatever it was, the rite was administered to 
him as fulfilling all righteousness. Baptism then, in some 
cases and for some purposes, may be administered without pre- 
vious sin in its subject. I therefore remark — 

Secondly, that whether baptism is a proof of sin in its sub- 
ject, depends wholly on what it is, or on the reason or end of 
its administration in the particular instance or instances in 
which it is administered. If administered in one case with a 
specific design or reference in that case, and not with the same 
design in others, then it is in each instance just what it is in 
that, and it is no more. Now we know that it was not ad- 
ministered in the case of the Saviour with any reference to sin 
in the subject, Again: we know that in the case of adult 
believers it was administered with another design, viz., as a 
sign of the remission of sins, and of course that in these in- 
stances it is proof of sin in the subject. Now where is the 
proof that it is administered to infants with the same design, 
or that it is the same thing in their case as when admin- 
istered to adult believers ? I say there is no evidence on this 
point. There is decisive proof to the contrary, as our oppo- 
nents themselves must admit on their principles ; for they 
concede that it is not the sign of Regeneration or of remis- 
sion of sin in the case of infants. Of course it is not in one in- 
stance what it is in the other. (Yicle Morns, vol. ii. p. 517.) 
And this utterly destroys the argument. ~Nor is this all. What 
is baptism in infants, when it is once conceded that it is not a 
sign of remission of sin or of Regeneration ? Why, say our op- 
ponents, it is a sign that they need remission and Regeneration 
as sinners, i. e., it is a sign of their sinfulness. And is it so ? 
Have we such an ordinance from God ? Has he appointed the 
very emblem of purity as the sign of impurity and corruption ? 
This is incredible. Or if it be said that it is not a sign of moral 
impurity, but of the necessity of moral purity, then I ask for 
the proof. What right has any man without warrant to unfold 



SCRIPTURAL ARGUMENT. 239 

the import of such an ordinance in a manner so entirely arbi- 
trary ? Besides, it involves the subject in gross incongruity. 
In the case of adults it is a sign or seal of what is ; in that of 
infants it is not, nor yet even a sign of what will he, but only 
a sign of what need he / and yet no more a sign of what need 
be in that class of children than in all others. In adults it dis- 
tinguishes one class from another in view of a difference. In 
infants it distinguishes, if at all, one class from another with- 
out denoting a difference. Surely all this is arbitrary, and said 
for a purpose of defending a favorite opinion. 

But what is infant baptism, and what does it denote or sig- 
nify ? I answer, and this on the principle of my opponents, 
as exhibited in all their formulas of doctrine — baptism has one 
general, common character, viz., it is a sign and seal of a cov- 
enant. This I suppose it was in all cases. In that of adult be- 
lievers, it is admitted to come in the place of circumcision, and 
the apostle virtually declares it to be such a seal when he says 
Abraham received the sign of circumcision — a seal of the right- 
eousness of the faith, &c. (Bom. iv. 11). Thus it is a rite 
which certifies the validity of the covenant, and in all its par- 
ticular promises. As applied to believers, it signifies the ful- 
fillment of those promises in them which respect them as adult 
believers. As applied to the infant children of believers, it 
signifies the validity of the promises which respect them. Com- 
prehensively, the promise which respects them is, that of this 
class of children God will perpetuate a spiritual seed in the 
world, and each baptized child is thus exhibited as one of this 
class ; his baptism is the sign of this fact, and the seal of this 
promise, and this is all that it is. 

I come now to the scriptural argument against Infant De- 
pravity." 

The only importance of this, is to show that sin consists in 
free moral action, by the removal of an objection drawn from 
this source. The doctrine of infant depravity exposes the Bi- 
ble to the sneers of Infidels, and to its rejection by men of in- 
telligence and reason. I allege the case of the child Imman- 
uel (Is. vii. 15, 16 ; viii. 1). " Before the child shall know to 
refuse the evil," &c. ; " have knowledge to cry, my father." 
Here is one child at least who, till about three years old, was not 

8 From the MS. notes of a pupil. 



240 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

to know good from evil. If it refers to Jesus, then a portion of 
the race, other children, cannot know and cannot have sinned. 
There are passages in which children are spoken of as " not 
knowing good from evil." " Your children which in that day 
had no knowledge between good and evil" (Dent. i. 39). To 
this some object that it may mean that particular sin for which 
others were excluded from Canaan. There is no indication 
that this was meant ; but we will allow them to adhere to their 
literal interpretation, ' no knowledge of good and evil.' Again, 
Jonah iv. 11 : " And should not I spare Nineveh, that great 
city, wherein are more than six-score thousand persons that 
cannot distinguish between their right hand and their left, be- 
sides much cattle?" It is objected, 'there could not be so 
many infants in one city.' There could be in those times and 
regions, for the population exceeded all that we see in modern 
times. In this passage then, God is giving Jonah a reason why 
he spared Nineveh. What logic is it to say, that he spared it 
because there were one hundred and twenty thousand persons 
in it who deserved punishment ? The weight of the reason con- 
sisted in their innocence. There are passages in which infants 
are called innocent. Jer. ii. 34 : " In thy skirts is found the 
blood of the souls of the poor innocents." Ps. cvi. 38 : " In- 
nocent blood," &c, of souls, &c, sacrificed. Jer. xix. 4. 
2 Kings xxi. 16. But the last does not certainly mean infants. 
It may mean pure, free from blame, or clear, free, quit from 
an obligation. On what ground will they pronounce these in- 
fants, whom inspiration characterizes as innocents, deserving 
of eternal death ? Do they say it means comparatively inno- 
cent ? Let them adhere to a literal interpretation. Passages 
which speak literally of the time when sin begins, seem to me 
to be very indefinite. Such as speak of going " astray from 
the womb" are evidently figurative. But Gen. viii. 21 : "The 
imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth," &c. 
Youth is a period of very indefinite length. All we can say 
is, they sin very early. 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

XII.— CONSEQUENCES OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY, AND THE 
CONNECTION BETWEEN THAT SIN AND THESE CONSEQUENCES. 

Subject divided into two parts. — I. The fact of a connection. — General statement variously modi- 
fied. — Proved (1,) by narrative in Genesis. — Also by the assertions in Eomans v. 12, 18, 19. — II. 
Mode of connection— It is not true (1.) that Adam's posterity are created with a sinful nature, 
nor (2,) that they are guilty of his sin.— The doctrine involves absurdity, injustice, and is unsup- 
ported by the Scriptures.— The principle is denied in the Scriptures. — Not guilty of his sin by 
being counted as one with him, through a sovereign act of God. — Nor by putative act of God.— 
Biblical Eepertory and Christian Spectator. 

That sin and death, with that class of evils to which in this 
world our race were doomed after the apostasy, come, in con- 
sequence of Adam's sin, on his posterity, is an opinion almost 
universally received by believers in Divine revelation. The 
more particular consequence, viz., the sinfulness of his pos- 
terity, is that respecting which there has been great diversity 
of opinion, and which now claims our particular attention. 

The subject naturally divides itself into two parts, viz. : 

I. The fact that the sinfulness of mankind is in consequence 
of the sin of Adam ; and — 

II. The mode of connection between his sin and this conse- 
quence. 

I propose — 

I. To prove the fact, that the sinfulness of mankind is in 
consequence of the sin of Adam. 

Those who have maintained this general form of the fact 
have frequently connected with it specific statements, which 
in my view the Scriptures do not authorize. Thus it has been 
confidently asserted, that had our first parents not sinned, sin 
and death would never have entered the world, — that the death 
of mankind is to be considered as exclusively the consequence 
of Adam's sin, and in no respect the consequence of their own, 
so that all men would die though they were sinless or holy, — 
that had the penalty of the law which Adam transgressed been 
executed according to the strict principle of Moral G-overn- 
16 11 



24:2 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

merit and exact letter of the law, Adam would have had no 
posterity. 

I advert to these opinions chiefly for the purpose of remark- 
ing, that caution is requisite in this case, as in most others, lest 
we give to the general forms of scriptural language a more 
particular meaning than they are designed to convey. It is, if 
I mistake not, from the want of this that most of the theologi- 
cal controversy in the Church arises, and especially on the 
subject now under consideration. 

It will be admitted by those from whom I may differ on the 
topics just stated, that the language of the Scriptures, at least 
so far as words or forms of statement are concerned, gives us 
only the general fact, that the sinfulness of mankind is in con- 
sequence of the sin of Adam. But it is maintained that this 
general form implies the other more particular facts. This I 
deny. It may be true, that God determined that if Adam sin- 
ned, his posterity should be sinners, and also, that had Adam 
not sinned, some, or even all of his posterity should sin. God 
may determine that the small-pox should be introduced into a 
community by one man ; and still it may be true, that were it 
not to be thus brought, it would be introduced in some other 
way. So also it may be true, that the death of mankind is a 
consequence indirectly of Adam's sin, and directly a conse- 
quence of their own sin. Again, it may be consistent with the 
strictest principles of law or Moral Government, that when 
Adam had sinned, God should delay for a time, as men do in 
civil governments, the execution of the penalty, and that our 
first parents, even without the system of redemption, should 
have lived long enough under a merely legal dispensation, to 
people the earth with their descendants. If these things are 
so, then plainly there can be nothing to justify the above spe- 
cific statements which are so often made. Instead then of 
adopting these conjectural and unauthorized implications, I 
take only this general position, as that and that only which the 
Scriptures authorize, — that the sinfidness of mankind is in con- 
sequence of Adam's sin. 

I proceed to support the truth of this position by the follow- 
ing proofs. I allege — 

1. The account given by Moses of the fall of our first parents, 
and its consequences. 

From this narrative we learn that God designed that Adam 



CONSEQUENCES OF ADAM'S SIN. 243 

and Eve should be the progenitors of a race. Gen. i. 28 : 
" God blessed them and said, ' Be fruitful, and multiply, and 
replenish the earth, and subdue it.' ' : The form in which mar- 
riage is instituted plainly shows the same thing. " Therefore 
shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave 
unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh" (Gen. ii. 24). The 
fifteenth and sixteenth verses of the third chapter very clearly 
show, that not only the serpent but the woman were acquainted 
with the design of God to people the earth with human beings 
as the descendants of the first pair. 

Again : we shall now see that this narrative of Moses gives 
yet other facts, which clearly show that sin and death, with 
other evils, were the consequence of the sin of Adam. 

Particularly, an economy of grace was immediately intro- 
duced as consequent on the sin of Adam ; it respected his 
descendants as truly as himself, and essentially changed their 
condition from what it would have been under a merely legal 
economy. . In Gen. iii. 15, an economy of grace is revealed : 
" It shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." The 
w T ork of the Redeemer is described by an apostle as consisting 
in destroying him that hath the power of death. (Vide Heb. 
ii. 14 ; 1 John iii. 8.) 

Who then can doubt that certain consequences of Adam's 
sin to his posterity were the grounds in respect to which this 
economy of grace was adopted? Who can doubt as to the 
specific consequence that they were to he sinners, and in this 
character to need a Saviour ? And yet who can on this point 
decide any thing more specific? Whether they would or 
would not have sinned if Adam had not, who can tell? It 
might be true that if he sinned, they would sin, and it might 
also have been true, that had he not sinned, they would not 
have sinned. While then the simple fact, that in consequence 
of his sin, they would sin, is all that can be inferred from the 
narrative, this fact itself is most clearly taught. 

Another fact consequential on the sin of Adam is, that Para-. 
dise is changed into a world of thorns and briers, of toil and 
pain and death. By this change, it was obviously designed as 
the residence of a sinful race, and clearly indicates its charac- 
ter. Again we see not only that the sinful character of Adam's 
posterity, but also that these ills of life, and death itself were con- 
sequential on his sin. But who can say any thing more than this ? 



244 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

Who can decide from this narrative whether death is or is not 
the consequence of Adam's sin, exclusively of the sin of his 
descendants ; or whether it is or is not directly the consequence 
of their sin, and indirectly of his, as the latter is the ground 
of the certainty of the former ? 

Another fact is conspicuous from this narrative, that death 
and other evils consequent on Adam's sin, both to him and 
his posterity, are not the result of a strictly legal process. 
If so the economy of grace was vain, since it accomplished 
nothing. Death, with other earthly calamities, does not imply 
any violation on the part of the Lawgiver of the principles of 
law ; nor yet are they what these principles demand as the full 
execution of the legal penalty. These evils are inflicted under 
an economy of grace, and are blended with manifold mercies. 
They were denounced subsequently to the establishment and 
disclosure of such an economy. Even death, the greatest of 
them, may be, and often is a blessing, being an entrance into 
bliss eternal. Death was as truly destroyed when the promise 
of redemption was made, as when Christ died; i. e., though an 
evil, it was not a penal evil — it was an evil as included in a 
system of moral discipline for sinners under grace ; it was an 
evil, and as such, a consequence and proof of sin and condem- 
nation, but not a legal penalty. These evils therefore, are not in- 
flicted on men, nor was this implied in this sentence, in the way 
of legal process. They are indeed inflicted on sinners and on 
those who deserve them, and even still greater evils. 

Now from all these facts in the Mosaic narrative, we una- 
voidably conclude that sin and death, with other evils, were in 
a most palpable and striking manner the consequence of 
Adam's sin. For why this change from the original dispensa- 
tion of law — why this economy of grace ? Why this world of 
thorns and briers, the appointed residence of a race yet to 
exist? Why this destiny to toil and pain, and sorrow and 
death, in respect to all who should live on the face of it ? Is 
there or is there not some single event, whence in some way 
of connection all this originated ? No one can read the Mosaic 
history and doubt that there was such an event, and that it 
was the sin of Adam in Paradise. He must see that the 
grand object of the historian was to convince us that this is 
such a sinful, dying world as it is, under the government of 
God, as the consequence of Adam's sin. 



THE MODE OF CONNECTION. M5 

Here however, we must guard against certain particular in- 
ferences, which though the narrative of "Moses does not ex- 
pressly deny, it does not authorize. Who dare say it author- 
izes us to assert that the sin of Adam is the direct proxi- 
mate cause of the sin of his posterity ? The narrative does not 
imply this, while the nature of sin in man and the known 
proximate cause, as previously explained, forbid such an in- 
ference. Neither may we infer as a revealed doctrine, that 
death comes on men in no sense for their own sin. For had 
not their sin been certain, God might not have doomed them 
to certain death. If it be said that infants have no sin of their 
own, and therefore do not die for their own sin in any sense, I 
answer, this may be true, and yet the Scriptures may have used 
that general phraseology which decides nothing respecting in- 
fants. Their case may have been unnoticed, and the Scrip- 
tures have expressly decided in general terms that men die in 
the character of sinners.* On this supposition, death, though 
It comes in one respect as the consequence of the personal sin 
of each, comes as a mark of God's displeasure with each — 
comes as a proof of sin in each ; still as it does not come in the 
way of a strictly legal process, it may also be connected with 
Adam's sin as well as with their own. 

In further proof of our position I allege — 

Bom. v. 12, 18, 19 : " Wherefore as by one man sin entered 
into the world," &c " Therefore as by the offense of one (or 
better, as by one offense), judgment came upon all men to con- 
demnation." "By one man's disobedience many were made 
(or became) sinners." These passages cannot be understood 
to teach less than that all mankind become sinners in conse- 
quence of Adam's sin. 

I now proceed to consider — 

II. The mode of connection between Adam's sin and that of 
his posterity. 

It is obvious that one thing may be supposed to be the con- 
sequence of another in many ways or modes of consequence, 
and that simply to affirm that one thing is by another or by 
means of it, or is a consequence of it, decides nothing in re- 
spect to the particular mode of the connection. It is, if I mis- 



• The very passage in Gen. iii. 16-19, itself shows that the evils threatened 
respected not infants but adults. 



246 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

take not, in this general and indefinite manner that the Scrip- 
tures exhibit the connection between Adam's sin, and the sin 
and death of his posterity. This has given rise to much gratu- 
itous and unauthorized speculation; and there are few subjects 
in theology in respect to which the language of Scripture has 
been more unreasonably pressed, or on which opinions so 
groundless and absurd have been held with so much tenacity. 
Whether revelation enables us to answer every minute inquiry 
respecting the mode of this connection or not, it is believed 
that from the known, nature of the subject, and from what the 
Scriptures teach, we can decide in the most important respects 
what this mode is not, and also what it is. 
This I shall now attempt, remarking — 

1. That the posterity of Adam do not become sinners as a 
consequence of his sin, by being created with a sinful nature, 
or by having such a nature conveyed to them by the laws of 
propagation. This point has been already discussed. 

2. Adam's posterity do not become sinners as a consequence 
of his sin, by being guilty of his sin. This theory or doctrine 
has been advocated under some diversity of specific form. 
Some have maintained that we are guilty of his sin by trans- 
fer • i. e., that God in the exercise of absolute sovereignty 
transfers the guilt of Adam's sin to his posterity, without re- 
spect to any personal acts or personal ill-desert on their part ; 
thus making them guilty when otherwise they had been inno- 
cent. 

The absurdity and injustice involved in this doctrine are its 
sufficient refutation, since they are so palpable and gross that 
we are fully authorized to say a priori, that the doctrine itself 
is not to be found in a revelation from God. It is replete with 
absurdity, for what greater can there be, than that the guilt of 
one being should become the guilt of another — yea of the mil- 
lions of his descendants to the end of time ? We might ask, 
was the whole or a part of the guilt of Adam transferred ? If 
the whole, why did he not become innocent by the transfer? 
If a part, how was it divided between him and them ? Was it 
equally or unequally divided ? Was he as guilty as had no 
division been made, and each of them as guilty as he ? or was 
the portion of each lessened at all by the division? I may 
further ask, whether it could be thus divided into parts, and 
each part be equal to the whole ; whether guilt like matter be 



GUILT NOT TRANSFERABLE. 247 

infinitely divisible, and even whether when divided into parts 
as indefinitely as the supposition demands, there could be 
enough for all, and each the object of a just condemnation? 

More gravely now I ask, what is guilt ? "What is guilt if it 
be not a personal thing, pertaining to the action, and solely to 
the action of an agent who acts ? Plainly, if this be not true 
of all that can be called guilt, the human mind has no concep- 
tion of it. If it be true of all that can be called guilt, then 
the doctrine is chargeable with the contradiction of affirming 
that a thing which is not guilt is guilt. There is no escape from 
this,but by denying that guilt pertains exclusively to the action 
of an agent ; and this is folly too great to be reasoned with. 

The injustice which the doctrine imputes to God is still more 
revolting. " Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right ?" 
And is there no appeal to the reason of man in respect to what 
right is ? If not, then why does God himself so often appeal 
to human reason on this very question ? Every such appeal is 
an admission that men do know what right or equity is ; what 
it demands and what it forbids. If not, then there is an end, 
not only to all reasonings and conclusions in theology, but to 
all confidence in God. If there be no standard of right or 
equity on which human reason is competent to decide, where 
is our proof of his justice or goodness ? How can we reason or 
judge at all in respect to either his character or his government? 
But if there is such a standard, if there is an eternal rule of 
right which human reason does and must understand, and by 
which it must judge, or be of no use to man, then the appeal 
is fairly made to human reason. I ask then, what violation of 
the eternal rule of right more palpable, than to transfer the 
guilt of one being to another ; than to count another guilty, 
and to punish him for another's act ? Admit that such a prin- 
ciple obtains in the moral administration of God, and what are 
the consequences ? He who is not guilty becomes truly guilty ; 
yea, he who is holy may be really and at the same time as 
guilty as the guiltiest, and be treated accordingly. Such a 
principle subverts every thing ; law, equity, moral government, 
moral character, in respect to both God and man are over- 
thrown, and the righteous as well as the wicked have, cause for 
consternation and dismay. 

Again : this doctrine derives no support from the Scriptures. 
Allowing the possibility that it should be found in the Bible, 



24:8 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

Bti-11 no passage can be properly understood to teach it which 
will admit of any other meaning. Before a doctrine so revolt- 
ing to reason and common sense can be palmed upon the Word 
of God, it must be shown that the language cannot be inter- 
preted in any other but the absurd meaning, and this I affirm 
to be impossible in respect to any passage cited to support it. 

Further : the passages depended on for the support of this 
doctrine require another import. They are those which speak 
of God's imputing sin and righteousness. We read that 
" Abraham believed God, and it was imputed to him for right- 
eousness," that is, his faith was reckoned as the ground of favor 
instead of perfect obedience or of righteousness ; of course he 
had none by transfer. Shimei, who deserved death for cursing 
David, prayed thus : " Let not my lord impute iniquity unto 
me." Whose iniquity ? Not another's, but plainly his own ; 
as if he had said, let me not be punished as my crime deserves. 
God, it is said, imputed sin to the children of Xorah, Dathan, 
and Abiram, on account of their father's sin. But I answer, 
that there is no more evidence that these children were pun- 
\shed for heing guilty of their father's sin, than there is in every 
other case in which children die. Indeed their death, for aught 
that appears to the contrary, may have been to them on the 
whole a real blessing, and not a punishment, while it was evil 
to the parents, and might subserve the useful purpose to others 
to awe them from similar crimes. 

Other examples are referred to, viz., Job xxi. 19 : " God lay- 
eth up his iniquity for his children." Jer. xxxii. 18 ; 1 Sam. xv. 
1-7, and 19. These are examples in which certain evils come 
on those who deserve them for their own sins, or they are not. 
If they are, they have no relevance to the question. If they 
are not, they are cases in which the evils brought on the chil- 
dren may be, on the whole, blessings to them. Another pas- 
sage is appealed to. Ex. xx. 5 : " "Visiting the iniquity of the 
fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation 
of them that hate me." (Tide Emmons' Ser., vol. i. p. 305.) 
This passage must be interpreted so thfit " them that hate me" 
shall be the children that hate me, in which case the evil is de- 
served by the children ; or it must mean the children of parents 
ivho hate me, in which case the evils are not penal, but may be 
disciplinary, as in the case of a drunkard's children, to whom 
certain evils consequential on his crimes may be real blessings. 



MEN NOT GUILTY OF ADAM'S SIN. 249 

But the view of this passage now opposed is plainly contra- 
dicted by the following passages : Deut. xxiv. 16 ; 2 Kings xiv. 
6 ; 2 Chron. xxv. 4 ; Jer. xvi. 11, 12, 13. 

Once more : this doctrine of transfer is explicitly denied in 
the Scriptures. Ezek. xviii. 20 : " The soul that sinneth, it shall 
die." "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." 
Yide also Jer. xxxi. 29, 30. A more explicit recognition of in- 
justice in any procedure, than in that of punishing children 
for the sins of their fathers, cannot be well conceived ; nor a 
more formal vindication from the charge of injustice on the part 
of God be named. The charge is, that an innocent posterity 
are punished for the iniquity of the fathers ; in a proverbial 
form of expression, " The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and 
the children's teeth are set on edge." The vindication by God 
himself is a point-blank denial of the fact, accompanied with 
the severe and terrible rebuke, " What mean ye, that ye use 
this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying, The fathers 
have eaten sour grapes?" &c. (Ezek. xviii. 2). Who that reads 
this chapter will dare to repeat such a charge against God ? 

Another form of the doctrine, that Adairus posterity are 
guilty of his sin, and that in which it is taught by its ablest 
advocates, is, that Adam's posterity, by the sovereign constitu- 
tion of God, are one with Adam, and thus are truly and prop- 
erly considered as acting in his act ; and so committing one 
and the same sin which Adam committed. This theory is 
encumbered with absurdities, and involves imputations on the 
Divine character not less revolting than those which pertain to 
the theory of transfer. If we are one in Adam, and so guilty 
of his sin, then also was Adam one with us and guilty of our 
sins ; and without saying what a monster of iniquity this rep- 
resentative of the human race must be, having committed each 
and every sin that has been and shall be perpetrated from the 
beginning to the end of time, the question naturally arises, 
whether we have in fact any sin at all to answer for, since all 
sins were committed by our common father. Or if it be said, 
and this is said, that Adam and his descendants are one complex 
person, one moral whole, then how much sin pertains to each 
according to an equitable distribution among the parts? And 
further, it would seem that in the dispensation of punishment 
or pardon, this same moral whole must share alike in the calam- 
ity and the blessing ; i. e., so much sin as is punished must be 

11* 



250 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

so punished in the several parts of this moral whole, and so 
much as is forgiven must be remitted to the several parts of 
this moral whole. On which principle of equity can one be 
wholly subject to punishment, and another wholly pardoned? 
If any given number of sins for example, be pardoned, they 
must be pardoned in respect to the being to whom they belong ; 
i. e., in the present case in respect to the complex whole, and 
as there cannot be punishment so far as there is pardon, each 
individual has a fair claim to his portion of the benefit. 

But not to dwell on such absurdities, what shall be said of a 
Moral Government in which such a principle is acted upon, 
and what of its author ? The mind unpervef ted by theological 
system-making cannot fail to see what appalling consequences 
must follow from the adoption of the principle, that one being 
is to be considered and treated as having acted in another's 
act; nor indeed that God himself cannot make it true that 
one being is another, or the act of the one is the act of the 
other. ]S"o constitution or covenant of God can make it true, 
that a being can sin before he exists. All that can be said 
in extenuation of these u fooleries" is, that great and good 
men may believe the most palpable absurdities without seeing 
them to be such, when they suppose themselves obliged to 
adopt them in defense of revealed truth. 

There are two sources of argument on the part of those who 
maintain the doctrine that we are guilty of Adam's sin, which 
in their view at least ought not to be passed without notice : 
one is the fact that children suffer extensively in consequence 
of the sins of parents, according to the very laws of nature 
which God has established ; the other is the scriptural text, 
Eom. v. 12 : " Therefore as by one man sin entered into the 
world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for 
that all have sinned." 

The fact that children suffer in consequence of the sins of 
their parents is undeniable. But in what way or manner of 
connection ? Is it on the ground that the sins of the parents 
are the sins of the children? That all the -calamities of chil- 
dren are not inflicted on this principle, we are taught by the 
Saviour himself (John ix. 2, 3). The question is, what proof 
is there that any are inflicted on this principle ? To say that 
they are inexplicable on any other, is saying nothing to the 
purpose, since many, like that now adverted to, are inexplicable 



MODERN DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 251 

on this. Indeed, if they are accounted for in this way, the in- 
explicableness of the procedure is still increased. The truth 
is, that both reason and Scripture oblige us to class the suffer- 
ings of infants, be the proximate causes of them what they 
may, under the category of evils, which may be, whether we 
can or cannot tell how they are, consistent with God's moral 
perfection. At any rate, who shall say, that to account for the 
sufferings of infants we are bound to believe nonsense ? 

But it is not difficult to account for the sufferings of children 
which are consequential on parental crime. The child' of a 
drunkard becomes decrepit, deformed, and feeble. This to 
him may be a great blessing, in supplying useful discipline, 
as restraint on vice', and in other ways. 

4. There is another form of the doctrine of Imputation, 
which may be called Putation, — that the posterity of Adam are 
guilty of his sin, or that they are liable to suffer the conse- 
quences of Adam's sin, without being the subjects of ill-desert 
in any mode. 

This is only another, and so far as the Orthodox are con- 
cerned, a modern form of the doctrine of Imputation. It is 
that maintained in the "Biblical Repertory," published at 
Princeton, and by Professor Hodge in his " Commentary on Ro- 
mans." It may be thus stated, — that God regards and treats all 
rnen as sinners on account of Adairts sin, without their being 
the subjects of ill-desert, either by transfer or by Imputation, or 
in any other way. 

In a controversy between the " Biblical Repertory" and the 
" Christian Spectator" in 1831, Professor Hodge undertook to 
defend this form of the doctrine of Imputation. He appealed 
first to the authority of such writers as. Augustine, Calvin, Tur- 
retin, Owen, and Edwards. The " Spectator," in reply, main- 
tained that no one of these writers held this form of the doctrine 
of Imputation. The rejoinder of Professor Hodge consists sub- 
stantially in abandoning this ground of authority which he had 
taken with so much confidence at the outset, by saying, " that 
it was no concern of his whether these standard writers, to 
whom he had appealed, held the doctrine or not!" (Vide 
" Christian Spectator," 1831, p. 497.) 

The difference between the professed doctrine of Professor 
Hodge and the writers referred to is, that they held that the 
posterity of Adam are truly ill-deserving, and regarded as so 



252 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

on account of Adam's sin, and that he maintains, except when 
he contradicts himself, that no ill-desert whatever belongs to 
the posterity of Adam on account of his sin, though God re- 
gards and treats them as sinners ; thus virtually maintaining 
that God regards that to be true which is not. 

Thus Professor Hodge says, " that Adam's first act of trans- 
gression was not, strictly and properly, that of his descendants ;" 
that community in action, transfer of moral character, are no 
part of the doctrine of Imputation ; that their doctrine (that of 
the Old School) includes neither the idea of any mysterious 
union of the human race with Adam, so that his sin is strictly 
and properly theirs, nor a transfer of moral character ; he de- 
nies that the moral turpitude of that sin was transferred to us, 
and even the possibility of such a transfer. They say, that 
Imputation does not involve a transfer of moral acts or moral 
character, that the ill-desert of one man cannot be transferred 
to another. They maintain that the word guilt, as applied in 
the present controversy, denotes simply liability to punishment, 
and that no ill-desert belongs to Adam's descendants, as the 
previous ground or reason that the evil consequences of his sin 
come upon them. 

Such, in many different forms, are their statements of their 
doctrine of Imputation. 

Let us now hear all this contradicted by the same writer. 
He says: "In Imputation there is, first, an ascription of some- 
thing to those concerned ; and, secondly, a determination to deal 
with them accordingly." Again : " "When Paul begged Phile- 
mon to im/pute to him the debt or offense of Onesimus, he 
begged him to regard him as the debtor or offender, and to ex- 
act of him whatever compensation he required." He describes 
this as " laying the conduct of one to the charge of another, and 
deeding with him accordingly." Here plainly are two things — 
a first and a second — an ascription of conduct and a determina- 
tion to deal, &c. Paul not only begged Philemon to look to 
him for remuneration, if wronged by Onesimus, but to regard 
him as the offender. If language can express the idea, Paul 
requested Philemon to accuse him of the misconduct of his 
run-away slave, and also to exact compensation for any wrong 
done. In accordance with this, Professor Hodge says, " When 
Adam's sin is said to be imputed to his posterity, it is intended 
that his sin is laid to their charge, &kd they are punished for it, 



MODERN DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION. 253 

or are treated as sinners on this account." Who makes this 
charge ? God. Is it true or false ? If true, theu Imputation 
involves more than liability to evil consequences. If false, 
then God does not make it. Thus while we are told in formal 
statements, professed explanations, that Imputation involves 
mere liability, on the part of Adam's posterity, to certain con- 
sequences of Adam's sin, we are also told that it involves lay- 
ing Adam's sin to their charge. 

The reason for this exhibition of contradiction is to show the 
fact of an entire agreement in things between New England 
divines and the conductors of the Biblical Repertory, accord- 
ing to some of their statements. It is time to cease all dispu- 
tation except about words. 

In maintaining the form of Imputation now under consider- 
ation, its advocates attempt to give it plausibility by appealing 
to certain transactions among men. The cases to which they 
refer are those in which one is said to do what another does, 
and is also held responsible for his act ; or in which what one 
has done is said to be put to the account of another ; e. g., the 
monarch is said to do the act of his representative or minister, 
and to be bound by it. So the relation of one who employs 
an agent — the parent for a child, and particularly the case of 
Paul and Onesimus are referred to. Between all such cases 
and the one under consideration, there is one essential differ- 
ence which is fatal to the cause in support of which the appeal 
is made, viz., in all these cases the language used, and the 
responsibility which exists, is founded on a prior consent or 
stipulation, either expressed or implied, to be held responsible. 
The only question is, whether the evil consequences of Adam's 
sin come upon his posterity on this ground, viz., of their pre- 
vious voluntary consent, expressed or implied, to be held re- 
sponsible for Adam's act ? This is out of the question. How 
then can the fact that certain consequences of Adam's sin come 
on his posterity, be accounted for on the principle of the volun- 
tary assumption of another's responsibility ? 

To expose more fully the groundless nature of this appeal in 
the case of Paul and Onesimus, let us suppose Paul to have 
used the language of those who claim that he meant what they 
mean. Suppose he had said to Philemon, ' If Onesimus has 
wronged thee, or oweth thee aught, lay it to my charge ; not 
merely regard me as becoming liable by my consent to be re- 



254 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 



sponsible for the consequences, but charge and accuse me of 
all the misconduct of your run-away slave ; if he has robbed 
you, or defamed you, or burned your house, or killed your 
children, accuse me of these things openly and before the 
world.' Had the apostle said these things, would it not have 
amounted to proof of insanity? And yet, according to our 
brethren, he might have said them with perfect truth and pro- 
priety. They represent God as doing the very thing which 
Paul in such language would have requested Philemon to do, 
and which of course Philemon, had he complied with Paul's 
request, would have clone. He would have laid to the charge 
of Paul all the crimes of this run-away slave ; and the great 
apostle, even after his conversion, would stand before the world, 
in the proper use and true meaning of language, charged with 
and guilty of these crimes, as truly, in the belief of Professor 
Hodge, as Adam's descendants are charged in the Bible with 
Adam's sin. This indeed would be done with the consent of 
the apostle, while in respect to Adam's descendants, his sin is 
charged upon them, and they are made liable to its conse- 
quences without their consent, ex ordine Dei. 

Some hold the doctrine we have been considering under 
another form. They say that Adam was our federal head or 
representative. This language is sometimes used to describe the 
same thing as that of transfer y sometimes that of Imputation* 
sometimes that oiPutation y and sometimes to denote simply 
the doctrine, that in Adam there was such a trial of human na- 
ture, as to show us that there is no reason to suppose that it 
would have been better for his posterity to have been tried as 
he was, than it now is. This I do not deny. It certainly may 
he so. Indeed there is a high probability that it is better for us 
to be what we are in nature and circumstances, than to have 
been what Adam was in this respect. On this principle some 
proceed to make an inference wholly unwarranted, viz., that 
it is just in God, as Professor Hodge maintains, to regard and 
treat us as sinners on account of Adam's sin ; i. e., to bring 
upon us the penal evils of his sin. This is an outrage on justice. 
What if I, had I been created with the same constitution in 
kind and degree, and placed in the same circumstances with 
Borgia, or any other cut-throat of the hierarchy, should have 
committed the same crimes, can I therefore be justly considered 
and treated as if I had committed them? 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

XIII.— CONSEQUENCES OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY, AND THE 
CONNECTION BETWEEN THAT SIN AND THESE CONSEQUENCES. 

Rom. v. 12-19, considered.— Falsely interpreted. — I. Seasons for this untenable.— 1. Rendering 
of ty' w. — 2. No rendering of tjixaprov supports this doctrine. — 3. The drift of the argument does 
not support it — The apostle does not teach that infants are sinners, nor that death is the legal 
penalty of sin. — " All have .mined." 1 — " Death by sin." — Argument from fourteenth verse. — The 
death spoken of is not penal. — Signification of KaraKpifxa. — Nature of the case. — The death com- 
mon to all men.— It takes place in this -world.— Denied by the apostle to be legal penalty.— Ar- 
guments from the prevalence of death from "Adam to Moses. 1 '— II. Proofs against this inter- 
pretation are decisive. 

I proposed, in the preceding lecture, to show — 

I. The fact, that the sinfulness of mankind is the conse- 
quence of the sin of Adam ; and, 

II. To consider the anode of connection between that sin and 
this consequence. 

After attempting to prove the fact as now stated, I entered 
on the consideration of the mode of connection between 
Adam's sin and the sin of his posterity ; and attempted 
to show particularly the absurdity of the doctrine, that his 
posterity are guilty of his sin by Imputation, in the different 
forms of this doctrine ; also that the Scriptures give no sup- 
port to, but rather explicitly deny it. This led to an exami- 
nation of the scriptural argument with the exception of the 
passage in Horn. v. 12. I now propose to examine this much- 
controverted passage. 

If what has been said be true, there is at least a strong pre- 
sumption, not to say decisive proof, that this text gives no sup- 
port to the doctrine, that the descendants of Adam are guilty 
of his sin in any sense in which this language can be used. To 
suppose that it can be derived from this text, is to suppose the 
apostle to lay down a principle which has no countenance from 
other parts of the sacred volume, which is contrary to all rea- 
son and common sense, and which is also in the most explicit 
terms denied, and ' denied in terms of severe rebuke by God 
' : -nself. 



256 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

In considering this passage of Scripture, I propose — 

First — To examine the reasons given for the interpretation 
which I oppose ; and, 

Secondly — To offer proofs against this interpretation. 

First — To examine the reasons for the interpretation which I 
oppose. 

1. The rendering of the last clause of the twelfth verse thus, 
"m whom all have sinned." The Yulgate, and many of the 
older commentators, translate the words £</>' u, in ichom. 
Against this rendering there are the following reasons : (1.) The 
antecedent is too remote. (2.) 'Ev w would be used if this were 
the meaning. (3.) ' AfiaprdveLv em rivi (to sin in another), is a 
conception unknown. (4.) The assertion £</)' Z navreg r\\iaprov, 
is explained, or rather the idea or meaning is developed in the 
following verses, 13th and 14th, and indeed in the whole pas- 
sage to the end of the chapter. This we shall see hereafter. 
Professor Hodge rejects the rendering in whom. The render- 
ing unto which, is, I think, supported by the most evidence. 
(Yicle Doddridge in loo. Yicle also examples from Greek writers 
in Stuart's Com., in loc.) 

2. It is claimed that rj[iaprov may be understood, have sinned 
by Imputation. As we have seen, there are two forms of the 
doctrine of Imputation. One is, that the posterity sin by being 
one and the same person with Adam, and by committing the 
same sin, in number and kind, which he committed. It is 
worthy of remark, that the word dfiaprdvoy always denotes to 
sin by acting, in the view of those who adopt this theory. Thus 
Turretin says, " the word rjfiaprov properly denotes some actual 
sin" (pecatum aliquod actuale). He states expressly that they 
who sinned in Adam, before they exist, are considered as sin- 
ning in him and themselves to have sinned. — (Instit. Theol., vol. 
i. p. 481.) 

According to another form of the doctrine of Imputation, it 
is claimed that r\\iaprov may be rendered, treated as sinners, or 
regarded and treated as sinners, without personal ill-desert. 
Tli at God should regard a being as a sinner who is not, is in- 
tuitively absurd and impossible. Or if it be said that the 
meaning is, that all are truly regarded as sinners, then they are 
sinners and ill-deserving. In support of this rendering of the 
word rjfiaprov, we are referred by some commentators to other 
passages. Two of these only we shall notice, and merely be- 



TEXTS CONSIDERED. 257 

cause Professor Hodge has referred to them. One is in Gen. 
xliv. 32, or xliii. 9. The literal rendering is, I shall have sin- 
ned. ISTor is there any thing decisive that this does not give 
the exact meaning; i. e., there is nothing to show that Judah 
did not intend to say, I shall have sinned in violating my 
promise to protect, and restore the child. It may be however, 
I will consent to be regarded as a sinner, so far as this is pos- 
sible, without being in fault, i. e., to he treated as a sinner. 
Supposing then, that one man says to another in a case like 
this, I shall have sinned, meaning only, I consent to he treated 
as a sinner, does it follow that a Gocl of equity and truth can 
use the same language in the same meaning in respect to all 
mankind, and this when not one of them has sinned, nor even 
consented to be treated as a sinner? Supposing it to be proper 
to say, 7" have sinned, meaning simply that I have consented to 
he treated as a sinner, can God say that all have sinned, in the 
same sense, when not one has consented to he treated as a sin- 
ner f This would be a palpable falsehood. 

The other passage is in 1 Kings i. 21. Here the literal ren- 
dering is, "I and my son Solomon shall he sinners /" i. e., in 
the view of Adonijah, and other political demagogues. Sup- 
plying the ellipsis, the phrase shall he sinners has its literal 
meaning. Bathsheba affirming that herself and son would be 
in fact, though erroneously in her view, esteemed sinners or 
offenders by Adonijah. Suppose however that she had another 
meaning, viz., that Adonijah would, without believing her and 
Solomon to be actual offenders, treat them as such; does it 
follow that because usage would justify her in saying, we shall 
be sinners, meaning we shall be treated as sinners when we are 
not, by a wicked king and his coadjutors, that God uses the 
same language in the same meaning in respect to the whole 
human race? "What if, in such a case of flagrant injustice, 
usage sanctions the use of the phrase we shall he sinners, to 
denote we shall be treated as sinners when we are not ; does it 
follow that it is possible that God should actually use similar 
phraseology to mean that he treats the whole human race as 
sinners when they are not? And yet it is solely on the author- 
ity of such usage that Prof. Hodge claims that God declares 
that the whole human race have sinned, meaning that under 
his government they are regarded and treated as sinners with- 
out any personal ill-desert. Surely these examples do not fur- 
17 



258 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

nish the shadow of a pretense that such is or can be the mean- 
ing of the apostle when he says, " all have sinned." 

3. It is claimed that the interpretation now opposed is re- 
quired by the scope of the passage, the drift of the apostle's 
argument, and undeniable facts. This argument, which con- 
sists of several particulars, may, it is believed, be presented in 
its full force, thus: "The apostle, it is said in the 12th verse, 
clearly asserts a connection between the sin of Adam and the 
sin and death of all mankind ; and he does this, as is manifest 
from the subsequent context, for the purpose of tracing a con- 
nection between the sin of Adam and the condemnation of 
mankind, which resembles the connection between the work of 
Christ and the Justification of believers. Thus it is said, that 
when the apostle asserts that " by one man sin entered into 
the world, and death by sin, and so death passed on all men ;" 
that " through the offense of one many be dead ;" that " by 
the one offense judgment came on all men unto condemna- 
tion ;" and that " by one man's disobedience many were made 
sinners," we are forced to understand the apostle as teaching, 
not the acknowledged truth, that all men are sinners in conse- 
quence of Adam's sin, but the more particular truth, that they 
are sinners in Adam, or are guilty of his sin, or are regarded 
and treated as sinners on account of his sin. In support of 
this position, it is said that there is no other way of accounting 
for the universality of the penal evils summarily comprised in 
the word death, especially as these evils come upon infants. 
For as the infliction of penal evils implies the violation of law, 
the universal infliction of these evils cannot be accounted for 
by the violation of the law of Moses, since men died before it 
was given ; nor by the violation of the law of nature, since 
even those die who have never broken that law. To strengthen 
this argument, we are told that the apostle by death does not 
mean merely natural death, to which all men and even infants 
are subject, for this might be accounted for by the violation of 
the law of Moses, or of the law of nature, or by their inherent 
depravity ; but death stands for any and every evil judicially 
inflicted for the support of law, and especially for the great 
fact that men begin to exist out of communion with God; i. e., 
God instead of entering into communion with them the moment 
they begin to exist, as he did with Adam, and forming them 
by his Spirit in his own moral image, regards them as out of 



ARGUMENT CORRECTED. 259 

his favor, and withholds the influences of his Spirit. It is asked 
why is this ? And the answer is, that Paul tells us that it is 
for the one offense of one man that all thus die. The covenant 
being formed with Adam, not only for himself but for all his 
posterity, or Adam being placed on trial, not only for himselt 
but for the whole human race, his act in virtue of this relation 
is regarded as ours. God withdrew from us as he did from 
him ; in consequence of this withdrawal we begin to exist in 
moral darkness, destitute of a disposition to seek our happiness 
in God, and prone to delight in ourselves and the world. Thus 
the sin of Adam ruined his posterity. 

Such is an outline of the argument, as given by a late advo- 
cate* of the doctrine, that the posterity of Adam are guilty of 
his sin. 

To some of the positions contained in this reasoning I assent, 
and from others I entirely dissent. I assent unequivocally to 
the positions that the apostle asserts a connection between the 
sin of Adam and the sin and natural death of all mankind ; 
and of course a connection between the sin of Adam and the 
sin of his posterity, with the condemnation of all mankind 
according to law ; that the sin of Adam and the sin and con- 
demnation of mankind resemble in one respect the work of 
Christ and the Justification of believers ; i. e.,- the sin and con- 
demnation of mankind are connected with the sin of Adam, 
and the Justification of believers is connected with the work of 
Christ. I also admit that the covenant with Adam was made 
not only for himself, but also in an important respect for his 
posterity ; that Adam was placed on trial for the whole human 
race, and that in virtue of this relation, and in consequence of 
his sin, his descendants begin to exist without a prevailing dis- 
position to delight in God, and are prone to delight in them- 
selves and the world ; and that all, as soon as they become 
moral agents, sin and fall under God's condemnation, directly 
for their own sin, and indirectly in consequence of Adam's sin. 

There are other positions in the foregoing reasoning which I 
unequivocally deny. Particularly, first, that the apostle teaches 
that the posterity of Adam are in any sense guilty of his sin, 
or that they are regarded as sinners and treated as such on ac- 
count of Adam's sin ; secondly, that he teaches that the evils 

3 Prof. Hodge ; vide Com. on Rom. v. 12, &c. 



260 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

which come on mankind in this world are penal evils, or the 
punishment properly so called of Adam's sin, or of their own 
sin ; and thirdly, that he teaches any thing whatever concern- 
ing infants. 

It is manifest from the foregoing reasoning that the question 
is, whether Paul in this passage teaches the doctrine of Impu- 
tation, or that we are guilty of Adam's sin, in either of the 
forms in which it has been maintained. And it is equally 
manifest, that so far as this reasoning can possess the least 
plausibility, it depends on two questions, viz., whether Paul 
teaches that the evils brought on mankind in consequence of 
Adam's sin are penal evils, and whether he teaches that infants 
are sinners. 

Before I proceed to consider either of these alleged facts, 
I have one remark to make, — that if we admit that the apostle 
asserts them, neither of them nor both together prove that he 
teaches the doctrine of Imputation in either form of it. Sup- 
posing then, that the apostle teaches that infants are sinners 
and suffer the penalty of sin ; which is the most rational to con- 
clude, that they are sinners by actually sinning, or by Imputa- 
tion ; sinners by that which alone can be sin, viz., the trans- 
gression of law (vide Pom. iv. 15 ; 1 John iii. 4), or sinners by 
that which cannot be sin ? I know that it is affirmed by those 
whom I oppose, that infants cannot be sinners by transgressing 
law, or by actual sin. This they decide, as well they may, on 
the authority of reason or common sense. But I ask, how can 
they consistently do this when they have also decided that in- 
fants are sinners, and when in their full conviction Paul has 
not only said, that " where there is no law there is no trans- 
gression" (Pom. iv. 15), but also that "sin is not imputed 
when there is no law ;" and when another apostle has said, that 
" sin is the transgression of the law ?" Is it not exalting reason 
above revelation, to say that there is some other kind of sin 
than that of transgressing law ? If the apostle teaches that in- 
fants are sinners and bear the penalty of sin, then plainly it 
remains for the word of God and human reason to decide in 
what their sin consists. Shall we say that sin consists in that 
and that only, in which the word of God, and reason, and 
common sense decide that it can alone consist ; or in imputed 
sin, in which it cannot consist ? There is far less philosophical 
absurdity in supposing infants to be sinners by actual sin from 



INFANTS NOT DECLARED TO BE SINNERS. 261 

birth and before birth, than in supposing them to be sinners 
by iniputed sin. Augustine, Calvin, Turretin, the Westminster 
divines, Edwards, never boldly ventured to contradict the 
apostle's plain assertion, " that sin is the transgression of the 
law, and where there is no law there is no transgression;" but 
said " all sin being a transgression," &c. 

I now proceed to show that the apostle does not teach that 
infants are sinners, nor that the death of which he treats is the 
legal penalty of sin. 

(1.) He does not teach that infants are sinners. "We assert 
that no proof of the doctrine can be found in the passage be- 
fore us, unless the word of inspiration is self-contradictory. 
At least we may say, in view of the very peculiar and incredi- 
ble nature of the supposed fact, that if this passage or any 
other asserts it, it must be asserted in a form which shall be so 
unequivocal as to admit of no other construction. The mere 
assertion has the same aspect of incredibility beforehand, as 
that infants at the moment of birth, are accomplished, orators, 
mathematicians, or generals. 

But let us examine the arguments supposed to be furnished 
bj the passage itself. 

The first we notice is taken from the universal form of the 
apostle's phraseology, " all have sinned." This mode of inter- 
preting universal forms of expression we have already suffi- 
ciently considered, to show that it not only does not authorize, 
but absolutely forbids the extension of it to infants. In addi- 
tion to what has been said on this point, it is to be remarked 
that the apostle uses the same form of phraseology in predicat- 
ing universal sinfulness of mankind, without including infants. 
(Compare chap. iii. 9 with verse 23 ; and also chap. ii. 32 ; 
and Gal. iii. 22, especially the last.) But what is still more de- 
cisive, he makes the necessity of faith to Justification to be co- 
extensive with sin ; i. e., he teaches that every sinner must be 
justified by faith. This shows decisively that he speaks only 
of those who are capable of believing, and not of infants. Can 
infants believe in God or in Christ ? If not, are they damned 
for imputed sin, without the least benefit from the Atonement 
of Christ? 

But let us test the question by the law of usage and the dic- 
tate of common sense. Look at such sentences as the follow- 
ing : " All men value their reputation." " All men reason." 



262 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

"All Europe was agitated by the conquests of Napoleon." 
" Preach the Gospel to every creature." " Behold the whole 
city went out to meet Jesus and besought him." " And set all 
the city in an uproar." " Live peaceably with all men," &c., 
&c. Precisely like these is the case under consideration. The 
topic discussed was, whether both Jews and Gentiles (all men 
capable of sinning and capable of faith) were sinners ; and the 
reason for saying that Paul never thought of infants in the 
phrase all have sinned, is as decisive, as for saying that they are 
not thought of in such forms of expression in other cases. 
Peason and common sense decide that it is as impossible that 
infants should sin in Adam's sin, or in any other way, as that 
infants should walk or engage in the mob at Thessalonica. All 
usage of universal forms of expression proceeds on the princi- 
ple, that their meaning is to be limited by the universally 
known and acknowledged nature of things. 

The second reason alleged for including infants is, that in- 
fants die, and that we must understand the apostle to teach in 
the phrase death by sin, that sin, at least among human beings, 
is as universal as death. I answer, this argument depends en- 
tirely on the correctness of the principle already stated. In 
other words, the question is this, — whether the apostle means to 
say that death is the consequence of sin, and thus proves sin in 
those cases in which they are, according to reason and common 
sense and the word of God, without sin and incapable of sin ? 
Suppose it were to be said in the language of common usage, 
that all men take food because they know that it is necessary to 
sustain life. Could this language be justly interpreted to in- 
clude infants ? It will not be pretended. But why not? Infants 
take food as well as other human beings. Why then are they 
not to be included in the above proposition ? Plainly because 
reason and common sense say that they are incapable of the 
knowledge predicated. But reason and common sense decide 
with the same infallibility that they are incapable of actual sin. 
This our opponents all admit. I have already shown that there 
can be no other sin than actual sin. That death is a predicate 
common to both infants and those who have passed the period 
of infancy, is no more evidence that it is a consequence and 
proof of the sin of the former, because it is of the sin of the 
latter, than the fact that the taking of food is a predicate com- 
mon to infants, and also to the rest of the world, is a proof that 



INFANTS NOT DECLARED TO BE SINNERS. 263 

infants take food with the conviction of its necessity to sustain 
life, because adults take it with such conviction. I admit that 
if the common predicate in the latter case could be supposed 
to result from a common cause, the conviction of the necessity 
of food to sustain life, if this were the dictate of common sense, 
and if usage did not sanction the supposed universal form of 
speech without extending it to infants, this form of expression 
must be interpreted to include them. But as the facts are, we 
are compelled by the laws of usage to exclude infants, and to 
say with the most assured confidence that they are not even 
thought of. These decisive reasons exist in the case before us 
for saying that the apostle, when he said all men die because 
they are sinners, had no thought of an infant. 

A third reason for the opinion that infants are included by 
the apostle, is taken from the 14th verse : " Nevertheless death 
reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sin- 
ned after the similitude of Adam's transgression." The last 
phrase it is said must refer to infants, or to infants and idiots, 
since these are the only individuals during the interval between 
Adam and Moses of whom it could be true* that they " had 
not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression." I 
answer, (1.) that according to the theory of Imputation, infants 
are one in Adam, and therefore sinned exactly after the simili- 
tude of Adam's transgression. Being one and the same moral 
person, committing, as Edwards, Stapfer, and others say, the 
same sin in number and in kind, and corrupting their nature 
in this act just as Adam did in his, how could it be otherwise 
than that they sinned in precisely the same manner in which 
Adam sinned ? (2.) It is not true that infants and idiots are 
the only individuals of that period who could not sin after the 
similitude of Adam's transgression, for the adults having no 
revealed law like that which Adam violated, could not sin 
like him. 

But it is said that the apostle refers to all who lived in this 
interval, as dying on account of imputed sin, and to make the 
case more decisive to his purpose, he uses the distinctive parti- 
cle na\ even, to distinguish a particular class from others, viz., in- 
fants, in respect to whom no possible doubt could exist whether 
they had sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. 

* Here, by the way, an assertion is rejected because it is impossible. 



264 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

It is obvious indeed, that unless the apostle has shown that 
he had reference to some others than adults, it would be diffi- 
cult to prove from their case that he meant to say that only 
the imputed sin of -Adam was the cause of their death. On 
this supposition & possible doubt might arise whether he thought 
of imputed sin. But there is no evidence that he referred to 
infants, but rather proof to the contrary. For (1.) the dis- 
tinction claimed is a distinction without a difference ; for the 
adults of that period could no more have sinned after the simil- 
itude of Adam's transgression than the infants, nor yet as 
much so, according to the theory of Imputation ; for as adults 
guilty of actual sin without a revealed law, it is impossible 
that they should sin as much like Adam, as Adam did like 
himself, while infants as one with Adam must have sinned ex- 
actly as Adam did. (2.) If the apostle distinguishes infants 
from adults, it is by this peculiarity — that they had not sinned 
after the similitude of Adam's transgression — clearly implying 
that the adults had sinned after the similitude of Adam. But 
this is not only not true in respect to a revealed law, but if 
true would spoil the reasoning ascribed to the apostle ; for how 
could the case of those who had sinned after the similitude of 
Adam's transgression be brought to prove that they died for the 
imputed sin of Adam. If our opponents affirm that the adults 
of this period sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgres- 
sion, then they must give up the doctrine of death for imputed 
sin. If they say that they did not, then the difference claimed 
between them and the infants of that period did not exist; 
and to suppose the apostle to refer to infants in the clause in 
question, is to suppose him to make a distinction without a dif- 
ference ; i. e., to resort to downright falsehood in argument. 
Our opponents may hang on either horn of this dilemma which 
they prefer. I answer, (3.) that the word ttal, even, has not 
necessarily, as it occurs in this passage, the force of a distinctive 
particle in the manner asserted. It may be used merely to 
give greater point and force to the instance to which he ap- 
peals. Suppose that the apostle had said that (actual) sin was 
in the world until the giving of the law of Moses, and that 
some denied or doubted it on the ground that during that in- 
terval there was no revealed law of which sin could be the 
transgression. Suppose now the apostle to set aside all doubt on 
the point, and appeal to an undeniable matter of fact, viz., that 



THE APOSTLE DOES NOT REFEK TO INFANTS. 265 

death reigned over all men during that period, even over them 
who had not sinned under a revealed law or after the simili- 
tude of Adam's transgression. I ask, could any form of ex- 
pression be more natural, more exactly what we should expect 
him to adopt ? There is then not a particle of evidence in this 
clause, that the apostle thought of infants. (4.) I ask why he 
referred to this interval at all ? Plainly there was some pecu- 
liarity in respect to it, decisive of the point he wished to 
establish. But what was the point, and what the peculiarity ? 
His point, it is claimed, was to prove that imputed sin was in 
the world until the law of Moses. But what peculiarity would 
enable him to prove this? Was it in the case of those who 
were adults or not infants ? And what was it ? There was 
none which could show that they were sinners by Imputation, 
for their case no more proves this than that of those who lived 
after the law of Moses. For if it had been asserted that those 
who lived after the law of Moses, died as transgressors of that 
law, or for not receiving it, as the Jews supposed the fact to be 
with respect to the Gentiles, still it might be said that the former 
died for transgressing the law of nature. How then would the 
death of this part of mankind prove the doctrine of imputed sin ? 
Plainly not at all ; and this is admitted virtually by our oppo- 
nents, who bring forward no proof on this point till they find 
the apostle, as they say, referring to the infants of that period. 
The whole strength of the apostle's reasoning is therefore de- 
rived from the case of infants who lived and died before the 
law was given by Moses. But surely there was no peculiarity 
respecting the infants of that period at all to the purpose of 
the apostle, more than in the death of all others of this class. 
Infants, after the law, could no more die as actual sinners, than 
infants before the law ; and if this proves that they die for 
imputed sin, it proves it in all instances as much as in that of 
infants before the law. No possible reason then can be given 
why the apostle referred to death prior to the Mosaic law as a 
proof of imputed sin. The death of the adults would not fur- 
nish an argument, nor would the death of the infants of that 
period more than the death of all other infants. It is plain 
then, that the apostle did not attempt to prove imputed sin, nor 
refer for this purpose to the death of infants before the law. 

If now we suppose the object of the apostle in referring to 
those who lived and died between Adam and Moses, was to 

12 



266 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

prove that they died as the consequence of actual sin, though 
they had not sinned against a revealed law, then the case is 
fully and decisive to his purpose. Nor is it possible to assign 
any other object or design for his referring to that period in 
this manner. He has obviously done so as a peculiarly clear 
case in which there was sin, and also in which sin is not im- 
puted ; i. e., was not punished with death as the penalty of 
any revealed law having such a penalty. Neither the case of 
Adam, nor of those who lived after the Mosaic law, would so 
well answer his purpose ; for it might be said with some plau- 
sibility, that these died under law with the penalty of death, or 
that death in these cases was the legal penalty of sin. Again, 
it is manifest that in his reference to this period he included 
the adults, and whatever peculiarity there was which availed 
to his purpose in argument, it respected the adults of this period 
compared with those of any other. But these adults no more 
die for imputed sin, as we have seen, than others. The only 
conceivable peculiarity in their case, is that which the apostle 
unequivocally specifies, that they sinned and died when there 
was no law revealed. They being under the law of nature 
only, were avo\ioi, or " without law ;" death could not be to them 
a legal penalty, or when sin was not imputed, i. e., not pun- 
ished with death as a legal penalty. This being the" only con- 
ceivable peculiarity on account of which the apostle referred to 
the adults of this period, so it is the only conceivable pecul- 
iarity on account of which he could have referred, if he would 
have referred at all, to the infants ; for the peculiarity in the 
case of the adults and of the infants must be the same. Unless 
therefore we suppose that the infants sinned and died as the 
adults died, — i. e., sinned and died without a revealed law ; i. e., 
actually sinned under the law of nature, — then the apostle could 
not have referred to the infants of that period at all. 

5. To say that the apostle referred to infants as sinning by 
Imputation, is to beg the main question in debate, that infants 
can sin by Imputation. The thing is impossible in the nature 
of things, in every sense of the language. It is contrary to 
reason, common sense, and the Scriptures, and it might as well 
be said that not to sin after the, similitude of Adam's trans- 
gression, means that they sinned by conception or respiration, 
as that they sinned by Imputation. Who devised this mode of 
sinning ? Philosophical theologians, and on the authority of 



THE DEATH SPOKEN OF NOT PENAL. 267 

the realistic philosophy ; devised it in order to support a palpa- 
bly false interpretation of universal forms of language ; devised 
it for lack of ingenuity to see how all men could be said to be 
sinners, and without supposing all men to include infants ; de- 
vised it to support error and to carry a point in false theologj^. 
If such nonsense is to be ascribed to an inspired apostle, to 
what respect is inspiration itself entitled ? 

I give here the following extract from Tholuck's Commen- 
tary on Rom. v. 12 : 

" 'E0' w. Augustine proceeded on the realistic theory, that 
God having performed out one act of creation had placed the 
race in the first individual, so that all further existence was 
nothing else than the appearance and development of what was 
already in being. Since now in the beginning the first indi- 
vidual and the race existed together, it followed that the race 
fell in him. Subtle explanations of this view, and philosophical 
applications of the theory of the universalibus in re to this dogma 
of Imputation, are given by the schoolmen ; e. g., Anselm, and 
Odoart, in his essay De Peccato Originali." 

Having thus attempted to prove that the apostle in the pas- 
sage before us did not refer at all to infants, I now proceed to 
show as proposed — 

(2.) That the death of which he treats is not penal, or is not 
the legal penalty of sin. 

It is the assumption that the death here spoken of is the legal 
penalty of sin, which I consider as the first and grand error of 
nearly all the interpretations of the passage. It deserves par- 
ticular inquiry, why it is that interpreters have so commonly 
been led to adopt this view. I know of but one reason which 
has the least plausibility, — a plausibility existing only in words, 
if even so much can be said of it. This reason is derived 
solely from particular forms, or rather one particular form of 
expression used by the apostle. Three or four are commonly 
cited, in proof that he teaches that the death of which he 
speaks is a penal evil. 

Let us examine these so far as the force of the language, de ' 
usu loguendi, can be supposed to decide any thing on the ques- 
tion, and then appeal to other considerations. 

The first passage which occurs is, "By one man sin entered 
into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon al] 
men, for that all have sinned." What is there in this text to 



268 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

show that temporal death, as a common event to all men, comes 
on them as a penal evil, either as the penalty of Adam's or of 
any other man's sin ? Plainly, nothing thus specific is asserted. 
That the sin which has entered the world was introduced into 
it by one man, and that the death which has entered the world 
comes by sin, and comes to all men because all have sinned, is 
all that is affirmed. But this is not saying that death or sin 
comes on men as a penal evil, for it is quite possible that these 
evils should come in some other mode of consequence or con- 
nection than that peculiar to sin and its legal penalty ; and to 
assert that they cannot, is gratuitous, and to beg the main ques- 
tion in debate. 

Another passage relied on is, "Through the offense of one 
many be dead, or have died." 

There is another, which in words has more plausibility. 
'For the judgment was of one offense unto or in condemna- 
tion.' Here much is supposed to depend on the words apifia, 
rendered judgment or sentence; and Kardtcpipa, rendered condem- 
nation. It is assumed that Kplfxais the sentence of a judge, and 
that fcplua elg KaraKptfia is a sentence of condemnation to bear 
the penalty of the law transgressed by him on whom it is pro- 
nounced. I reply, that the word tipi\ia is obviously a generic 
term, like our English word judgment, at least when applied to 
the character and conduct of others. (Yide Matt. vii. 2 ; John 
ix. 39 ; Kom. xi. 33 ; 1 Cor. xi. 34, compare 32cl verse.) Kplfia, 
then, may denote any judgment or sentence in respect to the 
character or conduct, and especially determining or ordaining 
consequences. This word is used to denote condemnation in 
the sense of pronouncing one exposed to or liable to punish- 
ment, as worthy of punishment, as well as the act of dooming 
one to punishment. 

As decisive on this point I appeal to John iii. 18 : " He that 
belie veth not is condemned {neKpirai) already, because he hath 
not believed," &c. None will pretend that every unbeliever is 
absolutely and hopelessly condemned to bear the legal penalty 
of sin, or that he is doomed absolutely to this punishment. 
The meaning of the text is, that because of his unbelief he is 
in respect to character guilty, or deserving of the penalty, and 
as such justly exposed to it. Is there any other sense in which 
all men can be said to be condemned or under condemnation 
in this world of mercy ? 



MEANING OF CONDEMNATION. 269 

Look at a similar case among men. Suppose one arraigned 
for the crime of murder before a judge having the prerogative 
of pardon, as G-od had by virtue of the promised redemption ; 
he comes to pronounce sentence; and suppose too the sen- 
tence to involve the decision that the accused is guilty of the 
crime charged, by dooming him to that to which he could not 
be condemned were he not guilty, even as plainly as a sentence 
bringing him to the scaffold ; would not usage justify us in say- 
ing — would not all the world say, that the accused was con- 
demned ? and when the main question, and from the nature of 
the case the only possible question was, whether he was guilty 
or not, and as such exposed to the penalty, would not this be 
called a sentence to condemnation as certainly and as properly 
as a sentence dooming absolutely to bear the penalty ? 

Whether therefore the phrase, sentence wnto or in condemna- 
tion, denotes a sentence dooming to legal penalty, and thus in- 
volving its actual execution, must be decided, not by the mere 
words, but by the instances to which they are applied, or some- 
thing in the connection. So far as the nature of the case is 
concerned, I only remark here — intending to examine this 
more fully hereafter — that the sentence spoken of by the 
apostle was pronounced under an economy of mercy for all 
men, even for all who are delivered from the penalty of the 
law, and therefore could not be a sentence dooming all men 
actually to bear the legal penalty. 

Let us now look at the connection. Here however, we must 
keep in mind the precise point at issue. It is not whether the 
sentence pronounced on Adam, and also on his posterity, im- 
plied their sinfulness, and of course their just exposure to the 
legal penalty as sinners, nor whether it actually and abso- 
lutely doomed them to temporal death on account of their sin- 
fulness, but whether it absolutely condemned them to bear the 
legal penalty so that there was no escape; i. e., was it a sen- 
tence of hopeless condemnation to the legal penalty ? It is to 
no purpose to say that the death to which they were hopelessly 
doomed, was a part of the evil of the legal penalty. Be it so. 
This it must be in the nature of the case, if they were to suffer 
any evil even in the form of discipline or chastisement, for the 
penalty included the highest degree of evil of which they were 
capable. But if it was only a part of the evil of the penalty, 
then it was not the penalty itself; nor was it even penal, be- 



270 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

cause though it be an expression of some degree of displeasure 
for sin, it could not make a full or adequate expression of dis- 
pleasure, and no evil can he penal which fails to do this. 

What I maintain then is, that the sentence to condemnation 
pronounced on the human race was on account of sin and guilt, 
expressing God's displeasure, though not in that full degree 
which the infliction of the legal penalty requires, and deciding 
their guilt and just exposure or liability to the full legal pen- 
alty. The point in question then may be thus presented, 
whether this sentence was such as involved the just exposure 
of all men to the infliction of the legal penalty, or such as in- 
volved its actual infliction ? On this point, leaving the nature 
of the case for future inquiry, I now appeal to the context. 
The apostle then, in the 16th verse, says that the sentence was 
of (for) one offense, elg KardKptfia, but the free gift (xapiofia) is 
of (for) many offenses (elg SiKalcoiia) unto a provision for right- 
eousness. Now if the elg Ka-dapi\ia denotes an act of absolute 
condemnation to the penalty, the elg difcalcjiia denotes an act of 
absolute Justification. If the sentence unto condemnation in- 
volves absolute condemnation, or condemnation in the sense of 
dooming to bear the penalty, then the free gift unto an ordi- 
nance of righteousness or Justification involves absolute Justifi- 
cation. Thus the Universalist argues from the premises fur- 
nished by most commentators, and argues most unanswerably 
if the premises are true. But it is conceded by those with 
whom I now reason, that the xap l<y l ia £ ^ diical<*)[ia is a provision 
or gift not involving the absolute Justification of all men, but 
one which may be followed with the act of absolute Justifica- 
tion of all men, or is in one respect at least a sufficient ground 
for this act. It follows then, the Kptfia elg \iardnpi\ia is a judg- 
ment not involving an absolute condemnation of all men. 

The very form of the expression shows this. Why elg fcdra- 
KpifJLa instead of tipl\ia rov ftaraitpifMiTog, and elg ditcaicofia instead 
of rov diitaiufiarog ? Again, in the next verse, the apostle ex- 
pressly specifies a condition — the receiving abundance of grace 
and the gift of righteousness — of actual salvation ; thus clearly 
implying that without this condition, i. e., on condition of im- 
penitence and unbelief, men would perish under the penalty of 
sin ; in other words, that the exposure to the actual infliction 
of the penalty was not absolute but conditional. But the sen- 
tence to some death— the death* of which the apostle speaks— 



MEANING OF CONDEMNATION AND DEATH. 271 

was an absolute sentence. This then was not the legal penalty. 
Once more, that the gift of grace, or the grace of God in this 
provision for Justification and life, did not involve the actual 
salvation of any, is clearly asserted in verse 20th, " that grace 
might reign through righteousness," &c. Of course the sen- 
tence unto condemnation pronounced after the promise of a 
Redeemer, did not involve an absolute or hopeless condemna- 
tion to the penalty of sin. 

The judgment then, the sentence unto condemnation, was not 
a sentence of condemnation ; not a sentence absolutely doom- 
ing the race to eternal death — no such was ever pronounced on 
mankind — but a sentence pronounced under an economy of 
mercy dooming all men to return to dust, and clearly implying 
the sinfulness of all, and their just exposure to eternal death as 
the penalty of sin. Thus rightly to interpret the phrase Kpi\ia 
elg KardiipL[ia is the key to the whole context, since on this, the 
interpretation I oppose entirely depends. The only question 
is, whether God ever sentenced the human race in consequence 
of Adam's sin, to bear the penalty of his law; i. e., absolutely 
and hopelessly doomed them to everlasting death. But he did 
sentence them absolutely and hopelessly to some death. What 
was it but temporal death, and temporal death because all have 
sinned, and yet temporal death under an economy of mercy ? 
True, this sentence unto condemnation was pronounced by a 
Judge, but a Judge who had laid aside the terrors of legal 
majesty; and though frowning at sin, put on the smile of 
mercy to win back a rebellious world to his favor. This brings 
us to contemplate more particularly the nature of the case. 

The death then of which the apostle treats in this passage, is 
the death to which all mankind were doomed after the apostasy 
of our first parents, in the sentence, " dust thou art, and unto 
dust shall thou return" (Gen. iii. 19), This will be admitted. 
I ask then, whether the apostle could have understood, or ex- 
pected his readers to understand an event described by Moses 
in this language, to be what Prof. Hodge represents, viz., that 
men begin to exist out of communion with God ? This, ac- 
cording to the Professor, is " the essence and sum of all evils" 
— " it is inflicted antecedent to them all," and was described in 
the language, " dust thou art, and unto dust shall thou return !" 
This is too much I think for sober exegesis. 

Again : the death spoken of is not that which was threatened 



272 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

in the law, and therefore is not the legal penalty. So far from 
it, that instead of pronouncing the sentence of the law, the first 
annunciation from the offended Lawgiver is the gracious prom- 
ise, "the seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head. 1 ' 
Here then we have not a legal process, arraigning, trying, and 
dooming to legal penalty, but the promise of a Redeemee ; — 
not a sentence to bear the legal penalty, but redemption from 
that penalty. And are we to be told, that this proclamation 
of grace was instantly followed with the sentence of penal jus- 
tice ? Was man thus redeemed — thus placed under an econo- 
my of grace, and at the same moment doomed to bear the very 
penalty of the law from which he was reprieved by mercy? 
This is incredible, — impossible. The language of the sentence 
compared with that of the law, shows the same thing. The 
law says, " thou shalt surely die ;" language which, as used 
in such a connection, as Jewish phraseology, perpetuated and 
explained in the New Testament (as we have already shown), 
denotes death in sin, — eternal death. What now was the sen- 
tence actually passed on Adam under an economy of redemp- 
tion ? Not, thou shalt die, — die under the curse of the law, — 
die in sin, — die hopelessly as an immortal being ; — not, thou 
shalt depart from this world to the complete and endless mis- 
ery threatened in the law. No ; but, " dust thou art, and unto 
dust shalt thou return." By the law, man must have been 
doomed to the extreme of misery as an immortal being, by the 
sentence under grace, to temporal death with other evils. The 
death then which is here denounced and of which the apostle 
is speaking, is not the legal penalty of sin. 

Secondly — The death of which the apostle speaks is common 
to all men. It actually came on Adam — it comes on all men 
under an economy of mercy ; and what is more, it comes on 
those who are delivered from the curse of the law. It is a 
death which, in their case, as an evil, is destroyed. 2 Tim. i. 10 : 
" To die is gain." Is this death, the penalty — the very curse 
of God's law ? 

Thirdly — It is death which takes place in this world. The 
apostle tells us, that it entered the world by sin, — that it passed 
upon all men, — that it reigned from Adam to Moses. And 
is this the legal penalty due to sin? Have the whole human 
race, — all men, Adam, Noah, Abraham, and all the patriarchs, 
actually died in their sins ? Are all that ever lived in this 



DEATH NOT THE LEGAL PENALTY. 273 

world, now suffering the penalty of God's violated law ? But 
it is said, and this is all that can be said with the least plausi- 
bility in support of the interpretation now opposed, that the 
same apostle often uses the word death, and particularly in 
chap. vi. 23, to denote the legal penalty. To this I reply, that 
the 'mere word decides nothing on the point, because it is 
wholly ambiguous in itself — one of the most so in the Scrip- 
tures — being used in different senses in the same sentence. 
The only mode of deciding its meaning is from the connection, 
from evidence furnished by the case itself. When then, in chap, 
vi. 23, we are told that " the wages of sin is death, but the gift 
of God is eternal life," the meaning is clear and decisive. 
Death as the wages, the penalty of sin, and as contrasted with 
eternal life, is undeniably eternal death. But with the same 
unerring certainty we say, that death which takes place in this 
world, which passes on all men, and which reigned from Adam 
to Moses, is temporal death. The apostle refers to a fact of 
history in this world, and reasons from it as one placed beyond 
all doubt and denial, the fact of universal temporal death. 
How is it possible that the love of system can blind ih.Q mind 
to truth so palpable ! The reason why so many commentators 
suppose death, in this passage, to include the entire evil com- 
prised in the legal penalty is, that the apostle most obviously 
aimed to prove that all men were sinners, and as such were 
under condemnation. Thus Professor Stuart admits that the 
death spoken of is universal, that this is temporal death, and 
that the apostle had this particularly in view / and yet that 
" this does not oblige us to infer that other parts of the penalty 
are designedly excluded" (p. 227). The error lies in supposing 
that the entire evil of penalty is included in the word death, 
whereas the apostle, by the death of which he speaks (tempo- 
ral death, a universal palpable fact), simply proves that all 
men are sinners, and as such are condemned to bear the full 
penalty of sin, so far as sin and law condemn, while yet they 
are under an economy of pardoning mercy. 

Fourthly — That the death spoken of in this passage is the 
legal penalty, is most explicitly denied by the apostle, in the 
immediate context. Having affirmed in the 12th verse that 
all have sinned, he proceeds to prove it. As if he said, con- 
trary to what some may suppose, sin was in the world before 
the Mosaic law existed; but sin is not imputed, i.e., is not 
18 12* 



274 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

charged and punished in this world, when there is no positive 
revealed law, or when there is no such law with a penalty. 
As temporal death, the death of which the apostle speaks, was 
the actual penalty of the Mosaic law as a civil institution, it 
was very natural that those to whom the apostle wrote, should 
suppose, either that it was the penalty of some positive law, or 
that otherwise it was in no sense the consequence, and there- 
fore that it was no proof of sin. "While therefore the apostle 
asserts that sin was in the world before the Mosaic law, he is 
very careful to show that he did not rest this assertion on the 
fact that sin was imputed, i. e., charged and punished by the 
infliction of any legal penalty. Had he reasoned on this princi- 
ple, he was perfectly aware that he would in fact, and in the 
view of his readers, have reasoned inconclusively. He was care- 
ful therefore to guard against this view of his argument, by 
saying that sin is not imputed when there is no law. But if the 
prevalence of sin in the world before the Mosaic law cannot 
be proved in this way, i. e., on the ground that it was charged 
and punished with a legal penalty, how can it be proved? 
Why, very obviously and conclusively ; for although sin was 
not imputed, i. e., was not charged and punished with temporal 
death as a legal penalty, when there was no revealed law hav- 
ing such a penalty ; nevertheless death the consequence, and 
therefore the proof of sin, reigned during the whole interval. 
Here then we have the explicit assertion of the apostle, that 
death did not come on mankind as a legal penalty. 

The correctness of this interpretation depends entirely on the 
import of two phrases — " sin is not imputed" and " when there 
is no law." In my own view, when the former is applied to 
God, or when God is said not to impute sin, it means that he 
does not ooth charge and punish the sinner, or inflict the legal 
penalty of sin. When applied to God without the negative 
particle not, or when God is said to impute sin, the meaning is, 
that he considers, or knows the subject to be a sinner, and 
treats or determines to treat him as such by inflicting the legal 
penalty of sin. God never does the latter without also doing 
the former ; i. e., he never inflicts or determines to inflict the 
penalty of sin on any except those whom he considers or 
knows to be sinners. But he does remit the legal penalty in 
the case of those whom he considers and knows to be sinners. 
To do this is not the direct and full converse of imputing sin, 



"WHEN THERE IS NO LAW." 275 

for lie still considers them as sinners. It is however not im- 
puting sin, because an essential part of the act of imputed sin 
is not done ; the legal penalty is not executed. The proof of 
this is of course to be derived, not from the various uses of the 
word XoyiZofiaL, but from the phrase not to impute sin. A clear 
case, and one sufficient for my present purpose, is the prayer of 
Shimei, 2 Sam. xix. 19 : " Let not my Lord impute iniquity 
unto me." Shimei does not ask his Lord not to esteem him a 
sinner, for he confesses his sin ; but not to inflict the penalty, 
or to reckon and pronounce him a sinner to be punished. So 
in Ps. xxxii. 1, 2 ; Rom. iv. 8 ; 2 Cor. v. 19. 

Another question is, what is the import of the phrase " when 
there is no law." Some understand it in the broadest sense; 
i. e., to denote neither a revealed law, nor the law written on 
the heart, or no law whatever. To suppose the apostle to use 
the phrase in this meaning, would be to suppose him to say in 
the entire sentence what is true, but what is entirely irrelevant 
to his purpose. What possible occasion had he to affirm that 
God never imputed sin when there is no law whatever, and of 
course no transgression? "Who could suppose that God im- 
puted sin when there was none ? How could the fact enable 
him either by itself or in connection with any other fact, to 
prove that sin was in the world until the Mosaic law ? His 
argument on this supposition must be this — and this has been 
the opinion of many commentators — that as God does not im- 
pute sin when there is no law whatever, therefore as God did 
impute sin to men before the Mosaic law, there must have 
been a law during that period. But this argument is built 
on a false premise. God did not impute sin to men; i. e., 
he did not bring temporal death on men as a penalty, nor 
execute any legal penalty on men universally in this world 
during the period specified. Besides, to suppose the apostle 
to assert this, is to suppose him to say, that the death which 
reigned from Adam to Moses was the full penalty of the law 
• of that period, which none will admit who adopt this view 
of the passage. To say that this death was not the legal pen- 
alty, and that it was only a proof that God considered men 
as sinners, is to concede that it is no proof that God, in the 
true meaning of the language, imputed sin; for the phrase 
will not bear this meaning, viz., that of simply considering 
or regarding men as sinners. 



276 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

But we can be at no loss concerning the meaning of the 
phrase, fifj ovrog vdfiov, " when there is no law." It obviously 
describes the condition of those that lived before the giving 
of the Mosaic law, when indeed there was a law written on 
the heart, but no revealed law. He thus by stating the prin- 
ciple that sin is not imputed when there is no (revealed) law, 
affirms the fact that it was not imputed during the period of 
which he speaks ; i. e., it was not punished with temporal 
death as a legal penalty. Notwithstanding this fact, or as he 
says, " nevertheless," he maintains his position that " sin was 
then in the world until the law," and proved to be so, not in- 
deed on the ground that it was imputed, but on that of another 
fact, the universal prevalence of death the consequence of sin. 
But the language of the apostle is decisive of this point. Com- 
pare Rom. ii. 12, 13, where to be without law — not to have 
law — not having law, is not having a revealed law. The plain 
meaning of the apostle in these verses is, that sin was not pun- 
ished in this world by the infliction of the legal penalty when 
there was no revealed law, and that nevertheless death reigned 
from Adam to Moses. The following paraphrase will present 
the apostle's thoughts in this part of the passage : " I have said 
that all men, in all ages and nations, have sinned. Nor let any 
suppose that there can be no sin except in transgressing or re- 
jecting the law of Moses, or that there was no sin in the world 
till this law was given ; for sin was in the world before the law 
of Moses existed. True indeed it is, that sin was not then vis- 
ited in this world with the infliction of a legal penalty, as it 
was under the Mosaic law. Nevertheless death, which is oy 
sin, the consequence and proof of sin, reigned through that 
whole interval." 

Fifthly — In confirmation of this view of the passage I ask, 
why did the apostle appeal in his argument to the prevalence 
of death from Adam to Moses ? This period was evidently dis- 
tinguished by some peculiarity decisive in its bearing on^ his 
argument. By what peculiarity f This is a vital question. I 
answer then, not that during this period there was absolutely 
no law by which was the knowledge of sin, and by which sin 
could be charged, for it is beyond all denial, that the law of 
nature was written on the heart during this period. Nor was 
it a peculiarity of this period that death was any more a con- 
sequence of Adam's sin, or that it could be any more clearly 



UNTENABLE CLAIM. 277 

shown to be a consequence of Adam's sin, than during any 
other. For although it could be shown that death during this 
period was not the legal penalty of any revealed law, it could 
not be shown that it was not the consequence — I do not say 
the penalty — of the law written on the heart. As to the sup- 
position that the apostle refers to infants, if we admit so strange 
a supposition, there is plainly nothing peculiar in respect to 
that class of infants. It is just as true that other infants had 
not violated the law of nature as that these had not. Besides, 
it is undeniable that he refers to the death of adults, and that 
there was some peculiarity in their case, as truly as in that 
of infants, which he deemed necessary to his argument. The 
question then is, what was this peculiarity f Not that they 
died on account of Adam's sin in any sense in which the adults 
of any other period did not die for Adam's sin. And further- 
more, and let this be particularly noticed, that there was not 
according to the history of this period, any thing in the con- 
dition, in the character, or in the circumstances — not a solitary 
fact in any respect peculiar to that portion of the human race, 
by which the apostle could show in his argument that they 
died on account of Adam's sin. The fact then, and the only 
fact, on account of which he could have referred to the period 
from Adam to Moses was this : that during that period there 
was no law whatever of which the death that prevailed could 
be the legal penalty. If then the apostle attempted to prove 
the existence of sin during that period, by inferring it from 
the prevalence of death as the legal penalty of sin, he did so 
though there was no law, and when he himself asserted that 
there was no law of which death could be the legal penalty. 

In opposition to this view of the subject, it is claimed 
that the apostle clearly teaches that the death of the period 
under consideration, was the penalty of Adam's sin. The argu- 
ment for this doctrine may be stated in its entire force in this 
form : Death, as it takes place in the world, is and must be 
the penalty of sin ; and as death from Adam to Moses could 
not be the penalty of either the Mosaic law nor of the law 
written on the heart, it must be the penalty of the law given 
to Adam, or the legal penalty of his sin. (Yide Hodge on 
Eom. p. 176.) 

Such is the argument, and let it be noticed, that on this the 
whole question depends. If it is fallacious, all pretense that 



278 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

the apostle teaches that temporal death is the legal penalty 
of Adam's sin or of any other sin, must he abandoned. Let 
us then examine the argument. My first remark concerning 
it is — 

That the main premise is wholly unauthorized. Where is the 
proof that death, as it comes on all men in this world, is and 
must be the legal penalty of sin ? We say there is none on 
this point, and none is adduced even in pretense. The posi- 
tion is a mere assumption — a mere begging of the question in 
respect to the main thing in debate. 

Again : this assumption is contradicted by plain matter of 
fact. Temporal death as common to mankind, as we have 
seen, is not and cannot be the legal penalty of sin, inasmuch as 
it takes place under an economy of mercy, and is actually en- 
dured by multitudes who are delivered from the legal penalty 
of sin. 

Further: the assumption that death during the period spoken 
of is the penalty of any law whatever, is, as we have seen, ex- 
pressly denied by the apostle. Tims he says, sin is not im- 
puted, is not visited with a legal penalty when there is no law 
having a penalty ; and this principle is brought forward as 
applicable to the period between Adam and Moses. He thus 
unequivocally teaches that there was no law of which the 
death of that period was the penalty of sin. On what author- 
ity then is it assumed, that all the death that takes place in this 
world is the legal penalty of sin ; or that the death which pre- 
vailed from Adam to Moses, was the penalty of the law given 
to Adam ? But this is not all. 

If we concede that the death referred to was the penalty of 
sin, there is no proof that it was the penalty of Adam's sin, 
but rather proof to the contrary. There is no more reason for 
supposing the law of Adam to be in force as an existing law, 
than for supposing the law of Moses to be in force during that 
period. Why not then say that the death of that period was 
the penalty of the one law as well as of the other? Why 
might it not as well be the penalty of a law which had not 
begun to exist, as the penalty of a law which had ceased to 
exist ? Or rather, if it must be regarded as the penalty of 
some law, why not regard it as the penalty of the only existing 
law, viz., the law written on the heart ? It is to no purpose to 
say that many, especially infants, did not violate this law ; for 



DEATH NOT THE LEGAL PENALTY. 279 

neither did they violate the law given to Adam. Besides, the 
question now to be answered is this — of what law was the 
death of the adults referred to, the penalty ? Surely, to say it 
was the penalty of the law given to Adam, or the legal pen- 
alty of his sin, is not only gratuitous, but against the much 
stronger probability (if it was the penalty of any law) that it 
was the penalty of the only law which was then in existence, 
and which they had actually transgressed. To believe this, — 
indeed to believe that the death of infants was by anticipation 
the penalty of the law of nature, as one which they certainly 
would violate, is less irrational than to believe it to be the pen- 
alty of a law which they never had and never could violate. 

Again : in all the history of the period under consideration, 
there is not a solitary fact which shows that death was the 
legal penalty of Adam's sin ; while some of the most striking- 
facts are decisive that in many instances it was not. None 
that can support this scheme has ever been specified, and 
for this reason, none can be found. The destruction of the 
world by a deluge, and of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire and 
brimstone, were well-known instances of death for personal 
sin, for actual transgressions. What an utter failure then in 
argument, to have referred to this period to prove that man- 
kind died as the legal penalty of Adam's sin ! There is not a 
fact to support such a conclusion, but many which most de- 
cisively prove the contrary. 

But it is said, " that death must be the legal penalty of sin." 
But I ask, why it must be ? Is there no other way in which 
death can be a consequence of sin, than as its legal penalty ? 
Was the death of Abraham and of all the patriarchs, and of all 
the prophets and apostles, the legal penalty of sin ? Plainly 
the position, the main premise of the argument under consid- 
eration, is a false one. "Death," it is said, "must be the legal 
penalty of sin." Where is the proof — where is the attempt at 
proof? It is the merest assumption, or rather a most palpable 
begging of the main question in the debate — How do these 
men know the truth of what they affirm'? How dare they as- 
sert that death in this world is the legal penalty of sin, in face 
of the plain and undeniable fact, that it comes on all men 
under an economy of mercy, — comes on the individuals who 
are delivered from the legal penalty of sin, — comes on men 
who had no law with death as its penalty, when the apostle 



2S0 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

expressly declares that in such a case, sin is not visited with a 
legal penalty. 

I now proceed as I proposed — 

Secondly — To offer proofs against the interpretation of the 
passage which I oppose.* 

It will be sufficient for the present purpose to show — 

First — That the apostle teaches that death, considered as an 
event common to all men, is not a legal penalty ; and sec- 
ondly, that the sin, the universality of which he infers from 
the universality of death, is actual sin, and not the imputed sin 
of Adam. 

First — The apostle teaches, that death considered as an event 
common to all men, is not a legal penalty. We suppose it will 
be admitted, that the apostle here refers to the sentence de- 
nounced after the fall, upon Adam and his race, as disclosing 
the facts respecting his sin and its consequences. Here then 
we might rest our present position. For, as we have shown 
that sentence was not the sentence of the law, nor was its 
execution the penalty of the law. Many die the death de- 
nounced in that sentence, who are delivered from the legal 
penalty. This we regard as absolutely decisive on the point 
now at issue. 

But we are not obliged to leave the question here. The 
apostle in the very passage under consideration, has directly 
and formally disproved the doctrine that death comes on men 
as the penalty of any law whatever. Fie first asserts, that the 
sin which is in the world, came into it by one man. He next 
affirms, that death is by sin, and that death, as the consequence 
of sin, passed on all men because all had sinned. In confirma- 
tion of this statement, he appeals to a known and acknowledged 
matter of fact, viz., that before the Mosaic law, sin was in the 
world. " But," he adds, " sin is not imputed when there is 
no law ;" i. e., sin is not charged and punished when there is 
no law. Nevertheless, death the consequence (not the penalty) 
of sin prevailed from Adam to Moses, — a period in which there 
was no law of which death could be the penalty. Sin there- 
fore was in the world (as death, its consequence, decisively 
proves), even when there was no law with death as its penalty. 

* The remainder of this chapter is taken from the Quarterly Christian Specta- 
tor, Vol. III. No. 2, pp. 316-328. 



DEATH FROM ADAM TO MOSES. 281 

Thus, while the apostle decisively teaches that death is the con- 
sequence of sin, he proves that it is not the legal penalty of sin, 
according to any law whatever. 

In confirmation of this view of the passage we ask, why did 
the apostle appeal to the prevalence of death from Adam to 
Moses f. This period was obviously distinguished by some pe- 
culiarity decisive in its bearing on the apostle's argument. 
By what peculiarity ? This is a vital question. "We answer 
then, not by the fact, that death during this period was at all 
more a consequence of Adam's sin, or was niv re clearly shown 
to be a consequence of Adam's sin, than at any other period. 
iN~ot that during the period there was no law, by which was 
the knowledge of sin, and by which sin could be charged ; for 
it is beyond all denial, that there was such a law. What then 
was the fact peculiar to this period? Plainly this, and only 
this, that there was no law threatening death as its penalty. 
To suppose the apostle then to speak of death in this case as a 
legal penalty, is to suppose him to argue from a fact which 
directly contradicts his own doctrine, — to argue from the preva- 
lence of death during a period in which there was no law that 
had death as its penalty. The object of the apostle then in 
referring to this period, is obvious. It was to show that death, 
as an event common to all men, did not come upon them as the 
penalty of any law whatever ; but as an immediate consequence 
of personal sin, and remotely (in the manner before described) 
as the consequence of Adam's sin. Thus he proved from the 
universality of death, according to the original sentence under 
an economy of grace, that all men were under sin and con- 
demnation. 

But our brethren think, that the apostle appealed to the 
prevalence of death from Adam to Moses, for the very purpose 
of showing that death during this period came on men as the 
legal penalty of Adam 's sin. If this opinion can be shown to 
be wholly groundless, the main point at issue will be decided. 
We ask then, how does the prevalence of death from Adam to 
Moses, prove that it was the legal penalty of Adam's sin ? The 
vast multitude destroyed by the deluge and in Sodom and Go- 
morrah, are well known to have deserved death themselves ; 
to have died, in some respect at least, for their own personal 
sins. How then would such a case prove that men died solely 
for the sin of another ? Surely, the apostle was unfortunate in 



282 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

referring to this fact to prove that death reigned as the legal 
penalty of Adam's sin exclusively, or in any respect whatever. 

Again : how does this scheme exhibit the apostle in other 
respects as a reasoner ? If we suppose that there was a law at 
that period, viz., that given to Adam, of which death was the 
legal penalty, then the apostle gravely asserts, according to our 
brethren, that although sin is never punished with death as a 
legal penalty when there is no law threatening death, — never- 
theless, i. e., notwithstanding this incontrovertible principle, — 
sin was punished with death, when there was a law threatening 
death ! In other words, the apostle contrasts the period antece- 
dent to the law by Moses, with that which was subsequent, by 
placing them in direct opposition, the one to the other, and 
then proves that there is no difference between them ! 

But we shall be told (and here lies the strength of our 
brethren's cause), that the apostle proves that death from Adam 
to Moses was the legal penalty of Adam's sin. We ask then, 
how does he prove this ? Not by his assertion of the notorious 
fact, that actual sin was in the world during that period, reign- 
ing unto death, — pervading the whole race, and bringing this 
consequence with it. Eor will it be claimed that the apostle 
asserts in direct terms, that death at this period was the legal 
penalty of Adam's sin. How then does he prove it ? Our 
brethren reply, by inference, — by premises which unavoidably 
support the inference. Let us then examine the premises, and 
the conclusion derived from them. The apostle asserts, that 
sin is not punished with death as a legal penalty, when there is 
no law threatening death ; and that death reigned before the 
Mosaic law, or from the introduction of sin to the giving of 
this law. Does it follow from this that death was the legal 
penalty of Adam's sin ? It is as palpable a non sequitur as 
can easily be imagined. For how does the fact, that death 
reigned before the Mosaic law whose penalty was death, prove 
that death at this period was the legal penalty of the law given 
solely to Adam ? If death could be a consequence of sin in no 
other way than as its legal penalty, then indeed the inference 
might claim some plausibility. But, as we have seen, it can 
be, and is in fact a consequence in some other way. And this 
exposes at once what we have always considered the error of 
our brethren, in deriving this inference from the apostle's 
premises. They assume that death is and must be the legal 



THE SIX NOT IMPUTED BUT ACTUAL. 283 

penalty of some law. Hence their reasoning (not the apostle's) 
is this. The apostle asserts that sin is not punished with death 
as a legal penalty, when there is no law threatening death ; 
and that death reigned before the law, i. e., from Adam to 
Moses. Therefore, as death is and must he the legal penalty of 
some law, it follows that death at this period was the legal 
penalty for Adam's sin. This we say, is the argument of our 
brethren in its entire strength, so far as we can understand it. 
And whether it be conclusive or not, even thus stated, who 
does not see that it adds to the premises of the apostle the very 
position on which the whole inference depends, and takes for 
granted the very point in debate ? " Death is and must he the 
legal penalty of some law" Let this be proved. Let it be 
proved in opposition to plain matter of fact ; otherwise the 
argument of our brethren clearly depends on that sort of paral- 
ogism, called begging the question. Do we state this too 
strongly ? Let then the argument be formed which shall justify 
their conclusion, without assuming the position that death is 
and must be the penalty of some law. Surely an assumption 
so entirely gratuitous, can need no other refutation than to say 
that it is merely an assumption, and one which contradicts 
plain matter of fact. The doctrine that the millions of the hu- 
man race who died from Adam to Moses, died under the legal 
penalty of Adam's sin, has plainly no other basis, than that the 
apostle expected his readers to draw such an inference from 
his premises ; and to draw it in face of the plain matter of 
fact, that death comes on men under an economy of grace, and 
on many, who, we know, were delivered from the curse of the 
divine law. Surely such a doctrine has but a feeble claim to 
be ranked among the articuli stantis vet cadentis ecclesice, — the 
very foundation of the superstructure of redemption. 

Secondly — We proceed to show that the sin, of which the 
apostle speaks in this passage, is not imputed sin, but actual, 
personcd sin. 

It is not imputed sin ; i. e., it is neither sin which we have 
committed in Adam as one with him, nor is it the mere liabil- 
ity to the punishment of his sin. The former we need not dis- 
cuss. The question therefore is reduced to this, — whether the 
phrase all have sinned means, that all are liable to the legal 
penalty of Adam's sin, without ill-desert of their own f Now 
we say, that the language in question never has this meaning, 



284 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

neither as used by this apostle, nor any other inspired writer, 
nor according to the ordinary use of language. To say then 
that it has this meaning in this instance, is to say it without 
evidence and against evidence. Let us then advert to the evi- 
dence alleged. It is said, that the phrase all have sinned, must 
include human beings who cannot be said to have committed 
actual sin. But if so, then we may suppose that they are said 
to have sinned in some other mode of sinning, as well as in that 
which is contended for. Other modes of sinning might be 
supposed quite as rational as that of being made liable to be 
punished for another's sin. And when we have once resorted 
to "mere conjecture, we may as well suppose one thing as 
another, especially if the absurdity in the one case be no 
greater than in the other. But why must human beings be 
intended who have not yet actually sinned ? Suppose it were 
said that all men reason j should we suppose the language to 
include human beings before they can reason ? Shall we be 
told that they die before actual sin ? But how does this prove 
that they are liable to death as the legal penalty of Adam's 
sin? Does the death of all sinless beings prove the same thing 
in respect to them ? But we shall be told that the words of the 
apostle are, that " all have sinned." But who are the all ? 
Plainly the all men, the ndvrag dvdpuTrovg, Jews and Gentiles, 
whom the apostle is proving to be under sin and under law ; and 
who therefore must be justified by faith, and not by the deeds 
of the law. And does his argument and his conclusion relate 
to human beings who cannot commit sin on the one hand, nor 
be justified by faith on the other? Is the apostle discussing 
such subjects in respect to beings who are not moral agents, 
and who can neither commit sin nor exercise faith ? Is he ap- 
plying his statements to beings to whom they can have no pos- 
sible application ? Can it be supposed that a writer like Paul, 
in arguing and illustrating the necessity of Justification by faith 
to both Jews and Gentiles, and founding his doctrine on the 
sinfulness of both, as subjects of a law which is to stop every 
mouth, intended that his declarations should be extended to 
human beings before moral agency? One thing is certain. 
Those whom the apostle proves to be sinners must, according 
to his argument, be justified by faith. Is this true of any hu- 
man being before moral agency ? We might as well suppose 
the laws of the land against theft and murder to respect such 



ALL DOES NOT INCLUDE INFANTS. 285 

beings. But it will be said, that all means all, in the most ex- 
tensive sense which the word will bear ; i. e., we must interpret 
to the letter ; we must disregard that great principle applicable 
to the interpretation of all popular language, ne resecemus ad 
vivum. But who does not know that this is pre-eminently a 
false and dangerous mode of interpretation ? To see that it is 
false, apply it to the following passages : Rom. xii. 18 ; John 
i. 7, v. 23 ; Mark xvi. 15. According to this principle, the first 
of these passages gravely teaches, that we are not to quarrel 
with infants as soon as they are born ! Such trifling is un- 
worthy of any one who interprets the word of God. The mere 
use of the word all then furnishes not a particle of evidence. 
On the contrary, to interpret such general phraseology to the 
letter, is doing palpable violence to language, as the above ex- 
amples and universal usage in like cases decisively show. But 
it will be said that, in the passages just cited, we have in the 
known nature of the things spoken of, a decisive warrant for 
some limitation of the language. True, and this establishes 
the principle, that the known nature of things must limit such 
language. And where have we this warrant for limitation, if 
not in the case now at issue? Look to the subject treated of, 
the scope and object of the writer, and especially to the 
known nature of the predicate, sin, without begging the ques- 
tion about imputed sin • and what more decisive reasons can 
be supposed for concluding, that the phrase all have sinned, 
does not denote beings who confessedly cannot sin.. Plainly, 
we have as good reason for saying that a being cannot sin be 
fore moral agency, as for saying he cannot believe before moral 
agency. 

But we shall be further told, that the phrase, " even over 
them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's trans- 
gression," describes those who sinned before moral action. 
We ask, how does this appear? Not from the assertion that 
they did not sin as Adam did. The difference between them 
and Adam, we have before shown, consists in this, that they 
did not sin under a law with the penalty of death. This is the 
distinctive peculiarity. But it may be said that the beings 
here spoken of, are only a particular class of those who lived 
between Adam and Moses, viz., infants and idiots. We answer, 
that if this be so, then the other class did sin after the simili- 
tude of Adam's transgression; for otherwise, one class could 



286 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

not be thus distinguished from the other. But if all except 
infants and idiots, during this period, sinned like Adam, then 
the sin of this period, by which death reigned, was chiefly actual 
and not imputed sin. TVny then did the apostle refer to this 
period to prove that death came on all, exclusively of actual 
sin, and solely for the imputed sin of Adam? Surely, he 
intended to prove no such doctrine as this. But it will be 
claimed that the force of the word even is, to distinguish a part 
from the rest. The true force of this word as here used by the 
apostle (keeping in mind the precise shape of the question he 
was discussing), may be illustrated by an example. Suppose 
then the question in discussion to be, whether any ever had the 
small-pox except those who had not been vaccinated ; as it 
was in the present case whether any died as sinners without 
being under a law whose penalty was death. Suppose that it 
was a known fact, that between the years 1800 and 1810 the 
entire population of a city or country, all of whom had been 
vaccinated, had been visited with this disease. How natural 
in discussing the question now supposed, to appeal to the fact 
and say, " the small-pox prevailed in that city from 1800 to 
1810, even over them that had been vaccinated." So the apos- 
tle ; death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over such as it 
may be supposed it never reigned over, viz., those who were 
under no law whose penalty was death. He thus stales the 
fact that death prevailed during this period, and then dis- 
tinguishes the manner in which they who lived during this pe- 
riod sinned, from that in which Adam sinned. Why then 
must this phrase denote human beings who sinned before moral 
action ? 

But the doctrine of imputed sin is contrary to the decision of 
the competent unperverted reason of mankind ; i. e., contrary 
to common sense, and as such to be rejected. This expres- 
sion of our opinion is not intended ad invidiam • and the 
reason is, that we intend to prove what we say. "We claim 
then, that the reason of man is competent to decide in respect to 
the justice or injustice of the principle, that one being should 
be held liable to be punished without his consent, for the sins 
of another. This we have shown already. Again : aside from 
certain theological purposes, the decision or judgment of the 
human mind is uniform in condemning this principle. !No 
one will hesitate to admit, that aside from some supposed theo- 



PKINCIPLE DEVISED FOE A PURPOSE. 287 

logical exigency, such a principle had never been thought 
of, except as one of palpable injustice and oppression ; that 
it had never been ranked among even the possible truths or 
principles of God's government ; and that even now, aside 
from the supposed exigency, the united wisdom of man, were 
it to be consulted, would reject it with abhorrence. The very 
men who maintain it, are obliged to admit that God adopts 
directly the opposite as a general principle ; while they them- 
selves to a man reject it with detestation, in all the relations 
of human life. It has indeed been applied to the govern- 
ment of God by wicked men, to impeach the equity of his 
administration, and God has disclaimed it with the severity of 
indignant rebuke. It has been ascribed to earthly tyrants, to 
illustrate their oppressions and cruelties. But aside from these 
instances and the one now under consideration, it is unknown 
and unheard of in the annals of moral legislation. One thing 
then is plain and undeniable, as a matter of fact, viz., that this 
principle was devised for a purpose. Certain providential 
events, and the supposed import of an apostle's declarations, 
were regarded as incapable of defense, without it. For this 
purpose therefore it was devised — for this purpose, on grounds 
of equity, it has been exclusively applied. It has been applied 
solely to this purpose, with no evidence to justify its applica- 
tion, but the supposed necessity of the case ; and in defiance 
of an otherwise universal, and confessedly correct judgment of 
the human mind. It has been applied solely to this purpose, 
though it confessedly involves the supreme Lawgiver in the pal- 
pable inconsistency of acting on opposite principles, as though 
both could be alike the principles of equity. It has been ap- 
plied solely to this purpose, when otherwise it would have in- 
curred universal execration. It was therefore devised for a 
purpose, and applied to carry a point in controversial theol- 
ogy ; and more decisive proof of a perverted judgment can- 
not easily be imagined. 

Nothing is more remote from our belief, than that they who 
have adopted this principle, have done so with, a clear percep- 
tion of its nature. On the contrary, we believe, that at first, 
the supposed necessity of the principle for controversial pur- 
poses, secured its admission and gave it currency ; and that 
soon the sanction given to it by great and good men, with other 
causes, effectually served to conceal its otherwise palpable de- 



288 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

formity. This however is no reason why its true nature should 
not be exposed ; nor why, if it is contrary to the infallible 
judgment of the competent, unperverted reason of man, the 
fact should not be understood. If the Bible is to be inter- 
preted at the sacrifice of all such decisions and judgments of 
the human mind, then let this principle of interpretation be 
avowed. Let it be defended, if it can be. But if not, then let 
the doctrine which involves such a sacrifice be rejected, 
although in a given instance, which is not the case here, we 
should be entirely unable to discover " the mind of the spirit." 
We only add, that in our view, the doctrine of imputed 
sin, instead of relieving the passage from difficulty, only 
creates insuperable difficulties where otherwise none would 
exist. ISTo one acquainted with the controversies respecting 
this text will pretend, that aside from this doctrine of Impu- 
tation, and the character and state of infants before moral 
agency, the passage presents any peculiar difficulties to the in- 
terpreter. Assumptions on this subject so unnatural, so strange, 
so foreign to the design of the writer, are the stumbling-stones 
at the outset. Let them be dismissed from the mind of the 
interpreter, as things which the apostle never thought of in 
writing the passage, nor expected his readers to think of in inter- 
preting it, and we venture to say, that this passage, so long 
abandoned to controversy and obscurity, will be regarded as 
one of the most lucid in argument and striking in illustration, 
to be found in the writings of the apostle. We shall see, that 
God in his wisdom and goodness, determined to make such a 
trial of human nature in one man, that if he sinned, the merely 
legal system under which he was tried, should be modified by 
the introduction of an economy of grace ; that under this 
economy, his descendants should be born with the certainty of 
commencing their moral existence in sin, and as sinners be 
doomed to temporal death ; and that thus, universal sin and 
death by sin, were introduced into the world by one man. 
We shall further see, that these facts were appealed to, and 
this manner of death's coming on all men, was distinguished 
from the manner of its coming according to a legal process, 
for the purpose of showing the universality of sin in respect 
to men, — not as the descendants of Abraham, but as the de- 
scendants of Adam; not as Jews, but as men; and this for 
the further purpose of showing the universal necessity of 



THE SIN IS ACTUAL. 289 

that gracious Justification, not from imputed sin, but from 
"many offenses" which the gospel reveals. In accordance 
with this design, the apostle asserts and traces the similitude 
between Adam and Christ, in respect to the evils which come 
by the one, and the blessings which come by the other. Then, 
that he may vindicate and magnify the goodness of God toward 
us in the plan of grace, he shows also the striking dissimilitude 
between them. As if he had said, If in consequence of the 
sin of one man, sin and death and condemnation come on 
many, great as the calamity is, the grace of God by one man 
Jesus Christ, far surpasses, as a blessing, the calamity as an evil. 
More, far more is gained by one, than is lost by the other. For 
what if the sin of one results in these evils to all ; the gift by 
grace, which is by one, is a provision for Justification from 
many offenses. What if sin hath abounded, grace doth much 
more abound. TThat if sin hath reigned unto death, even so 
shall grace to those who reject not its provisions, reign through 
righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord. Be- 
hold the contrast ! By the first Adam, we are indeed subjected 
to sin and death. By. the second Adam, we may not only re- 
trieve the loss, but reign in holiness and bliss which shall never 
change and never end. If paradise is lost, heaven may be 
gained. Is it credible that when the apostle's mind was en- 
grossed with such a theme, and aiming to conduct his readers 
to such a conclusion, he should introduce and discuss the per- 
plexing topic of the Imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity '( 
Did he teach that the whole race, at the very moment of birth 
or before birth, were justly subject to the full penalty of God's 
law for the sin of Adam ; and on the justice of such a doom, 
found the rich and abundant grace of God in man's re- 
demption ? 

The sin which the apostle ascribes to all men in this pas- 
sage, is actual sin. The word Tjfiaprov (have sinned) is used 
to denote actual, personal sin, and that only. Thus it is used 
by the apostle in this discussion. (Yide Rom. ii. 12, iii. 23.) 
If therefore any thing can be decided by language, this point 
is decided in the present case. For by what warrant are we 
told that the word rjfxaprov [have sinned), means in this case 
what it never meant in any other? By what evidence are we 
called to believe that a word always used to denote what all 
the world, this particular instance excepted, understand to be 
19 13 



290 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

sin, and regard as the only thing which can be sin, or properly 
called sin, denotes merely a liability to be punished, and this 
too, solely for the sin of another % 

Further: the sin of which the apostle speaks in the 12th 
verse, is the same hind of sin of which he treats in the preced- 
ing discussion. This is undeniable, not only because the 12th 
verse is inferential from what precedes it, but because the 
apostle had been speaking of sin universally. But of what 
kind of sin, if indeed we are to suppose more kinds than one, 
had he been speaking ? The sin of being " enemies to God," 
verse 10 ; the sin for which Christ was delivered, " our offen- 
ses" iv. 25 ; sin in respect to which " all have sinned and come 
short of the glory of God /" sin in respect to which both Jews 
and Gentiles are all under sin • sin by which all have gone out 
of the way, &c, &c, iii. 9-18 ; sin under the law which stops 
every mouth, and by which is the knowledge of sin, 19, 20 ; sin 
which is without excuse, because when they knew God, they 
glorified him not as God / sin committed under a revealed law, 
or the law written on the heart ; sin consisting in all vile affec- 
tions and abominable doings ; sin consisting in doing things 
which they knew to be worthy of death ; sin under the gov- 
ernment of that God whose judgment is according to truth 
against them which commit such things, and who will render 
to every man according to his deeds. And now we ask, is this 
only Adam's sin imputed f Does this kind of sin, thus de- 
scribed as personal acts and doings, consist after all, not in per- 
sonal acts, but only in being liable to be punished for another's 
act ? Is not the principle of our brethren most explicitly con- 
tradicted in the clause — " who will render to ever}' one accord- 
ing to his deeds ?" Plainly, if language can distinguish one 
thing from another; if the apostle could describe what we 
mean by actual, personal sin, he charged this and this only on 
men. But this is the very sin of which he speaks, when he 
says in the passage under consideration, " Wherefore as by 
one man sin entered into the world." What sin, except that of 
which he had been speaking as common to Jews and Gentiles ? 
As if he had said, Since the sin which I have proved to be 
common to all men, entered the world by one man, &c. And 
when he adds, repeating only what he had said before, that 
" all have sinned" does he mean that all are liable, though as 
yet sinless, to be punished for another's sin ? Did the apostle 



THE SIN IS ACTUAL. 291 

prove all men to be the perpetrators of actual sin ; did he de- 
scribe the fact by the phrase all have sinned, and in that ex- 
plicit manner too which we have seen ; and does he now in the 
12th verse, pursuing still his course of thought, turn aside to 
beings as yet personally sinless, and bring the same charge in 
the same language against them ? We can as well believe that 
he is predicating sin of the primordial atoms that compose a 
human body. 

The same thing is evident from the immediate context. 
u By one man sin entered into the world" What sin, except 
that which is in the world ? And is this nothing but the lia- 
bility of personally sinless heings to be punished for the sin of 
another ? Was- this the sin and the only sin which entered the 
world, and by which death came ? Is this the meaning of the 
apostle, that by one man liability to death on the part of be- 
ings as yet sinless, entered the world ; and death by this liabil- 
ity to death, and so death passed on all men because all were 
justly liable to die for another's sin ? Such reasoning we can- 
not charge upon the apostle. Again, " For until the law, sin 
was in the world." Does not the apostle here refer to the well- 
known historical fact of abounding actual sin ? Had a world 
been destroyed by a deluge of waters ; and Sodom and Gomor- 
rah by a storm of fire and brimstone, and this for actual sin ; 
and was there no sin in the world resulting in death but im- 
puted sin ; no sin but the sin of personally sinless beings ? 
But this sin which was in the world, was the sin by which 
death reigned. The sin therefore by which death reigned from 
Adam to Moses, was actual sin. 

Further : it will be admitted that the sin spoken of by the 
apostle, is that by which death prevails. And here the ques- 
tion is not, whether " in Adam all die," i. e., whether death is 
not to all, in some mode, a certain consequence of Adam's sin ; 
but whether the apostle teaches that they die irrespectively of 
personal sin ? We say, that he teaches that men die indeed as 
the consequence of Adam's sin, but not without actual sin of 
their own. Adam introduced death by introducing sin. By 
one man sin entered into the world. But how does death 
come ? " Death hy sin /" and so, by this connection, " death 
hath passed on all men, because all have sinned." We do not 
see how the language of the apostle could be more explicit, in 
asserting personal sm to be the proximate cause of death. 



292 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

He traces the same connection between the actual sin from 
Adam to Moses, and the prevalence of death. For to what 
other sin could he refer when he said, " until the law sin was 
in the world ?" But we have his own explanation of the fact. 
He describes the very sin with which he connects death, as the 
offense which abounded by the entrance of the law. But what 
had the entrance of the law to do with imputed sin? Nor is 
this all. He describes the connection in terms the most une- 
quivocal. " That as sin hath reigned v.nto death." What is 
this but sin, pervading the world and bringing with it death as 
its consequence? And will it be said or thought, that the 
apostle ascribed such a dominion to any sin but actual sin ? 
Or to ' put the question in its true form, is mere liability to 
death without personal sin, the offense which abounded by the 
law; the sin which reigned unto death? 

Again : it will be admitted by all, that the sin of which the 
apostle treats, is that from which Christ died to procure our 
deliverance. In the preceding chapter then, we are told he 
was delivered for " our offenses." In this chapter we have not 
a word about deliverance from imputed sin, nor yet from the 
death which is the consequence of sin, but a Justification from 
" many offenses ;" resulting not in exemption from that death 
which is common to all, but in life, eternal life. Is this a 
deliverance from imputed sin, and from death as its legal pen- 
alty ? Surely the apostle has here taught no such redemption. 

We only add, that the apostle has placed the point in debate 
beyond all question, by clearly and unambiguously showing 
that the very sin which is the consequence of one man's diso- 
bedience, is actual sin. After asserting in the 19th verse, that 
"by one man's disobedience many were made sinners," he 
adds in the next verse, " moreover the law entered that the 
offense might abound" We ask, what offense? Plainly the 
offense by which men became sinners in consequence of one 
man's disobedience. Was this then imputed sin — mere liabil- 
ity to punishment for Adam's sin? or was it actual sin? How 
could the law by Moses cause imputed sin or any other sin 
to abound, except actual sin ? And what law could do this, 
except a law by which is the knowledge of sin ? But this 
is the sin by which all are made sinners by one man's dis- 
obedience. Actual, personal sin then, is the sin which entered 
the world by one man. If any mode of describing this sin, 



THE SIN IS ACTUAL. 293 

either in its nature or its relation, in its effects or its conse- 
quences, can decide this point, it would seem that this question 
must be settled. Can the evidence now adduced be set aside 
by the groundless assumption of imputed sin? Could this 
assumption be shown to be & possible truth, would it even then 
avail against the evidence now adduced, to the fact, that actual 
sin was here intended ? What then is the state of the argu- 
ment, when even the possibility of the truth of such an assump- 
tion cannot be shown ? Shall we do open violence to the dic- 
tates of common sense, by giving to the apostle's language such 
a meaning, when it not only admits of, but in view of the evi- 
dence in the case, absolutely demands another ? 



HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

XIV.— CONSEQUENCES OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTEKITY. 
Exposition of Romans v. 12-21. 

What I now propose is, to exhibit the mode of connection 
between Adam's sin, and its consequences to his posterity, in 
that positive form in which, in my view, it is presented by the 
apostle in Kom. v. 12, &c. I proceed then to say in general 
terms, that contrary to what has been commonly supposed, the 
apostle represents 

The mode of connection between Adam's sin and its conse- 
quences to his posterity, to be by God's sovereign constitu- 
tion, in distinction from the mode of strict legal procedure. 
Or thus, the mode of this connection was by God's sovereign 
constitution, ordaining an economy of grace immediately after 
the sin of Adam, so that his posterity commence their moral 
probation under a system of both law and grace ; i. e., under 
a system in which law is so modified by grace, that while in its 
authority to command, and in its power to condemn, it is 
neither abrogated nor weakened, it is not in all its principles 
strictly adhered to, or carried out in man's probation on earth, 
but is in this respect partially, and may be wholly, through grace, 
dispensed with in determining man's relations to its sanctions, 
and to the rewards and punishments of a future state.* 

With this general view of the apostle's representation before 
us, I now proceed to his more particular views of the subject. 

His object in the 12th, 13th, and 14th verses, is to show that 
all the posterity of Adam became sinners, and subject to tem- 
poral death in consequence of his sin, and yet in such a way or 
mode of connection as not to exclude their individual respon- 
sibility for their own sin, nor to imply that temporal death was 



* What the cause or reason in each individual's mind is, that he sins in his 
first moral act, is an inquiry untouched by the apostle in this chapter. We shall 
treat of it hereafter. 



PECULIAR CONSTITUTION. 295 

the legal penalty of sin ; but in such a way by God's sover- 
eign constitution, that the sin and just (not actual) condemna- 
tion of all men to bear its penalty, must be inferred from their 
connection with Adam as his descendants. (Yide his conclu- 
sion in the 19th verse.) For this purpose, he obviously in the 
12th verse refers to the historical narrative in the 3d chapter 
of Genesis. The facts, as the record shows, respected the pro- 
genitor of the human race, and all his descendants, as moral 
beings, and were such as no human ingenuity would ever have 
surmised. Adam, the father of us all, sinned ; and instead of 
being at once visited with the infliction of the legal penalty 
for sin, was placed with the race who were to descend from 
him, under an economy of grace (Gen. iii. 15). Under this 
economy, and in entire consistency with its nature, a sentence, 
on account of sin, was pronounced upon him — not however in 
the language of the legal threatening, " thou shalt die" — but 
a sentence of very different import, a prominent part of which 
is, " dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." This, 
though dooming him to temporal death only, being a sentence 
on account of sin, implied of course his just exposure to the 
full penalty of the law, or eternal death. At the same time, 
this narrative is so conducted as decisively to show, that not 
only the revealed economy of grace, but the sentence to tem- 
poral death under this economy, respected not Adam only but 
his whole posterity. God had in our first parents made a trial 
of human nature, of the kind of beings called men, placing 
them as it would seem, in circumstances the most auspicious 
to a happy issue. "Nor is it for human reason to say, that 
exactly that system of things in respect to Adam and his de- 
scendants which God in his sovereign counsels had determined 
on, was not the dictate of infinite wisdom and goodness. This 
system or constitution under which he determined to give ex- 
istence to a race of moral beings, as disclosed in the narrative 
by Moses, was however so aside from the ordinary notions of 
the human mind concerning the government of such beings, as 
scarcely to be credible were it not revealed. Obedience with 
reward, or disobedience with penalty, had been the natural ex- 
pectation. But God had determined that if the first progeni- 
tors of all sinned, not to deal with them in exact retribution, 
but at once to introduce an economy of mercy, and what per- 
haps is no less strange under this economy, to bring into exist- 



236 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

ence their jjosterity with sucli a nature and in such a condition 
of being, that from the first — or very early in their first moral 
character — they would become sinners, and that 'all with this 
common character should be subjected to the common doom of 
returning to dust, i. e., to temporal death. Accordingly when 
Adam sinned, the first great announcement respecting him and 
his posterity, is an economy of grace in the promise, " The 
seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head." Then 
under this economy follows, not the sentence dooming all to 
bear the penalty of the law, " Thou shalt surely dee," from 
which grace had now reprieved the whole race ; but the sen- 
tence, " dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." This 
is not spoken of the soul, but of the body only ; and yet it is 
the only sentence, with some of its connections, which God has 
ever pronounced on the whole human race. This sentence, in- 
cluding other temporal evils, instead of shrouding a sinful 
world in despair, was obviously designed as a part of a wise 
system of moral discipline, to restrain the wickedness of men, 
and to reclaim them to God under the proffers of his mercy. 
Thus manifest is it from the historical record, that all the de- 
scendants of Adam were to come into being and assume the 
relation of moral beings, not merely under a system of law, but 
also under an economy of grace ; that all were to become sin- 
ners, and to die or return to dust, on account of sin, indirectly 
as a consequence of his sin, and directly as a consequence of 
their own sin. Such was the sovereign constitution of the wise 
and benignant Creator of the human race, as described in the 
very records of his creation, and as it has ever been unfolded 
in the events of his providence.* 

° The act of dooming men to temporal death, and thus subjecting them to so 
great an evil for sin as a part of a system of moral discipline to restrain them 
from wickedness and to reclaim them to duty, would be as decisive a proof of 
their sin, as to threaten the same evil as a legal penalty. Nor would it manifest 
displeasure toward sin less really in the one case than in the other, since the 
magnitude of the evil inflicted would be the same in either. That the pro- 
spective certainty of temporal death has a reclaiming tendency and influence in 
this state of moral probation, and that it was designed to have such tendency 
and influence cannot be doubted. To say nothing of the impossibility, on ac- 
count of the inadequacy of temporal death as a legal penalty or sanction of the 
divine law, without the sure prospect of this death, what check on human 
wickedness or what hope of human reformation would remain ? Who, though 
expecting by repentance to escape the full legal penalty of sin, expects to escape 
temporal death ? 



VERSE TWELVE. 297 

With, these facts in view, it cannot, we think, be difficult to 
understand the language of the apostle in the passage under 
consideration. 

Yerse 12 : He says, " By one man sin entered into the 
world." This is simply affirming, in accordance with the 
acknowledged historic record, that the sin which there is in 
the world came into it by the sin of Adam, that is, was in 
some mode of connection a consequence of his sin. It is not 
saying, that the sin which is in the world is either universal or 
not, nor in what way or mode it is connected with the sin of 
Adam."* The apostle next asserts, that temporal death entered 
the world by sin — " and death by sin." This is not saying any 
thing concerning the mode in which death is connected with 
sin, whether in the mode of judicial retribution, or in the way 
of moral discipline under a gracious economy, or in some other 
way which human ingenuity may devise ; it is simply the 
general affirmation, authorized by the original record of the 
fact, that the death which is in the world, be it more or less, is 
the consequence of sin. Thus two facts are very plainly as- 
serted, that the sin which is in the world is a consequence of 
Adam's sin / and that the death lohich is in the world is a 
consequence of sin. How obvious are these truths from the 
narrative in Genesis ! 

The apostle then proceeds to the more particular assertion 
of the universal prevalence of death, and the more direct reason 
for such prevalence. " So, ovrcjg, in this manner, death (be- 
ing by sin as its consequence) hath passed upon all men, be- 
cause (or whereunto, unto which) all have sinned." f Thus, 
still in accordance with the original narrative, the apostle 
asserts, that under that constitution of God, in which human 
nature was tried in one man, the whole race now under am 
economy of mercy, were to die, i. e., to return to dust, because 
the whole race were to be sinners, as the consequence of one 
man's sin. 

In this 12th verse then, and according to the narrative of 
facts in Genesis, the apostle has unfolded the divine constitu- 
tion in respect to that race of beings called men. According 

° The specific mode of this connection the apostle seems to have left, in this 
passage, to be determined by the uninspired authority of polemic theologians. 

f Vide Phil. hi. 12 ; Rom. x. 19, and xvi. 19 ; 1 Thess. iii. 7, and iv. 7 ; Gal. v. 
13 ; Eph. i. 10 ; 2 Tim. ii. 11 ; 2 Corinth, v. 4 ; Phil. iv. 10. 

13* 



298 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

to this sovereign constitution of the Creator, this race of moral 
beings were to be tried in one man ; not indeed in respect to a 
legal retribution of all, but in respect to a subsequent and 
further trial, under a very different system from that of mere 
law: if he sinned, an economy of grace was to be at once 
adopted. Under this economy, not only sin and death were to 
come into the world — the latter as the consequence of the 
former — but all were to become sinners as the consequence of 
one man's sin, and thus all were to die or return to dust, di- 
rectly for their own sin, and indirectly in consequence of his 
sin. A divine constitution so peculiar, and so aside from the 
common and natural mode of contemplating the subject by 
the human mind, — a constitution in which the more familiar 
principles of mere law and a strictly legal procedure with 
moral beings were so far dispensed with, by the Sovereign 
Creator and Disposer of all, might not unnaturally by some 
be doubted or denied, at least in two respects. To confirm 
therefore the view given, the apostle adds the 13th and 14th 
verses. 

Verse 13: " For, until the law, sin was in the world; but 
sin is not imputed when there is no law." As if he had 
said, — " That sin and death should have existed and prevailed 
in the world as they have done, in any other supposable mode 
or manner of connection or consequence than that which I 
have described, is incredible, in view of an undeniable fact, 
and an incontrovertible principle. It cannot be supposed or 
said, in respect to sin, that it did not prevail in the world, ex- 
cept as the transgression of a revealed law ; for it is a fact too 
palpable to be questioned or denied, that hefore the law given 
by Moses, the only revealed law which God, after the sin of 
Adam, ever gave to men, sin prevailed in the world. None 
surely can gainsay this fact* Is it then said, that the death 



■■■' While the apostle had unequivocally laid down the principle, that " where 
no law is, there is no transgression," he had surely left his readers no reason to 
suppose that there could be no law except a revealed law. Vide Eom. i. 19, 20, 
&c. ; and also ii. 12-15. Nor has he said any thing which implies, that " the 
law written on the heart" is without a just penalty ; and still less, that tem- 
poral death, common to the righteous and the wicked, is the penalty of that law. 
Indeed none could suppose it to be such a penalty. It was important to guard 
against another error, to give no countenance to the idea that it was such a 
penalty. 



VERSES TWELVE— FOURTEEN 299 

*vhich has prevailed in the world as common to all men, must 
be a legal penalty — a penalty of some law — if not of the law 
of Moses, then of the law given to Adam ? ' But sin is not 
imputed,'' — that is, sin is not visited or punished with temporal 
death (the only death of which he was speaking, and which 
in the present case, could be supposed to be a legal penalty), 
when there is no law with such a penalty. This principle is 
incontrovertible." Thus the apostle has plainly shown, con- 
trary to what might be and what has been commonly supposed, 
that death in this world, or temporal death, does not come on 
all men by imputing sin, i. e., as the legal penalty of sin.* 

Terse 14 : " Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, 
even {icdi) over them that had not sinned after the similitude 
of Adam's transgression." As if he said — u Notwithstanding 
the incontrovertible principle just stated — that sin is not im- 
puted, is not punished with temporal death as a legal pen- 
alty, when there is no revealed law having such a penalty, 
still death universally prevailed from Adam to Moses, and of 
course over them who had not, like Adam, sinned against a re- 
vealed law. Death therefore, as an event common to all men, 
does not come on them, by imputing sin, or as the legal penalty 
of sin — it does not come upon them in the way of a merely legal 
procedure ; but under an economy of mercy, under a redemp- 
tive system, — comes' upon them therefore as a system of means 
and influences designed to reclaim and save from sin and its just 
penalty. And yet death with other evils, according to God's pe- 
culiar constitution of things, coming oy sin, — being connected 
with it as its consequence in the manner stated — indirectly with 
the sin of Adam, and directly with the sin of each individual, — 
is a decisive proof of what I proposed to prove, — that both Jews 
and Gentiles — all the descendants of Adam, in consequence of 
his sin, are sinners, and justly exposed to final condemnation." 

Such then is the conclusion which the apostle establishes in 
the 12th, 13th, and 1-itli verses. Thus not by authorizing, but 
by expressly contradicting the common opinion, that the sen- 
tence in Genesis iii. 19, or any other sentence, doomed all 
men to bear the legal penalty of the law, in this world of 
mercy, — in this world, where so many are delivered from that 



" s What it is to impute sin, I have before shown, and may be easily understood 
by comparing 2 Sam. xix. 19 ; Ps. xxxii. 12 ; 2 Cor. y. 19. 



300 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

penalty, and where God is " not imputing unto men their tres- 
passes," — he has shown from undeniable and acknowledged 
facts of history, that all the posterity of Adam, as a conse- 
quence of his sin, and according to God's sovereign constitution, 
became sinners ; that " by one man's disobedience, many were 
made sinners" (verse 19).* 

Having thus spoken of the evils which come upon all men, 
and the manner in which they come by one man, the apostle 
does not forget the promise, that " the seed of the woman shall 
bruise the serpent's head." He adds without a pause, " who 
(Adam) is the figure of him that was to come." The glorious 
promise of a Redeemer of the race immediately followed the 
sin of Adam, and preceded the sentence of temporal death, and 



o It was essential to the apostle's argument to show that death was an event 
common to all mankind — that it could and did come upon them in this world, in 
another mode of connection than that of the legal penalty of sin. Otherwise, he 
would have exhibited this world as a state of exact and full retribution, and the 
grand object of writing this epistle would have been defeated. For with what 
pretense could he have asserted and proved the doctrine of Justification by grace 
through faith, under a system of mere law, involving the full and just retribution 
of sin ? Temporal death had come to all who " died in faith," and who of course 
were delivered from the legal penalty of sin. Surely to the righteous — to the just 
ified — to those who are blessed, because to them God does not impute sin (Ps. xxxii. 
2 ; Rom. iv. 6), temporal death is not the legal penalty of sin. How then can tem- 
poral death as an event common to all men, be viewed as the legal penalty of sin, and 
as such be alleged as a proof of universal sin ? Plainly, if it proves universal sin, it 
must prove it under some other relation than that of being the legal penalty of 
sin. If temporal death is the legal penalty of sin, then who are saved from this 
penalty? Were Enoch and Elijah the only men delivered from it ? Did Abel, 
and Noah, and Abraham, and all the patriarchs who died, and to whom God did 
not impute sin, bear the penalty of the law? How could this apostle himself say, 
" for me— to die is gain ?' ' What too becomes of the great doctrine of his Epistle, 
—the articulus stanlis, &c, — how are we saved from wrath— in a word, how is Christ 
a Saviour ? Paul, as a reasoner, obviously saw the vital importance of guarding 
his argument on this point. Not to have done this as he has in the 13th and 
14th verses, would have ruined his argument as one designed to show that all 
men are sinners, in consequence of Adam's sin. The answer might have been, 
according to a probable Jewish notion, {i they die as the legal penalty of Adam's 
sin, or in some other supposed mode of legal procedure." If any ask, why are 
all men doomed to temporal death, if temporal death is not the legal penalty of 
sin ? I answer, to prove the sin of all— to manifest God's displeasure for their 
sin, though not in that high degree which is essential to, and involved in, the 
legal penalty of sin, and especially that, in this way, death as an event of pro- 
spective certainty to all, while yet under a gracious system of moral discipline 
and trial, with the judgment to follow it, and the retribution of eternal life or 
eternal death, as men accept or reject proffered mercy, may serve to reclaim them 
from sin and bring them to Him who saves from the wrath to come. 



VERSES FIFTEEN" AND SIXTEEN. 301 

other temporal evils, pronounced on him and his posterity. 
This promise from the moment in which it was announced, — 
how august the fact ! how great the change ! — was fulfilled ; 
fulfilled so far as, that along with the evils by Adam, the 
blessings of redemption by Christ co-existecl. Under this re- 
demptive system, every child of Adam was to come, and did 
come into existence, — a condition of being, whatever other 
evils may belong to it, which is widely different from one which 
involves a full and hopeless retribution in the legal penalty of 
sin. The apostle was thus led to advert, in the briefest manner, 
to the fact of a general resemblance between Adam and Christ. 
As if he had said, " As there are certain consequences of the act 
of one, which come upon all men / so there are other certain con- 
sequences never to oe lost sight of, of the act of the other, ivhich 
come upon all men. This is the resemblance. The rest is 
contrast and dissimilitude." Hence the apostle hastens, as if 
through impatience, to contrast the consequences in the one 
case with those in the other, that it may appear how much the 
evils as evils, in the one, are surpassed by the blessings as 
blessings in the other. Thus he proceeds to say generally in 

Terse 15 : "But not as the offense so also is the free (gracious) 
gift (xapio[ia) ; for if through the offense of one many have 
died, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace (Sopea 
kv xdpLTi), which is by one man Jesus Christ, hath abounded 
unto many." This was to say, immensely great (as we must 
suppose) is the difference between the consequences of the one 
offense, and what must be the results of the grace of God and 
of the gift by grace. For if by the offense of one many die 
(i. e., if many return to dust as the consequence of one sin re- 
sulting in their own sin, and of course in their just and actual 
exposure to final condemnation), great as the evil is, still the 
grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man 
Jesus Christ, is much greater in its abounding riches as a bless- 
ing, than is the evil as an evil. The one as a blessing is so 
great, it so far as a blessing surpasses the other as an evil, that 
we may well be satisfied and grateful under a system of such 
overflowing srace. 

Yerse 16 : And not as the sentence icas by one that sinned, 
so is the gift, (duprjfia) for the sentence {npifia) was of one of- 
fense (elg Kar&KpLfm) unto condemnation, but the gracious gift 
[xapLOfia) is of many offenses (elg 6ifcalo)[xa) unto a provision or 



302 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

ordinance for righteousness or Justification.* As if he had 
said, there is yet another important difference ; for according 
to the sentence as already explained, although all men directly 
for their own sin, and indirectly for Adam's sin, became justly 
exposed to final condemnation by one offense, yet the gracious 
gift is unto a provision for righteousness for many offenses. 
Or thus the sentence (icplfia) of death, "dust thou art," &c. — 
the only sentence which God ever pronounced on the whole 
race ; the sentence which implies and proves the sin and just 
condemnation of all men — was in the manner explained by one 
offense, but the gracious gift (x ( ^P La f ta ) involves one (fr/catw/m, an 
instituted provision for righteousness or Justification from many 
offenses, f 



® This SiKalwfia the apostle speaks of in the 18th verse as one Sucatwua. The 
most general meaning of SiKatwpa seems to be, that which is ordained or appoint- 
ed by authority for righteousness or Justification. (Vide all the instances of its 
use in the New Testament, and particularly in Rom. viii. 4. Vide also McKnight in 
loc.) Where the Sacalwua tov vdpov cannot be ' the righteousness of the law' as the end 
of Christ's sacrifice for sin; that is, perfect personal obedience to law, nor the 
iiKaioavvTi Zk v6fxov in Phil. iii. 9, nor the hucaioavvri h v6/i<# in verse 6th. (See P. S. 
on p. 305.) 

f Most theologians seem not to enter into the apostle's conception of the 
superabundance of the grace of God in giving the posterity of Adam existence 
under a system of redemption. Indeed, I cannot but think that very inadequate 
and low views on this subject extensively prevail. That it should be so with 
those who believe that man is born with concreated or propagated sinful deprav- 
ity, or with imputed sin, or under a necessity from some cause of sinning from 
the first, or that in any way he deserves the wrath of God prior to all free, 
responsible, moral action on his part, is not to be wondered at. But there are 
some who profess to maintain simply the certainty of his sinning in his first moral 
act, who still regard him as not placed in a state of fair trial. My object in this 
note is, briefly to advert to this last view of the subject. I remark that the very 
nature and condition of a moral being are essentially such — his intellect, his sus- 
ceptibilities, his elective power of will, and the reasons, motives, known to him 
are such — that nothing can excuse the guilt of morally wrong action on his part, 
either in the first instance or in any other ; while the mere previous certainty 
(involving the most perfect moral liberty conceivable), of his acting morally 
wrong in the first instance, can no more lessen or increase the moral turpitude 
of his acting morally wrong, than the mere certainty of his acting morally right 
would lessen or increase the moral rectitude of his acting morally right. Besides, 
if the mere certainty of his acting morally wrong is inconsistent with a fair trial, 
then no moral being in a state of fair trial can ever act morally wrong ; since in 
every such case there would be a prior certainty of his so acting, and a reason 
for it. Of course no creature of God ever has sinned or can sin, except as the 
result of a fair trial. And further, how can the trial of a moral being, having, 
as he must have, perfect moral liberty, be otherwise than fair ? Be temptation 
what it may in its nature and its circumstances, still what is it when compared 



VERSES SEVENTEEN AND EIGHTEEN. 303 

Verse 17 : " For if by the offense of one, death reigned by 
one, much more they who receive abundance of grace and of 
the gift of righteousness (rfjg dupeag rrjg diKacoavvTjg) shall reign 
in life by one Jesus Christ." Here the apostle advances 
another step. Comprising the evils by the one offense of one 
man in the prevalence of temporal death, and assuming what 
he had just asserted, a provision of righteousness for Justifica- 
tion from many offenses, he unfolds in contrast the actual result 
of this gracious gift to those who receive abundance of grace 
and of the gift of righteousness (vide chap. iii. 22, and Phil, 
iii. 9), as reigning in life through Jesus Christ. He thus con- 
trasts the actual and unavoidable evils in the one case with the 
actual blessings in the other when fully secured ; and shows 
how immeasurably the actual evils by Adam are surpassed by 
the blessings actually secured through Christ by all who are 
willing to accept them. 

Terse IS : " Therefore as by one offense (&•' evbg napcnTTu- 
{larog) the sentence (Kplfia) came upon all men unto condemna- 
tion (elg KaraKpL^a^ even so by one provision for righteousness 
(&' evbg diKaLufiarog) the gracious gift (xdpLOfia) came upon all 
men unto Justification {diKaiuoiv} of life." Here the one Tcapan- 
-&\m, and the one duiaiwiia, are in respect to their tendencies 
placed in obvious contrast. The one, in the manner already 
explained in verse 12th, leads to condemnation ; the other, in 
the manner explained in the three preceding verses, leads to 
Justification. As if he had said, As through one ixapar~6\ia, 
there was a sentence upon all men unto condemnation, so 
through one Sifcaiufia, there is a gracious gift to all men unto 
Justification of life. The preposition elg is plainly telic, or else 
the apostle teaches the Justification and salvation of all men 



with the known reasons for acting morally right ? If we would form this only 
just view of man as a moral being, — as one so perfectly qualified for right moral 
action, thart on a priori grounds it would he cause for astonishment to heaven and 
earth that he should ever act morally wrong (Isa. i. 2, and Mark vi. 6). and espe- 
cially if we suppose that all should actually accept as they can, the offered bless- 
ings of salvation, then we should be prepared to enter into the apostle's concep- 
tion of the abundance of God's goodness and grace in the economy of redemption, 
and to pronounce it as he does "the exceeding riches of his grace in his kind- 
ness toward us through Christ Jesus.' ' But as our acceptance of that grace would 
not enhance, neither does our rejection of it diminish its abundance. Goodness 
to us — goodness in the forms of grace and mercy — aims at our good, and while 
our perversions of it evince its nature, they may instead of obscuring, only serve 
to augment its splendors. 



304 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

contrary to verse 17 ; for if the sentence was one of actual con- 
demnation, the gracious gift is one of actual Justification. Nor 
is this all. The two propositions amount to a palpable contra- 
diction ; for the one asserts the actual condemnation of all men 
to eternal death ; the other, their actual Justification to eternal 
life. By failing to see the meaning of api\ia elg Karditpip,a, and 
of x d P LG ^ a e k ducaiafia, in verse 16, and consequently that of 
elg ducaiwoiv. in verse 18, Prof. Stuart has made the apostle 
assert the actual Justification of all men as truly as the Uni- 
versalist could desire. The Professor probably would not ad- 
mit this. But on this point he must be judged by his readers. 

Verse 19 : " For as by one man's disobedience (jrapatcoTjg) 
many were made sinners, so by the obedience (viraKoijg) of one 
shall many be made righteous." As if he had said, I have 
thus shown how obvious it is from well-known history and all 
acknowledged facts, that according to the sovereign constitu- 
tion of God, by one man's sin all men became sinners, as such 
were exposed to a just condemnation to bear the full penalty 
of sin, and were, as the evidence and proof of this, actually 
doomed to temporal death. I have also shown in the preced- 
ing part of the epistle, that by the obedience (unto death) of 
one man, — of him that was to come, and actually promised 
(Gen. iii. 15) before, and therefore virtually cotemporaneously 
with the sentence (icpifia elg KaraKptfia) not only an abundant 
provision of grace was made for the Justification of all men, 
but that many shall become righteous* and reign in life. 
(Vide from the first verse to the twelfth of this chapter.) 

Verse 20 : " Moreover the law entered that the offense might 
abound. But where sin abounded, grace did much more 
abound." As if, in confirmation of his views already express- 
ed, he had said, Justification is not by the law, for the law 
(meaning the Mosaic or national law, which I have before 
shown, comprises the first and great commandment) entered 
(Trapeioijkdev) (had a limited entrance compared with that of sin, 
vide Doddridge in loc), that sin might appear in its degree and 
extent, or how much there was of it. And yet abundant as sin 
was with its evils, grace was much more abundant ; so that it 



* The SiKaioi of the Scriptures are the Sucatoi h marsus, those who by faith or 
personal holiness are justified, and so stand right in relation to the sanctions 
of law. 



IMPORT OF IMPORTANT TERMS. 305 

might never be forgotten or lost sight of, that sin with all its 
evils in this world considered as an evil, was by no means to be 
compared with redeeming grace in its results as a blessing in- 
somuch — 

Yerse 21 : " That as sin has reigned unto death, even so 
might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life, by 
Jesus Christ our Lord.-' As if he had said, while therefore 
there is a certain similitude between Adam and Christ in their 
respective relations to all men, there is a great dissimilitude. The 
resemblance is, that both sustained an important relation of con- 
nection with all men in respect to consequences or effects. But 
the dissimilitude is, that in the one case the consequences of 
the connection were evils, and in the other blessings, — a con- 
nection in both cases to be resolved into God's wise and benig- 
nant sovereignty, and vet capable of the most complete and 
honorable vindication. For if Adam injured us, it cannot be 
shown that it was in a greater degree than we in some other 
necessary condition of existence should have injured ourselves ; 
while Christ has greatly profited us far, very far more than 
Adam injured us. If we compare the constitution (diaQfjurf) of 
God with Adam and the human race as his descendants, great 
as the resulting evils are, with the constitution (diad/JM]) of Gocl 
in Christ as the Redeemer of the world; if we view the latter 
in all its provisions of grace and mercy, and judge of it aside 
from our perversions of it, and especially as availing ourselves 
of its blessings as we may, how transcendent the good com- 
pared with the evil ! \Yho would, not prefer to receive exist- 
ence as an accountable and immortal being under that system 
of law and mercy under which he does receive it, to being 
placed under one of mere law, where his eternal destiny in bliss 
must depend on his sinless obedience, or indeed under any 
other system than the present, which he can pronounce possi- 
ble or worthy of the Creator of all \ 



P. S. — The just interpretation of the passage under consider- 
ation depends much on the import of the words difcaiufia, 
dtKacoavvrj, and. diKaiuGLg, especially as they are used by the apos- 
tle on the subject of Justification. That these words are not 
used by him as synonyms to denote Justification, as Prof. 
Stuart supposes, and that neither dacaiufia, nor SitMLiovvvr) can 
20 



oOb HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

be properly rendered Justification, nor ducaiofia, 
must be obvious by comparing the use of these words in verses 
16th and 18th of this chapter, and from Kom. iii. 22, and 
Phil. iii. 9, and Kom. viii. 4. In Rom. viii. 4, our transla- 
tors absurdly represent the design of Christ's sacrifice to be the 
fulfilling of the righteousness of the law on our part. The true 
rendering of 6iKaiu)\ia would correct the error. 

That the words referred to are always used in the Scrip- 
tures in one precise meaning, I do not here assert. What I 
maintain is, that they are used with great precision, and in a 
plain and familiar meaning by this apostle, when treating of 
the subject of Justification. 

What I propose in this note is, to illustrate my own view of 
the diversity of meaning, by considering some of the obvious 
and prominent facts in the case of a subject of law who should 
be justified by the deeds of law. The case implies a trial or 
an investigation in respect to his relation to the sanctions of 
law, as that which is to be determined. It implies next his 
perfect obedience to law, which sustains two relations to law : 
one is, that it is the fulfillment of the claim of law as an act or 
doing, required of the subject; and the other is, that it is the 
ordained, or instituted ground by which the subject might 
stand right in relation to the sanctions of law ; and this in two 
respects, — first, as it renders such standing consistent with jus- 
tice, and secondly with all the other interests or ends of benev- 
olence. As the fulfilling of the claim of law, it would be called 
ra epya rov vb\iov. As the ordained or instituted ground of 
merely rendering it consistent with justice, or with the 
authority of law, it would be called to dmaiG)[ia rov vb\iov 
(Rom. viii. 4.)* As a 6i\iai^\ia, and yet not merely as such ; 



* Vide Calvin, Instit., Book III. Chap. 11, S. 9, and Chap. 17, S. 7. It is obvi- 
ous that 5iKaiu)na is here used (Rom. viii. 4) in this sense ; since there is no other 
in which the design of Christ's sacrifice for sin can be said to be, " that the 
righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us," who have broken the law. 
Besides, if it be understood to mean the same as 6iKaioa6vif i< vdftov, in Phil, 
iii. 9, then the apostle in the latter passage expresses a strong desire that the 
design of Christ's sacrifice for sin may not be accomplished in respect to himself. 
It is neither desirable nor necessary perhaps to change the translation of Rom. 
viii. 4, since the English word righteousness will bear perhaps the meaning, which 
the connection so clearly shows to be the meaning of StKaiaiia. Beza was so 
struck with the incongruity of understanding biKaiwfia as synonymous with ducaiocvvr), 
that he translates the passage, " Ut jus illud legis," that that right of the law, viz., 



THREE THINGS DISTINGUISHED. 307 

but also as being received by faith, rendering it consistent 
with all the ends of benevolence, that the subject stand right 
in relation to the sanctions of law, it would be called t\ dinat- 
oavvrj eft vdfiov (Phil. iii. 9) ; and thus the sure and complete 
ground of Justification. Yet another thing is implied, — the act 
of Justification itself; — the act of the judge which authorita- 
tively determines the main question, — that the subject does 
actually stand right in relation to the sanctions of law so far as 
treatment is concerned. This is called t] dcfcalG)aig. (Yide A. 
Clarke on Rom. v. 18.) 

Thus in the supposed case of Justification under law, we find 
three prominent things, which are necessarily, easily, and 
familiarly distinguished; — so much so, that, as I claim, it is 
incredible, that the apostle, adhering as he does to the use 
of forensic phraseology, should not clearly and strongly dis- 
tinguish them in unfolding the divine plan for the gratuitous 
Justification of sinners, in its consistency with the great prin- 
ciples of law and Moral Government. In respect to obedience 
to law, as fulfilling the claim of law, this, under the plan of 
grace, is out of the question ; "for all have sinned." But if law 
is to be established in its authority, or the justice of God to be 
vindicated, and sinners are to be justified, then it would seem, 
that some ground or means of establishing the authority of 
law, or vindicating the justice of the Lawgiver, would be im- 
periously demanded and prominently presented ; that is, some 
diKattjfia, equivalent to that which would be furnished by the 
perfect obedience of the subject. I need not say how fully 
the apostle has shown this to be true in the third chapter of 
this epistle, by the clearest implication ; nor how obvious it is, 
that the word diKaioiia will bear no other than this precise 
import in the 16th and 18th verses of this chapter, and also in 
chapter viii. 4. But further, and for the same imperious reason, 
we should expect the apostle to exhibit, not merely a Sucaioiia, 
or ground on which the justified sinner could stand right in rela- 
tion to the sanctions of law, consistently with the authority of 
law or with the justice of the Lawgiver, but a ditcaioovvr], which, 



to perfect obedience as the ground of acceptance might, &c. — thus, as I think, 
conforming to the meaning of the apostle, by distinguishing the right of the law to 
be upheld in its authority by obedience, from its claim to obedience as action or 
conduct on the part of the subject. 



308 HUMAN SINFULNESS. 

without excluding but including the dticaiwfia, should also ren- 
der it consistent with all the other ends of benevolence, that 
the sinner should stand right in relation to the sanctions of 
law ; — a ducacoovvn, which in those respects shall be equivalent to 
a diKaioovvri ek vofiov, and so become a sure and complete ground 
of Justification. And now what do we find ? In this chapter, 
t; those who receive abundance of the gift of righteousness" — 
(diKatoovvrj) — " grace reigning through righteousness unto eter- 
nal life ;" the same thing which the apostle had called and often 
calls " the righteousness of God by faith of Jesus Christ, unto 
all and upon all them that believe." (Yide chap. iii. 22, 25, 
26 ; x. 4 ; Phil. iii. 9, et al.) Now this righteousness of God by 
faith is not the dctcaioyfjia merely. The Atonement, as we have 
seen, simply supports the authority of law, and so far renders 
it consistent with that authority, that the sinner should stand 
right in relation to legal sanctions. It does not of itself actu- 
ally place any sinner in this relation to these sanctions. For 
this purpose something more, as we have seen, according to a 
strictly legal procedure, would be necessary even in the perfect 
obedience of the subject of law. To become a righteousness, it 
must, as it would, render it consistent with all the ends of be- 
nevolence, that the obedient subject should on this ground stand 
right in relation to legal sanctions. So in the case of the sin- 
ner there must be in both respects an equivalent righteousness 
or diKaioovvr}. This is " righteousness of God by faith" — the 
righteousness of God's providing ; and is a righteousness, inas- 
much as by the Atonement the sinner's standing right in rela- 
tion to the sanctions of law is consistent with the authority of 
law, and by his faith (his personal holiness), his so standing is 
consistent with all the other ends of benevolence. Thus we 
find not merely a diKat^a {kvbq ducai^ixarog), but also a dutai- 
oovvTj, a diKaioovvi] Oeov dia moreug, as sure and complete a ground 
of Justification for sinners, as would be their own perfect obe- 
dience to law, had they received such an obedience. Thus 
" Christ is the end of the law for righteousness" (dtKaioavvrj) — 
to whom, not to all men, for whom there is one SiKaiu>\La ; but 
" to every one that believeth." 

I will only add here, that it is not the difcaicoua, as such, or as 
merely sustaining the authority of law, which becomes a right- 
eousness^ or the duccuoovvTi rov deov , nor is it the faitn of the 
sinner as rendering it consistent with other ends of benevo- 



IMPORT OF LEADING TERMS. 309 

lence, that the sinner should stand right in relation to legal 
sanction, much less as meritorious, which becomes a righteous- 
ness y but it is both the oucaiwfia and TTLareojg, as having together 
the same twofold relation, which perfect obedience would have, 
viz., as rendering it consistent with the authority of law or with 
the justice of the Lawgiver, and also with all other ends of be- 
nevolence, that the sinner should stand right, i. e., be regarded 
as if he stood right in relation to the sanctions of law ; and so 
be justified, i. e., be pronounced and authoritatively deter- 
mined, thus to stand, in respect to treatment — by the act of the 
judge, the SiKaiGJocg, or act of Justification. Or thus : The one 
dif£ai(t)(ia is the Atonement of Christ as a provision or an ordi- 
nance of God to be received by faith, and as that from which, 
when thus received, results the consistency between all the ends 
of perfect benevolence, and the Justification of the believing 
sinner. Thus viewed, the Atonement or propitiation of Christ, — 
not merely as such ; for as merely such, it only supports the 
authority of law — as a provision, which is appointed of God 
— to be received by faith, i. e., to be taken hold of with all 
the truths involved in it, — to be embraced as it is by the mind 
with just, intellectual apprehension, and with a holy heart, for 
practical results ;* — thus received, the Atonement is the one 
diKaitofia, of which the apostle speaks in verses 16 and 18. 
This dmaiofia, when thus received hy faith on the part of the 
sinner, renders it not only consistent with justice, or the au- 
thority of law, but with all the ends of general benevolence, 
and thus demands of perfect benevolence, that the believing 
sinner oe justified. It thus becomes to him, in this one respect, 
what his own perfect obedience to law would be under mere 
law, — a righteousness, a ditcaLoovvn — and being wholly from 
God, and not from himself — being a dupea sv xapcri of God — a 
free or gracious gift — a %apio\ia, a provision of grace, — and so 
through abundance of grace it becomes to believers the gift of 
righteousness, — f\ dcopea rfjg diKacoavvvg, — and is called by the 
apostle, the righteousness of God. 

* What truths, and how much truth, is included in such apprehension, will 
scarcely be understood and duly estimated, without much reflection. It is all 
the truth of God's testimony in the law and in the gospel, except one in the law, 
the impossibility under mere law that the transgressor should escape its penalty ; 
and yet the whole influence of law is preserved unimpaired, — law is established. 



III. 

JUSTIFICATION. 

I.— FEELIMINAEY OBSERVATIONS.— ROMISH DOCTRINE. — JUSTIFICA- 
TION NOT SANCTIF1CATION. 

Signification of right, morally right, right in relation to Moral Government, &c. — Views of the 
ancients in respect to justice and moral rectitude.— Righteousness under Moral Government. — 
Importance of understanding the Romish doctrine.— Doctrine before the Reformation.— First and 
second Justification.— Relation of Faith to the first, and of Works to the second. — Romish view 
controverted, particularly in respect to the nature of Faith —Justification not the infusion of a 
principle of holiness. The Hebrew and Greek words translated to justify, do not admit this- 
interpretation.— The conception unknown to heathen nations.— Scriptural; usage of the word 
discussed. 

The word Justification in Theology, denotes an act of God in 
respect to men as the subjects of his Moral Government. This 
act of God, in its nature, in its ground, and in its condition, as 
presented in the Scriptures, is now the subject of inquiry. Its 
nature — in other words — what is the act of Justification on the 
ypart of God as the Moral Governor of men, will first claim our 
attention. 

Before however, I enter directly on the investigation of this 
topic, I deem it important to offer some preliminary remarks re- 
specting the use and meaning of some prominent words ; and also 
to examine as briefly as may be, the Roman Catholic doctrine 
of Justification, which in one essential part stands so directly 
opposed to the Protestant doctrine, as, if true, to supersede 
further discussion. I proceed — 

1. To make some preliminary remarks on important words. 

It is obvious that the Justification of an obedient subject of 
law under a system of mere law, must in some respects be a 
different thing from the Justification of a disobedient subject 
of law under a system of law and grace combined. ~Now the 
Moral Government which God administers over this world, is 
not a system of mere law, as we use the word, but a system of 
law and grace — a system, which compared with every other 
system of Moral Government, except that of the Jewish Theoc- 
racy as its representative shadow or type — is entirely peculiar. 
This being true, a peculiarity in the use of language is required, 
especially in forensic terms, which under any other would be 



VARIOUS SENSES OF TERM RIGHT. 311 

unintelligible or false in their meaning. It is this grand pecu- 
liarity in the use of scriptural language, which it is believed 
has occasioned much of the controversy on the subject of Just-' 
ification. . The use of forensic words, modified as their mean- 
ing must be under a system of law and grace, compared with 
their meaning under a system of mere law, demands a careful 
and thorough investigation. 

It will be admitted, that in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin 
languages, there is a word, which, with at least some circum- 
stantial qualification, is equivalent to our English word just- 
ify. This word is derived from the Latin justifico, or justum 
facere, literally, to make right I propose to examine the use 
and meaning of this word, or rather this word and its equiva- 
lent in each of the languages mentioned, before I enter directly 
on the leading inquiry before us. 

The general or generic idea of the word right, first claims 
consideration. This idea or conception, we may say, is com- 
mon in all languages ; in which also we find a class or family 
of words, of whose meaning this abstract and general idea is an 
essential element. The primary idea is that of straight, or 
straight to, straight forward, — right, as in the phrase straight or 
right line. This 'idea by metaphorical modification, and gener- 
alization, is the idea of fitness, — adaptation, — tendency, stretch- 
ing to. The resemblance between the primary and secondary 
idea is at once obvious, and accounts for the latter. 

The most important application of this word, is to moral be- 
ings, their action and its ends. My own views of such action, 
and of its ends as right, and of such action as predominant and 
subordinate, I have already given. "We have seen that pre- 
dominant action in the form of benevolence as an elective pref- 
erence of the highest good of all sentient being, and as dis- 
tinguished from all other, is the only morally right action. If 
we conceive of subordinate action as the expression and proof 
of this kind, and so conceive and speak, as we often do, of the 
whole as one action, still the morally right element of the com- 
bination is the predominant action — the act of the heart and 
will — an elective preference of the highest good of all. This 
is not only right, but morally right in all circumstances, semper 
et ubigae, being fitted, and the only one which is fitted, in all 
circumstances, to secure the great end of all action on the part 
of a moral being. But subordinate action is right or otherwise, 



312 JUSTIFICATION. 

only according to certain variable circumstances ; as it is, or is 
not, necessary to some limited result which is essential to the 
great ulterior result of morally right action ; or it is right, as it 
is the expression or going forth of morally right predominant 
action or principle. These remarks are sufficient to show that 
the word right, as a general term, is applicable to both the spe- 
cific kinds of action now described, while in all cases of proper 
use, some epithet, or the connection and manner of use, deter- 
mines the precise meaning of the writer or speaker. 

Thus one kind of moral action, which may be called benevo- 
lent action, including the predominant action or benevolent 
principle, and its appropriate expression in subordinate action, 
is truly and properly said to be morally right ; or to be right, 
provided the connection shows the meaning to be its fitness to 
the true end or right end of action on the part of a moral be- 
ing, in the given case. The same kind of action of a moral 
being, viewed irrespectively of his sustaining any other relation 
than that of a moral being, — e. g\, that of a parent or child, 
lawgiver or subject, — would be called not only right or morally 
right, but also, virtue, goodness, moral goodness, moral recti- 
tude, &c. In each case, the language would designate the fit- 
ness of the action to the great end of action on the part of a 
moral being — the highest good of all — of the agent and of all 
sentient being. This complex idea, or these elementary ideas 
combined in one, are expressed in the manner described, by 
the word right or morally right as applied to the action of a 
moral being, without the recognition of any other relation on 
his part, than the great, comprehensive relation of a moral 
being. 

But the same kind of action must be contemplated under 
other and more specific relations, especially under those which 
arise from and pertain to Moral Government. The moral rela- 
tions of men, and of all moral beings, are their relations to 
themselves and to others, as sentient beings, capable of happi- 
ness and misery. These are superior to all others, and can 
never he superseded. On the contrary, in that system of fit- 
nesses in which they exist, all others are subordinate and sub- 
servient. A moral being can never cease to sustain moral 
relations, nor cease to act, or to be acting morally. He may 
however, when acting morally in his moral relations, be viewed 
also as acting in those which mav be distinguished from 



DEFECTIVE VIEWS OF THE ANCIENTS. 313 



such as are moral. Thus in the social relations subsisting 
merely between himself and his fellow-beings, as in his domes- 
tic and political relations, all his action may be viewed as sub- 
ordinate, in which in principle and in practice he aims at the 
temporal and earthly well-being of himself and of others, with- 
out deciding whether he acts from any other, either higher or 
lower principle. . Thus conceived, action has no moral quality. 
Contemplated merely in relation to his fellow-men, to his fam- 
ily, or to the State, or to all these, his subordinate action may 
be right, and yet he may act not morally right, but morally 
wrong. Indeed, he acts morally right, only as he acts morally 
right in predominant action; i. e., in the exercise of morally 
right principle. Otherwise, in all moral action, he acts in the 
exercise of the morally wrong principle, and acts morally 
wrong. 

I have already had occasion to show what low and inade- 
quate ideas of the nature of morally right action are formed 
by the human mind when uninstructed by divine revelation. 
The most enlightened of heathen philosophers seem to have 
formed no higher conception than that of the s^lg rov Seovrog of 
Pythagoras, the habit of doing that which is tit to be done, or 
ought to be clone. Nor had this definition of virtue, which 
Dugald Stuart speaks of as the best given by any philosopher, 
ancient or modern, been so objectionable, had it not been con- 
fined in its meaning to the habit of the particular social virtues 
among men, as beings of earth and time. Justice as distin- 
guished from benevolence, as the latter is required in the first 
and great commandment of the divine law, seems to have been 
regarded as the predominant action — the sum and source of 
the whole train of the social, domestic, and political virtues.* 

-"• With this view, it is believed that Aristides was signalized by the surname 
of The Just, as comprising the sum of moral excellence. In Justinian's defini- 
tion of justice, we find no recognition of benevolence, i.e., of goodwill, or an 
habitual elective preference of the highest good of all sentient being, or an 
habitual will to render to sentient being what is due; but such a will to render to 
every one his due, as if there were no morally good action on the part of man 
but what is comprised in justice. Cicero says, " Ex justitia viri boni appellantur (De 
Offic. ii. 11). Aristotle gives this view of justice in his Ethics, B. V. vii. 3 : " We 
are accustomed," he says, "to cite the proverb, 'In justice is included every 
virtue/ and it is pre-eminently complete virtue, because it is the exercise of the 
perfection of virtue. Wherefore this same justice is not a part of virtue, but is 
virtue in its universal aspect ; nor is its contrary, injustice, a part of vice, but vice 
itself." 

14 



314- JUSTIFICATION. 

These conceptions would of course constitute and determine 
the meaning of language ; and in view of this fact, we see at 
once how inadequate must be the meaning of the word right, 
and of kindred words, as applied to the action of moral beings ; 
and how low the conception formeol of the nature of such be- 
ings viewed in their relation to God and his sentient creation, 
or only in the inferior relation to fellow-beings. How different 
also must be the conceptions which would exist in respect to 
the same kind of action on the part of men when viewed 
simply as moral beings, and also as moral beings under a 
Moral Government. Now whatever be the conception of 
moral action, whether that which the mind forms under the 
light and guidance of divine revelation, and in the true use of 
its reflective faculties, or that low and inadequate idea which 
men have actually formed without revelation, it is obvious that 
the action conceived not simply as moral action, but either as 
the moral action of one sustaining the relation of a Moral Gov- 
ernor, or as the moral action of one sustaining the relation of a 
subject of Moral Government, must possess other and import- 
ant relations. As the action of either governor or subject, it 
would be conceived as moral action, or as morally right action. 
But as action common to both, it could not be conceived as 
obedience, for it plainly is not obedience ; i. e'., it is not submis- 
sion to authority on the part of the ruler. And yet as com- 
mon to both in a subordinate generic import of the word, it is 
righteousness or riglit-wiseness, inasmuch as it is action, which 
in the different relations of ruler and subject, is in accordance 
with the principles of Moral Government — action which is de- 
manded by the nature and principles of a legal system, accord- 
ing to the relations of the one who governs, and of the other 
who is governed. "Without here more particularly unfolding 
what it is as righteousness or right-wiseness in a Moral Gov- 
ernor, it requires in this discussion, as the action of the subject 
of Moral Government, to be considered in its, more prominent 
particular relations. Thus considered, morally right action, 
instead of being conceived simply as fitted to secure the great 
and true end of action on the part of a moral being as such, 
sustains also the following important relations. One is, that it 
fulfills the claim of the law or of the lawgiver. Another is, 
that as a testimony or proof , it recognizes and so upholds the 
authority of the lawgiver. Another is, that it is the ordained 



TEEM RIGHTEOUSNESS. 315 

and necessary ground of the subject's standing rigid in relation 
to the sanctions of law, so far as any thing on his part can be 
the ground of his so standing. And another is, that as sus- 
taining these relations, it is the ground of the authoritative act 
of the Judge by ivhich the subject is determined, caused, or 
made so to stand in relation to legcd sanctions, that he is not to 
be punished but rewarded. Now lor the purposes of speech on 
this most important of all subjects, men have frequent occa- 
sion in practical life to express these different relations of this 
one kind of action, and to give prominence to some one or 
more of them in the use of single words or phrases. Thus one 
and the same kind of action on the part of a moral being, as 
common to both ruler and subject, would be called morally 
right action, or virtue, or goodness, or moral rectitude, &c, to 
denote its relation as fitted to the great end of all action on the 
part of such a being in all circumstances, viz., the highest well- 
being of all. To denote a more particular relation of the same 
action to the principles of Moral Government, and still as com- 
mon to both ruler and subject, and conformed to these, it would 
be called righteousness. In application to the ruler, this word 
would denote his perfect conformity to all those principles of 
right which arise from his peculiar relation as a ruler. In the 
case of a moral being under law to another, the same action 
done in submission to authority would be called obedience, or 
epyov voilov, to denote its relation as fulfilling the claim of law. 
For yet another purpose the same action would be called right- 
eousness, to denote its comprehensive relation as the ordained 
and necessary ground of the standing right of the subject in re- 
spect to the sanctions of law in the broadest sense of the lan- 
guage, according to principles of justice and benevolence. I say 
in the broadest sense, for while the obedience of a subject fulfills 
the demand and sustains the authority of law on his part, and 
so becomes the ground of his standing right in relation to the 
sanctions of law, as far as any thing on his part can be the 
ground of his so standing, still he does not in the broadest 
sense of the language so stand, without the authoritative act of 
the Judge determining that he so stands, and is to be rewarded. 
Thus his obedience to law, as his righteousness, has a twofold 
relation ; it is the ground of his standing right in relation to 
the sanctions of law according to the principles of justice and 
all other principles of benevolence ; and as such, it is also the 



316 JUSTIFICATION. 

ground of the authoritative act of the Judge, which determines 
in such a respect that he so stands — that he is not to be pun- 
ished but rewarded. The obedience of a subject of law must 
obviously sustain all these relations, since otherwise the author- 
itative act of the Judge would be wholly groundless and un- 
authorized. If it did not fulfill the claim of law and so uphold 
its authority, it could not become the ground of his standing 
right in relation to the sanctions of law according to the prin- 
ciples of justice and benevolence, so far as such standing de- 
pends on the subject himself. If it did not sustain this last 
relation, it could not become the ground of the authoritative 
act of a righteous Judge, which alone determines or causes 
him so to stand that he can be actually rewarded ; and of 
course, this act of the Judge could have no sufficient ground, 
and the subject could not be rewarded according to the princi- 
ples of law or of Moral Government. 

Here it may be well to remark, that of a Moral Governor 
reigning in rightful authority — for example, of God acting in 
this relation — obedience could not be properly and truly predi- 
cated ; while both moral goodness or right moral action, and 
righteousness might be ; — the former having its ordinary gen- 
eral import, and the latter a meaning modified by his peculiar 
relation to his subjects as their Lawgiver and Judge. In the 
case however of a moral being, under a system of mere law, 
the true predicate of either moral goodness, or of obedience, or 
of righteousness, would necessarily imply, but not formally ex- 
press both the other predicates. From the true predicate of 
moral goodness of a moral being, we could not infer, either 
that he is or is not a subject of law, nor be authorized to predi- 
cate either obedience or righteousness of him as such. Nor 
would the predicates of obedience or of righteousness of a 
subject of law be strictly synonymous, since his righteousness 
at most is an inference. He is obedient, and therefore is right- 
eous, — or, he fulfills the claim of law, and therefore is right- 
eous so far as his righteousness depends on himself. But he is 
not made righteous (i. e., is not justified), so far as his right- 
eousness depends on the authoritative act of the Judge. JSTor 
can it be inferred that he will be made righteous in this respect, 
without assuming the justice of the Judge as a further premise. 
Nor yet can we, merely from the true predicate of righteous- 
ness of the subject of a perfect law (vide Phil. iii. 9, and Rom. 



ROMISH DOCTRINE. 317 

iii. 22), infer his obedience to law ; since lie may be said, in an 
important sense, to have, so far as it is possible in the nature of 
things he should have, another righteousness than his own, even 
that which the apostle so earnestly desired. Nor from the Just- 
ification of the subject of law can we infer his personal obedi- 
ence to law ; for under a system of grace, or wickedly under 
a system of mere law, he may be as fully justified by the au- 
thoritative act of the Judge, though disobedient, as were he 
obedient to law. 

What has now been said will serve to show that important 
forensic terms must be greatly modified in their meaning when 
referring to a system of law and grace, compared with that 
in which they would be used in referring to a system of mere 
law. It will enable us, it is believed, to understand with more 
precision than is usual, the scriptural terms, dLfcaiog ducatoGwrj, 
dtfcaiofia, diitaioG), and other important words and phrases, as em- 
ployed by the sacred writers in different connections, and thus 
greatly aid us in the investigation of the comprehensive subject 
of Justification, as an act of God in relation to men as the 
subjects of his Moral Government. I now proceed as I pro- 
posed — 

2. Briefly to state and examine the Roman Catholic doc- 
trine of Justification. 

This doctrine in one prominent and essential element, con- 
founds what Protestants regard as distinct acts — that of Justifi- 
cation, and that of Sanctification ; thus representing both as one 
and the same act — that of making just, or personally righteous. 
In this view, the Catholic and Protestant forms of the doctrine 
stand opposed, in respect to the very nature of Justification. 
It is on this account that I am led to introduce the considera- 
tion of the Pomish doctrine in this connection ; and though 
I shall present it with some particularity and fullness, and 
notice in my examination some of its particular elements, and 
hereafter still other parts, I shall now confine myself chiefly 
to the inquiry, whether Justification includes Sanctification ? 
This I do now, because otherwise the way is not well pre- 
pared, in my view, to show the nature of this act as pre- 
sented in the Scriptures. There is also a strong reason for no- 
ticing this doctrine, arising from its prevalence in our own 
country, — a fact, which, imperiously demands a more thor- 
ough examination and exposure of its errors, than it has hith- 



318 JUSTIFICATION". 

erto received. If the scriptural doctrine of Justification is 
what the Reformers pronounced it — the articulus stantis vel 
cadentis ecclesim, why are not Protestants more engrossed 
in guarding this main pillar of the edifice, than in conflicts 
among themselves, or in assailing the mere scaffoldings of 
Romanism ? It is pre-eminently by opening the batteries of 
truth on the strongholds of sin through the doctrine of Justi- 
fication by faith, that the weapons of this warfare must become 
mighty through God. Besides, it is my conviction, that the 
broad distinction which the Scriptures make between Justifi- 
cation and Sanctification, was not fully unfolded by the earlier 
Fathers of the Church ; and that even modern Protestants, 
though some of them, like our New England divines and the 
late Dr. Chalmers, have strenuously insisted on a broad dis- 
tinction, have failed fully to exhibit it, through the want of 
accurate views of scriptural Sanctification. Into this part of 
the subject however I cannot here enter. What I propose in 
respect to the Romish doctrine of Justification is, for the 
reasons given, to call your attention to the subject with some 
increased interest, by attempting to show, though imperfectly, 
how entirely groundless it is, as well as directly opposed to the 
plainest teachings of the word of God. 

I shall attempt in the first place, to give a fair and just state- 
ment of this doctrine ; and in the second place, to show how 
entirely unscriptural it is in some of its essential parts or 
elements. 

In the first place, I shall attempt to give a fair and just view 
of the Roman Catholic doctrine of Justification. 

Here I am not led back to those scriptural forms of contro- 
versy which respect chiefly, not to say wholly the ground and 
condition of Justification, rather than the nature of the act; 
for the sacred writers seem ever to assume that in respect to 
this, there was no occasion for discussion. Controversy on this 
part of the subject had a later origin than in the time of the 
apostles. To find its commencement, we need go no further 
back than the rise of the Romish Church, nor much beyond the 
time of the Reformation. Even the early controversies of the 
first Christian Fathers had at this time so far ceased, and their 
flagrant errors had been so abandoned and modified, that we 
may regard the question concerning the nature of Justification, 
as embodied in that form of the doctrine in which the Roman 



FIRST AND SECOND JUSTIFICATION. 319 

Church found itself confronted by Protestantism. The Council 
of Trent (1545-1563) had to defend the doctrine of the Catho- 
lic Church, and in so doing, solemnly to sanction to a great ex- 
tent the system developed by the more eminent scholastics of 
the preceding period. The Canons of this Council, the Cat- 
echismus Romanus based upon them, and the views of many 
of the scholastic divines, as explained and vindicated by Bel- 
larmine, Yasquez, and others, are therefore to be regarded as 
the true symbols of the Romish Church. 

In giving a statement of the doctrine of Justification which 
shall shut off all plausible contradiction, there is the serious 
difficulty which arises from the want of consistency in the views 
and statements of Roman Catholic authorities. I shall be care- 
ful however, to impute nothing to them which they do not 
plainly teach, presuming that they are responsible for what 
they assert in one instance, however they may contradict it in 
another. 

This doctrine then, as I understand it from the authorities 
now referred to, comprises two parts, which some have called 
a first and a second Justification. The first is the act of Gocl 
infusing into the soul an inherent principle of grace and char- 
ity, i. e., of personal holiness, by which, original sin and all 
habits of sin, are extinguished. This Justification is by faith 
with baptism as its condition, and is called Justification by 
faith. Of this, Christ is said to be the meritorious cause. The 
principle of grace thus infused is a preparation of mind for re- 
ceiving a habit of grace — gratiam gratum facieniem — render- 
ing the subject acceptable (not accepted) to God.* This is a 
speculative or historical faith, which, as involving submission to 
the authority of the Church, is meritorious ; and as attended 
with contrition, repentance, and love, renders it congruous with 
the wisdom and goodness of God (what the schoolmen call 
meritum de congruo) to justify the believer. This first Justifi- 
cation is said to be that of which Paul so fully treats, in dis- 
tinction from Justification oy works of law.\ The second part 
of Justification is a consequence of the first. Of this, good 

"~ Three kinds of grace are spoken of, — gratia gratis dans, gratia gratis data, 
and gratia gratum faciens ; the last being divided into gratia operans and gratia 
co-operans, prozveniens and concomitans . (Hagenbach. vol. ii. p. 49.) 

f They understand by works of law, works done without the influence of the 
Holy Spirit. 



320 



JUSTIFICATION, 



works, proceeding from the principle of grace and love, espe- 
cially works of beneficence, alms-giving, and presents to clois- 
ters and churches, are ike formal ground and procuring cause. 
They are meritorious ; and their merit consists in this, that the 
righteousness is increased by the performance of good works. 
Still it is maintained that the merits of men will not throw 
those of Christ into the shade ; they are rather themselves the 
effects of the merits of Christ, and serve to manifest his glory 
among men. It is also said, that Justification is not only the 
remission of sins, but also the Sanctification and Renovation of 
the inner man by the voluntary susception of grace and gifts, 
whence man from unrighteous becomes righteous, and from an 
enemy a friend, that so he may be an heir of eternal life. 
It is further said, that we are justified by faith, because faith 
is the beginning and foundation of human salvation, and the 
root {radix) of all Justification ; but that if any say that the 
wicked are justified oy faith onlij, so that it be understood 
that nothing else is required which co-operates to obtain the 
grace of Justification, let him be anathema. By this two- 
fold Justification, it is claimed that Paul and James are rec- 
onciled, — Paul treating of the first, which is without works, 
and by faith only, and James of the second, which is by 
good works ; both the first and the second being necessary 
to and constituting the full or complete Justification of the 
Gospel. 

This view of the Romish doctrine of Justification, may be 
further unfolded and better understood by adverting to some of 
the leading topics of controversy between the Catholics and 
Protestants. The parties agreed in speaking of Justification as 
the act of God; but differed in this, — that the Catholics often 
confounded Justification with Renovation and Sanctification ; 
maintaining in some cases, that they are one and the same 
thing, the act of making subjectively righteous, and in other 
cases, implying and plainly affirming, that with this act of God 
is included another — that of the remission of sins and receiving 
to favor. Protestants on the contrary maintained a broad dis- 
tinction between them, insisting that Justification is a forensic 
term, denoting the act of God as Judge, remitting sin and re- 
ceiving the guilty to favor and reward, and that Renovation 
and Sanctification denote the act of God in making man in an 
imperfect degree subjectively holy, or holy in heart. Differ- 



ROMISH AND PROTESTANT DOCTRINE. '321 « 

ing thus as to the nature of Justification, both admitted that it 
is by faith, but still differed widely also as to the nature of this 
faith ; the Catholic maintaining that it is merely a sj^eculative 
or historical assent or faith, which exists as the antecedent and 
condition of God's act of producing the principle of holiness or 
grace in the heart, and that this compound state of faith and 
principle of grace, as it expels sin, and is connected with re- 
pentance and love, renders us so far acceptable, though not 
fully accepted, of God. This is the first Justification, but not 
complete Justification. The second is the consequence of the 
first, the proper formal cause of which is good works proceed- 
ing from the principle of grace and love. Thus the good works 
and the principle from which they proceed, are the righteous- . 
ness wherewith believers are righteous before God, and deserve, 
by the merit of condignity, eternal life. This is complete 
Justification, or the Justification by works which they under- 
stand the apostle James to teach. They imagine that Paul, in 
denying Justification by deeds or works of law, denies only 
that it is by works done without the grace of the Holy Spirit. 
(Yide Council of Trent, Sess. 6. chap. 10 ; and Davenant, p. 348.) 
Protestants, on the other hand, maintained that we are in a 
seme justified by a merely speculative faith, but by that faith 
which they characterize as uniting us to Christ, as receiving, 
or relying on and embracing his righteousness — a faith which 
makes us one with Christ hy a mystical union, and by which 
the righteousness of Christ (of God) becomes ours by Imputa- 
tion. They maintain that this faith is believing with the heart, 
that it implies the Renovation or Regeneration, repentance, 
personal holiness, though in an imperfect degree ; and by this 
faith only — per fidem solam, sednon per ficlem solitariam — we 
are justified; — that no other grace, duty, or work can be asso- 
ciated with it, or be of any consideration in justifying us; that 
faith does not derive its power to justify, or its connection with 
our Justification, as being itself a good work, or by the love 
associated with it ; that it is not the formal but merely the 
instrumental cause of our Justification, and that the righteous- 
ness of Christ, made ours by Imputation when we believe, is 
the formal cause-* and that there is no proper sense of the 



s I doubt -whether either Catholics or Protestants always use the phrase formal 
zausein one precise meaning. Sometimes, the Catholics seem to mean hy it, the 
21 14* 




JUSTIFICATION. 

language in which it can be said, that a man is justified by 
works, or by good works. Thus they maintain, that a man is 
justified before God — to the exclusion of all works of law, and 
all good works — by faith only as the instrumental cause ; and 
by the righteousness of Christ, as \h& formal cause. Both par- 
ties, with the modern exception of some of our ISTew England 
theologians, seem to proceed on the assumption that there is 
and must be a perfect righteousness sustaining all the relations 
to our Justification under grace, which our own perfect right- 
eousness under mere law, would sustain. That Protestants with 
the exception just referred to, have maintained this view of 
what they call the righteousness of Christ, more properly, if we 
follow the apostle, called " the righteousness of God" I need 
not attempt to show. The Catholics teach, that the formal 
cause of our Justification is our own inherent righteousness ; 
that this infused habit or quality of righteousness and sanctity, 
by its own nature, renders us immaculate, innocent, accepted 
of God, and worthy (clignos) of eternal life ; that this inherent 
righteousness is that which is permanent, produced and im- 
pressed by the Holy Spirit in the justified, and is presumed to 
be in those who cannot work, or furnish an actual righteous- 
ness, equally in infants and those who are asleep, as in adults 
who are awake. According to Bellarmine, this habit of grace 
is maintained by the Triclentine Fathers, under an anathema, 
to be the formal cause of Justification. He maintains, that it 
is so perfect, that by it we are absolutely righteous (justi) and 
are so called, and though it is imperfect by some venial admix- 
ture, and needs daily remission, yet it does not cease to be true 
righteousness, and in a certain sense perfect. It is true that 
Vasquez, another Romish authority, tells us that the doctors 
{pontificios) are not agreed whether Justification in adults is by 
act or by habit as to form.* Thus though nothing seems to be 
settled in the Romish Church in respect to the formal cause of 
Justification as consisting in actu or habitu, yet it is clearly 
maintained, that the formal cause is one or both, and sustains 
the same relation to Justification, as would sinless obedience 
under a system of mere law. Yet they obtrude upon Protestants 

constituti?ig cause of Justification ; at other times both evidently mean the same 
determining or procuring cause which sinless obedience on our part would be un- 
der a merely legal system, which is impossible. 
" Vide Davenant on Justification, p. 346, sqq. 



THE ASSUMPTIONS ABSURD. 323 

this formal cause of Justification, which thej themselves ad- 
mit to be undecided as a matter of divine faith.* 

Here I might show in detail, how entirely gratuitous and 
absurd it is, in its seveial parts, and how impossible therefore 
that it should be true, — I might show, as I have clone, that 
there is no such thing as original sin in the sense intended ; 
that is, that there is no such thing in man as a created or prop- 
agated property of the mind, which is sin ; nor any original sin 
by the Imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity ; nor any 
other original sin, or any thing which can be called such, ex- 
cept " the transgression of the law " by him whose sin it is, as 
his own act, done in his own person. Of course there is no 
such thing, in the sense intended, as original sin which is ex- 
tinguished by a principle of grace and charity. Nor can any 
sin in the mind or heart of man, in the nature of things, be 
extinguished by a principle of grace and charity ; for the sin 
in the mind must cease, before the principle of grace and 
charity can exist, and therefore the latter, though it may fol- 
low and thus exclude, can never destroy or extinguish, the 
former. Nor can any principle of grace and charity (i. e., of 
holy love) be infused into the mind prior to or distinct from 
the love itself ; for this, though the effect of divine grace, is the 
only holy or morally right principle. Nor can the supposed 
principle of grace and love, nor the extinction of original sin, 
being in the nature of things incapable of existence, be caused 
or produced ly faith ; and of course, there can be no Justifica- 
tion, as an act of God producing things which are not, and 
which cannot be. Nor can things which are not and cannot 
be, constitute a subjective state of Justification, of which the 
obedience of Christ is the meritorious cause. Nor can things 
which are not and cannot be, result in a preparation of mind 
for receiving a habit of grace ; nor can any habit of grace re- 
sult from them, rendering us acceptable to God ; for, how can 
nothing produce something? Or if it be said, that the so-called 
principle of grace and charity is itself holy love, how can it 
be by faith, when it is also alleged that this faith is attended 
with contrition, repentance, and love ? How can an antecedent 

° For the foregoing view of the Eoniish doctrine of Justification, I refer to the 
Decrees of the Council of Trent ; to Hagenbach's Hist, of Doctrine, vol. ii. pp. 39, 
59. 63, 189. 191, 267, 268 ; to Bishop Davenant on Justification, and to Owen on 
Justification, &c. 



324: JUSTIFICATION. 

cause or condition be truly said to be attended with its conse- 
quent or effect, especially when the two are things so distinct 
that they do not constitute one thing ? If they actually co- 
exist, as alleged in the present case, then why is not the love 
the cause or condition of the faith, as well as the faith tKe 
cause or condition of the love? Besides, as we shall pres- 
ently see, the faith described often exists without love, and 
therefore does not imply or involve its existence. And further : 
what are these two Justifications ? The first is the act or oper- 
ation of God, producing in man the specified effect of personal 
holiness, — and in this sense justifying or making just, — and 
thus rendering it consistent with the wisdom and goodness of 
God to justify the believer. Here then are already two Just- 
ifications spoken of, one which is Sanctification, conditioned 
on faith, and another on this personal holiness, or Sanctifica- 
tion ; — a first Justification, which is Sanctification, or the act 
of making the subject personally holy ; and a second, which 
being by the first and its effect, is rendered congruous with the 
wisdom and goodness of God ! And now what is this second 
Justification, if not an act of God making the subject to stand 
right in relation to the sanctions of law, or acquitting the sub- 
ject of sin and accepting him as righteous? What else can it 
be imagined to be ? And if it is this, and simply this authori- 
tative act of God — the act of accepting the subject — then how 
can this act of accepting be the same as that which by its effect 
only makes him acceptable? But then again: besides these 
two acts of Justification, which are so palpably different, we 
have another second act of Justification, of which meritorious 
good works, consequent on all that has preceded, are the formal 
ground and procuring cause. These two Justifications, or 
rather these three, to say nothing of any more, constitute com- 
]}lete Justification. What is this? Not the act of God making 
the subject personally and subjectively holy or righteous or 
just; for this act with its effect has already taken place, and 
constitutes the first Justification — which is not a complete Just- 
ification — a thing which it is not. And yet this Justification 
which is not a Justification, is part and parcel of another. But 
what is complete Justification ? Not good works, nor yet the 
act of God securing good works ; but an act of God consequent 
on all these antecedents, and which therefore is not and cannot 
be any of them nor all of them together. What then is it but 



ESSENTIALS OF THE ROMISH DOCTRINE. 325 

a fourth Justification? — and what is this, but an act of God 
acquitting the subject of the penalty of sin, and accepting him 
as righteous ? What else can it be ? "What else can it be con- 
ceived to be? And what is all this but denying, and then con- 
ceding and maintaining, that Justification is an act of God 
placing the subject right in relation to the sanctions of his law ? 
I ask, whether saying that Justification is one thing and not an- 
other, and then asserting it to be the latter, — whether confound- 
ing things that differ, causes with effects, antecedents with con- 
sequents, in a medley of contradictions and absurdities, is the 
scriptural doctrine of Justification ? 

Without however dwelling longer on these and other absur- 
dities so plainly involved in the Romish doctrine of Justifica- 
tion, there are some things so prominent and so much insisted 
on in the authorized statements of it, that they must be regard- 
ed as its grand and peculiar elements. Among these the fol- 
lowing at least must be included : — 1. That a merely specula- 
tive assent or historical belief in Christianity is a meritorious 
condition of Justification. 2. That Justification essentially 
consists of or includes jSanctification, or the infusion of a prin- 
ciple of holiness or habit of grace y and, 3. That works done 
from this principle are meritorious, and necessary to a complete 
Justification. 

This last proposition respects the ground or condition of Just- 
ification rather than its nature, and will therefore be examined 
in another connection hereafter. I say it respects the ground 
or condition of Justification, for this second part of Justifica- 
tion presupposes the first — the infusion of a principle of holiness 
and the performance of good works as antecedent and neces- 
sary to it. The word Justification in this connection must be 
used as we have intimated above, if used in the Protestant 
meaning ; i. e., to denote an authoritative act of God determin- 
ing the subject of his law to stand right in relation to its sanc- 
tions. Whether good works, or works done from morally right 
principle, are a meritorious condition or ground of Justification 
in this sense of it, will therefore be more properly considered 
when we come to inquire what the scriptural ground or condi- 
tion of Justification is. 

Without proposing fully to examine these propositions, I 
shall as briefly as may be, attempt to show how entirely un 
scriptural they are. I remark then — 



326 JUSTIFICATION. 

(1.) That a merely speculative or historical faith is not the 
condition of Justification. That the Scriptures strongly dis- 
tinguish a merely intellectual a'ssent or historical belief in the 
Gospel from believing with the heart, is plainly conceded in the 
very statement of the doctrine now opposed ; for it exhibits 
faith as the condition, and of course as the antecedent of the 
principle of grace infused. It is therefore a kind of faith 
which is prior to a right act or state of the heart. But how 
plainly and abundantly do the Scriptures teach that man is 
not justified by such a faith ! Thus John tells us, that " among 
the chief rulers many Relieved on him, but because of the 
Pharisees they did not confess him, lest they should be put 
out of the synagogue." (John xii. 42 ; and compare Mark viii. 
38. Yide John ii. 23; Lnke xviii. 13; Acts viii. 13.) Were 
these more justified? Or were they of those who deny Christ, 
and whom Christ will deny ? " With the heart," says Paul, 
" man believeth unto righteousness" (Romans x. 10). And 
again : " For in Christ Jesus, neither circumcision availeth 
any thing nor un circumcision, but faith which worketh by 
love" (Gal. v. 6.) Jucle calls it "your most holy faith" (Jude, 
verse 20). How explicit is the apostle James in showing 
that there is a faith which is to no profit ; a faith only, which 
has no heart, no love, no principle, or spirit of obedience 
in it. He denounces it as a dead faith, Kad'eavrrfv^ according 
to itself, its very nature. He compares it, the faith itself, 
to the body without the spirit. He ascribes it to infernal spir- 
its. "The devils also believed and trembled." Surely such a 
faith, — a faith which they who refuse to confess, and who there- 
fore deny Christ before men, may possess ; a faith which neces- 
sarily implies an unholy heart ; a heart without love ; a faith 
which devils possess, — instead of being the means or condition 
of Justification in any sense, must leave the sinner still under 
the power and condemnation of sin. I admit that an intel- 
lectual belief is necessary, as is also the truth to be believed, 
or a mind to believe, to a change of heart or to a principle 
of holiness in man through grace. But the question now is, 
whether such a faith is certainly connected with this moral 
change in all cases ; or has by promise connected with it the 
infusion of a principle of grace or holy love ? This, we have 
seen, the Scriptures plainly deny. Nor is this all. John ex- 
pressly asserts that true or saving faith, instead of an antece- 



IMPORT OF FAITH. 327 

dent is a consequent of Regeneration, or of what the Roman- 
ist calls a principle of grace. "Whosoever believeth that 
Jesus is the Christ (yeyevvrjrat etc rov Oeov), is born of God." 
(1 John v. 1. Compare Acts viii. 37, and Rom. x. 10.) I am 
aware that it is maintained, " that the faith by which a man is 
justified is attended with contrition, and repentance, and love." 
But is this true of all that can be properly called faith f How 
can that faith which is the antecedent condition of personal 
holiness, i. e., of contrition, repentance, and love — a principle 
of grace be attended with its consequent, except indeed as a 
cause in loose language may be said to be attended, i. e., fol- 
lowed, with its effect, and is distinct from it, as every cause is 
from its effect ? How can this be said in all cases of what is 
properly called faith ? Was the faith of some of the Jewish 
rulers, who believed and refused to confess Christ, attended 
with these Christian graces ? Is it true of the dead faith which 
James describes, or of the faith of devils, that it is attended 
with, contrition, repentance, and love? Can there be repent- 
ance, or contrition, or love, without Regeneration, or a change 
of heart ? As to repentance or contrition, it is itself a change 
of heart, a principle of holiness or grace. As to love, the apos- 
tle says, " Love is of Gocl, and every one that loveth (his 
brother) is born of Gocl" (1 John iv. 7). How could the Ro- 
mish doctrine of Justification, in one essential element, be 
more plainly contradicted by Divine authority than it is? 
And yet this error in some form, — the error of making some- 
thing on the part of sinful man the sure means or condition 
of Regeneration, or of that moral change for which man is 
dependent on the Spirit of God, — the error of making some- 
thing prior to personal holiness, the condition of personal holi- 
ness — something which will secure converting grace, some- 
thing done without grace, the sure antecedent and condition of 
Regeneration, Sanctification, Justification, and thus of final 
salvation, — has, in my view, been one of the most common and 
worst errors of the Church of Gocl. It has marred and cor- 
rupted, if not Protestant creeds, much Protestant theology — 
not to say nearly all Protestant preaching ; while it may be re- 
garded in its various forms of exhibition, as the grand compre- 
hensive error of the Roman Catholic Church. The specific 
form of this error, which connects with a mere speculative 
f\iith on the part of man what the Scriptures call Justification, 



328 JUSTIFICATION. 

or, as its advocates explain it, a principle of grace and holiness, 
is plainly nothing less than changing and thus falsifying the 
very terms of salvation which God has revealed and fixed be- 
yond all change. I remark — 

(2.) That scriptural Justification does not consist of, nor in- 
clude, the infusion of a principle of holiness or habit of grace. 
That scriptural Justification does not consist of the infusion 
of personal holiness, though the contrary is often asserted by 
some prominent Papists, has been conceded by others. Thus 
Eaclantus says, " that to some, there appears to be an inconsist- 
ency between the theological teachers and the sacred Scrip- 
tures, inasmuch as the former maintain that to justify is to make 
(subjectively) righteous, and the latter, that it is to pronounce 
righteous." He adds that this is not so, and confesses that 
" the forensic signification of the word is more familiar and 
more obvious in the Scriptures than the other ;" although he 
still maintains, " that the faithful are not only pronounced, but 
constituted righteous before God." ]STow what is this but a 
full concession, that the act of God in justifying men, as more 
familiarly and obviously exhibited in the Scriptures, is a foren- 
sic act ? What if it be also true, that believers are sanctified 
by another act of God, or constituted righteous by Imputation, 
or in any mode, as the ground of the forensic act, or as in some 
way connected with the forensic act, neither of these acts is the 
forensic act itself ; nor does the forensic meaning of justify 
cease to be obvious in the Scriptures. And what is more, 
nothing appears to show that the forensic meaning so familiar 
and obvious, is not the only scriptural meaning of the word. 
What is this view of the subject, but plainly mistaking the 
ground of Justification for the act itself? 

Again : it is maintained by Papistical writers, that their 
view of Justification as including a principle of holiness, de- 
rives decisive confirmation from the two words of which the 
Latin word is compounded— -justum facer e ; as if these words 
could have no other sense than to make subjectively righteous, 
or to make one the subject of personcd holiness. It happens 
however, that the Latin words justifico and justificatio are not 
to be found in any classic writer, and probably have no higher 
authority than Tertullian or some, other Latin Father, who 
coined the Latin word to express a scriptural idea which was 
wholly unknown in heathen use, — that of justifying in any 



PRIMARY SIGNIFICATION OF JUSTIFY. 329 

sense a disobedient subject of law. But especially, the idea 
of infusing a principle of grace or holiness into the mind of 
man, and thus changing his moral character, is unknown in 
any language, except so far as the idea has" been derived from 
revelation. From the very nature of the case therefore, this 
idea or meaning of facere justum were impossible in classic 
Latin, and the word justifico or justificatio could not be used 
by any good author in the supposed meaning. The idea de- 
noted by this modern Latin word, would be expressed in classic 
Latin, by aliqiiem a culpa liberare, or innocentem jpronuntia/re, 
an idea or a conception of an act which one man in the capac- 
ity of a judge can perform in respect to another, and whose 
effect in respect to the latter is such as can in the nature of 
things be thus produced. But the effect of such an act can- 
not be conceived to be either in the nature or the moral char- 
acter of the subject. How is it possible to suppose that this 
as a mere word, which, de usu, is applicable alike to an act 
of man as well as to an act of Gocl, can denote the making 
one subjectively holy? Can man, as well as God, renew and 
sanctify the heart of his fellow-man ? What then can it be, 
except an act of jurisdiction, prerogative, or authority, mak- 
ing, determining, or causing some effect, which in the nature of 
things depends on such an act ? To explain somewhat further : 
There is an obvious difference in many cases between the ab- 
solute existence of a fact and its relative existence, or its exist- 
ence in relation to those who are to regard it, and act upon it, 
as a fact. Thus to verify a fact by testimony, does not give 
absolute but relative existence to the fact, — makes or deter- 
mines it to be a fact in relation to those who are to act upon 
it as a fact. Thus property, the ownership of which is liti- 
gated in court, may or may not in truth or in fact belong to 
him who has it not in possession ; and yet the authoritative 
decision of the judge makes it Ms in an important sense in 
which it was not before, that is, relatively to the possession 
and use of it. So, -justum facere, to justify, under a system 
of law does not give absolute but relative existence to the 
righteousness of one justified — an existence to be regarded 
and acted upon as real ; — decides that he is to be treated as 
righteous. 

"Without here more particularly unfolding the nature of 
the act of Justification and its effect, what I have now said 



330 



JUSTIFICATION 



is sufficient to show in one respect what the act is not, and 
what its effect is not, — in other words, to show, so far as the 
etymology of the word is concerned, that the act of Justifica- 
tion is not that of- making another subjectively righteous, or 
personally holy in moral character. Indeed, the act, as de- 
scribed by the Latin words of which the word justify is com- 
pounded, is from the very nature of the case, one in which the 
subjective character of the object of the act is, and must be 
presupposed, ascertained, and proceeded upon, as the basis 
and warrant of the act. 'Nov is this all. The advocates of 
the doctrine now opposed, have in their very statement of 
it, distinctly and expressly maintained all that I now assert. 
Thus, they tell us, that by faith, a principle or habit of grace 
and love is infused into the mind of the believer, and that this 
faith, attended with contrition and love, renders him acceptable 
to God, or renders it congruous with the wisdom and goodness 
of God to justify the believer ! Now in all this, the act of 
God and its effect on the subject in personal holiness is de- 
scribed, but still it is not the act of Justification ; for it is an 
act of God, which by its effects in personal character, only 
renders the subject acceptable to God, and prepares the way 
for the act of accepting him as righteous, i. e., for the act of 
Justification. So we are told that good works proceeding from 
the principle of grace and love, are the formal ground and pro- 
curing cause of the second Justification, — are the righteousness 
with which the believer secures complete Justification before 
God. TThat then, according to this scheme, is Justification • 
what, viewed either as a first or a second, or a complete Justi- 
fication ; what but an act of God, consequent on the personal 
holiness or character of the object of the act? Surely, the act 
of God by which, or by the effects of which, he merely pre- 
pctres the believer to he justified, or for the act of Justification, 
is not the act of Justification itself. 

Further : neither the Hebrew nor Greek word properly ren- 
dered by the word justify in our English version, ever denotes 
or includes the act or operation of God by his Holy Spirit pro- 
ducing in man subjective holiness. That the Scriptures teach 
this doctrine of Sanctification, as described in these general 
terms, I have already attempted to prove. This is also abun- 
dantly admitted and maintained by both Papists and Protest- 
ants. If the views which I have given of this work of the 



CONCEPTION UNKNOWN TO THE ANCIENTS. 331 

Holy Spirit, and of the nature of the change in man produced 
by it, be scriptural, then it is not too much to say, that the 
views of this act or work of God, and of its effect in man, 
maintained and inculcated by both Papists and Protestants, 
at least with exceptions which need not be noticed, are 
neither scriptural nor true. According to both, it consists in 
producing some change, even some so-called moral change, 
diverse from the use of his moral powers in right moral 
action ; some moral change anterior to, and distinct from, the 
act or exercise of supreme love to Gocl, or of an elective pref- 
erence of God. But if the view which both Papists and Prot- 
estants maintain is unscriptural and false, then it is not incul- 
cated in the use of any scriptural term or language, either 
Hebrew or Greek. And further still, the scriptural idea or 
conception of the work of God in producing holiness in the 
human heart — in other words, what is commonly called the 
doctrine of Regeneration or Sanctification — was certainly un- 
known to the heathen nations, and of course cannot be found in 
their languages, — a fact which shows how vain must be every 
attempt to find a word either in classic Greek or Latin which 
shall express the Romish doctrine of Justification. Nor is 
this all. It can scarcely be pretended that the idea or concep- 
tion of the work of God in Renovation or Sanctification, was 
imparted to men in the Hebrew language until the time of 
David and the later prophets. Prior to this however, the 
Hebrew word rendered by the Greek word difcacoG) in the Sep- 
tuagint, and by the English word justify in our version, is 
obviously a familiar term with a definite and fixed meaning, 
which excludes that given it by the Romanists. There is 
nothing therefore in God's revelation, throughout the patri- 
archal or Mosaic dispensations, which authorizes the doctrine 
or the idea of the work of God's Spirit in producing holiness 
in the human heart, as it is taught in the time of David and 
of the later prophets. Nor is it taught at this period in 
any such particular form as that in which it is revealed in 
the New Testament, especially by the apostles. That there are ! 
some passages in the Old Testament which ascribe the change 
in man's moral character from sin to holiness to the supernatu- 
ral interposition of God, is in my view undeniable. Still I find 
nothing in these passages which necessarily teaches any thing 
beyond that supernatural interposition and influence of God, 



332 JUSTIFICATION. 

which consists in the revelation of truth in a course of mirac- 
ulous manifestation and confirmation of its divine authority, 
and in this way, or by these means, becomes the author of 
this moral change in man ; nothing, which like some passages 
in the New Testament in the form of explicit and absolute nega- 
tion^ assert the vanity and inefficacy of even the fullest revela- 
tion and exhibition of truth in this moral change, without 
another and a further influence from God. So far from this, 
there is not the slightest evidence that the New Testament doc- 
trine of Renovation or Sanctification was, up to the time we 
have specified, ever revealed to the human mind, or ever 
thought of by man. At the same time, the proof is decisive, 
that the Hebrew word rendered dotaiou by the Seventy, and 
justify by our translators, had not such a meaning, since it was 
applied in a general and common meaning to the act of God 
and the act of man as a judge. It is therefore plainly impossi- 
ble that the Hebrew word should ever have been used to de- 
note or to include, i. e., to express the idea of the act of God 
in Renovation or Sanctification, as this act is unfolded in the 
New Testament, or as it is believed by either Papists and Prot- 
estants. How utterly incredible it is, that our English word 
jtcstify, applied as it is to denote the act of a civil tribunal or 
judge in relation to a subject of law, should ever be used to 
denote some act or influence of a judge in producing the 
repentance or renovation of a culprit, when such an act was 
unknown and unthought of, or if thought of, utterly disbe- 
lieved ! For the same reason, such a meaning of the Hebrew 
p*i%, and the Greek dtnaioG), applied to an act of God, must 
from the time of man's apostasy to the time of the apos- 
tles, or at least to the time of David, be regarded as wholly 
impossible and incredible. How the Hebrew or Greek word 
ever acquired such a meaning, or that it ever did or ever 
could, has not been shown, nor could it be ; for the fact is one 
which, in the circumstances of the case, could not exist, and 
therefore cannot be proved. 

Again: no passage of Scripture is or can be adduced, for 
which such a meaning as that now opposed, can be claimed 
with the slightest plausibility. To be satisfied of this, we need 
only refer to some in which the word occurs. Luke x. 29 : 
" He willing to justify himself." Does this mean willing to 
sanctify himself? Luke xvi. 15: "Ye are they which jus- 



NOT ATTTHOKIZED BY THE SCKIPTTJRES. 333 

tify yourselves." Does this mean ye are they which sanctify 
yourselves? Matt. xii. 37: "For by thy words thou shalt 
he justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned." If 
justified here means sanctified or made subjectively holy, then 
condemned, its opposite, means made subjectively wicked. Are 
such to be the results of words on the judgment-clay? Prov. 
xvii. 15: "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that con- 
demneth the righteous, even they both are an abomination 
to the Lord." Shall we then suppose that one who should 
make the wicked inherently righteous, would be an abomina- 
tion to the Lord ? Rom. ii. 13 : " The doers of the law shall 
be justified" One would suppose such to be subjectively 
holy or righteous already without Justification. Rom. iii. 20 : 
"Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be 
justified in his sight." Does this mean that by perfect sin- 
less obedience to the law ; or, according to Catholic interpre- 
tation, that by mere external conformity to the law, none 
shall be made subjectively holy by the Holy Spirit? Rom. 
iv. 2: "If Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof 
to glory." Does this mean, that if he were made subjectively 
holy by the grace of the Divine Spirit, or as Catholics must 
interpret, sanctified by merely external works, he hath whereof 
to glory ? Here I might refer to numerous other passages to 
show how groundless is the supposition, that to justify means 
to sanctify ; but a few will suffice. And first, to those in 
which Justification is said to be not by works of law, and is 
said to be by faith. In all these, one and the same thing is said 
not to be by works of law, which is said to be by faith. Unless 
then we understand the former to assert the inept and nonsen- 
sical proposition that none are sanctified by perfect obedience 
to law, we cannot understand the latter to teach that we are 
sanctified by faith, or that we are sanctified at all. 

In another class of passages, Justification is clearly shown to 
be the opposite of condemnation (Isa. i. 8, 9 ; Prov. xvii. 15 ; 
Rom. v. 18, and viii. 33, 34). If then Justification is or in- 
cludes Sanctification, or the infusion of inherent righteousness 
by the Holy Spirit, then its opposite, condemnation denotes the 
infusion of inherent wickedness by the Holy Spirit. If this, 
revolting and false as it is, be not the meaning of co?idemna- 
tion, then Justification cannot denote or imply Sanctification. 

In another class of texts, great prominence is given to the 



334 JUSTIFICATION. 

act of God called the forgiveness of sin. We are taught to pray 
that he would forgive our trespasses \a£ we forgive those who 
trespass against us. (Yide also Mark, iii. 29.) Does this act 
of God include the act of Sanctification ? 

The Scriptures very clearly and abundantly teach, that a per- 
fectly obedient subject of law, were there any such, should be 
justified. But how can such a subject of law either be sancti- 
fied or need to be sanctified by the Holy Spirit ? 

In other instances, the same thing is described by other lan- 
guage ; as imputing righteousness without works of law, as 
" covering sins," as " not remembering sins," as " the remis- 
sion of sins which are past," or the passing over of sins before 
committed, as " saving and delivering from wrath," " redemp- 
tion from the curse of the law," by Christ's " being made a 
curse for us," &c, &c. Now I ask, does this language denote 
for imply Sanctification ? The question is not, whether accord- 
ing to other Scriptures those who are justified are also sancti- 
fied, but whether the Scriptures do not exhibit Justification 
and Sanctification as distinct acts of God; and particularly 
whether in the passages now cited, the language conveys or 
expresses in the remotest manner the idea of Sanctification. 
Whether the work of Renovation or Sanctification by the Spirit 
of God, by any just interpretation of the numerous passages 
referred to, could be derived or even conjectured. 

Again : I might add, that the formal, essential, or real act of 
Justification takes place on the judgment-day and not till then. 
I am aware that the question, when is the believer justified, has 
often been discussed by theologians. One thing however, is 
undeniable, — that the Scriptures unequivocally teach an act 
of Justification on the part of God which takes place on the 
last great clay of account, when all nations shall be assembled 
before him. Here then at least is one act of Justification on 
the part of God, which is not, and does not include the act of 
Sanctification, unless indeed we suppose it deferred till after 
the resurrection of believers from the dead. I am aware 
that the Scriptures often speak of believers as justified in the 
present tense, or in the present life, or when they believe. 
This however, is necessarily to be understood as nothing more 
than the language of anticipation, — a common and natural 
mode of speaking in analogous cases. Were I to propose to 
you to obtain from the governor of the State the pardon of an- 



WHAT THE SCKIPTUEES TEACH. 335 

other, our mutual acquaintance, and were you by making the 
supposed application, to obtain his assurance that he should 
be pardoned on some future day appointed for a public formal 
doing of all such acts, in announcing the fact to me or others, 
what more natural than for me to say, in the present time, 
" he is pardoned." Indeed, if this is not the usage of the 
Scriptures on this subject, how is it that the future tense is so 
often used to describe the time of the act, as, " hath everlast- 
ing life and shall not come into condemnation ?" (John v. 24.) 
Other familiar examples need not be given. Be this as it may, 
there is one act of God entirely distinct from Sanctification, 
called Justification, to take place on the great clay of the reve- 
lation of the righteous judgment of God. 

I would here remark, that I know of no attempt on the part 
of any Catholic author to prove that the word justify, denotes 
or includes Sanctification, except from an assumed etymological 
meaning of the word — which, as I claim to have shown, neither 
the Latin justifico, nor the Greek ducacdo), nor the Hebrew pl^, 
can in any case possibly bear. With what reason, or rather, 
with what decisive proof to the contrary, is it pretended that 
Justification in the Scriptures is, or includes Sanctification ? 

Here however, it ought to be stated, that a Protestant writer, 
Ludovicus De Blanc, in an attempt to reconcile the opinions of 
Catholics and Protestants on this important subject, concedes 
to the former, that the word ducaioa), in several instances in the 
New Testament denotes the act of Sanctif cation. A bare in- 
spection of these passages would, in my view, be quite suffi- 
cient to show this construction of the passages referred to, to be 
entirely groundless, and even to prove the contrary. And 
with this remark, I should be satisfied to leave them without 
examination, had not Beza, Osiander, and some other Protest- 
ant theologians of distinction maintained, and were there not 
some even among us, who hold the same opinion. 

There are two assumptions on this subject, which demand 
a more thorough examination than, so far as I know, they 
have received. One respects the scriptural use of the word 
dyidfa (to sanctify) ; the other the words dyvlfa and Kadapifa. 
It is often assumed by both Protestants and Catholics, that 
these denote in certain connections, the work of God in pro- 
ducing holiness of heart either in its beginning or in its pro- 
gress, or in both. If this be conceded in some sense of the 



336 JUSTIFICATION. 

language, I have already said enough to show, that the sub- 
jective change in the mind is not what Protestants and Cath- 
olics most commonly maintain, viz., some change other than 
that which consists essentially in the morally right exercise of 
the heart or affections. And further : I cannot but think that 
what may be called the Augustinian, as distinguished from 
the Pelagian view of the JSTew Testament use of the word 
&yid£(*>, deserves a more thorough investigation than it has 
had from modern critics and theologians. I will only say on 
this topic, that the generic meaning of the word is evidently, to 
consecrate, and that to obtain from the mere word itself, or 
even from its connection, the meaning of an act of God pro- 
ducing personal holiness, is more difficult than is commonly 
supposed. The other assumption to which I refer is, that 
redemption or deliverance from sin (p&fav dnb rtiv dfiapntiv, 
Matt. i. 21 ; icadapl&iv d~b rrdong djiaprlag, 1 John, i. 7, 9 ; com- 
pare Titus ii. 14; 1 Pet. i. 18, and others) by the blood of 
Christ, is, as Socinians maintain, or at least, includes, the act of 
God in delivering from the power of sin. While I admit that 
the work of the Holy Spirit in delivering us from the dominion 
of sin is through Christ, I do not understand, as many do, those 
passages which ascribe cleansing from sin, redeeming from 
iniquity, to the blood of Christ, as including this work of the 
Holy Spirit. To take away sin, was with the Hebrews one 
and the same thing as to take away punishment (vide Isa. 
liii.) ; the idea of delivering from sin, taking it away, &c, 
being uniformly assumed on the ground of repentance and ref- 
ormation ; that is, on the antecedent condition of personal 
holiness. But I cannot here dwell on this part of the subject, 
and proceed to consider some of the principal texts which are 
relied on to show that Justification is the same thing as Sane- 
tification. These I shall examine as briefly as may be. 

Rom. viii. 30 : " Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them 
he also called, and whom he called, them he also justified, and 
whom he justified, them he also glorified." It is claimed to be 
incredible, that the apostle in this enumeration of blessings, 
should omit that of personal holiness ; and that he has done so, 
unless he used the word justified, to denote it. I answer first, 
that no one is competent to decide what the apostle would or 
would not omit in such an enumeration ; and secondly, that he 
has not omitted, but fully expressed the blessing of personal 



PARTICULAR TEXTS EXAMINED. 337 

holiness, in the phrase, " them he called." This calling is evi- 
dently what divines have termed effectual calling. (Tide Rom. 
i. 7 ; and compare 1 Cor. i. 2 ; Rom. viii. 28 ; Eph. iv. 1, 
4, &e.) 

1 Cor. vi. 11: "And such were some of yon; but ye are 
washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified, in the name of 
the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God." If being washed, 
sanctified, justified, are not here distinguished as different 
things by the form of expression, especially by the repetition 
of aXXa (but ye are, &c), it would be difficult to say how they 
could be at all. But it is said that Justification is here as- 
cribed to the Spirit of God, whose work it is to renew and 
sanctify ; and must therefore mean Sanctification. One would 
suppose that the washing and the sanctifying, including noth- 
ing less than moral Renovation or personal holiness by the 
Holy Spirit, and the known condition of Justification, and all 
being in the name of Christ, would be quite sufficient to author- 
ize the apostle's form of speaking ; since all the specified bless- 
ings come only in the name of Christ, and are directly or indi- 
rectly by the Holy Spirit. 

Tit. iii. 5, 6, 7: "Kot by works of righteousness which we 
have done, but according to his mercy he saved us by the 
washing of Regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost, 
which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our 
Saviour; that- being justified by his grace, we should be made 
heirs according to the hope of eternal life." It is said that ac- 
cording to this passage, our Justification includes our Sanctifi- 
cation. If by this be meant, that Justification by grace im- 
plies Renovation or Sanctification, this is admitted. But how 
does this prove that it is Sanctification ? How directly opposed 
this declaration of the apostle is to the Romanist view of Just- 
ification, is obvious from a very brief exposition of it. The 
apostle then expressly asserts that we are saved not by works 
(tojv ev dtttaioovvrj) which are in righteousness, i. e., constitute a 
righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy, 
by the moral purification and Renovation of the Holy Ghost ; 
that we, being justified by his grace, i. e., that being saved by 
the moral purification and Renovation of the Holy Spirit, 
should be made heirs, &c. Now, is being justified by his grace, 
the same thing as being morally purified and renovated by the 
Holy Ghost ? Such tautology is not after the manner of this 
22 15 



338 JUSTIFICATION. 

apostle; while the phrase "justified freely by his grace," in 
Rom. iii. 24, will admit of no such meaning, as some, and even 
Rosen muller, have given it in this passage in Titus. 

Rev. xxii. 11 : " And he that is righteous, let him be right- 
eous still ; and he that is holy, let him be holy still." In respect 
to the first clause in this passage, the readings are various ; and 
one which is preferred by many is, for dLKcuod/JTG) eti, to read 
duccuoovvrjv TTotrjadro) en — work righteousness still. Retaining 
the common reading the question is, what is the 6 dmalog ? I 
answer, he who on any ground stands right in relation to legal 
sanctions ; in other words, is accepted of God. Hence the dec- 
laration is, that he who is in this state of acceptance and favor 
with God shall continue in it. But whether we adopt this 
meaning or change the reading for another, one thing is clear, 
this clause does not respect subjective personal righteousness in 
the sense of personal holiness produced by Sanctification ; for 
how then could the apostle repeat the same thought in the next 
clause, " and he that is holy, let him be holy still?" To work 
righteousness is to do good works, with which Justification is 
connected. 

These are the only passages in the New Testament which are 
relied on for that view of the doctrine of Justification now op- 
posed, while the words ducaiou and ducaiooiiai are used it is said, 
thirty-six times. If we have rightly interpreted the four passa- 
ges, they not only will not bear the meaning opposed, but ex- 
clude it, and require another, as they plainly do in all other in- 
stances. 

Again : in proof that Justification is not and does not in- 
clude Sanctification, I appeal to the scriptural exhibition of the 
Moral Government of God. If Moral Government is any 
thing, it implies a Moral Governor, a law with its requisite 
sanctions, subjects, a holding and calling to account, a judg- 
ment and a retribution. And if in the Scriptures God has re- 
vealed himself to men in any relation, it is the prominent, 
grand, and most august ; that to which all things else are sub- 
servient — the relation of a Moral Ruler and Judge. "What else 
is presented to us but God in his administration of a system of 
law and grace ? Consider his works of creation, his ways of 
providence, his varied and wonderful dispensations ; man cre- 
ated in his image, his law given, and at first obeyed amid the 
beauties of paradise, and with the joys of communion with his 



SCRIPTURAL VIEW OF MORAL GOVERNMENT. 339 

Maker, and then disobeyed with the curse in exile, and in the 
sorrows and groans and death of a sinful world ; the promised 
redemption, with its superabounding grace to retain and bless ; 
the patriarchal altars with their victims, and their holocaust 
fires kindled from heaven; the calling of Abraham and its cov- 
enant of grace and life anew, and more fully unfolded in the 
seed promised to bless all nations ; Egyptian bondage, with its 
task-masters and years of oppression and cruelty ; and then its 
deliverance by the outstretched arm of Omnipotence ; sojourn- 
ers in a strange land ; heaven and earth shaken to reclaim them 
from idolatry to the service of the only living and true God ; 
the desert, with its cloud by day and pillar of fire by night, its 
famine of food and drink, its smitten rock and gushing waters ; 
Sinai with its terrors ; Israel in the promised land flowing with 
milk and honey ; God, their national king and tutelary Deity ; 
their captivities and redemptions ; the fullness of time, the har- 
binger to prepare the way of the Lord calling to repentance ; 
the Messiah, God manifest in the flesh ; the Gospel, its teach- 
ings, its glad tidings of great joy to all people; its Atonement, 
its miracles, its mission of the Holy Ghost in the Renovation 
and Sanctificatiou of men, its resurrection of the dead, its im- 
mortality brought to light ; its progress, its actual and predict- 
ed triumphs, its millennium of holiness and happiness in a new 
heavens and new earth, its final judgment announced with the 
archangel's voice and the trump of God, the melting elements 
and a burning world, the great white throne, the Son of man 
thereon, the dead, small and great, standing before him, the 
deeds of all laid open, every heart searched, every secret thing 
revealed ; and now the final resistless decree, the authoritative 
act of the Judge, placing those already sanctified by grace, the 
righteous, on his right hand, and the wicked on his left. And 
has the former of these, the final act of God, that by which he 
consummates all his other acts, and accomplishes his highest 
and greatest design toward the children of men, no name ? 
While the Scriptures call his authoritative act in respect to the 
wicked, condemnation, do they make so little account of his 
authoritative act toward the righteous as not to name it ? 

I only add, that the Romanists, in holding that inherent right- 
eousness, Sanctification, and good works are the formal cause, 
the meritorious ground of Justification, fully concede in respect 
to the nature of Justification, all that Protestants maintain. 



340 JUSTIFICATION. 

The Romanist fully admits the act of the remission of sin on 
the part of God. But no mind which can thus distinguish the 
act of Renovation or Sanctification from that of remission, can 
at the same time not regard them as distinct ; nor can it con- 
ceive of the remission of sins as an act of God, except in the 
capacity of lawgiver and judge, nor without connecting with 
it the act of placing the subject right in relation to sanctions 
of law, or in a state of acceptance with the offended lawgiver 



JUSTIFICATION. 

II.— CLASSICAL AND SCRIPTUEAL MEANING OF THE VERB AIKAlOil. 
JUSTIFICATION AS AN ACT OF GOD TO MAN DEFINED. 

I. General classical meaning of lucaiow. — Justice as conceived by tbe ancients. — Definition of the 
verb in question. — Authority of Lexicographers. — The derivation of the word. — The conception 
of the production of holiness unknown to the ancients. — 2. Its forensic meaning in classical use. 
— Absolute and relative condition of a subject of law.— Classical forensic use not synonymous 
with English use of justify. 

Scriptural sense. — 1. The most general meaning. — 2. Its forensic meaning in the Scriptures. — 
Adapted to a peculiar system of things. — Man cannot be justified under mere law. — Actual 
usage of the term in the Scriptures. — Justification not synonymous with pardon. — Man prone to 
regard Justification as meritorious.— Influence of sacrifices. — Mistake of the Komish Church. — 
Criteria for deciding what is the scriptural meaning. — Conclusion. 

Havixg shown that Justification as an act of God in respect 
to men, is not nor does include that of Sanctification, or of mak- 
ing the heart morally right, I have set aside the view of the 
nature of Justification which has been most directly and chiefly 
opposed to what I deem the scriptural one. The question in 
its positive form still remains to be answered, viz., What is the 
Scriptural view of the nature of this act of God? The an- 
swer to this question will not only reveal more fully the error 
which I have already attempted to expose in respect to the 
nature, but will serve to correct others in regard to the condi- 
tion and the ground of the act. I proceed then to say, that 

Justification as an act of God in the relation of Lawgiver 
and Judge of men is authoritative — making, or causing, or de- 
termining a disobedient subject of his law to stand relatively 
right in respect to its sanctions / not according to the principles 
of distributive justice, hut according to the principles of general 
justice and of general benevolence. 

This view of the nature of this act of God I propose to illus- 
trate and confirm by examining the various uses and applica- 
tions of the word Justification or Justify, with the equivalent 
word in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, as applied in the different 
circumstances of men by different nations, and also by them in 
different connections. I propose to consider — 

I. The use and meaning of the word dcKacoG), as a classic word 
employed in a heathen sense ; and — 



342 JUSTIFICATION. 

II. As a scriptural word, employed in a biblical sense, or 
under a system of grace. 

I. The use and meaning of the word Sinatoo) as a classic word 
employed in a heathen sense. 

The reason for giving particular attention to this word, is its 
use both by the Seventy and by the New Testament writers as 
equivalent to the Hebrew word p'lS, both of which in Latin 
are rendered by juslifco, and in English by justify. The He- 
brew word being exclusively used under a system of facts and 
truths peculiar to a revelation from God, and the Greek word 
used in a classic heathen sense, could not otherwise be exact 
synonyms. The Hebrew word then must control, modify, and 
determine the meaning of the Greek word when used by the 
Seventy, and also by the New Testament writers ; so that the 
Greek word if correctly used, must in biblical usage (and the 
same must be true of the Latin) be employed in a meaning 
equivalent to that of the Hebrew. The Greek Sinaiou as a 
classic word, used in a heathen and forensic sense, was em- 
ployed in relation to a system of mere law ; whereas the He- 
brew word pi2, was used only in relation to a system of law 
and grace combined. The Greek word difcaioio when used by 
the Seventy, or by the New Testament writers, if properly em- 
ployed must be Hebraized, and mean the same as the Hebrew 
word p72 ; for neither can be used in the Scriptures to denote 
an act of God, except in a system of law and grace combined. 
This use of the Greek word by the New Testament writers is, 
as we may see hereafter, undeniable. Hence it becomes highly 
important to ascertain the meaning of dLfccuooy as a classic word 
used in a heathen, especially in a forensic sense, under a sys- 
tem of mere law, that we may determine the changes in its 
meanings, if such exist, from classic to Hellenistic use, or 
as Greek conformed to Hebrew ideas. I proceed then, to con- 
sider — 

I. The use and meaning of the word dotaiou, a classic word 
employed in a heathen sense. 

Here its most general meaning in this use will first deserve 
attention, and then its general forensic meaning. 

1. Its general meaning in classic use. — In this, the word 
diftawG) denotes to make relatively right • or thus, it denotes the 
act, either personal or impersonal, of making, causing, deter- 
mining, either a person or thing to be relatively right. 



ORIGIN OF THE WORD. 343 

This act like every other, has an object on which or in re- 
spect to which, it produces its own peculiar effect or change, 
and which otherwise neither would nor could be effected. This 
effect or change is not in the character, nature, or qualities of 
the object of the act, but only in the relation of the object to 
the manner in which it is to be practically regarded and treated, 
as this is consequent upon and determined by the act. 

This view of the general meaning of the word fiwawG), may 
be confirmed by some observations on the derivation and form- 
ation of the word. 

The word diun is the original root of a family of words com- 
pounded of it, with various terminations. Hence dtKatog ; and 
hence again, dinaioG). The adjective from which the verb seems 
to be more directly derived, appears to be equivalent to our 
English word just. The great Christian idea of benevolence, 
tmiversal, disinterested love, was not known to the heathen. In 
the conceptions of the wisest heathen philosophers, justice ap- 
pears to have been the comprehensive virtue — the element 
and essence of all virtue. Piety was inculcated chiefly, if not 
wholly, to prevent crimes hostile to the peace and prosperity 
of the State, and consisted not in the love, but in that servile 
fear of the gods which sought to appease their anger and to 
propitiate their favor. Hence justice, as the great cardinal 
virtue as related to the welfare of civil society — justice to indi- 
viduals and justice to the State — justice viewed as conformity 
to those established usages and customs which had the force of 
law, as well as to law itself — was among the heathen nations, 
and especially among the Greeks and Romans, the pre-eminent 
and comprehensive virtue — the sum and perfection of moral 
excellence, which secured the favor of gods and of men, and 
so of the government of the nation. 

Justice as the comprehensive virtue, " a constant will or dis- 
position to render to every one his due," would exist and 
necessarily be spoken of under a great variety of specific 
forms, among which what we call the administration of jus- 
tice, or doing justly by the civil magistrate or judge, would be 
peculiarly prominent. This act of the judge, causes, makes, 
determines, not the character or subjective relation of the ob- 
ject of the act as obedient or disobedient to law, for he is in 
every respect one or the other before the act of the judge, — but 
this as an authoritative act, causes, makes, determines, only the 



S44 JUSTIFICATION. 

relation of the object of the act to the manner in which he is 
to be practically regarded and treated, as this wholly depends 
on and is determined by it. It is essential to the very nature 
and design of civil government, that in certain cases there 
should be such an authoritative act ; and that it be the only 
ground, cause, or determining antecedent of the relation of sub- 
jects of law to the manner in which they are to be practically 
regarded and treated by the State. 

Besides this particular act of justice, or making relatively 
just or right, there would be many others both toward persons 
and things, which would more or less resemble and yet also 
differ from it. Hence all such, including the act of the judge, 
having a common nature, would have a common name, denot- 
ing the common idea of making relatively just or right. This 
would of course be a generic term in relation to all the species 
included under it, and the species under it, if determined at all ? 
must be determined, not hj the general word, which is equally 
applicable to all the species, but by the known nature of the 
subject or logical connection. 

It may be well to say here, that the idea we are now defin- 
ing, that of making relatively right, is not the same as that of 
doing right. The act may be one particular form of doing 
right. But then there are many others, e. g., feeding the 
hungry, clothing the naked, &c, which cannot be denoted by 
the word Smatoco. Especially is it to be noticed, that this word 
cannot be used to denote the act of making its object right or 
just subjectively or inherently, but only relatively, or in rela- 
tion to the manner in which the object is to be regarded for 
practical purposes, or in which he or it is to be treated. 

Having made these explanatory remarks, I proceed to show 
that in its most general classic meaning, the word ducaiou de- 
notes the act, either personal or impersonal, of making, caus- 
ing, determining, either a person or thing to be relatively just or 
right; or just or right in relation to the manner in which he or 
it is to be regarded for practical purposes, or in which he or it 
is to be treated. In support of this definition I allege, 

In the first place, the authority of lexicographers. This 
kind of evidence is of course not demonstrative ; but, as it must 
be in all such cases, probable or moral evidence, or evidence 
by induction. Lexicographers for the most part unfortunately 
attempt to give, not the most general meanings of even im- 



MODE OF DETERMINING THE MEANING. 315 

portant words ; but some, many, or most of their particular or 
specific meanings, as these are determined by the logical con- 
nection in actual usage. Xow it is only from these specific 
meanings of a word, that its generic or general one can be 
ascertained, for this is common to all the specific meanings. 
So far then as the induction or bringing together of these spe- 
cific meanings approximates perfection, — for on no subject can 
it be assumed to be known to be absolutely perfect, — and results 
in one which is common, the evidence is reliable ; in other 
words, while it is the only kind of which the nature of the case 
admits, it is prima facie evidence, or that which is to be re- 
lied on, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary. The 
facts, — the instances of the specific meanings of the word 6ik<l- 
log) in its classic use, given in good lexicons, — are not all that 
might be given, and yet are in such variety as to render it 
highly probable that the meaning which is common to them 
all, is the common and generic meaning of the word. Assum- 
ing then, as I am authorized to do, that this is true, until some 
evidence to the contrary is furnished, I maintain that the 
meaning which I have specified is that which is common to all 
these cases, and is therefore general or generic. Xo one who 
will look into a good Greek lexicon will deny that the mean- 
ing which I have specified is common to ail these cases. Un- 
til then he adduces at least one instance of its use in a specific 
meaning which shall furnish an exception to the common one 
now claimed, he is bound to admit this to be the common and 
of course the general meaning of the word. In support of the 
present definition, I allege. 

In the second place, the derivation and formation of the 
word dtKdLOG). All, or nearly all the Greek verbs formed in the 
same manner as this, denote the act of making, causing, deter- 
mining, not a subjective or intrinsic effect or change in the ab- 
solute nature of the subject, but a rdatime effect or change. Take 
as examples the following : deue/Aoco, a^ioco, ofiowo), re/.siocj. vlog), 
dytoG), ~a?Mi6u. A like mode of compounding words, is found 
in the Latin language, as in glorifco, Vtrifco, &c, and in 
English, as in glorify, verify, etc., to denote an act. making, 
or causing a relative effect or change. But what is making 
or causing an effect in such cases? Xot making or causing 
an effect which it is impossible and inconceivable should be 
made or caused. To illustrate by some examples will show 

15* 



346 JUSTIFICATION. 

that the effects in the cases now referred to are merely rel- 
ative. In what sense then of making or causing a founda- 
tion, can the verb Oejie/aoG) be used? Not surely in that of 
making or causing an effect in the intrinsic nature of the 
material, e. g., of a rock or other substance, but in the sense of 
making or causing it to sustain the new and peculiar relation 
specified. So the verb vloo, is not to cause the object of the 
act to be a son in every respect, but to make or cause him to be 
a son in every respect in which he can be, as having the rela- 
tion and place, and receiving the treatment of a son. I might 
illustrate the same thing by Latin words of like composition, as 
glorifico when applied to God, and by English words, as I have 
already, done in respect to the word verify. It admits per- 
haps of a question, whether the words mortify, vivify, and 
perhaps some few others, which have been regarded as excep- 
tions to the rule now stated, are real exceptions. 

I do not affirm that none of this class of words denote in any 
case the making or causing of a subjective effect or change, as 
distinguished from that which is relative. If however there be 
any such, which I doubt, they must be decisively shown to 
be such by the nature of the case, or by other equally decisive 
proof. This however, can impart no doubt to those in which 
this class of words must at least, have the meaning of causing 
a relative effect or change, and in which there is no evidence 
of any other. Such, as I claim, is the fact in respect to all or 
nearly all the class of words now under consideration. Hence 
arises a strong presumption from the mere formation of such a 
word, that it denotes the making or causing only of a relative 
effect, and this is prima facie evidence — evidence decisive that 
such is its only meaning, until proof to the contrary is adduced. 
These remarks are strikingly applicable to the word dotaiou. It 
is confessedly used to denote the act of making, causing, a rela- 
tive effect, or change ; and until it be shown that it has also 
some other or further meaning, the proof is decisive that such 
is the only one. I allege, 

In the third place, that the idea of the production of virtue 
or holiness in the human heart, is entirely foreign to the 
heathen mind. This fact has been fully proved in another 
place. Unless then we can suppose men to express in words, 
ideas which they have not in their minds, it is absolutely in- 
credible and impossible, that the word Sataibu in classic use, 



CLASSIC USE OF THE TERM. 347 

should denote the act of making or causing the object of the 
act to be subjectively just, or right, or righteous. It confess- 
edly denotes the act of making relatively just or right, — just or 
right in relation to the manner in which the object of the act is 
to be regarded for practical purposes, and of course to be treated. 
This therefore, so far as the main thing at issue is concerned, is 
the whole general classic meaning of the word dacaiou. 

With this view of the general meaning of di/ccuou, as a clas- 
sic word, it is obvious that in its classic use it must have, as we 
commonly speak, many particular meanings, for it is applied 
like our word justify to both persons and things. It is not 
necessary to my present purpose to trace these in detail, but 
only to say what will not be questioned, that among them a 
forensic meaning is both prominent and common. To this par- 
ticular use of the word I now call attention, with the design to 
ascertain as proposed — 

2. Its general forensic meaning in classic use. — In this mean- 
ing and use, the word being employed of course in- a heathen 
sense and under a system of mere law, denotes 

An authoritative act of a judge, making, causing, determin- 
ing a particular relation of a subject of law to its sanctions, 
as one to be actually rewarded or actually punished, according 
to merely legal principles. 

To explain my meaning more fully, I remark, that the condi- 
tion of a subject of mere law, whether obedient or disobedient, 
may be viewed as absolute and relative. His subjective act of 
obedience as fulfilling the claim of law and entitling to its re- 
ward, and his subjective act of disobedience as violating the 
claim of law and exposing to its penalty, may each be consid- 
ered as an absolute condition resulting necessarily from the 
subject's own act and the nature of law. But this condition of 
the subject of law is changed by the authoritative act of the 
judge, which makes, causes, or determines the existence of a 
new relation to the sanctions of law, viz., that the subject is to 
be actually rewarded or punished. This relation depends on, 
and is made or caused solely by the act of the judge, and may ' 
be called a relative condition. These things, the condition of 
a subject of law as it depends on his own act, and as it is 
changed by the act of the judge in its relation to legal sanc- 
tions, differ so widely and essentially that they demand a care- 
ful consideration. 



348 JUSTIFICATION. 

There is an obvious and important difference between giving 
an absolute existence to a fact or thing in many cases, and giv- 
ing it a relative existence, especially in relation to its being 
practically regarded and acted upon as real. Thus in cases 
innumerable, the fact depends for this relative existence on a 
different cause or act from that which gives it its absolute ex- 
istence. To verify a fact by testimony does not give absolute 
existence or truth to it, but makes, causes, or determines it to 
be a fact for practical purposes, or to be acted upon as such 
when otherwise it could not be. The authoritative act of a 
judge makes the litigated property of its owner his property 
in one respect, in which otherwise it is not his property rela- 
tively to his possession and use of it. In like manner the 
authoritative judgment of the supreme tribunal of the land in 
respect to one on trial for a crime, does not give absolute exist- 
ence to his standing in respect to the sanctions of law, but only 
a relative existence, or an existence to be regarded and acted 
upon as real. Accordingly, I maintain that the Greek word 
dticaLoo when used as now supposed, denotes an authoritative 
act of a judge, making, causing, determining the condition or 
standing of a subject of law in respect to its sanctions, not 
absolutely, for this is already done either by his obedience or 
disobedience, but relatively, and so far as it can determine it, 
which is so far as it is to be acted upon. 

Further: this word as classic Greek, used in the manner 
now supposed, whatever it may be as Hellenistic Greek, is not 
synonymous with our English word justify. As a general 
forensic term in classic use, it denotes simply a just or right 
judgment, either in acquitting or condemning. From the mere 
act of the judge nothing could be inferred concerning the inno- 
cence or guilt of the object. This act simply determines the 
standing or relation of the subject in regard to the sanctions of 
law in that respect in which it depends, and in some respect it 
does depend on such an act. The absolute fact is, either that 
the subject is obedient and ought to be rewarded, or he is dis- 
obedient and ought to be punished. But which of these is the 
fact, and the one to be acted upon in retribution, is in one most 
important respect undetermined, and must remain so until the 
act of the judge decides it. In other words, it must in this 
respect remain non-existent until there be an act of authority 
and jurisdiction determining the fact, and so giving it existence 



CLASSIC USE OF THE TERM. 319 

as one to be acted upon in conferring the reward for obedience 
or inflicting the penalty for disobedience. This act of author- 
ity and jurisdiction under a merely legal system, must be 
assumed in practical life to be right or just in the broad sense 
of being in accordance with the principles of distributive and 
general justice, and also with those of general benevolence. 
These under an equitable system of mere law are ever in har- 
mony, for what is demanded in such a case by any is demanded 
by all of them.* 

According to what has now been said in the way of expla- 
nation, we find the facts and the proof of them. We find that 
the Greek word under consideration was used by the classic 
Greek writers in the general forensic meaning now specified ; 
i. e., to denote a just or right judgment, either in acquitting or 
condemning. Suidas in his lexicon, referring only to classic 
authority, says " that the word was used to denote a right or 
just judgment either in acquitting or condemning." The same 
thing will appear by referring to any good Greek lexicon, 
classical or biblical. Dr. Owen cites an instance of this use 
of the English word justify, from a treaty between the English 
and Scotch in the time of Edward YL, in the clause, " that if 
any one committed a crime he should be justified on trial." 
That such was the general forensic meaning of the word dotaiou 
as a classic word, is confirmed by another consideration, that it 
is used as the opposite of adi/ceo), to act unjustly, and in a foren- 
sic sense to judge unjustly. Thus it appears, that as a classic 
word it was not used as a forensic term in the same as its Hel- 
lenistic meaning, nor as that of our English word justify. 
However, its most general classic meaning may have been, as 
we shall see it was, perpetuated, viz., to make relatively right 
or just / yet its general forensic meaning under a merely legal 
system, was not and could not be perpetuated under a system 
of grace. The act of the judge in the former sense would be 
impossible, there being no obedient subject to be acquitted, 
and none of course to whom the word could, with the least 
truth or propriety, be applied to an obedient subject. 



* It may be well to say here what I claim to have before shown, that while 
distributive justice requires the obedient subject to be rewarded in all circum- 
stances, it does not require that the disobedient subject should be punished in 
all circumstances. 



350 JUSTIFICATION. 

Having thus attempted to ascertain the general and also the 
general forensic meaning of the Greek word dtKaioo) as a clas- 
sic word, and as used in a heathen sense under a system of 
mere law, I now proceed to consider it — 

II. As a scriptural word, or as employed in a biblical sense. 

Here, if I mistake not, we shall find that the word is greatly 
modified and changed when compared with its classic use, as 
it is employed under a system of grace ; and that while it re- 
tains, as we might be sure it would, its most general classic 
meaning, it is not used in its general forensic meaning as a 
classic word. As these things may need confirmation, I pro- 
ceed to show — 

1. That the most general meaning of the word as used in the 
Scriptures, is the same as its most general meaning in its classic 
use, which is the act of making, causing, or determining either 
a person or thing to be relatively right or just. 

The difference between what I have called the absolute and 
the relative existence of a fact, has been already sufficiently 
illustrated. This, as accurately recognized in the use of lan- 
guage, especially in the use of that class of active verbs which 
are applied only to the production of relative effects, cannot 
be denied, and ought not to be overlooked, it being easily and 
surely, and I may say necessarily determined, by the known na- 
ture of the subject. This is manifest beyond all contradiction 
in respect to many words, and as we now maintain, in respect 
to ditcaiod) in Greek, p"S in Hebrew, justifico in Latin, and just- 
ify in English. These words, in their most general meaning, 
are strict synonyms ; and in this, the word whether that of one 
language or another, is that of which I now speak, when I say 
it denotes, not the act of making, causing, or determining 
an absolute, but only a relative effect, an act done in respect 
to a person or thing, making or causing not a subjective effect 
or change in the object of the act, but only a relative effect 
designated by the word right, or just. 

To justify or make right another, as the act of a judge — to 
justify one's self — to justify a doubtful particular action — 
to justify a proposition or assertion questioned or denied — to 
justify a crime, is to make right or just in different modes of 
making right or just. In the one case, the act is done by 
authority ; in another, by assertion or proof, or by both ; in 
another, by reasoning ; in another, by sophistry. The right- 



SCRIPTURAL USE OF THE TERM. 351 

ness of one accused made by the act of the judge, is different 
from the rightness made and determined in every other case. 
And yet in neither of these instances is the thing said to be 
made right absolutely, but only relatively, or in relation to 
the manner in which it is to be regarded for practical pur- 
poses. 

What is thus obvious from the statement of familiar ex- 
amples of common life, is equally so from the scriptural use of 
the word. In proof of this, I appeal to a sufficient number of 
examples from the Scriptures, of the particular application of 
the word to persons and things. First to persons : "It is God 
that justifieth" (Rom. viii. 3). " And all the people justified 
God" (Luke vii. 29). ." Speak, for I desire to justify thee" 
(Job xxxiii. 32). " He willing (choosing) to justify himself" 
(Luke x. 29). "God was manifested in the flesh, justified in 
the Spirit" (1 Tim. iii. 16). "They (the judges) shall justify 
the righteous, and condemn the wicked" (Dent. xxv. 1). 
"Which justify the wicked for a reward" (Isa. v. 23). "That 
justifieth the ungodly" (Rom. iv. 5). Secondly, to things: 
"But wisdom is justified of all her children" (Luke vii. 35; 
Matt. xi. 19). "The sanctuary shall be justified" (Dan. viii. 
14). Now there must be one general meaning of the word 
justify (ducaiou, p'TS. justified), which is common to all these 
different cases. It is equally obvious that they cannot all have 
the same specific or particular meaning. None will pretend 
that God is said to justify the ungodly in the same particular 
meaning in which all the people are said to have justified 
God, or in which God manifest in the flesh was justified in 
the Spirit, or in which a human judge is required to justify 
the righteous, or in which wisdom is justified of all her chil- 
dren, or in which it is said the sanctuary shall be justified. 
Nor will it be pretended, that in any two of the instances re- 
ferred to, the word justify is used in the same, nor denied that 
in each instance it is used in a different specific meaning. 
The question then is, what is the general meaning of the word, 
or the one common to all these cases ? Is it that of making right 
in the sense of doing strict justice? But does God in justifying 
the elect, do them strict justice? or is the lawyer in Luke x. 
29, said to be willing to do himself strict justice ? or can they 
be said to do strict justice, who justify the wicked for a re- 
ward? Is the meaning then which is common to all these 



352 JUSTIFICATION". 

cases, that of making the object of the act subjectively holy 
even in any degree, — is this the sense in which all the people 
justified God ? or in which the lawyer was willing to justify 
himself? or the judges are required to justify the right- 
eous? or august judges justify the wicked? or wisdom is justi- 
fied of her children ? or the sanctuary was to be justified ? 
It will not I think be pretended, that either of those now spe- 
cified is the meaning common to all these cases of the use of 
the word justify, nor of course its general one. But it is 
at once obvious that what I have specified as the general 
meaning of the word is common to all these cases, and that 
nothing more specific is or can be common to them all. This 
is decided at once by taking either of them as an example : 
thus, " the people justified God." It is manifest, that the 
word denotes at least the act of making right, not absolutely, 
but relatively, or in relation to his being practically regarded, 
treated, as right, and that it cannot denote any thing more, 
and still have a meaning common to all the other cases ; viz., 
to justifying the elect, the righteous, the wicked, wisdom, and 
the sanctuaiy. This is as obvious and certain, as that the 
general meaning of the word triangle is a three-sided figure, 
and nothing more, whether we speak of an isosceles, equilat- 
eral, acute-angled, or a right-angled triangle. 

Once more : if the general meaning of the word ducaiou is 
not that now given, then the word as used in the Scriptures is 
falsely translated by the English word justify. Nothing is more 
undeniable than that the general meaning now maintained, is 
the general meaning of the English word justify. I venture 
•to say, nothing would be more hopeless than to attempt to show 
that the mere English word justify is ever used in any other 
general meaning. If this be so (and who that at all under- 
stands the English language will pretend the contrary), then if 
Aikcllog) has another and a different general meaning, it follows 
that in our English Bible it is falsely translated in every in- 
stance. I admit that it has different specific meanings, as we 
commonly speak in different applications ; i. e., that the whole 
meaning of the writer as determined by the connection, is in 
many cases something more than the general meaning of the 
mere word. But I maintain, that the word as such, denotes 
nothing more and nothing less than what I have said is its gen- 
eral meaning. If it does, then our translators have sadly blun- 



OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. 353 

clerecl in rendering it by the English word justify.* Had our 
translators the remotest suspicion that the Greek or Hebrew 
word meant to sanctify ; or that as a general term it meant to 
do strict justice ? Could they have so understood it in Daniel 
viii. 14 ; or in Luke x. 29 ; or in Romans iv. 5 ? Is it in the* 
lowest degree credible that they understood the Hebrew or 
Greek word in either of these as its general meaning? Had 
they so understood it, nothing is more certain than that they 
would have rendered it by the English word sanctify, or by 
the phrase do justice to / and that in rendering it by the word 
justify, they have intentionally given a false translation of the 
word. There is then, all the evidence that the word has the 
general meaning now given it, which there is that these men 
were honest and skillful translators of the sacred writings. If 
they have mistranslated the word, let the error be corrected, 
and let it henceforth be understood, that the self-righteous 
Pharisee was willing to sanctify himself, that judges were 
required to sanctify the righteous, and that wicked judges for 
a reward did sanctify the wicked. 

There are other considerations which strongly confirm this 
view of the general meaning of the word. I acid only one, viz., 
the coincidence between the general classic meaning and what is 
now maintained to be its general scriptural meaning. The pri- 
mary meaning of words is always changed by generalization, 
but the general meaning never can change, unless there is an 
imperious necessity for some alteration in their specific mean- 
ing arising from a change of particular facts or ideas of such 
facts. Every one at all acquainted with the process of gener- 
alization, must see how incredible, or rather impossible it is, 
that the general terms animal and tree, should become each 
a general term in whose meaning that of the other should be 
included. The same impossibility must have existecl in re- 
spect to the general words rendered justify and sanctify. Not- 
withstanding the changes and differences in the specific mean- 
ings, as they are called, of the word dtfcatoo) under its general 
classic meaning, and especially in the Scriptures, it cannot be 
shown that its general classic meaning, compared with its gen- 
eral scriptural meaning, has been changed at all, nor that there 

* The same thing is true of the Vulgate, as rendering the Greek and the 
Hebrew by the Latin word justifico. 
23 



354 JUSTIFICATION. 

was in the scriptural use of it, as a general term, the slightest 
necessity or reason for changing it. On the contrary, we have 
seen that the general meaning of the word is the same in both 
uses, viz., to make right relatively in the sense already ex- 
plained. What pretense then can there be for asserting a 
change in the general meaning of the word, so that under this 
shall be included the specific meaning of making right abso- 
lutely or intrinsically f To suppose this, is, as we have already 
shown, not only without the least warrant and wholly gratui- 
tous, but against decisive proof to the contrary, arising in the 
present case from the total absence of all such ideas of things. 
In addition to this, we now see that the supposition is forbid- 
den by one of those established laws of language which must 
regulate all such changes. 

2. That the word dcfcatou in its general, scriptural, forensic 
meaning, denotes an authoritative act of a judge, making, 
causing, determining a subject of law, to stand right in relation 
to the sanctions of law. 

In the Scriptures, the word is used in a forensic meaning, as 
a common term applicable to an act of God, and of man as a 
judge. This is its general forensic meaning in the Scriptures, 
and is that for which we now inquire. 

In this forensic use it retains its most general meaning, which, 
as we have seen, is the same in both its classic and scriptural' 
use, — denoting the act of making or determining a person or 
thing to he relatively right. But, as we shall see, the general 
forensic classic meaning differs widely from the general foren- 
sic scriptural meaning. The former is the authoritative act of 
a judge making or determining the relation, of a subject of law 
to its sanctions, as one to be rewarded or punished according to 
merely legal principles ; or simply, a just or right act of a 
judge, either in acquitting or condemning according to merely 
legal principles. The latter is the act of a judge, making or 
determining the relation of a subject of law to the sanctions of 
law as one to be rewarded ; or, determining the subject of law 
to stand right in relation to the sanctions of law. These state- 
ments are deemed sufficient to show the difference between 
the general forensic classic meaning of the word dittcuocj, and 
its general forensic scriptural meaning; showing the act of 
the judge to be the same, and the word to have the same gen- 
eral forensic scriptural meaning, whether the object of the act 



INDIRECT ARGUMENT. 355 

be obedient or disobedient to law. All that can be meant by 
the mere word in this nse is, simply that by the authoritative 
act of the judge, the subject of the law, the object of the act, 
is made or determined to stand right in relation to legal sanc- 
tions. From the mere word, aside from the known character 
of the judge and the logical connection, nothing can be infer- 
red concerning the character or conduct of the subject as obe- 
dient or disobedient to law ; and nothing in respect to the act 
of the judge as right or wrong, just or unjust, according to 
legal principles. An unjust judge may actually justify the 
disobedient subject under a system of mere law. A just judge 
may, or rather will, j 'ustify the obedient subject under a sys- 
tem of mere law; and a just judge may, and in certain cases 
will, justify the disobedient subject under a system of law and 
grace combined. Yet in these three different particular cases, 
the mere word justify (ducatou) has one and the same mean- 
ing, in which it can be truly and properly applied to them all. 
In this sense the word cannot denote the act of the judge 
making the subject of law inherently, subjectively, and abso- 
lutely obedient or righteous. This would be palpably false in 
two, not to say in all the supposed instances. To say that it 
must be true in the third case, or there can be no act of justi- 
fying, is to affirm that there cannot be a common meaning of 
the word in which it can be truly applied to the three cases, 
which is palpably false. The only true and proper use of the 
word justify (ducatou) therefore, as a general forensic term in 
the Scriptures, is to denote an authoritative act of a judge, 
whether he be God or man, whether he be just or unjust, or 
whether the subject be obedient or disobedient to law, making 
or determining a subject of law to stand right in relation to the 
sanctions of law. 

That this view of the use and meaning of the word ducatou 
may be further confirmed, the peculiar system of things under 
which the word has ever been used in the Scriptures, must be 
explained. 

This system was not one of mere law, but one of law and 
grace combined, — one which the Lawgiver and Judge of men 
adopted, and revealed to our first parents in the hour of their 
apostasy (Gen. iii. 15), afterward to Abraham (Gen. xvii. 
1-9 ; Gal. iii. 8), then to some of his descendants by Moses 
and the prophets (Rom. iii. 21), and finally, in its fullness by 



356 JUSTIFICATION 

Christ and his apostles. In this system there was a grand pecu- 
liarity of things, which by controlling the ideas of men must 
have extended an influence to language wherever the things 
of this revelation have been known. ~Noy could it be other- 
wise, even in respect to that class of words which had acquired 
a prior established use and meaning, when it should become 
necessary to employ them to express the peculiar and moment- 
ous things of God's Moral Government over men, as exhib- 
ited by his revelation. Words, as I have often had occasion 
to say, necessarily change their meaning with the ideas and 
knowledge of men respecting the things they signify. If, foi 
example, some word which in its prior or heathen use had been 
employed on some subject to denote the act of one man toward 
another, should be found employed in divine revelation on the 
same subject to denote an act of God, and if the word in the 
former use would admit of or had acquired a broader applica- 
tion than it would consistently with truth, admit of in the lat- 
ter, still it would be applied to the latter, and of course in a 
new and limited meaning, so far as the exigencies of truth 
and the nature of facts would allow and require. 

Kow under that peculiar system of law and grace which 
God has revealed, and under which, since the fall of man, he 
administers his Moral Government over men, no word could, 
in accordance with the truths or things of this revelation, come 
into use in that forensic sense in which the Greeks had used 
the word ditcaioa), and other nations some synonymous word or 
phrase, in application to obedient subjects under a system of 
mere law. The reason is, that none of the facts or things 
which are the only possible basis of such a use of the word, 
exist under God's moral administration over men. Before the 
apostasy of man, such a use of language under God's Moral 
Government as it then was, may be supposed possible. But 
from the time of that event, this government of God over men 
has been administered only over disobedient subjects. There 
being no obedient subject, there could be no act of God acquit- 
ting such a subject of the legal penalty, and giving him a title 
to a legal reward de merito, or as an obedient subject. E~o 
word therefore could with truth be used to denote such an act 
">n the part of God. There neither was nor could be, a right 
or just judgment de mevito of obedient subjects of the law of 
his Moral Government, for there were no such subjects. If 



INDIRECT ARGUMENT. 357 

then the Greek daccuou), or any other word, was applied to de- 
note the act of God in determining a subject of his law to 
stand right in relation to its sanctions, it must he in a very 
different sense from that of its classic or heathen import. In 
its classic forensic use, it could be applied either to the act 
of acquitting an obedient subject of law, or of condemning a 
disobedient subject. But under God's moral administration it 
could not be applied to either : to the former, because there 
was no such subject and no such act; to the latter, for it could 
not be forensically applied as it is in the Scriptures, exclu- 
sively to the act of God in placing the disobedient subject of 
law right in relation to its sanctions. 

Further: there is no act of God as a judge under the re- 
vealed system of grace, directly determining the relation of 
men to the sanctions of law, according to the principles of 
mere law. It is the doctrine of Paul, that the whole world 
will be judged according to the Gospel. I shall have occasion 
to treat more extensively of this topic in another connection. 
I only say here, that none of the human race will be judged on 
the last day, nor of course in this life, according to merely 
legal principles. Even the heathen may know " that God is, 
and is a re warder of them that diligently seek him," and there- 
fore may and will be judged substantially according to the 
Gospel; i. e., for having disobeyed what the apostle calls " the 
law of faith," as the great rule of final judgment. There was 
indeed a great fact assumed and acted upon on the part of God 
in the very act of providing an economy of grace, viz., that 
Adam and all his descendants were viewed as sinners, and as 
such, would and must, according to the principles of mere law 
or of strict justice under a system of mere law, be condemned 
to bear the legal penalty of sin. The case was hopeless with- 
out an economy of grace. But instead of pronouncing the 
sentence of law, or dooming the race as they under this view 
deserved to bear the penalty of the law, that so none could be 
redeemed and saved, God at once introduced an economy of 
grace, arresting both the sentence of the law and the execution 
of its penalty. It- is true, that under this economy of grace 
there was another sentence than that of law ; not of course con- 
demning all to bear the legal penalty of sin, but a sentence 
elg fcarafcpifia, implying and proving the sin of all men, and 
thus the justice of their condemnation according to law. In 



358 JUSTIFICATION. 

this import and bearing of this sentence, though it cannot with 
even the show of propriety or truth be called a sentence of 
condemnation, it is with exact precision and truth called by the 
apostle a sentence unto condemnation. Nothing could be more 
remote from his mind than the idea of a sentence of God — one 
too, fully executed — dooming the whole race of men to bear 
the legal penalty of sin under an economy of grace. If then 
there is and can be no act of God as a Judge under the re- 
vealed system of grace, determining, that is, unchangeably fix- 
ing the relation of any of our race to sanctions of law accord- 
ing to the principles of mere law or of strict justice, then how 
could the word diicaiooi, or any other in the full forensic sense 
of its classic or heathen use, be applied in the Scriptures to 
denote such an act of God ? 

~No word then, having the same general forensic meaning 
under a merely legal system which the Greek word Sikcliou) had 
under such a system, could in such a meaning find a place in the 
Scriptures to denote any act of God, especially that which ac- 
quits men of the penalty of his law. The meaning in such an 
application would be plainly false. God actually justifies only 
disobedient subjects of his law. 

As then the word dmaiou is actually used in the Scriptures 
to denote the act of God placing only disobedient subjects of 
his law right in relation to its sanctions, it must either be falsely 
applied, or it must lose much of its general forensic meaning 
as a classic word, and refers to this act of God in another and 
a very different sense. The word in this application, as in sim- 
ilar cases, would retain its most general classic, and some of its 
general forensic classic meaning, as the connecting link be- 
tween its antecedent and subsequent meaning and use. It 
would however, unavoidably lose so much of its general foren- 
sic classic meaning as would be inapplicable and false, and yet 
retain so much of it as would be true in its new application. 
This meaning would become the general forensic meaning of 
the word in the Scriptures, whether applied to the act of God 
or to the act of a human judge. As applied to the act of God, 
the particular act would respect a disobedient subject of law ; 
as applied to the act of a just human judge, the particular act 
would respect an obedient subject of law. Either of these 
would be called an act of justifying as a general forensic term, 
as truly and properly as the other. The only meaning of the 



NEW INQUIRY. 359 

word common to both cases, is of course that of an authorita- 
tive act of a judge, making or causing a subject of law to stand 
right in relation to the sanctions of law. 

If , as I claim to have shown, the Greek word ducaiou in a 
heathen sense cannot be employed under a system of law and 
grace, and of course never in the Scriptures, then the way is 
prepared as I proposed, 

To ascertain the general forensic meaning of the word when 
used under the system of law and grace which the Scriptures 
reveal. 

I have said, that the word in this use and meaning denotes 
the authoritative act of a judge, making or causing a subject of 
law to stand right in relation to its sanctions. 

I remark then, that the classic in becoming a scriptural word, 
would lose so much of its general forensic meaning as a classic 
word as would be inapplicable and false, and yet retain so much 
of that meaning as would be true in its new application. The 
general forensic meaning in its new application would be that 
which would be common to all cases of its actual use. It would 
be actually employed to denote the act of God as a judge, and 
also to denote an act of man as a judge. As applied to the act 
of God, it would respect his act done to a disobedient subject 
of his law; as applied to that of a human judge, it would 
respect his act as done to an obedient or to a disobedient subject 
of law. Either of these would in this use be called an act of 
justifying a subject of law as a general forensic term, and of 
course without denoting their specific difference, as truly and 
properly as the other. There is no avoiding this change in the 
meaning of the word in its new application, unless we suppose 
the coining of a new one, which is wholly unsupposable, or that 
no word is used to denote this act of God. But no sooner is the 
use of the classic word sanctioned by usage in application to 
this, than it acquires as we commonly speak, a new specific 
meaning, even that of placing a disobedient subject of law right 
in relation to its sanctions. But the word, for the reasons just 
given, will be applied also to the act of a human judge, one 
which places an obedient and even a disobedient subject of law 
right in relation to its sanctions. Thus the classic word Sinaiou, 
to justify, would unavoidably be applied in common to both of 
these, and either be as properly called an act of justifying as 
the other. But what meaning is common to both ? Plainly 



360 JUSTIFICATION. 

each is an authoritative act of a judge, and is such by making 
or determining a subject of law to stand right in relation to its 
sanctions ; and it is jnst as plain that it is nothing more. 

This view of the subject may be confirmed under another 
aspect. There is then, and there ever has been since the Scrip- 
tures were written, a prominent fact in God's moral adminis- 
tration over men, which some word would, or rather must be 
used in the Scriptures to denote ; viz., an authoritative act of 
God determining some of the disobedient subjects of his law 
to stand right in relation to its sanctions. This it will be ad- 
mitted is the Hebrew word, which in the original writings of 
the Old Testament, and the Greek word, which in the Septua- 
gint and in the New Testament, is rendered in our translation 
by the word justify. As this then would not be applied to 
any act of God in the general forensic sense of heathen usage, 
neither to that of condemning a disobedient subject of his 
law, nor yet to one determining an obedient subject to stand 
right in relation to its sanctions, there being no such subject; 
the word would be unavoidably and exclusively applied to 
his authoritative act, which determines that a disobedient sub- 
ject of his law stands right in relation to its sanctions. So 
the word, when applied as it would be to the act of a human 
judge, would not refer to his condemning a disobedient subject, 
any more than to the same act of God ; but to some act of a 
human judge to which it could be applied in a meaning com- 
mon to both him and God. There would be a common nature 
in these acts which would be denoted by a common term ; but 
the only meaning in which it could be thus used, is that of an 
authoritative act of a judge, determining the subject of law to 
stand right in relation to its sanctions. 

Further : actual usage fully accords with and thus confirms 
this view of the subject. This is not only too obvious to be 
controverted in resjDect to the English word justify when used 
as a forensic term, but it is believed that the same thing is true 
respecting the equivalent word of every language which has 
been modified by and conformed to Scriptural usage. But it 
is important to our purpose only, to show that there is no other 
forensic use of it in the Scriptures. "\Ye say then, that the He- 
brew word when used forensically, will admit of no other 
generic meaning than that now maintained, for it is applied 
not only to the authoritative act of God in respect to disobe- 



USE IN THE SEPTUAGIXT. 361 

client subjects of his law, but to the authoritative act of human 
judges in respect to both obedient and disobedient subjects of 
civil law, in one and the same general meaning. Thus we 
read in Dent. xxv. 1 : " Then shall they (the judges) justify the 
righteous and condemn the wicked ;" in Prov. xvii. 15 : ' ; He 
that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the right- 
eous ;" and in Isaiah v. 23 : <; ^Vho justify the wicked for a re- 
ward.'' Here it is plain that the word justify has a meaning 
common to both cases, to the righteous and the wicked. The 
word therefore denotes the same act in respect to both — the 
authoritative act of a judge, determining that a subject of law 
stands right in relation to its sanctions. 

In further confirmation of what has been said, we now refer 
to the use of the Greek word SLKaLoo) by the Seventy, in their 
translation of the Hebrew Scriptures. AYhen they undertook 
this work, they found no such act on the part of God in respect 
to obedient subjects of his law, as a right or jnst judgment de 
merito, or according to the principles of distributive justice. 
Of course they found no Hebrew word strictly- synonymous 
with the Greek word dcadiou as a classic word — no Hebrew 
word used to denote an act of God as the Lawgiver and Judge 
of men, determining obedient subjects of his law to stand 
right in relation to its sanctions. Yet they found a prominent 
and peculiar fact in divine revelation, and also a word for it ; 
and one which, had the facts been the same, would have been 
used as strictly synonymous with the Greek word. This fact 
is the authoritative act of God determining some of the diso- 
bedient subjects of his law to stand right in relation to its 
sanctions ; to denote which, the Greek word in some of its 
Greek meanings would, according to the laws of usao-e which 
regulate such changes, be used by the translators. For the 
universal law of usage in such cases is, not to coin a new word 
to denote the difference in things, but to use an old one which 
had already been applied to that which in some essential re- 
spects is the same thing as that to be designated, and in such a 
modified or restricted meaning as the exigency requires. By 
this law of usage, the Greek translators of the Old Testament 
were led in the present and many other cases to employ Greek 
words in so much and only so much of their Greek meaning as 
would express Hebrew icleas or conceptions, on substantially 
the same or similar subjects. This use of words by the Sev- 

16 



362 JUSTIFICATION. 

enty, is tlie principal source of the Hebrew idiom of the Greek 
language, or of Hellenistic Greek, which so prevails in the New 
Testament. Accordingly, the Hebrew fact and conception of 
the fact in the case under consideration, being as we have 
stated, these translators instead of using the word ducaiou in its 
full generic forensic meaning in which the Greeks had used it, 
were unavoidably led by the law of usage to employ the word 
in a meaning conformed to the Hebrew fact and Hebrew con- 
ception of the fact. They found the Hebrew word correspond- 
ing with the Greek word when used forensically, so applied to 
an authoritative act of God and to certain authoritative acts of 
men, as to show that it was used in a very different meaning 
as a general term from the classic meaning of the Greek word. 
They were not only under the necessity of translating the He- 
brew by its corresponding Greek word, but of conforming to 
the Hebrew meaning in this use ; i. e., they were under the 
necessity of using the Greek word dotaiou, to denote in its gen- 
eral forensic meaning, the authoritative act of a judge, determ- 
ining the subject of law to stand right in relation to the sanc- 
tions of law. 

What has been said is deemed sufficient to show, not only in 
what meaning the Hebrew word in the Old Testament and the 
Greek word in the Septuagint which we translated by the word 
justify, are employed when used forensically, but also in what 
meaning the Greek word when thus employed is used in the 
New Testament. No one doubts that the Greek of the New 
Testament is Hellenistic ; that is, classic Greek so modified in 
the use of important words as to express Hebrew ideas or con- 
ceptions. From this it follows that the Greek word di/caLou 
when used by Christ and his apostles forensically, denotes noth- 
ing more and nothing less in its generic import, than the au- 
thoritative act of a judge, determining that a subject of law 
stands right in relation to the sanctions of law. 

The same thing will follow from admitting that the Greek 
word dutaioo is correctly translated by the English word justify. 
This is indeed an argument only with those who admit the cor- 
rectness of this translation. And yet there are so many even 
among Protestants, who deny or doubt on this point, that the 
argument for our purpose ought not to be omitted. Assuming 
then the correctness of the translation of the Greek word by 
the English wor&justifyj the only question is, what is its ge- 



USAGE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 363 

neric forensic meaning ? And it will not be pretended that it 
does not include all that which I have said constitutes this, 
viz., the authoritative act of a judge determining a subject of 
law to stand right in relation to the sanctions of law. Does it 
then include any thing more ? Does it denote and so determ- 
ine the personal character of the subject? This cannot be 
true. For the act of Justification, as every one knows, under 
mere law, and according to the strict principles of law, suppo- 
ses a previous trial and decision or judgment respecting the 
personal character of the subject. On this the act of Justifi- 
cation is, and must in the case supposed, be founded. It is true 
that in a known case of equitable judgment under mere law, 
the Justification of the subject is proof of his personal obedi- 
ence to law. One fact implies the other as the effect implies 
its cause. But the one is as distinct from the other, as the trial 
is from the judgment founded upon it. !Nor is the inference 
respecting personal character authorized by the mere fact of 
Justification. Other facts, viz., that the judgment is made 
under mere law and that it is a just judgment, must be known 
to authorize the inference respecting the personal character of 
the subject. Besides, as we have seen, there may be a full and 
perfect Justification, whatever be the personal character of the 
subject. Prov. xvii. 15: "He that justifieth the wicked," &c. 
In short, as the word is properly applied to the act of God just- 
ifying the disobedient, and to that of the human judge in justi- 
fying both the obedient and disobedient, it is plain that the word 
cannot denote an act of a judge done according to the personal 
deserts of the subject, nor according to the principles of either 
distributive or general justice, but only an authoritative act 
of a judge determining a subject of law to stand right in rela- 
tion to the sanctions of law. 

The same thing may be abundantly shown from the usage of 
the ^N"ew Testament. It is sufficient to refer to the epistles of 
Paul, who so largely treats the subject, especially in his Epistle 
to the Romans and that to the Galatians. The prominent de- 
sign of the apostle is, to deny that any are justified by works 
of law, and to assert that some are justified by faith ; or that 
disobedient subjects (sinners) and none others who believe, are 
justified. He thus with the most studious precision of lan- 
guage denies one and the self-same thing (actual Justification) 
in connection with works of law, or with obedience to law, 



364 JUSTIFICATION. 

which he asserts in connection with faith without works. The 
word Justification, when he asserts Justification not to be by 
works of law, cannot be specifically Justification according to 
the principles of distributive justice, or the personal deserts of 
the subject; for he asserts the self-same thing to be by faith 
without works, or without obedience to law ; which of course 
cannot be according to the principles of distributive justice. 
ISTor can the word Justification be used in any more specific 
meaning so far as the mere word is concerned, than that which 
might be predicated of a human though unjust judge, what- 
ever it might be inferred to mean from the character of God, 
had the apostle actually predicated of God what he denies, 
viz., the act of justifying the obedient. He had no occasion to 
use the word in this connection in any other than its generic 
forensic sense, since to deny the act in this, is virtually to deny 
it in every subordinate specific sense. !No.r could he employ it 
in any other with truth, for he uses it in a common meaning in 
two cases, denying Justification by works of law, and asserting 
Justification by faith. If therefore he intends either more or 
less by Justification in one case than in the other, then the 
meaning of his language properly interpreted cannot be true. 
He could not be understood to mean in the former case a mer- 
itorious Justification, without being understood to intend it in 
the latter, which is plainly absurd and impossible. He could 
not be understood to mean, as some suppose, merely pardon in 
the latter, without being understood to intend merely pardon in 
the former, which would also be plainly absurd and impossi- 
ble. What then must he be understood to mean by the word 
in both cases, except an act of the judge which is common to 
both, — an authoritative act of the judge, determining the sub- 
ject of law to stand relatively right in respect to its sanctions? 
Inference. — Prom this view of the general forensic meaning 
of the word Justification, I infer, contrary to the opinion of 
some, that Justification is not exactly synonymous with pardon 
or forgiveness. Justification, as we have seen, designates noth- 
ing in regard to the personal character of the subject; while 
the words pardon and forgiveness expressly recognize his pre- 
vious sin. It is true indeed, that in most instances in the New 
Testament, the term Justification when applied to men is used 
in such a connection as distinctly shows their previous sin. 
Thus Justification hy faith, justified by grace, justified without 



JUSTIFICATION AND PAEDON. . 365 

the deeds of the Iaw,justifieth the ungodly ', are phrases which 
recognize the sin of the subject, — a necessary combination of 
terms for the purpose, which clearly shows that the mere word 
justify does not designate and is not intended to designate the 
same fact. By this however, I do not intend to say that the 
mere word asserts or implies that the subject is not a sinner; 
but simply that the term itself does not decide either that he 
is or that he is not. To say that one is justified, merely ex- 
presses his right relation to the sanctions of law, as this results 
from and is determined by the authoritative act of the Judge. 
But while the term Justification does not express or imply 
the particular idea of pardon or forgiveness, either of these 
terms under a perfect moral administration, implies all that 
Justification denotes. Under the imperfect governments of 
men, pardons, as terms are used, are mere arbitrary acts — acts 
often of mere State policy or of favoritism, as opposed to 
every principle of justice or equity. The prerogative to par- 
don is the result only of the fallibility of the supreme tribunal, 
and proceeds entirely, when unperverted, on the assumed inno- 
cence of the pardoned subject, and is only, in this view of it, 
placing the subject right in relation to legal sanctions ; i. e., 
justifying him as an obedient subject. Human governments 
however, in their palpable violations of the principles of Moral 
Government, furnish neither precise examples of things, nor of 
words, under a perfect moral administration. In these viola- 
tions, for which they must have names to conceal their nature, 
they may remit penalty without regarding the remission as 
restoring the subject to the fullness of that relation to the sanc- 
tions of law which is secured by obedience, and this may be 
called a pardon. The offender may be a prime minister, or a 
military commander whose influence and power may render 
his punishment inexpedient, but who, though pardoned, is 
nevertheless not considered as justified; i. e., as standing in 
the same relation to legal sanctions in which he would have 
stood without transgression. He is restored to some or many 
of the immunities of an obedient subject.* But he cannot be 
properly said to be justified', certainly not, merely as par- 
doned. The reason that he cannot, is, that the terms are not 



* We have an illustration in the permission given to Absalom to return to 
Jerusalem, but not to see the king's face (2 Samuel xiv. 32). 



366 . JUSTIFICATION. 

strictly synonymous. He is not considered as sustaining the 
same relation to the sanctions of law as had he not violated it. 
He is not justified in any proper sense of the word. He is 
partially or wholly exempted from punishment, while every 
principle of law or of justice demands it. There is a dispensa- 
tion which provides a middle state for a subject of law be- 
tween punishment and reward — a dispensation which aban- 
dons law by recognizing the subject as sustaining in fact no 
legal relation ; for it neither restores him to the standing of an 
obedient subject, nor treats him as a transgressor. It simply 
exempts him from punishment as one who is lawless by privi- 
lege. This may be called a pardon for want of a better term ; 
but to identify it with a pardon granted under a perfect moral 
administration, is a burlesque. Such an anomaly of legal pro- 
cedure in heaven's judicatory, and such looseness in the use of 
language resulting from it, are unknown. Under a perfect 
Moral Government no transgressor can be pardoned without a 
full recognition of his relation to law as its subject, and a full 
manifestation of its sustained authority in the grant. God's 
law knows no middle ground on which its subject can stand 
between condemnation and Justification — no intervening allot- 
ment or condition at last, but the endurance of its penalty or 
the enjoyment of its immunities. There is therefore no re- 
demption from punishment to him, who is not, with all the 
principles of law, supported in a state of acceptance with God, 
— no pardon without Justification. The act of God which 
pardons, also justifies, and the act of God which justifies, also 
pardons. 



With this view of the generic forensic meaning of the word 
Justification, which as a juridical act is alike applicable to God 
and to man, I now propose to show more particularly what is 
this act of God as the Moral Ruler and Judge of men. In 
giving this general forensic definition of the word, I have per- 
haps defined it with sufficient particularity for most specula- 
tive and practical purposes. And yet in my view, it is 
highly important to describe it with more of that fullness of 
import in which it is constantly presented to us in the Scrip- 
tures, that by giving it greater precision we may exclude 
those errors from the whole subject, which since the early ages 



JUSTIFICATION NOT OF MERIT. 367 

of the Christian Church have been, and still are, more or less 
connected with it. 

The human mind is ever prone to view forensic Justification, 
i. e., Justification in which the full authority of law is recog- 
nized, as a strictly legal act ; an act according to the mere prin- 
ciples of law; an act demerito. The earliest sacrifices, which 
had their origin evidently in divine institution, were sacrifices 
for sin. I need not say how difficult to prevent their perver- 
sion, even under the light of divine revelation. These rites were 
perpetuated by tradition among the earliest heathen nations, 
and were thus perpetuated, though not to the utter exclusion 
of all ideas of sin, or of sin in the conscience, yet as an equiv- 
alent for the obedience not rendered to law ; or the sin com- 
mitted, and as such an equivalent were supposed to invest the 
offerer with the same legal claim — the same claim de ?nerito, as 
had he not sinned. This was the view of the people of Israel 
when delivered from Egypt, which was ineffectually corrected 
under the Mosaic dispensation, and which, when this dispensa- 
tion was done away by the Messiah, had become almost uni- 
versally prevalent. Since the establishment of Christianity in 
this dark world, this error in its essential nature or principle, 
as representing or viewing Justification before God as a strictly 
legal act — an act de merito, or according to the legal merit of 
the subject — is scarcely less apparent. In this false principle 
men are confirmed, not only by their pride and self-gratulation, 
but by its early and familiar application in civil, and to a great 
extent in parental government. Hence to distinguish the 
forensic act of God in justifying, from that of a human judge, 
and to familiarize the difference to the minds of men, is impor- 
tant in proportion as it is difficult and unusual. Perhaps every 
other serious error on the general subject might be traced to 
that to which we have now adverted, as its true source. Thus 
in the Romish doctrine, the principle de merito is formally 
avowed. To what extent it has been made practical by the 
Romish hierarchy need not be said. Or if we examine closely 
the doctrine of the Reformation, which is claimed to be so 
directly opposed to the principle of merit or to the strict prin- 
ciples of law, the doctrine of Justification by faith only, what 
is it as fully unfolded in its more prevalent form of the Impu- 
tation of Christ's righteousness — of what is called his active 
and passive obedience to the believer, and made his righteous- 



368 JUSTIFICATION. 

ness by a mystical union with Christ, so that it becomes as 
really his righteousness, as would be his own personal perfect 
obedience to law in heart and life, and as his invests him in 
every respect in which such obedience would invest him with 
a claim de merito — what is this but a claim to Justification 
solely according to the principles of law, not only those of gen- 
eral but also of distributive justice? But without dwelling on 
these or other reasons for so doing, I now proceed to con- 
firm the answer already given to our leading inquiry, or to 
show that 

Justification as the act of God in the relation of the Law- 
giver and Judge of men is an authoritative act — making, caus- 
ing, determining a disobedient subject of his law to stand rel- 
atively right in respect to its sanctions / not according to the 
^principles of distributive justice, but according to the princi- 
ples of general justice and of general benevolence. 

When I speak of the meaning of the word in this particular 
application to God, I would guard against one misapprehen- 
sion. In all such cases, it is to be remembered that what in the 
common way of speaking is called the particular meaning of a 
general term, is not strictly speaking the meaning of the mere 
word ; but rather that of the writer or speaker, as this is shown 
by the connection and manner of use in each case. Hence 
what is commonly called the particular meaning of the word 
justify, when applied to God as the Judge of men, is that 
which is the meaning of the writer as shown by the word and 
by its connection, by the nature of the subject, or by any 
thing else which is good evidence of his meaning. With this 
remark in mind, and according to the only principles or laws 
of interpretation applicable to the case, I now propose to 
establish the view above given of the act of God under con- 
sideration. 

The controlling principle or law of usage and interpretation 
in all cases like the present, and the one on which I rely is, 
that whether a general term is to be understood in any mean- 
ing other than the most general, depends on evidence furnished 
by the known nature of the subject, the connection and man- 
ner of use, and that the particular meaning is to be deter- 
mined by such evidence in each particular case. 

According to this principle, the following things are deemed 
undeniable and incontrovertible : 



PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED. 369 

First — If we conlcl suppose the word justify, or Justifica- 
tion, or any equivalent word, to be so used in the Scriptures 
that we could not decide it to be employed in one meaning 
rather than another, then we must understand it in its most 
general meaning, as this has ever been controlled and determ- 
ined in all languages, when referring to a system of law and 
grace. According to what has been said, there would in this 
case be decisive evidence of this, and of no further or other 
meaning. Its classic use would be changed, as already ex- 
plained. 

Secondly — If we suppose the word to be so employed that we 
can decide nothing more than that it is used for 'ensically, then 
we can decide nothing to be meant beyond an authoritative act 
of a judge, determining that a subject of law stands right in 
relation to its sanctions ; or that he is to be exempted from the 
legal penalty and secured in a legal reward. But in such a 
case we could not decide whether the judge were God or 
man; whether the subject were obedient or disobedient to 
law ; whether the act of Justification were strictly conformed 
to a system of mere law, or were modified by a system of 
grace ; whether it were according to the principles of distribu- 
tive and general justice and of general benevolence, or whether 
some or all of those principles were not dispensed with or 
violated. Any one of these questions must be decided, if at 
all, on other grounds than the mere forensic use of the word 
justify. 

Thirdly — If we suppose the evidence to require the assump- 
tion of the perfect character of the judge, and that the act of 
justifying is under a system of mere law, then we must under- 
stand the act to respect an obedient subject of law, and to be 
according to the principles of distributive and general justice, 
and also of general benevolence. 

Fourthly — If we have no authorized belief respecting the 
character of the judge, and supj)ose the act of justifying to be 
under a system of mere law, then we cannot decide whether 
the subject be obedient or disobedient to law, nor whether the 
act be in accordance with the above principles, or in violation 
of them. 

Fifthly — If we suppose the facts in the last case, with this 
difference only, that the subject is disobedient to law, then the 
act of justifying is in violation of the foregoing principles 
24 16* 



OiV JUSTIFICATION. 

Sixthly — And without supposing all the variety of cases 
which are supposable, if we have proof that the Lawgiver and 
Judge is perfect in moral character, that he administers his 
Moral Government under a system of law and grace (and 
through an Atonement), and justifies a disobedient subject of 
his law, then we are bound to regard the act as done, not in- 
deed according to the principles of distributive justice, but 
consistently with the principles of general justice and of gen- 
eral benevolence. I say, not according to the principles of dis- 
tributive justice. That a disobedient subject of law should be 
justified, and at the same time be treated according to the 
principles of distributive justice, is impossible in the nature of 
things. To treat him according to the principles of distribu- 
tive justice, or according to his personal deserts, is to punish 
him by the infliction of the full legal penalty. To suppose him 
at the same time to be justified, is to suppose him to be ex- 
empted from the legal penalty. To suppose both, is to sup- 
pose him to be punished and not punished by the infliction of 
the penalty. That such a conception or notion of the fact is 
expressed by any language of the sacred writers is incredible. 
No theory of Imputation or of Putation, nor any other theory, 
hypothesis, or supposition, involving this idea or conception of 
truth or fact on their part, can ever be made to consist with 
their common sense or with their use of language, and what 'is 
more, with their inspiration. Nor is there any thing in the 
case supposed, which requires that the act of justifying a dis- 
obedient subject should be according to the principles of dis- 
tributive justice / nor even to give the faintest plausibility to 
this conception of it. Distributive justice as we have before 
shown, is not an essential attribute of a perfect moral ruler and 
judge in all cases ; but only under a system of mere law. Or 
thus, while it is necessary that such a Ruler should treat his 
subjects according to the principles of distributive justice in 
all cases under a system of mere law, it is not necessary .that 
he should so treat them under a system of law and grace com- 
bined in one by a complete Atonement. Justice as an essential 
attribute in such a Ruler, in all cases is general justice, or an 
immutable disposition or purpose prompted by benevolence, to 
uphold the authority of law as indispensable to the general 
good. This is the only attribute which, under the name of 
justice, is essentially involved in the perfect character of a per- 



FACTS OF GOD'S GOVERNMENT. 371 

feet Ruler and Judge.* For his perfect character allows, and 
even demands, so far as the good of his kingdom is concerned, 
the dispensing with acts of distributive justice, in all cases in 
which the good of his kingdom will in this way sustain no in- 
jury, and be on the whole increased. Under a system of grace 
through a perfect Atonement, the act of justifying the disobe- 
dient subject becomes consistent with his authority ; that is, 
consistent with justice as an attribute essential to his honor and 
glory, and becomes, on condition of the faith or personal holi- 
ness of the subject, consistent with and dictated by general 
benevolence toward his kingdom. Thus it appears that in the 
case now supposed, we are bound to regard the act of justify- 
ing a disobedient subject on the part of a Moral Ruler and 
Judge, as done, not according to the principles of distributive 
justice, but those of general justice and general benevolence. 

The facts in God's moral administration are in entire coinci- 
dence with those supposed in this last case. In view of what 
has been said in former lectures, we are bound on the author- 
ity of reason and of revelation to assume, that God is the 
Lawgiver and Judge of men ; that he is a being of absolute 
natural and moral perfection ; that he administers his Moral 
Government over men under an economy of law and of grace — 
i. e., through an Atonement which fully sustains his authority 
as a Lawgiver, establishes his law as a rule of action on the 
part of his subjects, and thus meets all the demands of general 
justice ; that he makes personal holiness, or what, as could 
easily be shown, is in the Scriptures called Faith, the condition 
of justifying the disobedient; and that thus dispensing with 
the principles of distributive justice — that is, without treating 
his disobedient subjects according to their personal deserts — he 
fully manifests and honors his justice as an essential attribute 
of a perfect Moral Governor through an Atonement ; and by 
making personal holiness or faith the condition of Justification 
of the disobedient, alike manifests his perfect benevolence in 
preventing evil in the form of sin and its penalty, and securing 
good in the holiness and happiness of a redeemed kingdom. 

Such are the views of God, of his character, and of his moral 



s Both distributive and commutative justice are circumstantial rather than essential 
attributes ; the one depending on a system of mere law, the other on gratuitous 
promise (1 John i. 9). 



372 JUSTIFICATION. 

administration over men, which they are not only authorized 
but required by abundant proofs to entertain, and by which 
they are bound to be governed in deciding what is^ the act of 
God i?i justifying men as the subjects of Ids law. 

We have seen that it must be not an act of Sanctification, 
but an act of God as a Judge, or a forensic act, determining a 
subject of his law to stand right in relation to its sanctions. It 
cannot be less than this, and must, in view of what has been 
said, be more. What more? It cannot be such an act of 
God, determining an obedient subject of his law to stand right 
in relation to its sanctions, for there is no such subject of his 
law among men. It cannot be such an act of God done in 
accordance with the principles of distributive justice, but must 
necessarily involve the entire dispensing with these principles ; 
for according to them, the disobedient subject of law must be 
condemned. But as an act of a perfect God, it must be done 
consistently with general justice; for this is an essential and 
unchangeable attribute of God as a perfect Moral Ruler and 
Judge. It must also, as the act of such a being, be done ac- 
cording to the principles of general benevolence, for in this 
consists the moral perfection of his character. 

Thus it appears that Justification as an act of God in the 
relation of Lawgiver and Judge of men, is an authoritative 
act — making, causing, or determining a disobedient subject of 
his law to stand relatively right in respect to its sanctions ; not 
according to the principles of distributive justice, but according 
to the principles of general justice and of general benevolence. 



IV. 

ELECTION. 

I.— EXPLANATION OF THE DOCTEINE. 
" But the election hatb obtained it."— Romans xi. 7. 

It is conceded by all Christians, that the Bible contains a 
doctrine of Election. What this doctrine is, however, ■ is a 
question which has occasioned much diversity of opinion, and 
none too little of the bitterness of controversy, even among the 
sincere disciples of Christ. And here I must be permitted to 
say, that writers and preachers, not content to state simply the 
plain matter of fact as the Bible does, have often incorporated 
with their statements of this doctrine what does not belong to 
it, and is inconsistent with the plainest truths of the Bible, as 
well as with the dictates of common sense. 

The true scriptural doctrine of Election may be presented so 
as to be free from all difficulties and absurdities. Not only so, 
it may be shown to be a doctrine of the most salutary practi- 
cal tendency ; directly fitted to augment the power of other 
truths ; adapted to sanctify, to strengthen, to comfort and per- 
fect the saints, and to rouse the sinner to instant, direct, and 
decisive effort in the work of his salvation ; and therefore, both 
the saint and sinner, if they have any wise regard to their 
highest, best interests, will believe and welcome it. 

I do not indeed suppose, that any exhibition of this doctrine, 
however clear and consistent it may be, will be sufficient in 
actual fact to put an end to all caviling and objection. This 
were too much to hope for in respect to any doctrine which so 
humbles man and exalts God. Still it can not be denied, that 
in some minds there are real difficulties on this subject; and 
that many things are often said on both sides, which ought with 
becoming firmness to be denied and exploded, as false and of 
evil tendency. We preachers are not infallible, nor yet our 
hearers ; and in respect to the field of theological difficulties, 
not unfrequently " fools rush in where angels fear to tread." 
Still, the Scriptures contain a doctrine of Election, and all 



374 ELECTION. 

Scripture is profitable, and he who bears God's commission 
must not keep back God's counsel. We fear the lightning of 
his indignation if we do this. 

My object in the present discourse is explanation chiefly, 
believing that this is needed more than labored and protracted 
argument, and that I can so present this doctrine in its con- 
nection with other scriptural truths, that we shall be of one 
mind respecting it. 

For this purpose I shall consider the doctrine — 

I. As comprising a simple matter of fact, in which I think 
all Christians will agree ; and — 

II. As it is related to, or connected with, other doctrines or 
truths. 

I. The simple matter of fact which I would state, and which 
constitutes the entire doctrine of Election, is this : That God 

HAS ETERNALLY PURPOSED TO RENEW, AND SANCTIFY, AND SAVE A 
PART ONLY OF MANKIND. 

Here it may be well to distinguish this statement of the doc- 
trine of Election, from some other forms of presenting it. 

First — It is palpably distinct from the doctrine of a national 
election, or an election of certain nations or communities to 
peculiar external privileges. That the Scriptures teach such a 
doctrine is admitted. But it is maintained that this is not the 
only doctrine of Election which they teach. Pelagians, Armin- 
ians, and indeed all who oppose the Orthodox doctrine, main- 
tain that a national election, particularly the election of the 
Jewish nation to peculiar external privileges, is the only scrip- 
tural doctrine of Election which has any relation to, or connec- 
tion with the salvation of men. That which the Orthodox 
maintain is a very different doctrine. 

Secondly — The Orthodox doctrine is not an Election to sal- 
vation, or a purpose of God to save on condition of repentance 
and faith, as uncertain and unknown events, as maintained by 
some Pelagian and Arminian writers. 

Thirdly — The Orthodox doctrine is not, that God has pur- 
posed to save a part of mankind on condition of foreseen re- 
pentance and faith. Though it is not inconsistent with it 
to maintain this doctrine in some sense of the language— 
though it is undeniably true that God has determined or 
purposed to save all those who he foresees will repent and 
believe, yet this is not the Orthodox doctrine of Election 



THE FACT OF ELECTION. 375 

properly so called ; nor by any means all that they believe 
respecting God's purpose to save a part of mankind. This 
is not merely a purpose to save, or a purpose to give eternal 
life on condition of faith and repentance, that is, of personal 
holiness. It is, if spoken of in relation to salvation, as it com- 
monly is, a more comprehensive doctrine, viz., a purpose to 
renew, sanctify, and save a part only of mankind. 

Leaving all other points for the present as being no part of 
the doctrine, I only state in this place a matter of fact, and one 
in which all who are not Universalists, and who believe in the 
necessity of God's grace to renew the heart, must agree. For 
if we are not Universalists, we believe that a part only of 
mankind will be saved. If we believe in the necessity of 
divine influence to change the heart, in other words, that holi- 
ness in man is the gift of God, we must believe that God 
jmijjoses to give a new heart or holiness to all to whom he 
does give it ; and that if he begins the work, and carries it on, 
and finishes it in eternal glory, he designed to do what he does. 
For who will say that God ever acts without design ; that he 
does any thing without intending to do it ? Is that grace of 
the Holy Spirit which is to produce, perpetuate, and bless 
God's redeemed kingdom, directed by chance? Does igno- 
rance or fate sit at the helm of the universe and sway its des- 
tinies? Are we to look forward only to its results, in dark- 
ness, terror, and dismay ? or is there a designing God on the 
throne ? 

ISTor will any one who believes that there is a God, hesitate 
to admit that he is omniscient and immutable. God then 
knows all his works from the beginning. The purposes of the 
eternal God are eternal purposes. If God actually renews, 
sanctifies, and saves a part only of mankind, he always knew 
that he should, and always designed to do it. 

Now I am happy, as I am confident, in the conviction that 
no one will deny this matter of fact. Whatever diversity of 
opinion may exist on other parts of this subject, in this plain 
matter of fact we must agree. We believe that a part only of 
mankind will be saved. We believe that their hearts will be 
changed by God's grace, and therefore must believe that God 
designs, and has from eternity designed, to change every heart 
which he does change. 

I need say no more on this point. We all know, and we 



376 ELECTION. 

all believe, that if God has made us Christians he meant 
to do it ; or in the language of the apostle, " of his own will 
begat he us." Without a feeling or a note of discord, Presby- 
terians, Episcopalians, Baptists, Methodists, are ready to join 
in the song, "Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy 
name give glory." 

I now proceed to consider — 

II. The doctrine of Election in its connection with some 
other doctrines or truths. Among these are the following : 

1. That Christ died for all men. He died as truly for one 
as for another ; for the non-elect as for the elect. " He gave 
himself a ransom for all." " He is a propitiation for our sins ; 
and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world." 
The sacrifice on Calvary has done this. There, on that hill, 
the Son of God dies ; and as he bows his head and exclaims, 
" It is finished," on earth and in heaven there is nothing great 
beside. Thus this world's Atonement is made. And now the 
message of divine mercy is sent forth to every dweller on the 
face of the whole earth, and its generous annunciation is, 
"The spirit and the bride say, come ; and let him that heareth 
say, come; and let him that is athirst, come; and whosoever 
will, let him take the water of life freely." Abundant provi- 
sion then is made for the salvation of every human being. 

2. All will he saved, if they will repent and believe the Gos- 
pel. The promise of life and the threatening of death are not 
made to men as elect or non-elect, but as penitent or impeni- 
tent, believing or unbelieving. To all who will repent and 
believe, the promise of life is sure. They have the oath of 
God for this. 

3. All men can repent and believe. All are free moral 
agents, as fully qualified to choose right as to choose wrong. 
Nothing therefore can prevent their compliance with the 
terms of life, but their own free, voluntary perverseness in sin. 
Neither the want of renewing grace, nor the purpose of God 
not to give it, can prevent, for they are fully qualified to com- 
ply without grace. Suppose a servant will not obey his mas- 
ter unless he gives him his estate in addition to his wages ; 
whose fault is it '( Who would say that the not giving of the 
estate prevented the servant's obedience ? Plainly he could, 
and therefore ought to have obeyed without the gift. So the 
want of grace does not prevent the sinner's repentance, for this 



THE WILL OF GOD. 377 

plain reason, lie can repent without grace. Let him do what 
he can and he performs all his duty, for God requires him 
to love only with all his strength. Let him do what he can, 
and a universe cannot prevent his repentance. "Whether there 
is any grace for him or not, he is a moral agent, and let 
him not blame God because he himself will not do what he 
can and ought to do, even his whole duty. 

4. It is the will of God, or his unqualified preference, that 
all men should comply with the terms of life rather than con- 
tinue in sin. He is " not willing," saith the apostle, " that any 
should perish, but that all should come to repentance." By 
the same authority we are told, that he " will have all men to 
be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth." And 
again by the mouth of his prophet: " As I live, saith the Lord, 
I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the 
wicked turn from his way and live." And yet again : " Have 
I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die, saith the Lord 
God, and not that he should return from his ways and live ?" 
ISTow observe here, that we are not told what God will do or 
ivill not do, but what he would that men shoxdcl do. It is not 
said that God will bkdtg all men to repentance, but that it is 
his will that they should come to repentance ; not that he will 
turn the wicked from his way, but that it is his pleasure that 
the wicked himself shoidd turn, rather than go on in sin and 
die. This is what he says when he could swear by no greater, 
swearing by himself. Can there be any mistake here % Is the 
language ambiguous ? Is the oath of God false ? No. God 
would that all men, elect or non-elect, should turn and live, 
rather than sin and die. 

I am not saying that God will change the appointed system 
of influence, or in other words, do those things which may be 
necessary to secure the repentance of the non-elect sinner. To 
do this, to change in the least the influence which he in his 
wisdom has appointed to be used with each, would be worse 
than to leave the sinner to his choice under the influence ap- 
pointed. It would result in more evil than good. This princi- 
ple is distinctly laid down and applied by our Lord to this very 
subject, when he teaches us that it were better to leave the 
tares among the wheat rather than to destroy the wheat by 
pulling up the tares. So a kind father may most sincerely and 
earnestly desire the return of a disobedient son to his duty and 



378 ELECTION. 

his home. But it by no means follows that he will, or that he 
ought to clo all that he can, and all that may be necessary, to 
secure the return of the prodigal. This might occasion the 
disobedience and ruin of all his other children, or occasion 
some other evil that would be worse than to leave the prodigal 
to his own perverseness. So God will not change the degree 
of influence which his wisdom has appointed, for the sake of 
bringing sinners to repentance ; he will not occasion a greater 
evil to prevent a less. Still God does all that he can wisely do 
to bring every sinner to repentance ; he does this at every 
moment of his probation ; he does it with the yearnings of the 
tenderest father, yea with the compassion of a God ; he de- 
sires, he longs, that under the influence he uses, every sinner 
should repent and live, rather than sin another moment. 

5. Is~ot a human being will comjrty with the terms of life 
without divine grace. Abundant as is the provision for the sal- 
vation of all, unqualified as are the overtures of pardon and 
life, free as men are from all preventing influence from God, 
abundantly able as they are as moral agents to comply with 
the terms of salvation, and willing, yea solicitous as God is that 
they should comply and be saved, not one will do it. Left to 
themselves, each and all of them will persist in rejecting 
Christ, and by their own choice plunge into perdition. I wish 
you to look at this world of sinners in this condition. Noth- 
ing but voluntary, willful perverseness can ruin one of them. 
Yet with all that eternal mercy has done, with the same pow- 
ers and faculties in kind which angels possess, yea, made in this 
respect in the very image of God (Jas. iii. 9), and invited and 
allured by all the entreaties and proffers of redeeming grace — 
in defiance of all the motives a universe can furnish — they 
will go down to hell, if the interposing grace of God does not 
prevent. 

6. In the midst of all this darkness, with no prospect before 
the whole race but that of self-ruin, God interposes with the 
purpose of Election. He not only prefers that all should re- 
pent and be saved rather than sin and die, but he purposes that 
some shall repent and be saved. He is not willing that his be- 
loved Son should die in vain, and see no reward for his agonies 
and death ; nor can he consent that all these creatures of his 
power and objects of his love, perverse as they are, should re- 
main in eternal alienation and exile from his friendship. He 



THE BEST CONCEIVABLE SYSTEM. 379 

who knew how to create mind, knows how to influence it in a 
way that accords with its nature, and with the nature of free 
moral action. He resolves therefore to interpose, so far as he 
wisely can, with such an influence — one which is over, and 
above, and distinct from the influence of truth and motives, 
even the power of his Spirit, and by this to overcome the per- 
verseness of a part of our guilty race. His purpose is not to 
save them from any physical necessity — from any compulsory 
power that pushes them onward to perdition against their will ; 
but to save them from going down to the pit by their own free 
choice, and by an influence which he knows exactly how to use 
for the purpose, to bring them to choose life just as freely 
as they now choose death. And this he resolves to do, after 
having done every thing in the form of motive, persuasion, 
and entreaty worthy of God, to prevent their ruin, and done it 
in vain. 

There is one thing more in respect to this purpose of God, to 
which I request particular attention, as constituting the key to 
all the difficulties on the subject. 

7. God purposes to secure the holiness of as 'many of his 
moral creatures as it is possible in the nature of things thai he 
should secure. 

That we may see this clearly, I remark that a moral system 
is the best conceivable system. IN" o other creative act could so 
unfold the wisdom and power of God as that which gives ex- 
istence to moral beings. No other creatures could so resemble 
God himself. Without them, the ascending scale of being from 
mere animal existence toward God himself had been a chasm; 
the universe a solitary waste, exhibiting only the barren mag- 
nificence of rocks and deserts. Moral beings alone can con- 
trive, design, and produce good to any extent worthy of notice. 
How imperfect would be a system in which mere animal sensa- 
tion should take the place of holy affections and holy activity, 
with all their blessedness ; in which there should be no acts of 
intelligent communion between the Creator and his creatures ; 
no acts of kindness done by God to intelligent recipients ; no 
song of praise returning the testimonies of gratitude to a divine 
benefactor ; no oneness of purpose nor acts of mutual co-oper- 
ation ; no beings with capacities to discern between right and 
wrong — between God and other objects of affection \ none to 
admire, to adore, to love, to trust, to enjoy God; and Gocl sit- 



380 ELECTION. 

ting on his throne the solitary spectator of the laws of matter 
and of the acts of instinct. But what magnificence is there in 
a moral system ! Here are beings which no man can number 
created in God's image ; fit to correspond with God ; meet for 
immortality ; qualified to be workers together with God to ad- 
vance his designs, and to be one with him amid the scenes and 
grandeurs of eternity. We say that such a system is the best, 
and that infinite benevolence must adopt it. 

Again : JSfo beings can be so happy as perfectly holy beings, 
and of course, no kingdom so happy as that in which should 
reign the purity and the joys of perfect and universal holiness. 
This we know. We know from the nature of the mind, that 
holiness and not sin is the necessary means of the highest con- 
ceivable happiness. A perfectly holy mind is perfectly blessed. 
We know it from the character of God. To be like God in 
character, is to be like God in blessedness. We know it from 
the nature of his law. God's law requires the best kind of 
moral action, and perfect obedience to it is perfection in char- 
acter and in happiness. We know it from the nature of sin. 
Sin is evil in itself, in its nature ; evil in all its tendencies, 
wholly evil. Sin is hell. God therefore, as a benevolent God, 
must purpose to produce the greatest amount of holiness which 
he can. For who will say that a benevolent God will not do 
all the good possible for him to do ? 

Besides, What is the law of God if it is not an expression of 
his icitt, i. e., of his preference of holiness to sin? God give 
a law, and not prefer that his subjects should obey rather than 
disobey ! It were an imposition and a mockery, — a burlesque 
on all legislation. But it is said " he prefers holiness to sin in 
itself considered, but sin to holiness all things considered." 
And what is this ? I will tell you what it is. It is as if a 
father should say to his child, " Be honest, and true, and sober, 
this is my law — this the rule by which you shall be judged ;" 
but then adds, " I prefer on the whole, all things considered, 
that you should cheat, and lie, and get drunk, rather than be 
honest, and true, and sober." Such is God as some would 
have ns believe ! He would rather, so they tell us, that men, 
all things considered, should do wrong than do right ! God 
himself the minister of sin ! No. God prefers, all things con- 
sidered, that men should do right ; fully obey his perfect law 
rather than sin once. Will he not then do all that is possi- 



THE NECESSITY FOE SIX. 381 

ble for him to do, to secure the entire holiness of the great- 
est number of moral subjects? Hear his own declaration: 
" What could have been done more to my vineyard that I 
have not done in it?" Deny this, and you make God the 
friend, approver, and patron of sin. 

But we are told that " sin is the necessary means of the 
greatest good." And can this be so ? Sin the best kind of 
moral action ! To rebel against God the best thing a man 
can do ! To hate God, and angels, and men, and to act ac- 
cordingly ! This the best way to bless the universe ! Must 
some men become devils, to glorify God and make his creation 
happy ? Bat it is said, " If there had been no sin, God could 
never have glorified his mercy in redemption." It is true in- 
deed that God could never have redeemed from sin if there 
had been no sin. But what kind of mercy is that which pro- 
duces evil merely for the sake of putting an end to it ? Does 
a kind father push his children into a pit, or clown a precipice, 
for the sake of showing how merciful he can be in bringing 
deliverance and in healing their broken bones ? Does a be- 
nevolent God design, and so order his providence, that our 
whole race shall fall into the gulf of sin and ruin, for the sake 
of showing his mercy in their rescue ; and this when he could 
as well have preserved them and all other beings in the purity 
and joys of perfect holiness forever ? Or does it better accord 
with God's character to suppose, that when men have freely 
plunged themselves into this ruin, against his law and against 
his will, God then comes in the glory of his mercy, to redeem 
and save ? This were indeed work for mercy — for God's mercy ; 
and what else deserves the name ? Push your children over 
the precipice ; then fly to their relief, and tell them that you 
have broken their bones and mangled their flesh for the sake 
of showing them how merciful you could be in restoring them 
again to health and soundness ! Call this mercy if you will ; 
but Oh, ascribe not such mercy to our Gocl ! 

It is also said, that " the sin and sufferings of the lost are 
necessary to the highest happiness of the saved" But can it 
be ? Gocl doom some of his creatures to everlasting sin and 
everlasting fire, as the necessary means of higher happiness to 
another portion, which otherwise they could not possess ! Are 
celestial spirits made happier by the smoke of the torment of 
the damned, than they possibly could have been had there been 



382 ELECTION. 

no sin ? Do they actually praise and thank God for that pecul- 
iar delight — those higher and exquisite raptures which they 
derive from the sins and agonies of others in everlasting burn- 
ings ? Would not these benevolent spirits — would not God, 
think you, have gladly dispensed with these peculiar joys, and 
been satisfied with the perfect holiness and perfect happiness 
of his moral creation ? Or must there be sin, with all its tur- 
pitude, and groans, and anguish, that God and other holy be- 
ings may be perfectly happy ? Who shall prove, that were 
the moral universe a heaven of perfect holiness — and of course 
of perfect blessedness — it would not be a happier universe than 
one with a hell in it ? Look up to the paradise of God, and 
then down on the lake of fire, and say, had there been no sin, 
and no necessity fur punishment — had all been like God in 
character, whether the universe had not been perfectly happy ? 
Who then shall say that God could secure such a result, and 
secure it for eternity, and yet would not ? 

But I shall be told that this is denying GocVs omnipotence — 
limiting his power. I reply, that it is not limiting the power 
of God to say that he cannot accomplish impossibilities. Om- 
nipotence is not power to make a thing to be and not to be at 
the same time. The question then is, not whether God is om- 
nipotent, but whether there is not an impossibility in the very 
nature of things, that God should secure universal holiness in 
his moral kingdom? Every subject of such a kingdom must 
be a free agent ; i. e., he must possess the power to sin, and to 
continue in sin, in defiance of all that God can do to prevent 
him. If God destroys this power,he destroys his moral agency, 
and then even God cannot make him holy. With this power, 
he can set at defiance all influence from truth and motives — 
from the spirit and power of God, and go on in sin. How do 
you know, how can you prove that he will not do this — that he 
will not do what he can do ? If he should do what he can do, 
God could not prevent his sinning. This would be to suppose 
that he should sin, and be prevented from sinning, which is a 
contradiction. But it will be said, " God does prevent some from 
sinning • why can he not prevent all ?" I grant God prevents 
some, and will prevent very many ; yea, I will grant that he 
could have prevented all sin that has existed, and that now 
exists, and will exist for myriads of ages to come. But sup- 
pose this to be done. God must do something which he has 



IS GOD THUS LIMITED? o5d 

not clone ; something which lie has determined not to do ; he 
must change the appointed system of influence (for all the 
sin that has ever existed would certainly take place under 
the present system) ; he must resort, in order to prevent any 
sin, to some further interpositions than those determined on, 
and who then could tell the results in eternity ? Who can 
say that the interposition requisite to remove the tares will 
not destroy the wheat ; that if he prevents rebellion in one 
place, or at one time, it will not break out in worse forms 
in another ? Who can say, that if God were to change his 
appointed system of influence in one iota ; if he were to bring- 
to repentance one sinner whom he has determined not to bring 
to repentance, that the result would not be the hopeless, and, 
to him, the irretrievable revolt of the whole moral creation ? 
]STo one. God knows how to govern better than we can tell 
him. He can not govern moral beings by physical power, nor 
by machinery. Moral government is the government of free, 
uncompelled, voluntary moral agents, and God, if he adopts 
it, is restricted by its nature and its principles as truly as man 
is. God knows, as does every wise human legislator, that by 
securing the loyalty of one, or of a few, he may occasion the 
hopeless and eternal rebellion of many. Had God used any 
more influence, or brought one more sinner to repentance than 
he has, the standard of revolt might be seen waving on the 
very hills of salvation, and the cry of rebellion be heard tri- 
umphant from one end of heaven to the other. 

Will it still be said that I limit God f Xo. It is the ob- 
jector who does this, and in a manner the most dishonorable. 
He supposes that God can produce more holiness (and as holi- 
ness is the best kind of moral action, it follows that he can 
produce more happiness) than he does or will produce. God, 
then, does not produce all the good he can. He is not perfectly 
benevolent ; not good enough to bless the universe to the ex- 
tent of his power. I love and adore a God more who does all 
the good he can. Xone else is worthy of my love. Or if you 
say that holiness is not, but sin is the best kind of moral action, 
still you limit God, for then God can not secure the greatest 
good without sin as the means of it. And is not this limiting 
God ? God, you say, can not secure the greatest good by means 
of universal holiness. Without sin, and sin enough for the 
purpose, this great end can not be accomplished. God has not 



384 ELECTION. 

power, in the language of the objector, to clo it. Omnipotence 
itself is weakness here, without sin as the necessary means of 
this end ! Should all perform their duty perfectly and forever, 
God could not accomplish this high end ! If all should do the 
very thing which God commands them to do, the great end 
of his creation would be defeated ! He must have sin as the 
means of this end, or the end must fail ! He therefore dooms 
multitudes to endless sin and its miseries, that he may have 
wherewithal to make the universe perfectly blessed ! Such, 
we are told by some, is the glory of God's omnipotence. He 
is dependent on the wickedness of men and devils as the only 
means of accomplishing his purposes. These creatures of God 
are brought into existence that they may commit all that sin, 
and bear all that misery which are necessary, that an omnipo- 
tent God may bless in the highest degree his moral creation. 
Is this a basis for confidence and joy under his government, or 
cause for consternation and dismay ? 

But to come to the tnrning-point of this great question — 
why is there, why will there he forever, sin and misery under 
the government of a perfect God? And here it must be agreed 
by all who 'would vindicate the ways of God to man, that there 
is some limitation in the nature of things, in respect to the 
production, on the part of the Creator, of perfect unmingled 
happiness. An infinitely benevolent God would secure such a 
result were there no such impossibility. To deny such impos- 
sibility is to say that God might produce more happiness than 
he does produce, and this is to deny his benevolence. Here 
then we must rest. Here all do rest who believe that evil ex- 
ists and that God is good. The question then is simply this, 
where does this impossibility lie / in the nature of sin, or in 
the nature of a moral system f Is sin so good a thing that God 
can not produce the greatest good without it ? Is that which 
is wholly an evil — evil in all its tendencies and relations — the 
best thing as the means of good — even the necessary means of 
the greatest good ? Or is moral agency such a thing that some 
moral beings who can sin, will sin in despite of all that can be 
done to prevent them ? Which is the most rational ; to sup- 
pose that what cannot be, is, or to suppose that what can be, 
should be ? "Which is the most rational ; to suppose that sin, 
which can not be a good thing, is a good thing, or to suppose 
that moral agents who can sin, should sin ? 



THE GOOD N ESS OF GOD. 385 

trod, according to this view of the subject, has adopted a 
moral system as the only and the best means of accomplishing 
the high ends of infinite goodness y he has adopted it notwith- 
standing he foresaw that some moral agents would pervert their 
high powers of moral agency, and that sin and suffering would 
follow ; he purposed these results rather than not adopt the 
best system, still determining to secure the greatest good in his 
power, and knowing that the results would make the fullest, 
brightest manifestation of his attributes in the production of 
good, which he could make ; doing all which was possible, to 
secure the perfect holiness and happiness of each and of all, 
consistently with securing the perfect holiness of the greatest 
number; and doing it with the most unqualified preference of 
the holiness and happiness of all, to the sin and misery of any ; 
giving to all the strong confirmation of his oath that so it is ; 
calling them to his friendship and favor with all the tenderness 
of redeeming love, even to brokenness of heart in view of that 
perverseness which forces upon him the necessity of punish- 
ment ; and at last giving up the incorrigible to their merited 
doom, with the sorrows of parental bereavement, because in 
despite of every effort which his wisdom, and goodness, and 
grace could make to save them, they would sin and die. 

REMARKS. 

1. In the view of our subject now taken, how illustrious an 
exhibition of the goodness of God is made in the creation and 
government of moral beings ! The true and just criterion of 
goodness is the good designed, and not that which is produced. 
It is no impeachment of a father's kindness, that its results are 
impaired or prevented by the child's perverseness. The ques- 
tion is, what was the good designed, aimed at, sought ? What 
was the result intended I By this criterion let the goodness of 
God be estimated. What are the beings created ? The most 
like God which God could make ; made in God's image and 
destined to immortality. 

'• Oh. what a patrimony this ! a being 
Of such inherent strength and majesty, 
Not worlds possess' d can raise it: worlds destroy' d 
Can't injure : which holds on its glorious course. 

When thine. Nature, ends." 

M There is but one thing," says Augustine, " greater than a 
25 17 



386 ELECTION. 

soul, and that one is its Creator." Such in dignity and grandeur 
are all the myriads of moral beings to whom God has given 
and will give existence. What now is the real, actual design 
of God in their creation? To render them one and all like 
himself in character, and like himself in blessedness. Such is 
the result designed ; such, uncounteracted, had been the actual 
result ; such is the measure of the Creator's goodness. Head, 
if you would read it aright, read the goodness of God in a moral 
creation thus holy, thus happy ; read it in the purity and joys 
of universal holiness, and thus answering the "great idea" of 
Him who made it. 

But this world revolted — strange alienation of the thing 
formed from him who formed it — this world revolted from its 
Maker. Still, has he relinquished or changed the great design 
of his goodness toward it ? Is it a justly incensed Creator tak- 
ing vengeance on his revolted creation that we see ? No ; it is 
a redeeming God. It is God in Christ reconciling the world 
to himself. The great design in man's creation is not aban- 
doned. Like the sun it still pours forth its light and warmth 
on this dark world ; counteracted in its results, but still unob- 
scurecl in its splendors. Resistance only gives new intensity 
and new luster to its beams. Read this design of God in his 
unspeakable gift, in the sacrifice that atones for every particle 
of guilt in this sinful world ; read it in the terms of life, — "who- 
soever will, let him take the water of life freely." Read it in 
those high powers of yours by which heaven and hell are 
placed at your own disposal ; in those accents of entreaty more 
tender than angels use. Read it in his oath, that he has no 
pleasure at all in your death ; in that purpose of electing love, 
formed in view of man's perverseness, to renew and save all 
that he wisely can; in those proofs of love, those intimations 
of grace and glory that gladden every moment of life. Read 
it in the song of angels, — " glory to God in the highest, and on 
earth peace, good-will — good- will toward men;" in the com- 
mission of the swift messenger who bears these glad tidings to 
all. Read it in the tears of mercy with which Jesus points 
you to the crown of life ; in the stilled tempest of God's wrath 
and the smiles of his inviting love. Read, Oh, read the design 
of a redeeming God as you would, were it uncounteracted by 
sin, and fully accomplished in the everlasting life and glory of 
all earth's millions. Such, such is God's design, counteracted 



THE SORROW OF THE LOST. 387 

by sill, but iinobscured. Such his goodness, shilling still in all 
irs brightness amid the darkness of sin ; the heart of infinite 
love fixed in all its fullness and intensity, and longings of de- 
sire on you, O sinner! Sin has not diminished the compassion, 
the kindness, the love of thy God. "Will you not yield to love 
like this ? How could the God who made you, love you more ? 
Can you still resist such a design of God, thy Maker? Is he 
not good ? Is he not sincere ? Does he not now desire and 
long to bless and save you? Sinner j sinner, falling into hell 
as you are, trust thy God to save thee. 

2. With the view given of the doctrine of Election in this 
discourse, how overwhelming must be the reflections of the lost 
sinner ! Why did God elect others to holiness and everlast- 
ing life, and not him? Xot because God did not as really 
and as much prefer his repentance and salvation to his impen- 
itence and perdition, as he did theirs. When these things are 
compared in the case of every sinner, elect or non-elect ; when 
the question is, what God would that sinners should do, his pref- 
erence is absolute, unqualified; the same in respect to all. 
4, Xot willing that any should perish, but that all should come 
to repentance." Why then elect others, and not him ? Not 
because God desires his sin or his death as the necessary means 
of good. God has no pleasure that he die, but that he turn 
and live. Why then elect others, and not him? Not .because 
God cannot bring many sinners, or any individual sinner to 
repentance, who will be finally lost. Why then elect others, 
and not him ? Because, according to the view that has been 
given, there is nothing which God can do to bring him to re- 
pentance more than he has determined to do, without produc- 
ing more evil than good ; lest in rooting up the tares he should 
root up the wheat also. Because when God, in the true and 
proper import of the language, has done all he could to save 
him, i. e., all he could to save him consistently with securing 
the greatest number of perfectly holy beings in his moral 
kingdom, that sinner would persist in sin and die. The pur- 
.pose of God to save others, has not touched him. God desired 
not his death, but his repentance and life. God aimed at this, 
designed it, sought it with the overflowings of infinite love ; 
doing all that infinite love guided by infinite wisdom, could do 
to reclaim and save the giant rebel. Such are the circumstan- 
ces, such the condition of every sinner who shall be finally lost ; 



3SS ELECTION. 

God doing at every hour and moment of his probation, all that 
infinite love guided by infinite wisdom, can do to reclaim and 
save him ; God ever ready to welcome him to the embrace of 
everlasting mercy. 

And what is it to persist in sin and perish eternally in cir- 
cumstances like these ? What agonizing reflections await such 
a self-destroyer ! To know, and feel, and say forever, " God 
made me, that I might be happy. He redeemed me, that I 
might be happy. He invited and entreated reconciliation, that 
I might be happy. He opened heaven ; he pointed me to that 
crown of life ; he showed me that throne of glory, that I might 
be happy. He told me of the songs and joys of those ran- 
somed spirits whom I see in the heavens of his glory ; he took 
me as it were in the arms of his love ; he held me to the bosom 
of his mercy; lie mourned over me. I saw his heart turn 
within him, and his repentings kindle together. I heard the 
sounding of his bowels as he said, ' How shall I give thee up, 
Ephraim V But I broke away from the embrace of his mercy 
and plunged into hell. Yonder in the distance is the paradise 
of God. I see its holy, happy, acclaiming throng. There I 
might have been. There God desired I should be. But the 
great gulf is fixed. Time is no longer. Eternity has begun 
its ceaseless, rolling ages. In hell I am ruined, self-ruined." 



ELECTION. 

II.— THE MODE OF EXECUTING THE PUEPOSE OF ELECTION. 
"Seeing ye have purified your souls, in obeying the truth, through the Spirit.'" — 1 Pet. i. 22. 

Ix a former discourse I presented the doctrine of Election, 
as consisting in this simple matter of fact; viz., that God has 
eternally purposed to renew, sanctify^ and save a jxcrt only of 
mankind. I trace the connection of this doctrine with the fol- 
lowing scriptural truths; that God, by the Atonement, has made 
abundant provision for the salvation of every human being ; 
that all will be saved if they comply with the terms of salva- 
tion ; that all, considered as free moral agents, can comply 
with these terms ; that it is the will or purpose of God that 
all should do so rather than continue in sin ; that not a human 
being will comply without divine grace ; that it is in view of 
this fact of universal self-ruin, that God interposes with the 
purpose of Election ; and that God purposes to secure ulti- 
mately the perfect holiness of as many of his moral creatures 
as it is possible, in the nature of things, he should secure. 

The subject now proposed for consideration, is the manner in 
which God executes the purpose of Election. 

I know of no single passage of Scripture which so fully ex- 
hibits in one combination the material facts on this subject, as 
the text : " Ye have purified your souls, in obeying the truth 
through the Spirit" These are the four following : — 1. That 
the change produced in the sinner is his own act : " JTe have 
purified your souls.'' 2. That this change is the act of obedi- 
ence, or right moral action : " Ye have purified your souls in 
obeying.'' 3. That the act is in conformity to truth : " Ye 
have purified your souls in obeying the truth.'' 4. That the 
Spirit of God is the author of this change : 4; Ye have purified 
your souls in obeying the truth through the Spirit." 

I propose briefly to consider these four facts, and by them 
to test several opinions on the subject before us. The last 



390 ELECTION. 

mentioned, claims according to the order of things, the first 
consideration. 

1. The Spirit of God is the author of the change in Regener- 
ation. I cannot suppose it necessary to dwell on this fact 
in opposition to Pelagian error, or the proud self-sufficien- 
cy of the human heart. The fact of divine influence, in the 
production of holiness in the heart of man, meets us as it were 
on almost every page of the sacred record. What the fact is 
however, or what it involves in some respects, demands con- 
sideration. The necessity of this influence, as we have already 
said, arises solely from the sinner's perverseness in sin. 

Again : This influence of the Spirit when effectual, is unre- 
sisted. Obedience to truth cannot be produced by compul- 
sory power. Dr. Dwight says of this influence : " It is of 
such a nature that their wills, instead of attempting any re- 
sistance to it, coincide with it readily and cheerfully, without 
any force or constraint on his part, or any opposition on their 
own." President Edwards says : " The dispute about grace's 
being resistible or irresistible is perfect nonsense. For the 
effect of grace is on the will ; so that it is nonsense, unless a 
man with his will can resist his own will." The Synod of Dort 
says : " This divine grace of Regeneration does not act upon 
man like stocks and trees, nor take away the properties of the 
will, or violently compel it while unwilling ; out it spiritually 
vivifies, heals, corrects, and sweetly and at the same time 
powerfully inclines it." We have still higher authority. " Ex- 
cept," says the Saviour, " the Father who hath sent me, draws 
him." Mark the language. It is an influence that draws, not 
compels ; which attracts, not forces to duty. 

Again : This influence of the Spirit is distinct from the nat- 
urcd influence of the truth • and though not miraculous, is su- 
pernaturcd. This fact is asserted in the text and in many other 
passages of the Scriptures. The change is in view of truth, 
by the word of truth, and also through the Spirit. The text 
thus clearly teaches, that by the mere influence of truth and 
motives, the sinner will not be persuaded to the performance 
of his duty. The powers of moral suasion, truth, motives, 
persuasions, warnings, ]3romises, threatenings, eloquence, tears, 
the hope of heaven and the fear of hell, will not make him 
yield. " Paul may plant and Apollos water, but God giveth 
the increase. So then neither is he that planteth, any thing, 



THE CHANGE IN REGENERATION. 391 

nor lie that watereth, but God who giveth the increase." 
Every Christian will say, and exult to sing in eternal song, " By 
the grace of God I am what I am." 

2. The change in Regeneration is the sinner's own act. " Ye 
have purified your souls." Could it he said in plainer terms 
that the act of moral purification was their own ? " Ye have 
purified." Could it be said in plainer terms, ye have done 
it? If the Bible tells us any thing, if human language can 
say it, this book tells us that religion in the human heart 
consists in repenting of sin ; in believing on the Lord Jesus 
Christ. It is breaking off our sins by righteousness ; it is 
making a new heart and a new spirit ; it is doing the will of 
God from the heart ; it is ceasing to do evil and learning to do 
well ; it is amending, reforming our ways ; it is doing right- 
eousness ; it is choosing whom we will serve. In a word, it is 
loving Gocl ; and love is the fulfilling of the law. Can there 
be a doubt whether this language is a literal description of true 
religion in the soul of man? Can any better religion, any bet- 
ter change, be conceived of than these ? Does this language 
not describe mental action ; the right exercises of the heart ? 
Most undeniably. It ought then to settle this point finally and 
forever. 

But this is not all. How careful are the sacred writers to 
show us the same fact, even when they describe this change in 
the strong language of metaphor — the language which is so 
commonly perverted. It is a creation • but it is being created 
unto good works. If there can be a remaining doubt on this 
point, one text will remove it. " That ye put off the old man, 
and that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in 
righteousness and true holiness." It is a creation in righteous- 
ness and true holiness. And not only so, but Christians are 
said to put on the new man ; i. e., to do the thing- which is said 
to be created. The thing produced by the power of God is 
their own act — the act of putting on the new man. 

To show you that there is nothing novel or peculiar in this 
sort of theology, I give you the statement of President Ed- 
wards on this point. He says, speaking of this change, " God 
produces all, and we act all. For that is what he produces, 

Viz., OUR OWN ACTS." 

3. The change in Regeneration is a change from wrong to 
right moral action / it is the act of obedience. " Ye have purified 



302 ELECTION. 

jour souls in obeying." But as an act of obedience, it is one 
which God has commanded, and which the sinner is required and 
bound to perform. The change then in Regeneration is not a 
physical change ; not a change in any of the properties or powers 
of the soul, but a moral change. It is a change from wrong to 
right moral action. It is simply the sinner doing that identical 
thing which God requires him to do. But can sinners actu- 
ally do that which God requires, when they do nothing ? Can 
duty consist in merely being acted upon ? If God produces 
any other change in the mind than right moral action — if he 
produces any effect in whicli the mind is wholly passive, is this 
doing any thing on the part of the sinner ? Is this obeying 
God ? You may as well say that we obey the moral law of 
God in being created out of nothing ! Nor does this change 
consist in any thing more than, or in any thing different from, 
the act of obedience. Look into the Bible. There you will 
see that what God produces by his Spirit is the very thing 
which he requires in his commands. God gives a new heart. 
But his command to sinners is, "Make you a new heart." 
God works in them to will and to do. But his command is, 
that they work out their own salvation in willing and doing. 
God gives repentance. But his command is, " Repent and be 
converted." Love is the fruit of the Spirit. But the law is, 
" Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." Thus 
what God produces in the sinner by his Spirit, is the very thing 
which he requires in his commands. In giving a new heart, 
he brings the sinner to exercise those holy, right affections in 
which a new heart consists. The powers proximately exercised 
in these affections, are the mental powers or faculties of the 
sinner. It is not God who exercises these affections. A sin- 
ner loving God is surely not God loving himself. A sinner 
repenting of his sins is not God repenting of sin. The sinner 
must, from the very nature of the case, do all the loving and 
all the repenting. These moral acts are, and must be the sin- 
ner's own moral powers in exercise. Nothing can be moral 
acts, but moral powers in exercise. The right exercise or act 
is all his own. In the words of President Edwards, " What 
God produces are our own acts. It is our act and our duty." 
The sinner does that through grace which he is competent to 
do and ought to do without grace. Through grace he does 
his duty. 



CONFORMITY TO THE TEUTH. 393 

4. The fourth fact which I mention as presented in the text 
is, that the change in Regeneration is conformity to truth. 
" Ye have purified your souls in obeying the truth." " Of his 
own will," saith another apostle. " begat he us with the word 
of truth." And another, "Being born again by the word of 
God." "The law of the Lord," saith the Psalmist, "is per- 
fect, converting the soul." Such is the testimony of the sacred 
writers on this point, and there is not a word or a fact in the 
Scriptures to show that the change in Regeneration ever did 
or ever will take place, except through the truth. 

When I say that the change in Regeneration is through the 
truth, I mean that the mind acts or exercises right affections in 
view of truth, or of the objects which truth presents. Truth 
presents the things to be done; the objects, the motives, the 
reasons, in view of which the mind must act. It tells us what 
God is, what Christ is, what sin is, what heaven and hell are, 
what the terms of life are, what man is, and what he must be. 
It is the light which shows God to the mind in his excellence 
and glory, as the object of supreme affection, that we may 
love him. It shows the Lord Jesus mighty to save, and will- 
ing, yea solicitous, to save every soul for which he died ; and 
this to call forth a fearless, unfaltering, delightful confidence 
in him as our Saviour. It shows sin to us in all its turpitude 
and odiousness, as the governing principle of conduct in our 
own hearts, that we may abhor and renounce it. It shows us 
the principle of holiness, in its beauty, dignity, and excellence, 
that we may assume it as our own and act from it henceforth 
and forever. It shows us in the man Christ Jesus a perfect 
model; the most attractive, lovely object in the created uni- 
verse ; a perfect moral character, that we may be like him. It 
shows us the bright path of duty and the joyous field of holy 
activity, in which we may do the perfect will of God, live 
under the light of his countenance, and as workers together 
with him, advance his designs. It points us to the dark preci- 
pice of damnation ; it lifts up the everlasting doors that we 
may flee from the wrath to come and lay hold on eternal life. 
Thus the sinner in Regeneration acts through the truth. In its 
light he sees what God is, and loves him ; sees what Christ is, 
and trusts his lost soul to his keeping; sees what sin is, and hates 
and renounces it ; sees what the service of God is, and chooses 
it. Thus the sinner "purifies his soul in obeying the truth." 

17* 



394: ELECTION. 

I have thus briefly presented the four great facts on the sub- 
ject before us. They amount to this, that in Regeneration, the 
sinner, in view of truth and through the influence of the Holy 
Spirit, does his duty. Through grace, the sinner, as a free, vol- 
untary, accountable subject of God, obeys him. This is the 
great change, the glorious transformation of moral beings in 
moral character. This is that work of God, which tames, and 
softens, and subdues the spirit of rebellion, and changes it into 
the spirit of obedience — the spirit of heaven; transforms what 
would become the un quenched hate and malice of an infernal, 
into what will become a seraph's love. This is that new crea- 
tion, compared with which " the former shall not be remem- 
bered nor come into mind.'' 

If any should be curious to inquire how can these things be, 
or what is the precise mode of the Spirit's operation beyond 
what is involved in the facts now stated, I answer, no man 
knows, no man can tell what it is. To any one who says it 
must be this or that particular mode and can be no other, I 
should say, u There are more things in heaven and earth than 
your philosophy has dreamt of." He who knew how to create 
a mind, may know many ways in which he can influence mind, 
— ways in which he can secure mental action in perfect accord- 
ance with its nature as mental action. "We have one class of 
facts which furnish an illustration. By that influence of the 
Spirit of God which we call inspiration, he produced in the 
minds of the sacred writers and the first preachers of Christian- 
ity, intellectual acts — thoughts, acts of memory and of reason- 
ing, views of truth, which otherwise would not have existed 
in their minds. Still, these were as truly their own mental acts 
as any other. They thought, they remembered, they rea- 
soned. So in Regeneration, God can produce moral acts or 
exercises in the mind which otherwise would not exist, and 
which shall be as truly moral acts, and the acts or exercises of 
the sinner's own powers and his own acts, as were they to take 
place without divine influence. Without creating new pow- 
ers, God can bring the sinner to use aright those he already 
possesses. He can bring the sinner to love him and to repent 
of sin, and yet the sinner do all the loving and all the repent- 
ing. The reality of this divine influence is known by the 
results, not by the mode of their production. " The wind blow- 
etli where it listeth, and thou nearest the sound thereof, but 



THE SINNER MUST ATTEND. 395 

canst not tell whence it coraeth nor whither it goeth. So is 
every one that is born of the Spirit." The omniscient God 
knows how to produce, and does produce by his word and by 
his Spirit, right moral acts or exercises in the mind, in a way 
perfectly consistent with their nature. This is enough for us 
to know. 

Having thus attempted to explain and establish the four 
great facts stated in the text, I now propose to test by these 
facts certain opinions respecting the manner in which God ex- 
ecutes the purpose of Election ; proceeding on this principle, 
that whatever is involved in these facts is true, and whatever 
is inconsistent with them is false. I remark — 

1. That the manner in which God executes the purpose of 
Election, involves an earnest, serious attention to truth on the 
part of the sinner. By this I intend that thoughtfulness, that 
sober, solemn thinking of the objects which truth presents ; 
that wakeful sensibility to these objects which are necessary to 
secure their effect on the mind in right moral exercises or ac- 
tion. It is easy to see, that neither the truth nor the Spirit of 
God can influence the mind through the truth, if the truth be 
not thought of. It is easy to see also, that it may be reflected 
on, and yet the sensibilities may be so held back, checked, re- 
strained, or so engrossed with other objects, that its influence 
shall be wholly counteracted. In this way it may fall as the 
rain and distill as the dew, but it falls on the cold rock. On the 
other hand, truth may be so thought of, especially God's truth, 
that it shall bear on the spirit like the pressure of great moun- 
tains, and so that the sinner can not rest in sin ; so that thought, 
feeling, emotion, shall be occupied with what eternal truth tells 
him ; so that he shall even tremble like a dying immortal fall- 
ing into damnation ; so that the world shall lose its attractions 
and its charms in view of the ruin that awaits him ; and so 
that he shall put himself with the earnestness of such a condi- 
tion to instant compliance with the terms of mercy. Let it 
not be forgotten however, that no duty is done — no duty is or 
can be done, until the supreme affections of the heart are fixed 
on Gocl. Attention to truth is an indispensable preliminary to 
a right act of the heart. But no sinner is the better merely 
for his attention or thoughtfulness, nor for his anxieties and 
trembling, nor for any attempts to love God until he does love 
him. ISTor is there, so far as we know, any attention to truth 



396 ELECTION. 

which, the sinner will in fact give, which creates any certainty 
that the heart will be changed. On this question we can 
neither affirm nor deny. God has not told us that there is a 
certain connection between any preliminary acts of the sinner 
and his conversion. The soul is never safe until the heart is right. 
We see sinners, so far as the human eye can judge, returning to 
sin from every degree of anxiety and earnestness, and can not 
therefore assert any certain connection between preliminary 
acts and a new heart; nor yet can we assert the contrary. 

Two things however we can say. Many who give attention 
to the subject are converted ; and none are converted who do 
not. So it was in the days of Christ and his apostles. So it 
has been in the revivals of later days. Many, not to say most 
of those who think, and feel, and are in earnest on the subject 
of religion, become Christians. But I speak of those only 
who take up the subject and enter on the work, as one which 
is to be done because heaven and hell depend on the doing of 
it. Look the world over, and you never knew or heard of the 
conversion of an unconcerned, heedless sinner. The conver- 
sion of the jailer, of Lydia, of Matthew, of the woman of Sa- 
maria, of the Ethiopian eunuch, of three thousand on the day 
of Pentecost — of each, of all, was through the truth and at- 
tention to truth. Even the conversion of Saul of Tarsus was 
not achieved till he was an awakened, distressed sinner. The 
Bible, as we have seen, affirms that Regeneration is through 
the truth. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that it 
should be otherwise. A sinner love God without thinking of 
him, without feeling his obligations to love him, without at- 
tempting to love him ! Believe in Christ without a thought of 
Christ ! Repent of sin without a thought of it ! Never. The 
Holy Spirit will not convert a sinner while remaining thought- 
less of his God, of his Saviour, and of his own soul. I care 
not what else is true of him, be he who he may, while he 
sleeps in sin, God will not convert him. Elect or non-elect, 
'tis death. Elect or non-elect, so sure as there is a hell, he 
who remains careless in his sins is the victim of its woes. 

On the contrary, let the sinner awake to the great concern 
of his salvation, and there is, we do not say an infallible cer- 
tainty of his conversion, but there is all the hope which he can 
have, while there is nothing but despair without his so doing. 
Let him under the pressure of his necessities as a guilty, lost, 



HOTT SHOULD THE SIXXEE ACT. 397 

perishing sinner, bring himself to the point of complying with 
the terms of mercy, to the point of giving his heart at once to 
God in view of what God is, and his soul to Christ in view of 
what Christ is. Let him take it up as a concern now on hand. 
and put himself to it with the urgency of a present achieve- 
ment, as that which may be done, which must be done, and 
which may as well be done now as ever ; as that which, if it 
can not be done now, there is decisive proof that it never can 
be done ; and more than all, as that which must never be 
abandoned. Let him thus put himself, the whole man, to the 
point of duty ; to the very act of giving his heart to God, and 
who shall say, that by the grace of God it will not be done ? 
Peradventure, God will give him repentance. Neither man 
nor angel can say, that in that same moment such a sinner will 
not, by the grace of God, become a child of God, and an heir 
of his glory. 

2. The manner in which God executes the purpose of Elec- 
tion, requires that the sinner should act in performing Ms duty 
in precisely the same manner as he would were he not depend- 
ent on God. Some there are who suppose that the sinner has 
nothing to do in this work ; that he is to take the attitude of a 
mere recipient ; that he is to regard himself simply as the sub- 
ject of an effect ; a being not to act, but to be acted upon, and 
at most, as one who, by his unholy prayers, is to induce God, 
if he can, to change his heart. But let us remember the facts. 
The change in Regeneration is a change from wrong to right 
moral action ; and right moral action is the right exercise of 
moral powers. There is no necessity for the creation of any 
new powers, and no necessity for any other act than the right 
exercise of powers already existing. Ko new or other duty 
devolves on the sinner, because he, by his perverseness in sin, 
is dependent on God. The self-same thing is still his duty ; 
the self-same thing is to be done, and to be clone in precisely 
the same manner or mode of acting as were he not dependent. 
But can the sinner perform right moral action without even a 
thought or suspicion that right moral action is what he has 
to do ? The thing to be done, and the only thing in his view, 
is not the right use of moral powers already possessed, but 
the actual creation of such powers by God. "Will he then at- 
tempt to use powers aright which are yet to be created ? Be- 
lieving that he has no soul, or at best only a part of a soul, will 



398 ELECTION. 

lie ever exercise, or attempt to exercise that repentance, or 
faith, or love, for which as yet he supposes he has no capacity ? 
He will never think of it. He will stand there till he dies, 
waiting for God to do what, in his view, God only can do. 
And now, is this the impression which ought to be made, which 
the Bible is designed to make ? Ko. The sinner must take 
the attitude of an agent, the attitude of a doer. Something is 
to be done on the part of the sinner. And the thing, and the 
only thing to be done on his part, as a moral agent, is right 
moral action, and he must put himself directly to its perform- 
ance. And be it remembered, that if God ever changes a 
sinner's heart, it will be, not when the sinner is trying to make 
God give him a new heart, but when he is trying to give his 
heart to God. Every thing that God does in this work is to 
bring the sinner to act right ; to exercise right moral affections. 
Every thing in the Bible is designed and intended to put the 
sinner to the performance of right action. Every command, 
call, entreaty ; every promise and every threatening, shuts the 
sinner up to the act of duty. God and his Son, prophets and 
apostles, call the sinner to the act of duty. This is required, 
and every thing but this is prohibited on pain of endless death. 
" Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.'- " Make you a new heart." 
" Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ." " Except ye repent, ye 
shall all likewise perish." The most distinct and loudest sum- 
mons from the throne of the Eternal : " My son, give me thine 
heart ;" and every voice of truth, every accent of mercy, every 
denunciation of wrath, heaven, earth, judgment, hell, echo the 
call. Do it ! do it ! 

Do you say that the sinner has no power to change his heart? 
You contradict one of the facts. A new heart is the right ex- 
ercise of moral powers. Without the-power in the sinner, how 
can even God give him a new heart ; how cause powers to act 
which do not exist? Or, if you say that God gives the power, 
still new power is not a new heart ; is not a holy heart. The 
possession of moral powers is not the right use of moral pow- 
ers. These may all exist and still be perverted. Surely it is 
no proof that a being will do right because he has the power 
to do so, nor yet is the fact that he does wrong, any proof that 
he has not power to do right. 

No power ! Have you ever read the law of God ? and if 
you have, do you not know that what God requires, and all 



GRACE NOT IRRESISTIBLE. 399 

he requires is, that the sinner love with all his heart, all his 
mind, all his soul, all his strength ? Do yon not know that if 
the sinner were thus to love God with all his powers, he would 
be a perfectly holy man ? And if God were to bring him to 
do this without giving him any new powers, would not this be 
Regeneration ? Would not this be a holy heart ? And does 
the sinner then need any new powers? Has the sinner no 
power, when he would be absolutely and perfectly holy, would 
he love God with all the power he has ? Away with this An- 
tinomian license to sin ; this plea for legalized rebellion against 
the living God ! My Hearers, if a man were to tell me under 
the solemnity of an oath, that he has no power to obey God, I 
would not charge him with willful perjury, but I should fear- 
lessly say, You know better. What, not know better than to 
say that you have not ability to love God with all your power ; 
cannot do what you can do ! 

But it may be said, the grace of God is irresistible grace / so 
that when this grace is given, the sinner is converted whether 
he acts or does not act. Nothing depends on what he shall 
do or shall not do. I appeal again to the facts. The change in 
Regeneration is moral action. And can such action be com- 
pelled action ? According to this scheme, the sinner would 
be a volunteer dragged to his duty. Would this be holy obe- 
dience to God? God, by the mere force of omnipotence, crushes 
the moral agency of the sinner in producing moral action ; 
makes the sinner willing against his will, and actually secures 
moral action by rendering moral action impossible ! And can 
these things be ? — the sinner will choose both ways at once ! 
Choose right, and at the same time choose not to choose right ! 
Love God with a heart wholly averse to God ! Love and hate 
at the same time ! Is such the absurd achievement of the ^race 
of God in the conversion of the sinner ? True, sinners are de- 
pendent on the grace of God. They come to Christ only when 
the Father draws them. Mark the word — when the Father 
draws them. It is an influence that draws, not compels ; that 
attracts, not forces to duty ; an influence which perfectly ac- 
cords with the free, unconstrained, voluntary nature of moral 
action ; an influence as attractive as the glories of his own 
Godhead ; moving upon, softening, melting the rebel's heart 
like the love of Jesus, and persuasive as the accents of his 
mercy. It never violates the freedom of the sinner's act ; never 



400 ELECTION. 

crosses the laws of voluntary action ; never dispenses with the 
true and proper exercise of every moral power of the moral 
agent. It is an influence which the sinner can, and often does 
resist ; an influence to which lie himself must yield, and yield- 
ing to which, he would be drawn by its mysterious, heavenly 
attractions to the bosom of his God. 

Thus every thing conspires to show you that the sinner is to 
put himself to the act of duty exactly as he would, as to the 
manner of doing it, were he not dependent, The influence of 
the Spirit of God modifies nothing, changes nothing in the 
manner of performing right action. It is still, though done 
through the Spirit, the self-same thing on the part of the sin- 
ner ; the same free, voluntary, moral act which it would be, 
and done in the same manner in which it would be, were it to 
be done without a divine influence. This influence, though dis- 
tinct from that of truth and motives, is yet in perfect harmony 
with it, and both combine and bear in the same direction and 
tend to the same result, viz., to produce right moral action. 
In a manner unknown to us, God, by his truth and by his 
Spirit, aims to enlist all the moral powers of the soul in the 
performance of right moral action. What the sinner has to 
do, is to accord with this design, by putting hi;nself — all his 
powers — directly to the act of duty. His understanding, in 
the form of solemn thought, must be exercised in apprehending, 
knowing, seeing what the objects of right affection are. Sen- 
sibility must wake up, and feeling and emotion must associate 
with thought, — feeling in all the forms of hope, and fear, and 
desire, and a sense of obligation and duty. The heart must 
be applied to right objects in the form of love and preference, 
softening in contrition and godly sorrow for sin ; the will 
must be fixed in the form of choice, of full purpose, in one re- 
solve, immutable, to serve the living God. This is right moral 
action. To this, God by his truth, through his Spirit, would 
bring the sinner. Let the sinner then who would not resist 
God and his grace, yield himself, heart and soul, to these in- 
fluences. Let him do it, as to the manner of doing it, just as 
he would had he never heard whether there be any Holy 
Ghost. Let him think of God, his character, his relations. 
Let him look thoughtfully on that Being whose glories enrap- 
ture all heaven. Let him yield his heart in supreme and ever- 
lasting love to that perfect Being ; and when he loves, when 



WHEN HE SHOULD BEGIN. 401 

he can say, " Whom have I in heaven but thee, and there is 
none upon the earth that I desire beside thee ;" then let him 
add, in grateful praise, " By the grace of God I am what I am." 

3. The manner in which God executes the purpose of Elec- 
tion, shows, that the tinner under the call to duty, should begin 
the work of duty without waiting for God to do more than he 
is noio doing. Appeal again to the facts. The change in Re- 
generation is " obeying the truth through the Spirit ;" and 
God's call to duty is truth. Truth brought to the mind of the 
sinner is always felt. And nothing prevents him, when truth 
is in his thoughts, from becoming at once a convicted and a 
converted sinner, but his own voluntary resistance of the truth. 
Do you say the effect in conviction, however slight, is to be 
ascribed to a divine influence attending the truth f Be it so, 
and God forbid that I should authorize a doubt on that point. 
But ought the sinner now to resist this combined influence of 
truth and the Holy Spirit, or to yield to it ? Ought he to say, 
and ought you to confirm him in the opinion, that God must 
do more for him than he is now doing, in order that he may 
put himself at once to the performance of his duty ? Ought 
he to make light of God's commands and God's grace, and say 
all this is nothing, something more must be done, and thus re- 
main in the firmest attitude of resistance, aggravating his guilt 
and endangering his soul ? 

But you say, the sinner resists what God is now doing, and 
he will resist unless God does more. Yes, the sinner resists 
what God is now doing ; and what is worse, he always will re- 
sist it in every future moment of his probation, if you preach 
and he believes that he must and will resist it. Tour own doc- 
trine believed, infallibly produces this effect. It annihilates 
thought of any thing else ; it paralyzes all attempt at any thing 
but resistance, by the assurance and belief that he shall do 
nothing but resist ; for when was such a thing heard of, that a 
man ever attempted to do what he fully believed that he should 
not do ? Never. And thus it is that this unauthorized doctrine, 
that God must do more than he is now doing, in order that the 
sinner may begin the work of his salvation, will account for 

■5 fatal resistance of truth and of the Holy Ghost, and the 

,al ruin of the soul in the case of thousands. God, you say, 
lust do more for the sinner than he is now doing. I do not 
ieny it ; but I affirm that you have no warrant for the assertion. 
26 



402 ELECTION. 

What more ? "Will lie turn the sinner to holiness from a state 
of absolute stupidity in sin, change his heart when he sleeps 
in his iniquity, or cause him to love him while he resists and 
shuts out the light which reveals the glories to be loved ? Do 
you say, he must awaken the mind and impress and convict the 
conscience, and so at least as to give some intimation that he is 
ready to convert him f But how does this appear ? The true 
and only reason that the sinner is not now awakened, and does 
not now give his heart to Gocl, is not that God must do more, 
but that the sinner resists what God is now doing. Truth 
without the Spirit would be enough if the sinner did not resist 
it. But this is not all. How do you know that the sinner 
would not, by the power of the Holy Ghost, perform his duty, 
when called to it, did he hot resist the Holy Ghost ? Indeed, 
where is the sin of resisting it, if his influence could produce 
no salutary result were it unresisted ? And who shall say, that 
under every call to duty from God, there is not (we do not say 
that there is, but who shall say there is not) an influence from 
the Holy Ghost that would conduct the sinner to holiness and 
heaven, did he not freely and perversely resist it ? 

We may view this subject with advantage in another light. 
Why has God revealed the doctrine of the sinner's depend- 
ence ? Is it to prevent him from doing his duty when God 
commands him to clo it ? From doing it at once, even with the 
very first thought of it ? Does God call sinners to instant duty 
in every command ; does he in every call and every entreaty 
do this ; does he in every promise and every threatening sus- 
pend the eternal life or death of the soul on immediate duty, 
and yet by the doctrine of divine influence, tell them to sit 
still and wait for him to do something more than he is now 
doing ? What says common sense ? It says, that if, when 
God calls the sinner to repentance, it is truth known to the 
sinner that God must do more than he is now doing, or is 
ready to do, that the sinner may repent, let the sinner wait till 
God does more. Is there any reason why a man should now . 
attempt to do what he knows he shall not now do % Is there 
any more reason why a man should attempt to become wise, 
or rich, or honorable, when he knows that he shall not succeed, 
than why he should try to visit the moon by flying thither ? 
It matters not, as to this point, what the ground of the certainty 
is, whether it is want of power or of inclination, so long as 



WHY DEPENDENCE IS REVEALED. 403 

there is a known certainty that the sinner will not attempt to 
perform his duty, there is a good reason why he should not 
attempt it. If it be known truth that he will not act without 
a further influence, reason says, common sense says, wait for 
the influence ; let the sinner sleep on, and sleep away the hours 
of his probation, waiting for God to do more. But is this the 
message that eternal mercy sounds in the ears of sleeping guilt ? 
Oh no, my hearers. The sinner under the call to duty must 
perform it. God tells him to begin, and begin in earnest. 
He tells him in every command of his authority, and in every 
entreaty of his love. Every voice that speaketh from heaven 
says, " Strive to enter in at the strait gate ;" and every voice 
that speaketh truth on earth repeats the summons. And you 
may be sure that while God thus urges the sinner to move and 
stir himself in this work at once, he does not paralyze every 
effort by assuring him that he will not act until something more 
is done for him than is now doing. 

Why then has God revealed the sinner's dependence on his 
Spirit ? Pre-eminently — I had almost said solely — to prevent 
utter despair, and consequent inaction. If it were not true, 
that God by his Spirit can. and may overcome the perverseness 
of the sinner's heart, what could the sinner hope for ? 'Tis all 
the hope that one of our lost race will ever see heaven. With- 
out it, we should, and well we might, sit down in inaction, de- 
spair. But here it is in this book of God's grace and mercy ; 
and here it is for the purpose of saving us from the hopelessness 
and horrors of the state into which sin has brought us. Here 
it is, as the arm of the Almighty revealed for our deliverance ; 
as the hand of eternal mercy which lias taken hold of us to 
raise us from the pit, and to convince us that heaven may be 
obtained. And shall the sinner sit still and do nothing, because 
God may be willing to help ? Shall we thus pervert this hope 
from God's own arm ; break away from the grasp of omnipo- 
tent love and plunge into hell, because God has undertaken to 
save ? Oh, what a perversion of the grace of God were this ! 

But it will be said, there are some sinners who never ivill at- 
tempt the work of their salvation, and that God knows they will 
not. True. But still, is there no good reason why they should ? 
The question here is not what God knows, but what the sinner 
knows. Is there no reason why a drowning man should make 
an effort to escape impending death, because God may know 



4:04: ELECTION. 

that he will not escape ? Do you say that if he knew what 
God knows, there would be a reason why he should not try 
to escape ? That is exactly what I say. If God lias revealed 
the certainty that there is no escape, and that no effort will 
be made, then there is a reason for not making an effort. 
But the fact that the sinner does not know but that by effort 
he may be saved, or rather the known fact that by it he 
may be saved, is surely reason enough for effort. If it were 
a revealed truth, that under the calls of God to duty, there is 
no hope of compliance, that the sinner will not attempt it, 
then all efforts are as preposterous as if the sinner were a 
corpse. 

If God has revealed such a doctrine, we ought to preach it, 
and when we carry to sirfners the moving message of wrath 
and mercy, tell them that they will not move ; that they may 
with entire propriety remain quiet and undisturbed ; for after 
all they will lie as dead, and hopelessly dead, till God, by 
some new and higher influence, shall move them, as if a word 
had not been uttered. But Oh, what another Gospel would that 
be, which should read to this thoughtless world such a warrant 
for sloth, or such a message of despair ! It might indeed tell 
us, and tell us with propriety, that we ought to repent. But 
if it told us that unless God should do something more than he 
is now doing, we never should even attempt it, not even make 
a beginning by having a thought about it, how would the con- 
viction of the uselessness of effort paralyze us ! Then would 
the tenfold slumbers of moral death take hold of this fallen 
world, and the shadows of the second death come up over the 
face of it ; and this region of hope, this theater of divine mercy, 
where the kingdom of God now suffereth violence, and the vio- 
lent take it by force, be changed into the pathway to hell, and 
every human being, in the gloom or frenzy of despair, take his 
solitary way down to everlasting burnings ! 

But such is not the world we live in. Such is not the Gos- 
pel its God hath sent to it. Hear the song of angels when its 
Redeemer came : " Glory to God in the highest, and on earth 
peace, good- will toward men." Hear the Saviour who bled 
and died for it : " God sent not his Son into the world to con- 
demn the world, but that the world through him might be 
saved." Consider God's purpose of electing grace, executed 
in such perfect accordance with the free, unconstrained, volun- 



CONCLUSION. 405 

tary action of the mind, as not to hinder the salvation of one, 
and that none can perish but by his own choice. Look abroad 
too at the work of this world's redemption going on. Yon see 
Zion's rising glories in every land, and in anticipation, her con- 
verts multiplying as the drops of the morning ; yon hear their 
songs of deliverance, and yon see this redeemed company, all 
of them sinners who have waked np and begun the work of 
their salvation, while not a man of all earth's thoughtless mill- 
ions is to be found among them. And, My Hearers, if you 
wonld be saved, you must begin. Under the mandate of the 
living God, you must act. You must think of something beside 
mere vanities. You must think of and feel something beside 
these nothings of earth and time. You must think of the 
things that belong to your everlasting peace ; you must feel 
the powers of the world to come ; you must ply the whole en- 
ergy of the inner man to the point of duty, the single point of 
giving God your heart. You must begin the work as one 
which may be done, which ought to be done, which must be 
done ; or, under God's condemnation, you must soon be plunged 
into the realities of eternity. 

Such is the manner then, in which God executes his purpose 
of Election. God you see, has no purpose of Election to bring 
any sinners to repentance who sleep away their probation in the 
stupidity and sloth of sin. He has no purpose to bring any to 
repentance, except through their own wakeful, free, voluntary 
activity, under the influence of his Spirit. Dependent then as 
sinners are on God for a new heart, it rests also in a most vital 
respect on themselves whether they have a new heart or not. 
If they sleep in sin, God will not give them a new heart. If 
they awake to their duty, he may. Yea, listen. ~No voice of 
truth throughout the universe says he will not. You see then 
that such is the manner in which God executes the purpose of 
Election, that your salvation so depends on what you do, as to 
create all the propriety, and all the importance, anol all the 
necessity for these efforts, that can be conceived of. With- 
out them, elect or non-elect, God will never convert you. 
With them the work may be done. It is then with you to 
say, whether you will be saved or lost. If you yield to God 
as you can, you will be saved ; if you resist God as you can, 
you will be lost. You must go to hell, if you go there at 
all, as a voluntary self-destroyer, with this conviction of the 



406 ELECTION. 

fact, as the never dying worm, the quenchless fire in your own 
guilty bosom, I am self-destroyed, self -destroyed for eternity. 

When therefore, Fellow-Sinner, the question comes up in 
your thoughts, — for it will come whether you will do any 
thing or not, whether you will begin, or wait for God to be- 
gin by doing more than God is now doing, — remember that 
if yon do not begin, God will never convert you, and if you 
delay a little longer, there is a fearful probability that God will 
give you up to determined sin and final ruin. And now think 
of this ; let it ring in your ears and thunder in your conscience, 
that nothing less than heaven or hell depends on what you do, 
and do soon. Perhaps your present purpose will decide it. 
Perhaps while celestial eyes are now beaming with tenderness 
upon you, and the bosom of eternal love swells with solicitude 
for you, you are making in your own heart the decision which 
God from the throne of final judgment will ratify ; a decision 
of your own heart, whose result will be heaven with its eter- 
nal joys, or hell with its everlasting woes. Think of this. God 
the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, are not un- 
concerned for you. Even malignant spirits beneath think of 
you, and their moanings of despair may have ceased, and the 
clanking of their chains may be stilled, intent to know your 
decision. The blessed above may have stopped their songs, 
ay, and some hovering angel may have paused on another 
errand of mercy, and be resting on his broad wings over this 
assembly, to witness and report in heaven a decision of your 
heart, on which heaven or hell depends. 



ELECTION. 

III.— OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION. 
" And say, We are delivered to do all these abominations." — Jeremiah vii. 10. 

The design of the present discourse is, to answer the princi- 
pal objections alleged against the doctrine of Election. For 
this purpose I recall to your minds the view of the subject as 
it has been given in two former discourses. This I will attempt 
to do in the form of an example. Let us suppose that several 
subjects of an earthly king have revolted from his government. 
The prince, the king's son, endures in view of the assembled 
empire, a degree of suffering which renders it consistent with 
the honor of the king, and the authority of his law, to pardon 
all, on condition that they will return to their duty. On this 
condition pardon is proffered, with the assurance that they who 
comply with the terms shall be exalted to distinguished honors 
in the empire. To these proffers of mercy the reply of the reb- 
els is, " Accept of pardon on such terms 1 — we had rather die ; 
we dislike you and your laws as much as when we determined 
on rebellion ; we will not submit to such tyranny." Some how- 
ever, on hearing these offers urged upon their acceptance, are 
more thoughtful of the matter than others. They dread the 
hour of execution ; their conscience feels the power of obliga- 
tion ; they think of the mercy that provides and proffers de- 
liverance. They soberly consider the question, whether they 
will comply with this overture of mercy. Still however, the 
spirit of rebellion keeps its hold on the heart ; their real feel- 
ing is, we can not, will not submit to the authority of one whose 
laws we so much dislike. Thus all in heart are rebels still. 
Who now will hesitate to say, that all deserve to die ; and de- 
serve it more than had no mercy been offered and rejected? 

We will now suppose that the king, by some extraordinary 
influence — by a peculiar power he has of reaching the heart 
through the motives he presents — which perfectly accords with 
the freedom of action, can cause these rebels to fall in cheerful, 



408 ELECTION. 

humble submission, at his feet. The question now is, will he do 
this for any ; and if so, for how many, and for whom t In de- 
termining these questions, the king sees and knows that to bring 
all to submit, would perhaps result in greater evil than not to do 
it; he sees that it might be made the occasion of, and even prove 
a direct encouragement to rebellion ; that many of these would 
rebel again, and that hopelessly, and still greater multitudes 
with them. They might reason in this way : " There is nothing 
to fear from our indulgent sovereign ; rebel as we may, he will 
not punish." Thus a universal, hopeless revolt might ensue. 
All this we will suppose the king foresees, and therefore determ- 
ines not to bring all these rebels by this peculiar influence to 
submission. Shall he then bring a part ? This he can do con- 
sistently with wisdom and goodness. This he can do, and 
secure the loyalty and happiness of a greater number of his 
subjects than by not doing it. But who shall be the favored 
subjects? Not those who persisted in treating the offered 
mercy with scorn — who, in the spirit of rebellion, turned from 
the message of grace only to meditate treason, and who would 
scarcely give it a hearing. Not one of these shall partake of 
the blessing. He determines then, to confer the favor on some 
of those who treat the message with more apparent respect ; 
not because they are the better for this, or for their upbraid- 
ings of conscience, or for their tremblings at approaching 
death ; but because it may be, that there is less that is provok- 
ing and offensive, or because he can do more for them without 
injury to others, or because he knows that when reclaimed, they 
will prove useful in the administration of his government, or 
for some other wise and good reason. These he thus brings to 
submission, and gives them the promised rewards. The rest, 
though he sincerely desires their repentance under the influ- 
ence he uses, and while he has used all the influence to secure 
it which he wisely can, he orders, as they deserve and as the 
public good demands, to be executed. Supposing now the 
king to have foreseen all that we have supposed, and in view 
of it to have done all he has ; has he not done right, and in 
every respect what wisdom and benevolence would dictate % 
And if so, was it not right to determine to do it ? 

This I give as an exact illustration of the doctrine of Elec- 
tion in its connection with other truths, as it has been stated 
and explained in two preceding discourses. 



CONSISTENT WITH FREE AGENCY. 409 

I now proceed to the inquiry, whether there he any valid 
objection to this doctrine? I remark — 

1. That the doctrine of Election is consistent with the free 
moral agency of man. Here I readily admit, that if men are 
not free agents without grace, then if they are not elected, they 
neither are, nor will they ever be, free agents. But, as we have 
shown, men are free moral agents without grace. God does not 
give, nor purpose to give, converting grace to men because they 
are not moral agents without it ; but because they are, and be- 
cause without it they will only pervert their moral agency to 
sin and death. Indeed, grace (the grace of the Gospel) can 
not make man a moral agent. This is a matter of equity or 
goodness, not of grace. The grace of the Gospel is favor to 
those and those only who are already moral agents, and sinful 
moral agents. Otherwise, " grace is no more grace." The ob- 
ject then of God's purpose of Election, is not to produce moral 
agency, but to prevent the abuse of it ; it is to prevent the 
wrong and secure the right use of moral powers already pos- 
sessed. God has never formed a purpose to give converting 
grace to stocks, or to animals, or to machines. God can pro- 
duce holiness in no beings except moral agents, and of course 
can purpose to produce it in no other. The doctrine of Elec- 
tion then, instead of proving that men are not free, proves most 
decisively and unanswerably that they are. 

Yiew this topic in another light. The mere purpose of God 
to renew the heart of sinners can not of itself, while 'unexecuted, 
destroy their free-agency. The purpose is formed before they 
exist, and therefore as a mere purpose it can not touch them. 
Not the purpose then, but its execution, if any thing, must de- 
stroy their free agency. The present objection therefore, does 
not lie against the purpose, but against the execution of the 
purpose ; i. e., not against the doctrine of Election, but against 
the doctrine of Regeneration. The question then is, whether 
the execution of the purpose destroys free agency ? If it does, 
it must have this effect on those only on whom it is executed ; 
i. e., only on the elect. The purpose respects no others ; it 
touches none but the elect, either in design or execution. The 
elect then, who are renewed, sanctified, and made heirs of 
glory, are the men to be pitied, and to complain, if any, be- 
cause their free agency is destroyed. As to them however, we 
have already show r n that in their Regeneration they act as 

18 



410 ELECTION. 

freely as in any act of their lives ; that the change in them 
consists in freely " obeying the truth through the Spirit ;" that 
the thing, the very thing which God produces in Regeneration, 
is the right exercise of free agency. As to the other class, the 
non-elect, their free agency can not be impaired by a purpose 
which has nothing to do with them. If they would be free 
without such a purpose, they are also free with it, for it never 
comes nigh them. 

But it will here be said, " What God purposes shall take 
place, will take place ; and if the actions of men are decreed, 
how can they he free f " I readily admit that what God purpo- 
ses shall take place, will take place. But the same thing would 
be true respecting every event, if we suppose God to have no 
purpose respecting it. The proposition concerning any actual 
event that it will take place, made before its occurrence, would 
be as true as the proposition made after its occurrence, that it 
has taken place. The previous certainty of every action and 
every event must be admitted, decree or no decree, election or 
no election, the contrary — "Uncertainty in the case — being im- 
possible and inconceivable. But how can the simple certainty 
of an action impair its freedom ? Ywis it not certain that God 
would create the world before he did create it ; and did this 
certainty impair the freedom of this act? ^Yas it not cer- 
tain that you would come to the house of God this evening, 
and did this certainty impair your freeedom ; did it destroy 
your power to have done otherwise ? What can be plainer, 
than that a man may have power to do many things which he 
certainly will not do, or power to do otherwise than he cer- 
tainly will do? If any two things are consistent, certainty of 
action and freedom of action are consistent. But you say, 
"the action is decreed or purposed of God." True ; but what 
is this ? An action is purposed by God when it is in accord- 
ance with his providential will ; when it is what he for some 
reason designs shall take place. Can not one being act in ac- 
cordance with the will, the pleasure, the designs of another, 
and still be free ? Can not a friend, a child, a servant, act ac- 
cording to the will of his friend, parent, or master, and still be 
free ? If all the world had acted according to the will of God 
as expressed in his law, would they have ever thought of doubt- 
ing their own freedom ? The fact that the action of one accords 
with the will of another, is no more inconsistent with its free- 



THE SINNER CAN CHANGE. 411 

dom, than if it were contrary to his will. Besides, God in pur- 
posing the moral actions of men, purposes none but free actions. 
He purposes not merely that they shall take place, but that 
they shall be free. How then can his purpose destroy their 
freedom ? Do you say, that " according to our doctrine, Gocl 
purposes that some men shall sin, and ask how this can be 
consistent with God's sincerity in forbidding sin as a Law- 
giver ?" This question I will shortly answer, but that now be- 
fore us is, how is it consistent with man's free agency? And 
we say, that it is one of the plainest and most certain of all 
truths, that one being may act according to the will of another 
and yet act freely. 

But the sinner still replies, "I can not change my own heart, 
and if J am not elected, I mast contin ue in sin and die" Here 
the precise question is, what does the sinner mean when he 
says U J must" "Teem not?" Does he mean that he is com- 
pelled to sin ; that he has not the powers of a complete moral 
agent — powers which fully qualify him to love God and to 
make himself a new heart? This plea is false; contradicted 
by the obvious consistency between the existence of these pow- 
ers in man and God's purposes ; contradicted, as we have seen, 
by the law of God, which expressly recognizes in man every 
power of moral agency ; contradicted by his own conscious- 
ness, for every man knows that lie has these powers ; contra- 
dicted too by the doctrine of Election itself, and by the man- 
ner in which God executes this purpose ; for this is nothing but 
a purpose to secure the right use of the powers of moral agency. 
Besides, if the sinner has not these powers, his election of God 
would not help the matter; for it is not God's design to give 
them to a single human being, but rather to secure the right 
use of those already possessed. 

What then do you mean when you say, " I can not change 
my own heart ?" Do you mean that you are so determined, 
so desperate in your purpose of rebellion, that you will not 
give it up ; that no truth, motives, commands, entreaties, will 
persuade you to submit to God ; that nothing but the power of * 
God will ever overcome the obduracy of your heart ; that 
without this you will persist in sin, and freely, and with your 
eyes open, go on to everlasting ruin ? Do you mean that you 
have such a heart as this ? True, you have just such a heart, 
and it can belong to no other than a free agent. Can a mere 



412 ELECTION. 

stock, or stone, a machine, a mere passive being, form such a 
purpose as this ? What being, or creature, or thing, can form 
such a purpose of rebellion against the Most High, except a 
free agent? And has it come to this, that beings who can 
choose one way, can not choose the other when every possible 
motive exists to induce them to do it ; that beings who have 
power to reject and to resist every degree of moral influence 
which a universe affords, and who could not but choose other- 
wise if they did not resist it to the uttermost, should not be 
free? Surely, surely here is no lack of power. If there can 
be a free agent, such a rebel against God is a free agent. The 
same powers employed in resisting sin in the same manner as 
they are in resisting God, would make the sinner like " an 
archangel strong" in the service of God. Thus it is that the 
provisions of the Gospel are for man as a free moral agent. 
The Atonement of the Lord Jesus has cleared the path of his 
return to God of every obstacle ; his prison doors are thrown 
open ; his chains are knocked off; an inviting God, proffering 
heaven's glories, calls him to life, and he freely, by his own act 
and deed, rejects the offer ; and in faithfulness to his soul, we 
must add, he knows it, and if he dies in his sins, will have it 
to reflect on for eternity. 

2. The doctrine of Election is perfectly consistent with the 
sincerity of the divine invitations. Here I would say, that 
things have been said on this subject which are palpably incon- 
sistent with God's sincerity. It has been maintained by some, 
that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and that 
on this account God prefers sin to holiness in every instance in 
which sin exists ; and that God's purposes would be painfully 
crossed, were men in every instance in which they sin, to do 
their duty instead. But you will remember, My Hearers, that 
I have taught no such doctrine as this ; but on the contrary, that 
if all men, elect and non-elect, would, under the influences 
which God uses to bring them to repentance, actually repent, 
i. e., do their duty as they are able and ought to do it, it would 
be what God prefers they should do. When God says that he 
is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come 
to repentance, he means exactly what he says. Compliance on 
their part, on the part of every sinner, would be the consum- 
mation of the strongest desires of eternal love toward him. 

But it will be said, that " God knew that some would reject 



OBJECTION URGED. 413 

his invitations, and continue in sin and die." Be it so. May 
not the tenderest earthly parent regard the reformation of a 
fro ward, abandoned son as hopeless, and still most sincerely 
and ardently desire his reformation ? Even if he knew his con- 
tinued profligacy to be absolutely certain, would he not still 
sincerely desire his return to duty, rather than his continuance 
in crime and wretchedness ? Ay, and his heart break with 
grief at the thought that all is thus hopeless in respect to 
this object of his love ? And, My Hearers, it is God, who in 
view of the known perverseness of sinners, and at the thought 
of abandoning them to their chosen way, — it is God who says, 
" How shall I give thee up, Ephraim ; how shall I set thee as 
Admah, and make thee as Zeboim ? My heart is turned within 
me, my repentings are kindled together." 'Tis the Saviour 
who says, " O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have 
gathered" (think of this image, for did you ever witness the 
solicitude of the parent-bird to protect her young, and doubt 
her sincerity ?) — " how often would I have gathered thy chil- 
dren together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her 
wings, and ye would not !" There is no mockery — no mistake 
here. 'Tis the overflowing of divine compassion — the very 
heart-breaking of bereaved and disconsolate love. God does 
not desire the life of the sinner the less because he knows he 
will die. 

But you will ask, "If God thus sincerely desires that cdl 
should come to repentance, why does he not briny cdl to repent- 
ance f" I answer by asking why should he? This would be 
to change the system of influence which infinite wisdom and 
goodness have resolved on in respect to each, as best fitted 
to secure the greatest amount of holiness and happiness which 
God can secure. To change this influence in a single and in 
•the least degree, might occasion ultimately more sin than it 
would prevent, even a hopeless revolt of his whole moral king- 
dom. ~No man can say, that if God were to bring one non-elect 
sinner to repentance, it would not be an act of unkindness to 
that sinner himself, since he might apostatize and perish under 
a more aggravated doom than now awaits him. You see then, 
how with all the ardor of infinite benevolence, God may prefer 
that all men should repent, rather than go on in sin, and yet 
not purpose to bring them to repentance. If they would do 
as he invites them to do, if all would come to repentance 



±u 



ELECTION. 



under the influence he actually uses and which is all he can 
wisely use to save them, he would rejoice over them with 
paternal love and gladness. Is he not sincere then in his invi- 
tations ? 

But I have another thing to say. God's purpose of Election 
in the manner in which it is executed, instead of being incon- 
sistent with the sincerity of his invitations to all, is one of the 
decisive proofs of their sincerity. If I make a rich, abundant 
provision for the entertainment of my neighbors, and send forth 
unqualified, urgent, warm-hearted invitations to them to come 
and partake, and they all refuse to accept them, am I to be re- 
proached with insincerity because I do not now resort to some 
extraordinary influence, because I do not give a thousand 
dollars to each to induce him to come? Is their refusal a 
proof of the insincerity of my invitation ? Suppose now that I 
resort to this extra influence, and actually use it with as many 
as I can consistently with other and higher interests, and by 
large sums of money prevail on a part to come, does not this 
show that I was sincere in my invitations to all? Am I not 
doing all that I can, in the proper sense of the language, to 
induce the greatest number to come? In what conceivable 
way — by what possible act or deed, could I evince my sin- 
cerity if this does not ? Precisely like this is the proof of 
God's sincerity which is furnished by the doctrine of Election. 
It is a purpose to give effect to his invitations of mercy to the 
utmost possible extent, in which as a wise and benevolent God 
he can do it. In this view of the subject we see God thwarted 
indeed in his gracious design toward all by their perverseness — 
perverseness which no urgency of entreaty can overcome — still 
repeating his invitations, assuring one and all that he has no 
pleasure in their death, but would rather that they turn and 
live ; that he has made all things ready by the sacrifice of his- 
Son as a ransom, entreating the acceptance of all with more 
than paternal tenderness, declaring that there is room enough 
in the mansions of eternal love and bliss, that there is a crown 
of life and a throne of glory for each and for all ; coming to 
them with the supplications and tears of a bereaved and broken- 
hearted father, and exclaiming in the anguish of his grief, 
" How can I permit these creatures of my power and love to 
lie down in everlasting fire ?" and now because he can not con- 
sent to leave them thus, he sends the Holy Ghost with his 



GOD NOT PARTIAL. 415 

transforming influence to save, in the true import of the lan- 
guage, as many as he can save ! And is not this sincerity ? 
Could God, as the Redeemer of this perverse and guilty world, 
have shown the sincerity of his desires, these longings of heart 
for its salvation as he now does, had he never formed the pur- 
poses of electing grace ? Thus this doctrine, the one that has 
been so confidently alleged as inconsistent with God's sincerity, 
becomes the most decisive proof of it ; revealing as it does, a 
love stronger than death and that passeth knowledge — love 
never to be satisfied till it has done all that it can do to save 
and bless a self-ruined world. 

One thing more ought to be said on this topic. Whatever 
any sinner may think of the sincerity of God's invitations as 
addressed to others, he can never know that they are not sin- 
cerely addressed to him. He can never know in this life, but 
that in the high counsels of God they are associated with an 
eternal purpose of grace to bring him to repentance. It may 
be so. Would he set himself in earnest to comply with the 
invitation of his God, the event may prove that that invitation 
was addressed to him, that God might accomplish in him his 
eternal purpose of grace and salvation. How then can he 
stand there in all the stupidity and sullenness of determined 
sin, reproaching God with insincerity? Why, Fellow-Sinner, 
you know not but you are elected. You never can know it 
until you have put the sincerity of Gocl to the test. Make 
then the experiment ; put the sincerity of a redeeming God to 
the trial by some degree of earnestness — some sincerity on your 
own part. Do what you can, clear yourslf in this matter, and 
be sure you have done it, and then if all is in vain, doubt or 
deny God's sincerity ; but never, never doubt it till you know 
that you are not resisting and grieving the sincerest love of thy 
God for thy salvation. 

3. The doctrine of Election does not involve God in the im- 
putation of partiality. By partiality here, must be meant 
some injustice through favoritism, or the conferring of bless- 
ings on one when there are equal or stronger reasons for con- 
ferring them on another. As to the question of injustice, that 
must be put to rest forever by the consideration that all de- 
serve death. If there be injustice in the case, it must respect 
the non-elect. But how are they the less guilty, because God 
who would that all should come to repentance, does all that he 



vit> ELECTION. 

wisely can to bring all, and so actually brings some to repent- 
ance ? They who are left lose nothing by Election. Their per- 
dition is no more certain with Election than it would be without 
it ; and if God shows favor to the elect, it is not at the expense 
of any rights of the non-elect. 

But it may be said, " There are as good reasons why God 
should confer his grace on all as on a partP I reply, that in 
respect to moral character, there is no reason why the blessing 
should be conferred on any. But the question is, when all de- 
serve death, whether infinite wisdom may not see reasons for 
making a discrimination ? What being of yesterday is compe- 
tent to decide the contrary? These are high matters. "When 
the law of God's kingdom has been trampled under the feet 
of rebellion, is man qualified to decide what ought to be 
done ? When the very throne and dominion of the Eternal are 
thus put in jeopardy, it becomes a question worthy of God's 
counsels whether any of the rebels can be forgiven with safety 
to his kingdom ; and if so, how many, and who ? God has a 
moral kingdom to govern. He can not bring to repentance by 
dint of power, nor yet by physical causes. He can not convert 
his subjects into machines and preserve that kingdom. They 
must still be moral agents, with powers to rebel as well as to 
obey, and this under an} T influence which he can use to pre- 
vent rebellion. Their rebellion or loyalty will and must de- 
pend on the course he takes. How much and what influence 
can be used to secure the greatest amount of obedience is the 
question, the decision of which of all others, requires the wis- 
dom of him who occupies the throne of legislation. When 
God sees, as he may, that he can not bring all mankind to re- 
pentance without injury to his universal kingdom, perhaps 
without subverting his throne, then the question assumes a new 
aspect. Has God good reasons for sanctifying only a part ? 
What is the dictate of wisdom and goodness? Plainly, to 
sanctify not all, but as many as he can consistently with secur- 
ing the greatest number of perfectly holy and happy beings 
which he can secure. This God will do, and as we have ex- 
plained the doctrine of Election, this he has purposed to do. 
And now, when all may justly be left to perish, and when God 
has devised a way in which he can save some, and will save as 
many as the greatest good possible to him permits — when he 
saves as many as he can consistently with infinite wisdom and 



GOD GOVERNED BY REASONS. 417 

goodness, is it a reproach that he does not save all? Is it a re- 
proach that he does not by his own act occasion revolt, and 
spread dismay and wretchedness throughout his dominions? 
Surely, with this view of the subject, we must see that God 
may have good reasons for saving only a part. My Hearers, 
when God is willing to save you and to save all — willing, yea 
desirous, that all should turn and live rather than sin and die, 
and when you will go down to hell by your own free choice — 
for be it remembered this is the only way in which you can 
go — will you reproach God because he does not prevent you 
by sacrificing the whole moral universe? Is this your objec- 
tion, that God saves as many as he wisely can ? Is this your 
philanthropy, your charity, which complains and murmurs 
when God saves as many of your miserable associates in sin as 
he wisely can, that he does not damn them as well as you ? Is 
this the dictate of benevolence ? 

Further : as God may see that it is best to bring only a part 
to repentance, so he may have good reasons for bringing to re- 
pentance the very individuals whom he has selected. Those 
restored to loyalty may be more useful than others in promot- 
ing his designs. There may be reasons for enlisting in the 
work of an apostle him who was brought up at the feet of Ga- 
maliel, rather than such a traitor as Judas, though the former 
was the most guilty. There may be reasons in the individ- 
uals themselves ; for although none who are brought to repent- 
ance will apostatize, yet if others were, they might apostatize 
and perish under a more aggravated doom. Nay more, should 
we expect that God, when he can wisely bring to repentance 
only a part, would select those who treat the overtures of his 
mercy with the most deliberate contempt and pointed scorn — 
those who will not compliment the message of his grace so 
much as to think of it ? True indeed it is, that they who think 
of and tremble at the coming wrath, and are serious and out- 
wardly respectful in hearing the calls of mercy, are no better 
for this while they cherish hearts of rebellion. But which 
class of sinners should we expect God to bless with the gift of 
his transforming grace — those who are thus thoughtful and re- 
spectful, or those who treat the message of eternal mercy, even 
when sounded in their ears by the voice of the living God, 
with as much indifference and contempt as they do the whist- 
ling of the breeze ? Save these rather than the others ! Would 
17 18- 



4:18 ELECTION. 

not this look like favoritism ? Save the worst, the most con- 
temptuous and hardened ! Would this be the way to avoid the 
reproach of partiality ? Thus you see, that God may have good 
reasons for saving only a part of mankind ; and that the gen- 
eral interest, the public good may forbid that he should do any 
more than he does for the lost sinner. If he saved all,it would 
be dishonorable, disgraceful partiality. It would be sacrificing 
the good of the whole from favoritism to a part — the well- 
being of his universal kingdom for the sake of the well-being 
of individuals. So he may have good reasons for saving the 
very individuals whom he does, save ; and nothing but undue 
partiality, nothing but dishonorable favoritism could save oth- 
ers instead of these. God therefore, instead of meriting the 
reproach of partiality for what he does, would deserve it were 
he to do otherwise. What rash inconsideration ! What reck- 
less presumption it is, that charges God with partiality in the 
dispensations of his grace ! 

4. The doctrine of Election is consistent with the propriety 
of immediate action on the part of the sinner. It is a standing 
objection to the doctrine of Election, that, if it be true, there 
is nothing for sinners to do. Now, I readily concede, that if 
the sinner in Kegeneration were the mere passive subject of 
an effect ; if he is merely to be acted upon ; if the change can, 
and is as likely to be produced when he is asleep, as when he 
is awake ; if nothing, in any sense or manner, depends on his 
acting more than on his not acting, then the present objection 
is valid ; there is, as he says, nothing for him to do. Such 
however, is not the doctrine of Election. God's purpose ot 
Election is to bring the sinner to the performance of right 
moral action ; to bring him, voluntarily, freely, to " obey the 
truth, through the Spirit." This involves, as we have seen, 
direct action on the part of the sinner, not less than were this 
moral change to be accomplished by the mere influence of 
truth and motives. He must think of God as he is, and love 
him; of the Saviour as he is, and trust his lost soul to his 
mercy ; of sin as it is, and abhor and renounce it with con- 
trition, and a sincere purpose of holy obedience. In this man- 
ner he must apply his mind, his understanding, his conscience, 
his heart, to the point of duty. In this way, through the 
grace of God, duty may be done, and it can be done in no 
other. Is this the manner in which God executes the purpose 



NO WARKANT TO WAIT. 419 

of Election, and is there no good reason why the sinner should 
act ? May he become a child of God, and be saved by acting? 
Will he remain a sinner, and be damned without acting, and is 
there no reason for acting ? Can a better, a more decisive 
reason for acting, be assigned for any action ever done by a 
human being? Take any conceivable case. You are sink- 
ing in the waves of the sea ; by effort you may escape ; with- 
out it you will infallibly perish. This is all you know ; and is 
there no reason for making effort ? A falling rock is descend- 
ing from the precipice that overhangs your head; by effort 
you may escape ; without it you will be crushed in almost in- 
stant death. Is. there no reason why you should stir? Like 
this, Fellow-Sinner, is your condition. You are condemned 
already. Now, of a long time, your judgment lingereth not, 
and your damnation slumbereth not. Sleep on, if you will ; 
sleep away your probation, dreaming that you may be elected ; 
but remember, that in this course, not the grace of God, but 
the fires that shall never be quenched, will first rouse you from 
these slumbers. 

But you say, "If lam elected, God will interpose and prompt 
me to begin this work, and I may therefore safely xoait for his 
interposition." Now the question is not, whether the sinner 
ever begins even to think of his salvation without that influ- 
ence which we call the strivings of the Divine Spirit, — we 
believe that he never will, — but the question is this : whether, 
under the present call to duty, and under such influence of 
the Spirit as may attend it, it is not indispensable to any salu- 
tary result that the sinner begin on his part. Suppose what 
degree of divine influence you will, does not the result depend, 
in a vital respect, on what the sinner does ? This is the real 
question, and the answer depends entirely on what is the kind 
and mode of this divine influence. If it be a physical, a me- 
chanical, or a literally creative influence, — i. e., one which 
secures its results in spite of all resistance, and when the sin- 
ner is doing all that he can to resist it, just as the power of 
steam carries the boat through the resisting waters, — then you 
are right ; and to call on the sinner to act, on the ground that 
any thing depends on his acting, were as absurd and useless 
as to call on the waters to make way for the boat. For in such 
a case the sinner yields to an influence which he can not resist. 
But such is not, as we have seen, the true doctrine. Convert- 



420 ELECTION. 

ing grace is not irresistible, but unresisted grace — grace that 
draws, not compels j that attracts, not forces. It can be resist- 
ed by the sinner. On whom then does it truly depend, whether 
the result be secured or not ? Suppose the waters could con- 
vert themselves into solid granite, as well as remain in a liquid 
state, on what would the passage of the boat through them de- 
pend ? Somewhat on the force applied ; but also on what the 
water should do. Now, if you will indulge the figure, the sin- 
ner, under any measure of divine influence, can make his 
heart solid granite, yea, as adamant and the nether millstone. 
Suppose what influence of truth and of the Spirit you will, 
the sinner, as a moral agent, can resist it. The change to be 
produced is from wrong, to free, voluntary, right moral action. 
If this change take place, the sinner must make it. It depends 
therefore as truly on what the sinner does, as on what the 
Spirit of God does. Do you say, that God does more for one 
sinner than for another? Be it so. But the sinner who is 
brought to repentance by God's doing more for him than for 
others, could have resisted all that God has done ; and, had he 
done so, had perished in his sins ; while, for the other who 
actually dies in his sins, God has done enough and more than 
enough to save him, had he not resisted God. But you will 
say, " God does more at one time to awaken and convert the 
same sinner than at another" We admit it, but still ask on 
whom does the result depend? You say, on God. Right. 
But does it not also depend on what the sinner does? Could 
he not have resisted even this influence, and made it the occa- 
sion of greater hardness of heart than ever ? If not, then he 
was not a moral agent, nor was the result right moral action. 
But if he could have resisted it, and did not, but yielded to it 
in voluntary right moral action, then the change depended as 
truly on what he did as on what God did. Hence you see, 
take what view of the subject you will, when God does all that 
he ever does for any sinner, whether the moral change takes 
place or not, depends on what the sinner does. Whatever the 
influence be, it is one whose result is, in a material respect, at 
the sinner's own disposal. It is for him to say, whether b} 
the grace of God he will be saved or lost. Though he be an 
elect sinner, still it is immutable truth, that if he does not re- 
lax his resistance to the grace of God — if he does not yield to 
this influence in voluntary right moral action, he will continue 



ANOTHER OBJECTION. 421 

in sin and die in sin. But there is one thing more, which is 
all the sinner can say on this point. If God has determined 
to bring me to act right, I shall act right, and therefore I need 
give myself no concern on the subject, It is true indeed, that 
if God has determined to bring you to act right, you will act 
right. But it is just as true, that if you give yourself no con- 
cern on the subject, and dismiss all thought of acting, God 
will never bring you to act. If God has determined that you 
shall leave this house to-night, or that you shall go to such a 
place, or that you shall read such a book, it is true that you 
will do it. But it is just as true, that if you do not think what 
you shall do, and decide upon the act, God will never bring 
you to do it ; it will never be done. So, Fellow-Sinner, pre- 
sume on God's purpose of Election to bring you to act right, 
without any thought on your own part ; never put yourself to 
the performance of right action, and you will never perform 
right action. God bring you to act right without a thought 
of acting right ? Impossible ! God can not execute his pur- 
pose of Election in behalf of such a sinner. Do you now say, 
u If I am elected, I shall think of acting right?" Your objec- 
tion then amounts to this — " If I am elected, I shall think of 
acting right ; therefore I will not think of acting right." What 
sort of reasoning is this? It may be certain that I shall think 
of doing a given action, therefore I will not think of doing it. 
It may be certain that I shall eat and drink, and think of so 
doing as necessary to the preservation of life ; therefore I will 
dismiss all thought of either eating or drinking, and take the 
consequence. I only say, maintain this opinion, believe and 
act on this principle in regard to the life of your soul, and you 
will soon find that you - are given up to " strong delusion, to 
believe a lie, that you may be damned." 

But the present objection often proceeds on the opposite 
supposition. 

It is said, "If I am not elected, my heart will never be 
changed, do what I may. I shall never give my heart to God 
even if I attempt it." This is not true. You say if I attempt 
it. Take a case exactly in point. Suppose that it is a matter 
of absolutely certainty, that God knows that you will die in a 
few days by voluntary starvation, and solely by this means. 
!Now if you should eat and drink as usual, would you die by 
starvation — would you not live ? The error in such reasoning 



422 ELECTION. 

lies in overlooking the fact that the hypothetical proposition is 
just as true as the absolute. Suppose the latter, that you will 
die by voluntary starvation, to be true ; still the conditional pro- 
position, if you eat and drink you will not die by voluntary 
starvation, is just as true. So, if the non-elect sinner were to 
make the same efforts to give his heart to God which the elect 
sinner makes, there is no reason to believe, nor warrant to as- 
sert, that by the grace of God he would not do it. It may be 
so. If then you are in fact a non-elect sinner, and you do not 
make these efforts, never make an attempt to give God your 
heart, and so die in your sins ; and if it shall appear that had 
you made the attempt you had been converted and saved, 
whom will you reproach as your destroyer? God may have 
purposed that you shall die by voluntary starvation. If then, 
on the ground of such a possibility, you should actually starve 
yourself to death, who would be the murderer? 

But you still say, " If I am not elected I shall not make 
these efforts, and therefore there is no reason why I should." 
Do you, can you believe this? No reason why you should do 
a thing which you can do, and on which your everlasting all 
may depend, because it may be certain that you shall not do 
it ? Then there is no reason for performing any future act of 
your life ; for which act of futurity do you know to be certain ? 
Carry out your reasoning then, and say that Gocl may know 
that I shall never either eat or drink again, but shall soon die 
by voluntary starvation, and therefore there is no reason why 
I should eat or drink : or, God may know that I shall never 
leave the seat I now occupy, and therefore there is no reason 
why I should move, or even think of so doing. Is this sound 
reasoning and common sense ; or is it folly too great to be rea- 
soned with, and fit only to be ridiculed ? Why then do you 
say, if the doctrine of Election be true there is no reason why 
I should make an effort for my salvation ? No, my hearers. 
The true, practical principle which governs all but madmen is, 
not what God knows to be certain, or what is in fact certain, 
but what we know and what we do not know. And if we do 
know that without some given act all that is dear to us will 
be lost forever, and if w r e do not know that we shall not do 
that act, then reason, and conscience, and God says do it; nor 
until we are omniscient can we act on any other principle. 
"What, perform no action without first knowing that we shall 



ENCOURAGES TO ACTION. 423 

perform it ; or at least, until we know that no previous cer- 
tainty pertains to human actions even in the Omniscient mind ? 
Then should we never act at all. The activity of this world's 
busy population would be changed into the stillness of the 
grave. Admit then the principle, and the only principle of 
reason, of philosophy, of common sense, of the Bible, that cer- 
tainty of action is consistent with freedom of action. The 
mere certainty of human action forces no one, compels no one. 
It leaves freedom, the power of choice, power to the opposite 
action, unimpaired. Apply now the only practical principle 
which ever did, or ever can move to a single human effort or 
action in all the business of life. You do not know but that 
you shall make the requisite effort to give your wicked heart 
to God in holy love ; you do know that if you never attempt 
it you will die in your sins — die eternally. Can there be a bet- 
ter, a more imperious reason for instant effort in the perform- 
ance of duty? Who is a fool or a madman, he that makes it 
or he that does not ? 

I have. one thing more to say on this point. The doctrine of 
Election is not only consistent with the propriety of action on 
the part of the sinner, hut it is in one respect the only ground 
of such propriety. Take it away, deny it, and see. Suppose 
that God has formed no purpose to change one human heart, 
then surely no human heart will ever be changed. Go then, 
and preach, and prove to this world of hopeless rebellion — pub- 
lish it to these sinful, dying immortals, that God has formed no 
purpose to change one human heart, and that not a human be- 
ing will ever change his own heart without grace. And Oh, 
how would despair, like a cloud from the bottomless pit, come 
up over the whole earth ! x^ot a human being will be saved ! 
There is no hope. Man will not change his own heart — God 
will not change it. A created universe can not change it. 
Every arm is palsied. Every face of man and of angel is pale 
with despair ; and that cloud from beneath only thickens, and 
darkens, and thunders damnation. But look again. The doc- 
trine of Election sets a bow on that cloud. God's purpose to 
renew, and sanctify, and save some, wakens hope in these 
guilty bosoms. God has purposed to save some, and some, 
even a great multitude which no man can number, will be 
saved. God's purpose is to save none but those who will wake 
up from their death-like slumbers in sin, and begin the work of 



424 ELECTION. 

salvation in earnest. All, all are lost — lost forever, who do 
not. Who then can wish the doctrine of Election to be false? 
Who of this guilty, ruined race, would oppose and annihilate 
this only ground of human hope ? Who, while this beam of 
mercy falls on him from the throne of God, will sleep in sin 
another moment? 

To conclude. If we have not erred in our reasonings, the 
doctrines of Election, of man's free agency, of God's sincerity, 
and the necessity of action on the part of sinners, are true, and 
are consistent truths. They are solemn and awful truths, too, 
to the determined sinner. Let him look at them and see, while 
deliberately adhering to his purposes of sin, what darkness 
and terror they shed on his path ; what a prospect of pain and 
woe they open before him in an approaching eternity. Could 
he change one of these truths into falsehood, he might find the 
quietness and consolation in his chosen way which he covets. 
Could he deny his accountability to his Maker, he could still 
those agitations of conscious guilt which now tell him of the 
worm that never dies ; then he might hope, if not to escape, at 
least to brave the final sentence of his Judge with the plea of 
innocence. Could he deny the sincerity of a redeeming God 
calling him to eternal life, he might hope to palliate the guilt, 
and to mitigate or avert the doom of a despiser of God's great 
salvation. Could he denv the doctrine of Election, he might 
defer the work of turning to God with the presumption of self- 
reliance ; the security of one that holds the destiny of his soul 
in his own hands, in proud independence of the God he so 
fearlessly offends. Or could he persuade himself of the use- 
lessness of effort or action on his own part, he might tread his 
quiet way onward to death and hell, undisturbed by the con- 
viction that he is a self-destroyer. But no ; these trnths are 
all immutable. As a sinner and a free moral agent, he de- 
serves the wrath of God. As a sinner who despises the sin- 
cerest proffers of life from his God and Saviour, he deserves 
the still deeper damnation of a rejected Gospel. As a sinner 
who cherishes an unconquerable perverseness of heart, he has 
placed his soul at the sovereign disposal of an incensed God, 
who may save or destroy as seemeth good in his sight. As a 
sinner, in the chosen, willful insensibility and death of sin, he 
sleeps on the verge of the eternal pit, and sleeping a little 
longer, will fall into hell. 



CONCLUDING ADDRESS. 425 

There, Fellow-Sinner, not one token of grace and salvation 
distinguishes you from those who will perish forever. Every 
cause which has destroyed thousands exerts its full and un- 
counteracted power on you. jSTot one ray of hope from God's 
high sanctuary falls on your dark and cheeiless way. No hand 
of mercy will ever reach you to reclaim and save. There God, 
the Saviour, the Sanctifier, will abandon you to your own 
choice of eternal sin and eternal sorrow. 

And now believing as I do these things, with some portion, 
as I trust, of the compassion and love for your souls, of him 
who died to save, I come with thy aid, Divine Saviour, to speak 
to these sinners. Now, when death and judgment are so near, 
heaven so glorious, hell so dreadful ; when these things are so 
certain and are coming on so fast, is it not time to awake and 
take care of your never-dying soul ; that soul, that being of 
eternity, yourself? Is it unworthy of a thought? Now, when 
the God that made you, implores, when the Son of God weeps 
as a suppliant at your feet, when new joys would gladden 
every heavenly bosom, and every heavenly hill break forth in 
new songs of rapture, when angels invite you to their eternal 
fellowship, when saints supplicate God to be gracious, when 
the paradise of God throws open its gates, and its thrones of 
glory and crowns of life attract ; now, when you are solemn 
and serious and know these things are so ; now, when the Holy 
Ghost touches your heart, and makes you feel the attractions 
of Jesus' love ; now will you not give yourself to that Al- 
mighty, perfect Saviour? Oh, will you never awake, until the 
voice of mercy is heard no more? Will you never ask for 
mercy, till God shall answer only from the secret place of 
thunder, and the eternal fires kindle upon you ? 



ELECTION. 

IV.— REFLECTIONS AND APPLICATION. 
" All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable."— 2 Tim. iii. 16. 

It lias often been said, that if the doctrine of Election be 
true, and contained in the Bible, still it ought not to be 
preached. To this objection, thus stated, there is one general 
answer, viz. : that ministers of the Gospel are bound to declare 
the whole counsel of God. When it is once admitted that a 
doctrine is contained in the Bible, we must say, either that it 
ought to be preached, or that we are wiser than God, and 
that what he has revealed, and declared to be profitable, 
ought not to be taught. Here, this very common objection to 
the doctrine of Election might be left. It may be well, how- 
ever, to trace its salutary practical tendency, and show those 
who hear us, that a wise regard to their own best interests will 
lead them to desire it to have its place in the ministrations of 
the pulpit. 

I remark then — 

1. That the doctrine of Election is a plain doctrine, though 
it has been pronounced mysterious, and hard to be under- 
stood and difficult to be explained. Now, if what has been 
said on this subject in former discourses be just, the supposed 
mystery and difficulties do not respect the doctrine, i. e., the 
simple matter of fact which constitutes it ; but certain theo- 
ries, or modes of explanation, which have been incorporated 
with the doctrine, and which, instead of being any part of 
it, are merely matters of human speculation. Theories are 
one thing, facts are another. Various theories have been 
devised to account for the fact that the sea ebbs and flows. 
But whether these are all consistent or inconsistent with the 
fact, that remains-t-the sea still ebbs and flows. So the matter 
of fact — the doctrine — that God has purposed to renew, and 
sanctify, and save a part of mankind, remains unaltered and 
unalterable by any theories devised by men to explain its 



THE TEUE DOCTEIKE. 427 

consistency with other truths. 'Not only so, but these theories 
have created all the mystery and difficulties which have ever 
embarrassed the subject. The two assumptions, that God on 
the whole prefers that men should do wrong rather than right, 
and that there is no impossibility that God should secure the 
universal holiness of his moral creation, involve the doctrine 
of Election, and I may say the whole system of Theology, 
not merely in unintelligible mystery, but in the most palpable 
absurdity. But here I appeal to my audience, whether I have 
not extricated this doctrine from these absurd and monstrous 
theories. Has it not been shown, that it is not only not incon- 
sistent with man's free moral agency, but that it necessarily 
implies it, inasmuch as the very object of the purpose of Elec- 
tion is the right use of moral agency ; that it is not only con- 
sistent with God's sincerity in his invitations to all, but the 
most decisive proof of it, inasmuch as it exhibits God as most 
earnestly desiring the repentance of all, rather than the im- 
penitence of any, by what he does to secure the repentance of 
some ; that it is not only consistent with impartiality in Go'cl, 
but actually implies the best reasons for the discriminations 
which it makes ; and that it is not only consistent with the 
propriety of acting on the part of the sinner, but is the only 
ground of hope that he will act successfully ? If I have shown 
these things, the supposed difficulty of seeing the consistency 
between the doctrine of Election and other scriptural doc- 
trines, is imaginary. 

Let us now appeal to the doctrine itself, which is, that God 
from eternity has determined to renew, and sanctify, and save 
a part only of mankind. Is this proposition in the least de- 
gree dark or obscure ? Do you not at least understand my 
meaning, when I say that God has formed such a purpose, as 
well as you understand your own meaning, when you say he 
has not formed such a purpose ? Surely, the mere negative 
particle not can add nothing to the clearness of the other terms 
of the proposition, .and if yours is intelligible with it, mine is 
also without it. 

But let us examine the proposition in its several parts. God 
has purposed. If you do not understand this, you do not know 
what it is for God to will ; what it is for God to give a law, or 
to design, or purpose his own actions ; nor indeed any thing 
of God which is of any importance ; for the purposes of God 



428 ELECTION. 

are the true and only index of his character. God has pur- 
posed from eternity. If you do not understand this, yon do 
not understand the truth that God is an eternal Being, for the 
eternity of God's purposes are as easy to comprehend as the 
eternity of his existence. God from eternity has purposed to 
renew, and sanctify, and save. If you do not understand this, 
the doctrines of Regeneration, Sanctification, and of the whole 
Gospel are unintelligible to you. And as to that part of the 
proposition which confines the purpose to a part only of man- 
kind, there can be no difficulty, except to understand that a 
part is less than the whole. Pardon, My Hearers, what in 
these remarks may seem to imply some disparagement of your 
intellectual capacity. My object is to show that a plainer 
proposition in theology is scarcely conceivable, than that which 
is so loudly denounced as unintelligible mystery. 

But you say, the doctrine is plainly inconsistent with man's 
free agency, and other acknowledged truths, and that there- 
fore, after all that is said, you can not understand it. Be it so. 
If you can pronounce this doctrine inconsistent with any other, 
then you understand the doctrine itself; for how else can you 
decide on its inconsistency with another ? Thus you concede 
the very point in debate. Besides, to say, because you do not 
understand its consistency with another doctrine, that there- 
fore you do not understand the doctrine itself, is like saying, 
that because you do not comprehend how your soul and body 
are united, that you do not understand the assertion that you 
have either a soul or a body. So far then as plainness — the 
obvious meaning of a doctrine is requisite to its utility — the 
doctrine of Election is sufficiently distinguished by this char- 
acteristic. 

2. The doctrine of Election has no injurious, but a highly 
useful, practical tendency. This will appear from the follow- 
ing considerations : 

First — It tends not to produce, hut to prevent despair. It has 
been often said, that the doctrine tends directly to produce 
this state of mind. If it be so, then truly it is a serious ob- 
jection to the utility of preaching it. Despair is fatal to all 
effort. Despair, even in presence of the greatest good, or 
most appalling evil, sinks the spirit of man into sullen inac- 
tion. Man will never act, so long as he despairs either of act- 
ing, or of obtaining his object. Is it then the tendency of 



PREVENTS DESPAIE. - 429 

the doctrine to produce this state of mind ? Has it in fact 
ever produced it ? I do not say, that some false view of the 
subject, something which, by a gross misnomer, may have 
been called the doctrine of Election, has not, in some instances, 
had this effect ; but has it ever been true of the doctrine, as 
stated and explained in these discourses ? This I fearlessly 
deny. The thing is impossible. Can I believe that God will 
renew, and sanctify, and save some, even many of this guilty 
world, and legitimately infer from this that my perdition is 
sealed ? Did I know that God would hereafter save but one 
human being, I could not justly infer that I should not be 
saved, for I might be the individual whom the purpose re- 
spects. Can I believe that many will be saved, and infer, by 
legitimate deduction, that none will be saved? If not, then 
plainly as an individual, I can not infer that I shall not be 
saved. We believe that many in this assembly will live till 
to-morrow. Can any one hence infer that he shall not live till 
another morning ? 

But further : the doctrine of Election is an infallible pre- 
ventive of despair. Can I believe that thousands and millions 
of my fellow-creatures, who have no better prospects of life 
than I have, will live another year or day, without also believ- 
ing that I mav live ? Can I as a rational man avoid this con- 
viction ? In like manner, can you and I believe that God has 
purposed to save a great multitude from among men — a multi- 
tude which no man can number — and at the same time avoid 
believing that you and I may be of that happy company ? 
No. In view of the doctrine of Election, no sinner can de- 
spair of eternal life. 

Again : this doctrine of Election not only prevents despair, 
it is the only thing indispensable to its prevention. Not a 
human being will ever turn to God and be saved, unless God 
by his grace turn him. Deny then the doctrine of Election : 
preach to beings thus desperate in rebellion against the Most 
High, that God has formed no purpose to sanctify and save 
one of them, and what could they hope for ? Will the un- 
changeable God form new purposes ? No. Can they hope to 
convert themselves ? No. Can they find a created arm through- 
out the universe to help ? No. There is no hope. Hide then 
from human vision the purpose of God's electing grace, and 
heaven's gate is shut, and barred, and bolted. Not a ray of 



4:30 - ELECTION. 

light from the upper sanctuary falls on this midnight of sin ; a 
cloud deep and thick as the blackness of darkness covers the 
world, and you see how beings hastening to God's judgment- 
seat sit down in the sullenness and gloom of despair, or rage 
and howl in its frenzies. Oh, who can deny and reproach the 
doctrine of God's electing grace ! Who can wish to extinguish 
this only beam of hope from the throne of eternal mercy ! 

Secondly — The doctrine of Election tends to destroy pre- 
sumption in sin. If sinners cherish an unreasonable and 
groundless confidence of final salvation, it were immeasurably 
desirable that it should be taken away from them. In its true 
tendency it is as fatal as death. Now every stupid sinner does 
cherish such a confidence. Throughout Christendom, there is 
not a man living quietly in sin, who is not venturing on in the 
path to ruin with the rashness and madness of a maniac. 
What violence to reason more gross and shocking than that a 
sinner under God's present condemnation, and liable every 
moment to death and endless perdition, should quietly defer 
repentance another moment ? And yet how almost universal 
is the fact, even under the full conviction of its necessity? 
Now what is the reliance of such men ? It is either directly 
or indirectly on their own strength, and their own acts, associ- 
ated with a purpose of future repentance. Do you doubt it ? 
Throw away every such hope from futurity. Suppose that you 
knew that you were to stand before God's judgment-seat this 
very hour, and that your preparation was in his hands and at 
his disposal, could you sleep in sin, quietly relying on what 
you intend to do hereafter ? How then shall we break up this 
delusion ; how restore such infatuation to sense and reason ? 
Shall we tell these sleepers on the brink of ruin that life is 
uncertain, and death always near? You may throw the deep- 
est and most chilling shade on the prospect of life, but when 
health and strength return, how they still believe that death is 
remote, and with a confidence that frequent and sudden deaths, 
and deaths in sin all around them, scarcely agitate ! Others 
may die without preparation, but they shall not. Thus thou- 
sands are going on to their last account. And can we only 
repeat that life is frail, and death is near ? Do you say, we 
must destroy this self-confidence, this presumptuous reliance 
on themselves, this trusting to their own heart, by telling them 
that repentance is the gift of God, and that it is only by his 



PRACTICAL INFLUENCE. 431 

grace that they will ever be prepared to meet him in judg- 
ment? True, this doctrine thus stated, is of great, of indis- 
pensable importance. But then they- already believe it, while 
they also believe that this necessary grace is ready for them 
whenever they shall be ready and condescend to use it. 
They do not, they will not believe, that the God of mercy 
may withhold his grace, even though they slight it till their 
last hour. Determined on present quietness in sin, they will 
practically believe, either that they can save themselves with- 
out grace, or that the requisite grace is always, even to the 
last, at their own disposal. And this, My Hearers, is the very 
presumption that holds these guilty thousands under the light 
of salvation in such death-like slumbers, that no accents of 
mercy, no, nor the notes of the second death, while this expec- 
tation remains, will ever move them. It is a presumption and 
a hope that must be torn away from the sinner, or he dies. 
And the case calls for all that truth can utter. He loves his 
sins, he loves the world, he is averse to God and his service, 
and he will persist in his chosen way till these hopes of salva- 
tion in such a course are cut off. If then you would rouse 
him from his lethargy, and suffer him to have no peace in his 
sins (and the God of mercy declares there is no peace to the 
wicked) ; if you would throw over his prospect the gloom and 
the forebodings in which truth invests it, preach the doctrine 
of Election. Point the thoughtless man to the eternal coun- 
sels of the Most High. Show him a sovereign God. There 
he will read, that by his own perverseness of heart he has ren- 
dered his salvation hopeless, without the grace which is his 
gift, — has put his salvation into the hands of an incensed God, 
— and that in view of that perverseness, God has decided re- 
specting the gift of his grace, in those counsels that never 
change. Thus will he see that God who can, and may save 
him, and yet who can and may destroy, and will destroy if he 
has formed no purpose to save him. \Yith such a view of the 
living God, can the sinner rest in his sins ? Can he now pre- 
sumptuously rely on what he intends to do hereafter ; or even 
on the grace of God, as that which will always be ready when- 
ever he shall choose to accept it. No ; instead of regarding 
his own salvation as a contingency to be made certain by what 
he shall do, or may intend to do, he would wake up to a rest- 
less solicitude, and to a laborious earnestness of effort, that he 



432 ELECTION. 

may ascertain how this great question is decided in heaven's 
high counsels, and, if it may be, that it is decided well for 
him. Contingency, as opposed to certainty, in respect to the 
salvation of the soul, is truly a consoling thought to the de- 
termined sinner. On this scheme, nothing is in fact certain in 
his future being. But who is the man that can think of the 
eternal life or death of the soul, as already certain in the coun- 
sels of an unchangeable God ; that in his present state all the 
evidence in his own case is, that he is one who shall die eter- 
nally ; and that there is one way, and only one, in which the 
terrors of his condition can be alleviated, — one way, and only 
one in which he can ascertain that he is the object of God's 
electing love ; — I say, who is the man that can think of these 
things and not feel himself, as it were, compelled to adopt the 
only method by which this unknown certainty shall be di- 
vested of its appalling aspect? Oh, the terrors of even the 
possible truth, that I am not included in God's purpose of 
electing grace ! TTho does not feel himself almost forced by 
such a thought to renounce sin and the world at once, that 
thus he may obtain the authorized and joyful assurance that 
he is chosen of God as an heir of all things ? Can there be a 
doubt whether such is the true practical tendency of the doc- 
trine of Election. Suppose yourself to have been tried before 
a human tribunal on a question of life and death ; that you 
knew that the question was decided, but. that the decision was 
still kept in profound secrecy, could you avoid a restlessness and 
an overwhelming solicitude in regard to it? When the sinner 
thinks of God's purpose of Election, a painful uncertainty re- 
specting what is certain in God's mind — an oppressive, agita- 
ting anxiety, will be felt. The doctrine will fasten itself on his 
thoughts, and excite emotion. It will be like hearing that the 
final decision is made, without being told what it is ; and in- 
stead of the peaceful reliance of sinners on what they intend 
to do hereafter, they will see, as they think of the counsels of 
an omniscient and immutable God, that their destiny is known 
but concealed. Perhaps it is life, perhaps death — perhaps 
heaven, perhaps hell ! The feeling will be, not so much as if 
the final sentence were yet to be formed, as if it were soon to 
be pronounced, — as if but another moment were left for ascer- 
taining by instant repentance the joyous truth, that in God's 
eternal counsels he is an heir of everlasting life. 



FITTED TO ENCOURAGE. 433 

And here I can not but remark is the very influence of the 
doctrine of Election which leads sinners to say, " It destroys all 
hope and drives to despair." It does destroy all their hopes of 
safety in determined sin. It does destroy these hopes, for they 
are false, deceitful, ruinous, and the sooner they are destroyed 
the better. God would destroy them and we would destroy 
them, not to produce despair, but that we may show them ex- 
actly what truth warrants them to hope for. This brings me 
to remark — 

Thirdly — That the doctrine of Election furnishes to the sin- 
ner all desirable encouragement By this I intend that degree 
which is best fitted to prompt the sinner to instant direct effort 
in the work of turning to God. 

When an object is one of difficult attainment, and when also 
it has engaged the strongest affections of the heart, then con- 
fidence of success will give strenuousness to effort. But how 
is it when the heart is on the object opposite ; when the very 
effort requisite to secure the one proposed is revolting to the 
heart, and when the only reason for effort is a painful, odious 
necessity, and when of course the whole tendency of the mind 
is to regard even this necessity as remote, and to defer acting ? 
Is it not certain that the mind will defer acting as long as in 
its own view it can with safety ; and will it not deem it safe to 
defer just in. proportion to the probability that efforts when 
made will prove successful ? To come then to the question — 

How much probability of success as pertaining to those im- 
perfect efforts which sinners make in turning to God, is best 
adapted to prompt them to immediate action ? One thing is 
certain, there is no promise of God that his grace shall attend 
these attempts of the sinner. So far from it that for aught we 
can say to him, he may be already given up to hardness of 
heart. Not only is there no certainty of success in these at 
tempts, but in proportion to the probability of it, and the facil- 
ity of performing the unwelcome task, the danger of delay is 
diminished, and with it the pressure of the motive to present 
effort. Nor is this all. If there is a high probability of suc- 
cess from present attempts, then there is a higher degree of 
such probability than would otherwise exist from future 
attempts ; and it is this belief, it is this false persuasion, that 
the work can be easily done now, and easily done at any 
future time, that is the solace of the sinner in procrastinating 
28 19 



434 ELECTION 

his duty to his God. To influence him then most powerfully 
to present action in duty, the prospect of success must be 
viewed as doubtful. It must be lowered down to what the 
apostle calls a " per adventure that God will give repentance." 
True it is this degree of probability may be very diverse in 
different cases. Still it is always so low in degree that if the 
sinner lessens it, as he inevitably must by delay, if he procrasti- 
nates noiv, he may well-nigh despair for the future. God in 
his Word confines all hope to the present hour, crowds the 
concerns of eternity as it were into the passing moment, throw- 
ing darkness over futurity, and converting the very thought of 
procrastination into "a fearful looking for of judgment and 
fiery indignation." That an almost absolute necessity of 
present action may be felt, and that the pressure of it may 
overpower all temptation to present inaction, " the Holy 
Ghost saith, To-day if ye will hear his voice, harden not 
your hearts." 

Now that this degree of encouragement is that which is 
altogether most useful to the sinner, the best fitted to move 
him to immediate action in the performance of duty, may be 
shown by an example. Suppose then you were in a prison 
where continuance is so desirable (for to make out a parallel 
case we must suppose madness in the heart), that nothing but 
the loss of life would even make you ever think of leaving the 
place. Suppose now the prison to be on fire, but that having 
the key in your own possession, you can with entire safety re- 
main in the enjoyments you love still longer. Would you be 
in haste to escape ? Not at all. You would still linger and 
still delight yourself in pleasure, and let the flames come nigh, 
for escape is easy, and this is all your concern. But suppose 
that the key is in the hands of another ; that he is your enemy, 
one whom you have greatly provoked to withhold every favor, 
and to leave you to perish. Suppose however, that you know 
that he has delivered others in the same fearful condition ; that 
some of those, not all, who have waked up to a sense of their 
danger and addressed themselves to strenuous efforts to escape 
have succeeded ; that if you do so, you through his interposi- 
tion may escape ; while every moment's delay is a moment of 
provocation to final abandonment to the flames. You see that 
the moment you were apprised of your danger would be the 
moment for effort — the moment in which you would wake up 



WARNS AGAINST DELAY. 435 

in agony to secure the interposition of that arm from which 
alone deliverance can come. 

Now like this, is the case of every unconverted sinner in 
respect to the work of turning to God. The service of God has 
no attractions to his heart. Instead of love he feels aversion. 
The necessity of repentance to avoid future punishment is all 
the influence he feels. He loves the world, he loves his sins ; 
he would firmly resolve always to live in sin were sin not to 
be punished ; he abominates the necessity of renouncing it ; and 
so long as he believes that he can safely continue in sin, so long 
he will do it, and with fearful probability, till the fires of the 
pit take hold of him. And now how much encouragement 
would you give him that success will crown his efforts to turn 
to God and escape perdition ? Would you raise it to a high 
degree of probability ? But this is the very presumption 
which he cherishes, and which emboldens him to go on in his 
iniquity. In this way you encourage procrastination, and 
brighten with hope the path which God darkens with the 
frowns and the terrors of his exhausted patience. No, if you 
would rouse him to attempt his conversion at all, preach to him 
the peradventure of the doctrine of Election. For while this is 
an immutable purpose of God, it is the sinner's only hope. 
Though it is formed in eternity, it is rightly viewed only in 
relation to what sinners shall do or shall not do in time. Ac- 
cordingly it tells them with a plainness and power peculiar to 
itself, that stupidity in sin is death in sin. It tells them that 
all reliance on futurity, even for a moment, is the presumption 
of one walking on slippery places, where fiery billows roll be- 
neath him. And yet it also tells every sinner that there is an 
attention of mind, an earnestness of effort, a plying of the moral 
powers to the act of duty, which in many cases does, and which 
even now in his case mat, by the grace of God, result in the 
performance of duty and the salvation of the soul. 

Thus the doctrine, while it shows him that the work may be 
done, brings upon him what sober reason would regard as the 
pressure of a present absolute necessity of doing it, with an 
almost insupportable weight, showing him that it must be done 
soon ; bringing upon him the conviction that it must be done 
now, or with fearful probability it never will be done. It 
shows him that many, not to say most of those, who under this 
pressure put themselves to instant effort, with the fixed decis- 



4:36 ELECTION. 

ion never to abandon it while life lasts, do in fact succeed. It 
shows him to himself sinking in the great waters, where with- 
out a struggle he is lost, but where by instant effort he may 
escape. If there be any condition conceivable which can 
wake and rouse the sinner to such effort, it is such as this. 
And thus to show him his condition, is all the encouragement 
that friendship, human or divine, would give him. Increase it 
if you will, but every addition is false and delusive. Increase 
the probability that a being who loves sin, and who will con- 
tinue in sin so long as he thinks he can with safety, will be 
converted and saved, and in that proportion you allay his 
fears, confirm his presumption, and embolden him in rebellion 
against God. Tell him that the Spirit is now ready, and will 
always be ready, and you tell him just what he wishes to be 
true to comfort him in his sins. You tell him what you have 
no warrant to say, that God may already have abandoned him 
to hardness of heart. You tell him what has been hitherto his 
solace in sin, that God will still wait and still consult his con- 
venience and his wishes; and so doing, you add your own 
strength to push him from the precipice where he stands, into 
everlasting burnings. Give him then the encouragement, the 
pevadventure of success which pertains to a present effort. 
Balance the probabilities of failure and success, so as to give 
the death-blow to all thought of a moment's procrastination. 
Bring upon him all the urgency of the crisis, now or never. 
Give him any other counsel, and while he follows it, his breath 
may stop, his soul may be lost, and his blood may be on yoit, 
his treacherous counsellor. 

Fourthly — The doctrine of Election brings upon the sinner 
the entire power of moral obligation. God's purpose of Elec- 
tion respects not machines or stocks, mere passive subjects of 
an influence, but intelligent, free moral agents, who are to live 
and act under the Moral Government of God forever. God 
can not make, nor purpose by grace to make, a creature holy 
who is not a complete moral agent ; that is, one having every 
power qualifying him to become holy without grace. Nor can 
I conceive how any man should be weak enough to think, or 
to imagine that others should think, that this purpose of eternal 
grace should respect any other beings than accountable immor- 
tals. Surely the mission of the Holy Ghost, purposed and 
planned in these high counsels, must have an object worthy ui 



EXALTS MAN. 437 

such an embassy. If the creation of a world for man's proba- 
tionary residence — if the law of God, coming forth with the 
authority of his throne — if the work of redemption by the blood 
of his Son — if the preparing of heavenly mansions in his tem- 
ple on high, bespeak the exalted nature and relations of man 
as an accountable being, not less does God's eternal purpose 
of love and grace. Accordingly, no man can look at this 
great purpose of grace and mercy, without feeling that so it is 
and so it must be. When God is seen to make so much of 
man, man must make something of himself, instead of shrink- 
ing away from his obligations to his Maker and his Maker's 
government ; sinking in his own estimation into the insignifi- 
cance of a creature whose conduct touches no interests but 
those of time ; of an insect who may be crushed and not missed 
from God's creation. God's purpose of Election does not thus 
make light of him. It tells him what the soul is, in the price 
paid for it, in the death of God's own Son ; it tells him that he 
is capable of God's moral image, for to this it proposes to re- 
store him ; it tells him that he is formed to be a co-worker with 
God in accomplishing his designs, for thus it proposes to em- 
ploy him forever. It brings him out upon the broad theater of 
accountable existence, and shows him that his character, his 
moral principle, his every action, reach the designs, the works, 
the glory of God in this and other worlds, and are to react 
upon himself also, either in a far more exceeding and eternal 
weight of glory, or in the endless agonies of God's condemna- 
tion. Thus it shows man to himself in his nature and rela- 
tions, as an accountable subject of the Eternal King, living 
and acting for God or against him, amid the glories and gran 
deurs of eternity. 

More than this. The doctrine of Election reveals the super- 
added obligations of an economy of redemption. It is man 
redeemed from the curse of a law which he is qualified and 
bound to obey, to whom the great salvation purchased by 
blood is proffered ; manfully qualified to embrace the offer, is 
the being to whom it is made. It proceeds wholly on the 
ground that the purchased inheritance is proffered with the 
sincerity of a God who does not lie — who does not mock his 
creatures with delusive offers ; on the ground therefore that 
man is a moral agent without grace ; that he can and ought 
without grace to accept the offer. Is not the purpose of Elec- 



438 ELECTION. 

tion a purpose of God to bring men to accept of his great salva- 
tion already offered ? Yes, I say offered. And can God offer 
salvation to the trees of the forest, or a statue, or a corpse ? No. 
God's offers are made to free moral agents, and the purpose of 
Election proceeds entirely on the sincerity with which they are 
made to each and to all — offers urged by command, and en- 
treaty, and love, and mercy, and every motive the universe 
can furnish ; influences perfectly adapted, in view of the moral 
powers of man, to secure the accejDtance of the offers. Is man 
then under no obligation to accept them ? Does not the pur- 
pose of Election distinctly, unanswerably announce this amaz- 
ing fact ; coming before the mind as it does, simply as a pur- 
pose of God to bring men by his grace to fulfill these high 
obligations which exist without grace ? And can man admit 
the purpose, and deny his obligations? ~No man can believe 
this in the clear, unperverted light of the doctrine of Election. 
If any doctrine combines in one view every thing that creates 
and enhances man's duty, if any thing can put the unyielding 
grasp of obligation on his conscience to do what God's law and 
gospel require, it is this. He must see himself under all the 
obligations of a law which has been bought off from its curse 
by God's mercy and a Saviour's blood ; and he must see them 
recognized and set forth in all their length, and breadth, and 
height, and depth, by the doctrine of Election. Had not these 
obligations existed, God's purpose of electing grace had never 
been known, nor heaven ever heard one song it has inspired. 
Let any man then, attempt to fly from his obligations and find 
a refuge in the doctrine of Election if he can. Let him retreat 
to this hiding-place, and attempt to throw off his obligations 
from himself upon his Maker ; but if he will listen, even there 
he will hear the voice to dut}^ sounding in his ears its most dis- 
tinct and solemn language, and the summons of obligation be 
to his soul like the trump of God. Go if you will, but even 
there shall you hear that God's purpose of Election seeks its 
objects in a world of rebels 1 — rebels against law, rebels against 
grace, of giant rebels, of whom you are one. 

Finally — The doctrine of Election discloses to sinners just 
views of their guilt and danger. It rests on the basis of this 
fact, that men under the immeasurable obligations just de- 
scribed are under all the guilt and the fearful exposure to 
eternal condemnation of their violation. Otherwise the pur- 



THE PERYERSENESS OF SIN. 439 

pose of Election could have no object and could never have 
been formed ; it were an absurdity and a solecism. God pur- 
pose to renew and sanctify, and save from sin and condemna- 
tion, beings who are not sinners ! to save from hell those who 
are not exposed to it ! Think what the doctrine is, and say, is 
not man's character that of a sinner, a rebel against God, and 
is not exposure to hell, while he is impenitent and unforgiven, 
his fearful condition ? 

But this is not all. For why this purpose of electing grace ? 
The answer to this question discloses an overwhelming fact ; 
I mean that perverseness of the sinner's heart which nothing out 
the purposed grace will ever subdue. Can there be a doubt of 
this ? Inquire then into the reasons for this purpose of God. 
Is it because man is a sinner and exposed to endless ruin ? 
Not simply that. Is it because he is not redeemed by an all- 
sufficient Atonement ? Not at all. Is it because the sincerest 
offers of life are not made to him ? Plainly not. Is it because 
he is not as truly able to accept these offers as he is to reject 
them ? Nothing can be further from the truth. Is it because 
he is not under every conceivable obligation to accept of these 
offers ? Surely not. Why then this purpose of renewing grace ? 
Because the sinner will perversely and infallibly reject these 
offers without this grace. Here is the true reason, the tremen- 
dous fact, and the doctrine of Election reveals it, pouring the 
daylight of truth on all its guilt and all its terrors. Calls and 
invitations, entreaties and warnings, are to no purpose. Urged 
by the sincerest love of a redeeming God, awed by the frowns 
and denunciations of his wrath, amid Bibles and Sabbaths, the 
voice of men and angels, the wooings and the tears of compas- 
sion, human and divine, under the strivings of the Holy Spirit, 
with all the light of truth and all the motives in the universe 
( entrated and poured burning and blazing on his heart ; Oh, 
ho v he still plants the firm footstep of rebellion on Jesus' blood ; 
how, as a reckless, ruined, damned spirit, he rushes on the thick 
bosses of Jehovah's buckler, and hastens his infatuated way to 
hell ! Nor is there a sinner on earth who can look at the doc- 
trine of Election, and not see himself as in a glass to be just 
such a rebel as this. None other can the purpose of Election 
respect. 

Why then will not the sinner actually perish under all this 
guilt ? Let him look at the doctrine of Election, and see what 



410 ELECTION. 

is the measure of guilt it discloses in the perverseness of his 
own heart ; how he has hated and perhaps vilified this purpose 
of God, and despised and slighted its gifts ; how he has to this 
hour refused all accordance with God's mode of dispensing 
grace, and habitually grieved the Holy Spirit. Let him look 
at the doctrine of Election, and see that the sovereignty of that 
God who hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, hangs a 
fearful uncertainty over all his prospects, and that the holiness 
of God must abhor a character of such moral deformity as his, 
and that it might be expected to revolt from all intercourse of 
love with him forever. Let him look at the purpose of Elec- 
tion, and see how it has hitherto left the broad way to destruc- 
tion thronged with fellow-beings, and how it still leaves the 
multitudes of living men treading on with thoughtless footstep 
the same road to death, — how many no worse than himself, with 
no more to provoke final rejection, and with the same hopes 
from futurity, are falling every day into perdition. Let him 
look at this purpose of Election, and in its actual development 
what a field of observation this world spreads out before him ; 
how it mocks human hopes, and trifles with the schemes and 
plans of salvation of human devising ; how it hurries away by 
death, amid the joyous anticipations of health and strength, 
unpardoned and unsanctified men ; how with the lightning's 
flash it wakes up from the fondest dreams of salvation to the 
agonies of eternal disappointment and woe, and how through 
human perverseness it renders the prayers of God's secret ones, 
and all the instituted means of his grace, the occasion of ex- 
hausted patience and of an aggravated doom ; how at the last 
consummation it will fix all destiny, shutting the gates of death 
and hell that they be opened no more, forbidding all mercy 
and excluding all hope. Let him look at the doctrine of 
Election, and see up to the present hour of this world's history 
how few — Oh, how few ! of all its myriads are saved ; let him 
look at himself, what he is, where he is, and whither he is 
going, and let him say if he feels no alarm. As he thinks of 
these high counsels of the Great Disposer of all, and sees how 
they are in fact unfolded in this sinful world, let him say if no 
salutary dread takes hold of his thoughtless, guilty spirit. He 
is, he must be afraid. He does not, he can not think of that 
throne of a sovereign and yet offended God, and not fear him ; 
he can not see that rising cloud of wrath, and not hear those 



WHO OPPOSES ELECTION. 441 

tlnmders roll, which so fearfully forebode the coming tempest 
of God's indignation upon every stupid sinner, and not tremble. 
Hark ! bow it murmurs damnation to thy soul ! 

REMARKS. 

1. According to the views given of the doctrine of Election, 
it can be opposed only by the determined sinner. As tbe doc- 
trine which, in one respect, is the only basis of hope to a guilty, 
lost world, surely none can oppose it. If then it be opposed 
at all on the ground of its practical tendencies, it most be on 
account of its tendency to destroy all presumption in sin ; as 
furnishing no more encouragement to seek salvation than what 
prompts to immediate and strenuous effort to obtain it; as 
bringing upon the conscience of the sinner the full power and 
pressure of his obligations, and unfolding the measure of his 
guilt and danger. And now I ask, who is the man that is un- 
willing that a doctrine should actually produce these effects on 
himself? Who is the man that wishes to go on in sin, with the 
false and fatal presumption that all will be safe in the end ? 
Who is the man that wishes for that encouragement in respect 
to the salvation of his soul, that supersedes and prevents all 
present solicitude and all present effort ? Who is the man that 
refuses to feel his obligations to his God and Saviour, and 
thoughtless of his guilt and unrelenting for it, chooses to walk 
quietly and unmolested on the brink of damnation ? The de- 
termined sinner, and he alone. Yfell may he oppose, and deny, 
and pervert the doctrine of Election. Otherwise, it would 
break up his present quiet in sin. It would come in like the 
strong man armed, upon his firm purpose of rebellion against 
God ; it would bind that purpose, and spoil and demolish all 
his hopes and comforts, and scatter them to the winds. And, 
My Hearers, it is not worth while to conceal this plain matter 
of fact, to palliate and excuse, when we have God's message to 
deliver and your souls to save. A sinner at ease, while he 
thinks of God's purpose of Election ; while he thinks of his 
soul forfeited already to God's justice, and through his own 
perverseness at the disposal of God's sovereignty ; at ease, 
while he thinks that he may be passed by in the unchangeable 
counsels of electing grace ! He can not be. Does he say, this 
is a hard doctrine, he can not bear it. Yes, very hard to the 

19* 



44:2 ELECTION. 

determined sinner. But true, and very useful even to him is 
the doctrine which benevolence, the sincerest kindness, if it 
can gain a hearing, would preach to every such self-destroying 
soul. Eternal grace and mercy first preached it. And shall 
we not repeat it, lest the sinner should be disturbed ; lest he 
should not go down to hell without annoyance? Would to 
God that the doctrine of Election might have its proper influ- 
ence on each sinner in this assembly. Then would he fear the 
justice of that God whom he so boldly defies, and yet is not 
without hope from his grace. Then would he for once look to 
that God who may show him mercy ; then would he ask, what 
must I do to be saved ; then would he have no rest till he 
found it in the everlasting arms. 

2. Sinners who oppose the doctrine of Election, oppose their 
own best interests. They oppose those very truths which, in 
some form, must come home to their conscience and their 
heart, or they must be damned. In some form or another they 
must see the mad presumption of stupidity in sin ; that there 
is a fearful uncertainty that they will ever repent and secure 
their salvation ; that they are under a weight of violated obli- 
gation, and a measure of guilt which are enough to sink them 
to the lowest abyss of ruin ; and have a peiwerseness of heart 
and stubbornness of will which tells only of inevitable destruc- 
tion. I say, they must consent to see and feel this. God will 
not convert a sinner who denies his dependence on his grace, 
nor take him to heaven who is unprepared to thank his deliv- 
erer. These are the truths embodied and held forth in the doc- 
trine of Election with peculiar clearness and force. Fellow- 
Sinner, I wish you to remember this — believe this doctrine. 
Let it come to your mind as it is. It will show you on the one 
hand all the hope there is for you ; and on the other, that you 
are in the hands of an incensed God, who may indeed save 
you, and yet may justly destroy you. This is what we wish 
you to see and to feel, and we can not in kindness to you but 
try to make you feel it. Look then at this doctrine, and you 
will not sleep in sin another moment. You can no more face 
it with stupidity and unconcern, than you can look into the 
burning lake without emotion. If then you would be saved, 
if you have not resolved to perish, I charge you not to resist 
the heart-searching, conscience-troubling doctrine of Election. 
You are fighting against your highest, your eternal interests — 



THE CONDITION OF SINNERS. 443 

taking one of those fearful steps toward everlasting perdition, 
which in the case of thousands, have taken hold on hell. 

3. To conclude, the condition of sinners as disclosed by the 
doctrine of Election is solemn and affecting. So the great 
apostle viewed it. Paul's preface to this doctrine was, " I say 
the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience bearing me witness 
in the Holy Ghost, that I have great heaviness and continual 
sorrow of heart, for my brethren, my kinsmen, according to 
the flesh." Life is rapidly passing away. These hours in 
which God will renew and sanctify the souls of sinful men will 
soon be gone. Their speedy termination will bring you, con- 
tinuing as you are, to the bar of God, not to arraign his justice 
in your condemnation, not to impeach his grace by casting the 
guilt of your impenitence on any decree of his, not to lighten 
your final doom by the conviction that the guilt is not all your 
own. but to penetrate your inmost soul with the conscious, 
agonizing truth that you are self-destroyers. You will come to 
the judgment with the remorseful conviction, that God, with 
more than a father's love, desired and sought your salvation ; 
that it was his unqualified purpose that you should repent and 
live, rather than sin and die; that you freely and deliberately 
defeated this purpose of his love. You will remember that 
when he revealed his purpose to save some by his grace from 
going clown to ruin by their own choice ; when he told you 
that he did all that he wisely could to save you, that you never 
devoted one week, or day, or even hour of your probation to 
this great concern ; never made one honest effort to give your 
heart to him in love ; were never for one moment willing that 
the Son of God should save you, but met and requited all his 
love, and entreaties, and grace, his blood, his agonies, his 
death, his authority, his pity, his wrath; met them all with firm, 
unyielding, desperate resistance. Oh, what must it be to stand 
at God's judgment-seat with such upbraidings riving the con- 
science, and thundering in the soul the sentence of doom! 

And are there not those in this assembly whom such an ap- 
pearance at the final bar awaits ? ]\iy soul can weep in secret 
places for you. I could fall at your feet and with tears entreat 
you. For whose perdition is certain, who will lie down in the 
devouring fire, if not some of you who yet remain stupid in 
your sins ? Reflect, ye who are thus wasting your probation, 
how long you have lived in sin, what means of grace and sal- 



4:4:4 ELECTION. 

vation you have perverted ; reflect how you have persevered 
in sin amid the outpourings of God's Spirit; how you have 
stood aside from all the peculiar influences of such seasons, 
and defeated all the efforts of eternal love and mercy to save 
you. Think too, that the number of God's elect from this gen- 
eration may be well-nigh completed, and that the influences 
of the Spirit to convert and save may here be given no more 
till you shall have gone into eternity. And now say, My Dear 
Friends, are there no reasons to fear that you will never see 
life ? Are there no marks of that reprobation of God upon 
you, which abandons sinners to strong delusions, that they may 
be damned ? There may at least be one such. Fellow-Sinner, 
it may be you. I fear it, and with trembling, and compassion, 
and love for your never-dying soul, I call on you to sleep no 
longer. Take, Oh take the hope which God's purpose of grace 
imparts, for he may yet save ; and take also its terrors and flee 
from the wrath to come, and lay hold on eternal life. From 
such an attempt there is hope. Set yourself to it then, as a 
work to be done before another sun shall rise ; yea, this hour, 
this moment. Cheer the dark hours that shall intervene before 
another morning, by reconciliation with God and hope in his 
mercy. Oh, the blessed hope that now beams upon you from 
the counsels of eternal grace ; the glad assurance that even 
now you may become a child and an heir of God ! But ven- 
ture on in the way of determined sin, and what can you hope 
for 1 In that path stands death, with which you have made no 
covenant ; on that way an angry God pours only the darkness, 
and the tempest, and the fire of his indignation ; ay, at the next 
step in it, a reprobating God may meet you, saying, " He is 
joined to his idols, let him alone." Let him alone, ye embassa- 
dors of the great salvation ; let him alone, ye angels of mercy ; 
thou only Saviour of the lost, let him alone ; Spirit of all grace, 
let him alone. 



V. 
PERSEVERANCE. 

"Being confident of this very thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you will perform it 
until the day of Jesus Christ'' — Phil. i. 6. 

Paul wrote this Epistle to the Philippians when he was a pris- 
oner at Pome. He tells them that he never thought of them 
without gratitude to God for their fellowship) in the Gospel ; 
and that he felt such lively emotions of joy in their behalf, as 
greatly to solace him under the trials of imprisonment. Nor 
did the joy of the apostle on account of these converts to the 
faith, result merely from the fact that God had begun a good 
work in them, — a good work which after all there was much 
reason to fear would never be finished, but terminate at last 
in sin and perdition. It was alike his confidence and his con- 
solation, that he who had begun this good work would perform 
it ; would carry it on toward perfection till it should be com- 
pleted at the final day, being confident of this very thing, "that 
he which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until 
the day of Jesus Christ." 

My object in the present discourse, is to show that the same 
thing is true of every real Christian : in other words, to estab- 
lish the doctrine, as it is called, of the Saints' Perseverance. 

I. I propose to explain this doctrine. 

For this purpose I remark — 

1. That by the doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance, we do 
not mean that true saints never fall into sin. They do. "There 
is not a just man on earth that doeth good and sinneth not." 
David committed adultery and murder. Peter denied his Sa- 
viour with oaths and execrations. Real Christians then are 
sometimes left to the commission of the grossest crimes. 

2. The doctrine is not, that real Christians, if they fall into 
sin, will be saved without repentance. I say this because al- 
most all who deny it, represent us as holding, that all real 
Christians will be saved, whether they persevere in holiness to 
the end or not. We wish it then to be distinctlv understood 



4:4:6 PERSEVERANCE. 

that we hold no such doctrine. No doubt if any real Christian 
falls into sin and dies without repentance, he will be damned. 

3. Our doctrine is not, that Christians cannot fall into sin 
and finally perish. They can. The Christian has the same 
power to sin, considered as a moral agent, which he always 
had, and left of God, would fall away and perish. The ques- 
tion does not at all respect what Christians can do, or what 
they have power to do. They have power to commit sin, and 
to go on in sin till death and perdition overtake them. But the 
question is, whether they will in fact die in sin and perish 
eternally. We maintain the negative of this question. ] 
therefore remark — 

4. That the real Christian will never he left so to fall away 
as finally to perish. We maintain that God will so keep his 
own children, so sanctify them through the truth, so invigorate 
their faith and love, so revive their graces when they languish 
and decay, so reclaim them from their backslidings, so perform 
the good work begun in them, that they will at last be found 
in the way of holiness and obtain eternal life. 

That there may be no mistake on this subject, allow that one 
real Christian will in fact so persevere in holiness as to be 
saved ; allow that there is no absurdity in the warnings and 
cautions against apostasy as addressed to that one ; allow the 
necessity of constant watchfulness and vigorous effort on his 
part ; say that he can fall away ; that if he Mis into sin and 
dies impenitent he will perish ; — say all this and whatever else 
you please, but only allow that one Christian will so persevere 
in fact as to reach heaven, and I add, this is precisely our doc- 
trine, with this only difference, that what you affirm of one we 
affirm of every real Christian. 

II. I shall offer some direct proof of the doctrine. 

The doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance I regard as taught 
by revelation, and its truth or falsehood to be wholly decided 
by what the Bible teaches. 

I can not in one discourse bring together but a small part of 
this proof. I shall aim only to give you some of the various 
forms in which the Scriptures teach the doctrine, citing under 
each, only one or two passages from many which are equally 
conclusive. 

1. The promise of the Father to the Son of his reward. The 
promise was, that the Kedeemer should see a seed who should 



THE COVENANT OF GOD. 447 

prolong their days, — see of the travail of his soul and be satis- 
fied. Christ further unfolds the import of this promise thus : 
" All that the Father giveth me shall come to me, and him 
that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out." " And this is 
the Father's will, that of all which he hath given me, I should 
lose nothing, but should raise it up at the last day." Now if 
all who were given to Christ shall come to him, and if no one 
of these shall be cast out ; if nothing shall be lost, will not 
every such person persevere in holiness and be saved ? 

2. From the intercession of Christ. Having prayed that they 
may be one with him as he is one with the Father, he adds : 
" Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also who shall 
believe on me through their word, that they all may be one, as 
thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they may be one in 
us." Now here is a prayer offered for every Christian to the 
end of time. It has been offered by the Son of God, him " whom 
the Father always heareth." 

3. From the covenant which God hath made with his peo- 
ple. This covenant is virtually the whole Gospel. It may be 
contemplated in its general comprehensive promise, and in its 
particular promises. First — Its comprehensive promise. This 
is nothing less than this : " I will be their God, and they shall 
be my people." Could more be promised, even by God him- 
self ? Will the blessing of sanctifying and saving grace, the 
richest, best gift of God to man, be wanting ? Will even the 
least real blessing be withheld ? We are at no loss on this 
point, for he hath told us that he " will give grace and glory, 
and withhold no good thing from them that walk uprightly." 
And again, " All tilings are yours." Will any to whom God 
hath made such promises as these, perish eternally ? 

Secondly. Let us contemplate this covenant in some of its 
particular promises. Here a wide field opens before us ; I can 
only glance at some of them. Here consider the specific de- 
velopment of this covenant. " Behold the days come, saith 
the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of 
Israel ; not according to the covenant that I made with their 
fathers in the day I took them by the hand to bring them out 
of Egypt, which covenant they broke," — [this covenant was 
conditional, and they broke it, and the new one now made, as 
the apostle says, is founded in better promises,] — " but this 
shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel ; 



'448 PERSEVERANCE. 

after those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their in- 
ward parts, and write it in their hearts, and I will be their God, 
and they shall be my people. And I will give them one heart 
and one way, that they may fear me forever ; and I will make 
an everlasting covenant with them, that I will not turn away 
from them to do them good ; but I will put my fear within 
their hearts, that they shall not depart fbom me." But say 
our opponents, some will depart from him. Which will stand, 
their speculation or the covenant of God ? But let us contem- 
plate still further these particular promises as they occur, I may 
almost say, on every page of the Bible. Consider those which 
connect salvation with holiness once begun in the heart. a He 
that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting life." " This is the 
will of him that sent me, that every one that seeth the Son 
and believeth on him, may have everlasting life, and I will 
raise him up at the last da}^." " Mary hath chosen that good 
part which shall not be taken away from her." 

Consider those which secure the Christian's growth in grace. 
" The righteous shall hold on his way, and he that hath clean 
hands shall wax stronger and stronger." " Every branch that 
beareth fruit, he purgeth it, that it may bring forth more fruit." 
The path of the just is as " a shining light, which shineth more 
and more unto the perfect day." 

Consider those which secure him against the fatal power of 
all temptation. u But God is faithful, who will not suffer you 
to be tempted above that ye are able, but will with the temp- 
tation make a way of escape that ye may be able to bear it." 

Those which secure recovery from falls into sin. " The steps 
of a good man are ordered by the Lord ; though he fall, he 
shall not be utterly cast down, for the Lord upholdeth him with 
his hand." " A just man though he fall seven times, yet shall 
he rise again." 

Those which promise no further remembrance of his sins. 
Saith the Lord, " I will put my law in their hearts," &c, " and 
their sins and iniquities I will remember no more." 

Those which secure deliverance from condemnation. " He 
that believeth on Him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and 
shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death unto 
life." " There is now no condemnation to them which are in 
Christ Jesus." 

Those which secure confirmation in holiness to the end. 



TESTIMONY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 449 

" "Who shall confirm you unto the end, that ye may be blame- 
less in the clay of the Lord Jesus." "The Lord is faithful, 
who shall establish you and keep you from evil." 

Those in which this confidence is expressed in respect to 
others. " Being confident of this very thing, that he which 
hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day 
of Jesus Christ." " And we have confidence in the Lord 
touching von, that ve both do and icill do the things which we 
command you." "We are persuaded better things of you, 
and things which accompany salvation." 

Those in which good men have expressed this assurance 
themselves. Saith Asaph : " Thou shalt guide me with thy 
counsel, and afterward receive me to glory." " I know," saith 
Job, " that my Redeemer liveth," &c. 3 " whom I shall see for 
myself." Paul says : " I am persuaded that he is able to keep 
that which I have committed unto him." "Henceforth there 
is laid up for me a crown of glory." 

Those which assert the endurino; nature of real religion. 
"The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring forever." "Blessed 
is the man that feareth the Lord, his righteousness endureth 
forever." " Surely, he shall not be moved forever ; his heart 
is fixed, trusting in the Lord." "His righteousness endureth' 
forever." 

Those which exclude all disappointment. " When thou hast 
found her [wisdom] then there shall be a reward, and thy ex- 
pectation shall not be cut off/' " For whoso findeth me [wis- 
dom] findeth life, and shall obtain favor of the Lord." "A 
hope that maketh not ashamed." "Whosoever drinketh of the 
water that I shall give him, shall never thirst ; but the water 
that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing 
up into everlasting life." 

Those which assert their union with Christ. "They are 
members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones." " They 
are one with him, as he is one with the Father." 

Those which base the assurance of God's perfections on his 
irruRut ability. "I, the Lord, change not, therefore ye sons of 
Jacob are not consumed." "Having loved his own which 
were in the world, he loved them to the end." On his faith- 
fulness, " The very God of peace sanctify you wholly ; and I 
pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body be preserved 
blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." " Faith- 
29 



450 PEKSEVEKANCE. 

ful is he that calletli you, who also will do it." In his truth. 
" God willing more abundantly to show unto the heirs of prom- 
ise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath, 
that by two immutable things in which it was impossible for 
God to lie, we might have strong consolation, who have fled 
for refuge to the hope set before us, which hope we have as an 
anchor to the soul." On his power. " "Who are kept by the 
power of God through faith unto salvation." "My sheep 
hear my voice, and I know them and they follow me." His 
omniscience and eternal purpose. " Whom he did foreknow 
he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of 
his Son." I add but one passage more, the bold and tri- 
umphant challenge of the apostle, in which, with God and 
Christ engaged in behalf of believers, he bids defiance to the 
universe beside. " What shall we then say to these things ? 
If God be for us, who can be against us ? He that spared not 
his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not 
with him also freely give us all things ? "Who shall lay any 
thing to the charge of God's elect ? It is God that justifieth. 
Who is he that condemneth ? It is Christ that died ; yea, 
rather that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of 
God, who also maketh intercession for us. Who shall separate 
us from the love of Christ ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or 
persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? 
Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors, through 
him that loved us. For I am persuaded that neither death, nor 
life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powei'Sj nor things pres- 
ent, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other 
creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God which 
is in Christ Jesus our Lord." Here is the triumph of the 
saints, triumph in God their Saviour. A universe is boldly 
challenged and defied. Nothing, nothing shall separate from 
Christ these members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. 
They are safe. An omnipotent God will keep them. 

III. I shall briefly consider the objections to our doctrine. 
These, so far as they demand consideration, may be reduced to 
three or four. 

1. It is said that the Scriptures record instances of actual 
apostasy from real religion. I reply, no such instance can be 
found in the record. Let us examine one of the most plausi- 
ble, the case of Judas. The passage relied on is this : " Those 



SALVATION CONDITIONAL. 451 

whom thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost 
but the son of perdition." This passage, to a mere English 
reader, seems to teach that Judas was given to Christ, whereas, 
properly translated, it implies the contrary. The true reading 
is this : " Those whom thou gavest me I have kept, and none 
of them is lost ; but the son of perdition is lost." But allowing 
that Judas was in some sense said to be given to Christ, one 
thing is absolulely certain, viz., that he was never a true disci- 
ple. " Jesus answered them, Have I not chosen you twelve, 
and one of you is a devil f He spake of Judas Iscariot." On 
another occasion, long before the apostasy of Judas, Christ 
said, " But there are some of you which believe not. For Je- 
sus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, 
and who should betray him." But, Brethren, for an unbeliever, 
a devil, to betray Christ, is not falling from grace. 

But I have not time, nor is it necessary to examine other 
particular cases. There are two passages of Scripture which 
remove all these objections at a stroke. " We are not of them 
that draw back unto perdition, but of them which believe to 
the saving of the soul." Now here are two classes, compris- 
ing those who do not and those who do draw back to perdition. 
Who are they who do not draw back ? They who believe to 
the saving of the soul. Who are they who do draw back ? 
John tells us. u They went out from us, but they were not of 
us ; for if they had been of us, they would, no doubt, have 
continued with us. But they went out from us that they might 
be made manifest that they were not all of us."* In other 
words, had they been of us, i. e., real Christians, they would 
never have apostatized. Now this settles the question hence- 
forth and forever in respect to all apostates. They never were 
real Christians. They were always hollow at heart, and their 
open apostasy only proves it. 

2. It is said that the Scriptures exhibit the salvation of real 
Christians as conditional ; for example, as in this passage : 
" We are made partakers with Christ, if we hold the beginning 
of our confidence steadfast unto the end." It is claimed that 
this class of passages prove that Christians may fall away, may 
not endure to the end, may possibly be lost. Be it so ; un- 
doubtedly they may ; I have fully and expressly said this in 

* Translate, " that they all were not of us." 



452 PERSEVERANCE. 

stating the doctrine. These passages prove that they may fall 
away. But is not this all? Do they prove that they will 
fall away ? This is the point. Is proving that Christians 
may fall away and perish, the same thing as proving that 
they will? Then indeed we are in an awful predicament. 
For this class of texts proves that all Christians may fall away 
and perish ; and if this is proving that they will, then will 
every soul be lest. 

How is it possible that any rational man should be imposed 
on by such reasoning as this ? All Christians can fall away 
and perish, or they may fall away and perish ; therefore all, or 
at least some, will do so ! All in this assembly can go without 
food and die by starvation, and therefore all, or at least some, 
will in fact die by starvation ! Or, every man in this house can 
and may commit suicide to-day, and therefore every one, or at 
least some, will commit suicide to-day ! 

But let me illustrate in this particular the doctrine of the 
Saints' Perseverance by an example. During the dangerous 
voyage of Paul with others to Rome, an angel appeared to 
him from God, and assured him that not one of the company 
should be lost. This fact then was certain, was revealed, that 
no one on board should perish. But afterward, when the sail- 
ors, alarmed for their safety, were about to leave the ship in 
the boat, " Paul said to the centurion and the soldiers, Except 
these abide in the ship ye can not be saved." Now both were 
true. It was true that no life would be lost, for an angel from 
God had said it. It was also true, that if the sailors left the 
ship, none could be saved, for so said an apostle. And yet no 
life was lost. So we maintain, that while the Bible clearly 
asserts, that unless Christians remain faithful they can not be 
saved, it no less abundantly asserts that no real Christian shall 
be lost. When therefore, you find texts which declare that real 
Christians will perish, if they fall away, they no more prove 
that any will fall away, than the above declaration proved that 
the sailors would leave the ship. 

But we shall be asked (and the objection is substantially the 
same as that we are considering), if none will in fact ever apos- 
tatize from real religion, why so many warnings and cautions 
in the Scriptures against apostasy ? I answer, because real 
Christians can and may, and doubtless would apostatize and 
perish, if they were not solemnly warned against it. And now 



WAKNINGS OF THE SCEIPTURES. 45J 

I ask the objector, can you give any better or any other reasons 
for these warnings % But he says, they prove that some will in 
fact apostatize and draw back to perdition. But I ask, how so ? 
What, My Brethren, because God, with all the solemnities 
of judgment and eternal retribution, warns his children against 
apostasy, does this prove that they will apostatize ? Because 
he takes the best means to prevent apostasy, do these very 
means insure it ? Suppose a case. Tour neighbor says to you, 
I fully believe that all, or at least some of your children will 
yet prove to be liars, thieves, and robbers. Wlrv so? you in- 
quire. Why, says he, I heard you, the other day, giving them the 
most solemn warnings against these crimes. True, you reply, 
my object and confident expectation is, by this means, to pre- 
vent their committing these crimes. Oh, no, says he, such 
wise, and faithful, and solemn warnings are infallible proof 
that some of your children will become liars, thieves, and rob- 
bers, for no parent ever warned his children against these 
crimes without their committing them. Would you not think 
your neighbor was deranged ? Yet this is the reasoning of our 
opponents from the warnings which God addresses to his chil- 
dren. They infer that some of them will certainly apostatize, 
because God, on pain of eternal death, has warned them against 
apostasy ! 

But it may be said that no parent warns his children against 
crimes which it is impossible that they should commit. True. 
Neither does God ; for as I stated before, it is possible that his 
children should apostatize, though I maintain that they will 
not. There is the same possibility in one case as in the other ; 
and therefore, the same propriety in warnings in the one case 
as in the other. 

But you say, no parent would think it necessary to warn his 
children against crimes which he hiew they would never com- 
mit. But does not God do this? Or do Christians in fact 
commit every sin against which God has warned them ? Be- 
sides, suppose you knew that cautions were necessary to pre- 
vent, and would in fact prevent the crimes of your children, 
what would you do ? Now precisely in this light are the warn- 
ings of God against the apostasy of his children to be viewed. 
They are necessary to prevent, and addressed to Christians for 
the purpose of preventing it; they are perfectly fitted and 
designed to secure this end. And shall we infer that the 



454 PERSEVERANCE. 

means which God adopts to secure a given end will defeat it? 
Is it proof that Christians will apostatize and perish, because 
God by the most solemn cautions and awful warnings has un- 
dertaken to prevent it ? Surely the most rational inference is, 
that they will secure the end designed, and thus through grace 
prove the means of their continued holiness and final salvation. 
If the warnings of God therefore prove any thing, it is that 
none will apostatize. 

3. It is said that our doctrine leads to licentiousness, tends 
to relax Christian watchfulness, lessens the power of motives to 
holiness, and even emboldens Christians to sin under the im- 
pression that they shall at last be saved. I readily admit that 
if the Christian had no love of holiness, or if he could be sup- 
posed to possess any evidence of his piety with the love of sin 
in his heart, or if our doctrine did not maintain the necessity 
of a faithful, diligent practice in all holy living, then it would 
be liable to the present objection. But it is not so. The man 
who does not love holiness above all things else, who finds the 
love of the world and of sin reigning in his heart, and who 
denies the necessity of faithfulness and diligence in all duty, 
has no warrant to rank himself among those that will be saved. 
All the evidence is against him. He has no reason to think 
that he is or ever was a Christian, or that the promise of sal- 
vation ever embraced him. The man, and the only man who 
can believe or hope to persevere in holiness and be saved, is 
the man who is holy, who loves holiness and loves heaven. 
And the question is, whether such a man will be led into 
sin by believing that he shall persevere in holiness, that he 
shall go on in the course in which above all others he desires 
to go, and obtain the end which above all others he longs to 
obtain ? Now we can bring this question to an infallible test. 
Suppose then, it were revealed that all men who love good liv- 
ing and desire long life, shall eat when they are hungry and 
drink when they are thirsty, and that they will continue to do 
so, and that by so doing, and in no other way, they will secure 
the longest and happiest life possible ; would the belief or the 
knowledge that you should continue in this course and thus 
secure a long and happy life, have any tendency to induce you 
to forego the pleasures of a single meal ? Would it have any 
such effect, when by so doing you would only prove to your- 
self that you did not after all belong to the class to whom the 



EFFECT OF PEOMISED SUCCESS. 455 

promise was made, and were in fact entering on a course that 
with fearful probability would end in starvation and death ? 
Now this is a case exactly parallel with the one before us. 
The question is not whether our doctrine tends to lead hypo- 
crites into sin, and thus to unmask their hypocrisy. It doubt- 
less has this tendency, and so much the better. But the ques- 
tion is, does the doctrine tend to lead the real Christian into 
sin? The Christian hungers and thirsts after righteousness, 
and the promise is that he shall be tilled ; and has this promise 
any tendency to destroy his appetite and to lead him to love 
sin ? Do men cease to love food and drink, because they be- 
lieve that they shall always love food and drink, and actually 
eat and drink to the end of life ? Is the man who loves holi- 
ness and delights in the service of God, likely to neglect it be- 
cause he believes he shall continue to be holy, and thus obtain 
eternal life ? Appeal to facts. Can you find a man who has 
truly loved the service of God, and forsaken it because he be- 
lieved he should love and serve him forever ? Ask the thou- 
sands and millions who have believed our doctrine, whether 
the heart that loves God resorts to it as a license to sin against 
him ? Have not those who have believed this doctrine, been 
among the holiest men the world has ever seen? Ask them 
whether they felt their zeal abate, or their labor in his cause 
languish, because they believed that heaven would in this way 
become their certain inheritance? Ask the noble army of 
martyrs, and all the saints who have met death in triumph, 
whether they were less desirous to glorify God and enjoy his 
presence because they regarded heaven as near and certain. 
Ask Job, who knew that his Redeemer lived ; ask Asaph, who 
knew he should be received to glory ; ask Peter, when assured 
by his Saviour that his faith should not fail ; ask Paul, when 
he looked upon his crown in the heavens as a sure possession. 
Ask these men whether this assurance cooled their love to 
Christ and put them in love with sin ? Ask angels ; ask the 
multitude before the throne who have washed their robes in 
the blood of the Lamb, whether their safe entrance into ever- 
lasting glory, awakens the love of sin, and tempts them to rebel 
against the God whom they worship ? Ah ! here are facts, and 
facts are not to be reasoned against. Surely, he who loves his 
God and Saviour will not be induced to sin against him by 
the promise of everlasting life. 



456 PERSEVERANCE. 



REMARKS. 

1. Our subject will enable us to compare the practical bear- 
Jig of believing and denying the doctrine of the Saints' Perse- 
verance. What then is the practical influence of denying it? 
One thing is plain ; the Christian deprives himself wholly of 
any peculiar influence from the promises to animate and en- 
courage to holy obedience. He has on this scheme no promise 
of preserving grace, no promise of God to secure his persever- 
ance. His salvation, of course, is just as truly a matter of 
doubt and uncertainty as when he was yet in his sins. Then 
he might be saved, and so he may he now ; and this is all that 
can be said. All the promises of God to the Christian it is 
claimed are conditional^ as truly so as to the sinner. The re- 
sults therefore, are as uncertain (unless he dies before he can 
fall from grace), as were he still under condemnation. And 
can this be ? Does the Gospel open no prospects, and give no 
consolations to God's children, but what it also gives his ene- 
mies ? Do you say, there is a hope, a probability that God will 
carry on the work of his grace when once begun % But I de- 
mand your warrant for these. According to your scheme you 
have no divine declaration, no promise of God ; no, not a word 
in all the Bible to authorize such a hope. Every promise of 
God you say is conditional. The sum total of all that God 
says, is, if he endures to the end he shall be saved, and if he 
draws back he shall be lost ; and this decides nothing in respect 
to which he will do. On what then, I ask, does your hope of 
the Christian's perseverance depend ? Simply and wholly on 
his own faithfulness. And what is such a hope ? Contem- 
plate such a Christian. With grace in his heart as a grain of 
mustard-seed, that heart frail and wandering in its affections, 
fluctuating and fitful in its best resolutions, surrounded by a 
tempting world, ever prone to relapse into sin, often quenching 
the Holy Spirit and provoking God to abandon him ; called to 
wrestle against principalities, against powers, against the rulers 
of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in 
high places (his own strength weakness), and not a particle of 
grace promised from God to secure that faithfulness on which 
all depends ; — what hope of victory has he ? Who would not 
say, there is every thing to discourage and depress, to damp the 
ardor of hope and to sink to the weakness of despair ! All 



BELIEF OF THE DOCTEINE. 457 

you say, depends on his own faithfulness, and his faithfulness 
depends on what ? !Not on any promise of grace, for there is 
not a word from God to secure it ; but on his own heart — a 
heart which like that of Christian Judas, as some esteem him, 
can and may, and for aught that appears, will betray the Son 
of God with a kiss, and sell him for thirty pieces of silver ! On 
such faithfulness, with no better security, depends the Chris- 
tian's hope of heaven ! Who that knows his own heart would 
not expect to prove a traitor and to go to his own place ? 

Contemplate now for a moment the Christian who believes 
our doctrine. Himself 'he can not, dare not trust. With the con- 
scious fickleness of his own heart, his best resolutions so often 
broken, his liveliest emotions so soon abated, his proneness to 
sin so constant, his return to God so difficult, his own faithful- 
ness such a broken reed, so much to be clone, with such a body 
of death to discourage, and overwhelm, how soon, without the 
promised grace of God to keep him, would he abandon all in 
despair ! But with the promise of a faithful God sounding in 
his ears, " My grace is sufficient for thee," his heart revives, 
and he is filled with the inspiration of hope. He listens, and 
again he hears, " My strength shall be perfected in thy weak- 
ness ;" " none shall pluck thee out of my hand ;" and he rises 
as in the consciousness of the promised strength, and enters the 
career of obedience as with its reward insured and in sight. 
The otherwise insurmountable obstacle of unconquered corrup- 
tion no longer appalls. This mighty barrier at the very en- 
trance opens before him, the rough places are made smooth, 
every mountain is brought low, every valley is filled, and by 
the promises is unvailed the salvation of God. Guilt is made 
to hope, and weakness itself looks up with confidence, and the 
path of obedience up to the paradise of God, is cheered and 
brightened with the assurance that what God hath said, God 
will do. 

2. By the practical use we make of this doctrine, we may 
be helped to determine whether we are Christians indeed. The 
doctrine unperverted, in its true tendency, animates the real 
Christian in the path of obedience. One who believes it, rea- 
sons and acts thus : " With all my imperfections, defects, and 
un worthiness I bear the marks of a child of God. I love holi- 
ness, I hate sin. My meat and drink is to do the will of my 
Father in heaven. I desire nothing so much as to be like my 

20 



4:58 PERSEVERANCE. 

Saviour, and to be freed from all sin. Remaining sin is my 
burden, my grief, my abhorrence. Who shall deliver me from 
the body of this death ? I thank God, through Jesus Christ 
our Lord. Amid all my corruption, and inconstancy, and 
weakness, and vain resolutions, I do not, will not sink in dis- 
couragement, for in the Lord have I strength. His grace shall 
be sufficient for me ; his strength shall be perfected in my 
weakness. Here I take courage ; my desires to be like God 
will be realized. Weak in myself, but strong in the Lord and 
in the power of his might, I press toward the mark for the 
prize of my high calling in Christ Jesus my Lord. I shall 
awake in his likeness ; then and not till then shall I be satis- 
fied." This man is a Christian. 

Another who believes this doctrine, turns it, by a gross and 
horrid perversion, to a very different purpose. " Once a Chris- 
tian," he says, "always a Christian. Having once the marks 
of a Christian, no matter whether I possess these evidences 
now or not ; no matter whether I desire holiness and hate sin, 
it is enough for me that I was once a Christian." Once a Chris- 
tian ! Never, never was this man a Christian. "Whatever may 
have been his experience, whatever may have been his hopes, 
his joys, whatever proof he may think himself to have had, he 
is a hypocrite. He loves the world, he loves sin ; it is not in 
his heart to love God and glorify his Saviour. In the language 
of the apostle, he goes out from us because he is not of us, that 
it may be made manifest that he is not of us. He remains' to 
this moment in the gall of bitterness and in the bonds of in- 
iquity. And does the doctrine that they who love holiness will 
persevere in holiness, warrant the conclusion that he who loves 
sin is a Christian ? Does the doctrine which supports, and 
comforts, and animates a heart full of divine love, administer 
equal consolation to the heart of an enemy ? Brethren, what- 
ever such a man may hope or think, he never was a Christian. 
He is a hypocrite, and his hope shall be as the spider's web when 
God taketh away the soul. 

3. The Christian may see to whom all praise is due. JSTot to 
himself, not to his own faithfulness. Faithful indeed he must 
be ; faithful indeed he will be. But in view of his faithful- 
ness itself, as well as all its results — in view of all that he is as 
a Christian, his language must be, " By the grace of God I am 
what I am." God begins the work, and God carries it onward. 



CONCLUSION. ±oy 

Ifot indeed against the will of man, but by making him will- 
ing. Not without our co-operation we will and do ; but God 
works in us to will and to do. We repent, we love, we give 
the heart to God, we return from our backslidings, we press 
toward the mark, we perfect holiness in the fear of God, but 
without God we never should ; and when he begins this good 
work, he performs it until the clay of Jesus Christ. If, Dear 
Brethren, you belong to the number of those who love God, he 
will not leave you, either to a tempting world, nor to the devil, 
nor to yourselves. He will cause all things, the assaults of 
Satan, the temptations that beset you, your very sins, to work 
together for your good. No part of your salvation will be neg- 
lected. In his own Almighty arms he will carry you through 
the opposing hosts of earth and hell ; he will give you the vic- 
tory aud the crowm of everlasting life. Give yourself there- 
fore to him in holy love, in unfaltering trust, and wipe away 
every tear. As God is true, eternal life is yours. Jesus will 
not forget the souls cleansed in his own blood. Not one of 
them shall be lost. In a little time conflicts, trials, temptation, 
sorrow, and sin will be over and past. On Mount Zion, in the 
light and amid the glories of eternity, you shall retrace the 
care, the love, the grace that brought you to its joys. And 
then, Brethren, we shall not give credit to our own faithfulness, 
and to our own resolutions. But whatever may be our specu- 
lations here, there, without a feeling or a note of discord, shall 
we say together, "Not unto us, but unto thy name be all the 
glory." " Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, unto 
Him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own 
blood." 

Finally. In view of this subject I would invite those who are 
yet in their sins, to comply with the terms of the Gospel. 1 
bring to you, My Dear Friends, this invitation, not without, but 
with the promise of salvation. My commission is not to say to 
you, Repent and believe the Gospel, and you may be, or per- 
haps you will be saved ; but believe the Gospel and you shall 
be saved. I do not indeed say that you will be saved if you 
repent and then draw back to perdition ; God forbid. But I 
say, he that believeth on the Son, hath passed from death unto 
life, and shall not come into condemnation. I do not say that 
you can not repent and believe, and then draw back to perdi- 
tion ; I do not say that watchfulness, and care, and diligence, 



460 PERSEVERANCE. 

and effort will not be necessary to secure final salvation. But 
I do say, Begin this work to-day, and by the grace of God it 
will be completed in eternal glory. Begin this work to-day, 
now, and the promise of God's all-sufficient grace is yours. 
Begin this work to-day, and you shall be kept by the power of 
God through faith unto salvation. This is no enterprise de- 
pending, in its results of eternal life and death, upon chance ; 
but on the unchangeable promise of the unchangeable God. 
It is not an affair of accident or hap-hazard, is not a heaven 
which may or may not be yours, but heaven made sure by the 
attributes and pledged by the oath of God. Fear not, then. 
Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ to-day, and heaven shall be 
your eternal home, and God thy God forever and ever. 



VI. 

WHAT IS TRUTH? 

" Pilate saith unto him, "What is truth ?" — John xviii. 3S. 

This Roman governor seems to have been fully initiated into 
the skepticism of those philosophers who admitted but one 
truth, viz., that nothing could be determined to be true. After 
hearing our Lord declare himself to have come into the world 
to bear witness to the truth, and that every one that is of the 
truth heard his voice, he contemptuously threw out the ques- 
tion, What is truth f and disdaining to wait for an answer, 
" went out again to the Jews." 

I need not say, that modern skepticism is of the same sort. 
The licentious depravity of the human heart is in nothing more 
apparent, than in its propensity to bring all practical truth into 
doubt and uncertainty. This, at a stroke, breaks the bonds of 
moral obligation. Rebellion against the Most High, in its 
own imaginings, is thus emancipated from his dominion, and 
brought into the joyous liberty of doing as it listeth ; as if 
truth were destroyed by being doubted, — as if the pillars of 
God's throne were not strong enough to stand against the doubts 
of disloyalty. 

From the general form of the question in the text, and from 
the declaration of Christ which occasioned it, that he came into 
the world to bear witness to the truth, we are led to give to the 
inquiry both a general and a particular answer. 

What then is truth ? I answer generally — 

I. Truth is the reality of things. 

Truth in this sense may be distinguished from the proposi- 
tions which declare it. It is asserted, for example, that the 
sun shines. This proposition, in common language, may be 
said to be truth ; meaning that its language accords with the 
fact, the reality. But then, though this accordance of words 
with things is necessary to the truth of a proposition, yet the 
truth, in the sense now referred to, does in no respect depend 
on the assertion. The truth, the reality of things, exists, whether 
it be asserted or not. 



462 WHAT IS TRUTH? 

Truth also may be distinguished from the knowledge and 
the belief of it. Contrary to a favorite conceit of all skepti- 
cism, truth exists in absolute independence of all knowledge 
and all belief. No doubting, no ignorance, no sincerity of un- 
belief can alter it. We know that two and two are lour, and 
so it would be whether we knew it or not. We believe that 
the earth revolves around the sun, and so it is, believe it or dis- 
believe it, as we may. Things are what they are, indepen- 
dently of all assertion, of all evidence, of all knowledge, of all 
belief, and of all unbelief. Whether it be known or not, as- 
serted or not, believed or not, there is a reality of things. 

This reality of things comprises the nature, the relations, and 
the fitness of things. It comprises the nature of things. Every 
thing has a nature, or properties peculiar to itself — a nature 
which is essential to its existence. Matter has a nature by 
which it is distinguished from spirit. Animals have a nature 
by which they are distinguished from men ; men and angels, 
angels and God, God and all creatures, have a nature by which 
they also are distinguished. This nature of things is a part of 
the reality of things. 

The reality of things includes also their relations. These 
are founded in the nature of things. From the nature of God 
and the nature of man, result certain relations between God 
and man. From the nature of men and the nature of their 
condition, result their various relations to one another. It is 
perfectly obvious that so long as things are what they are, their 
relations must be what they are ; for these relations result from 
the nature of things, and are determined by it, and are there- 
fore as unchangeable as the nature of things from which they 
result. No opinions of our own, no exercise of the authority 
or power of God can alter them, while the nature of things is 
unaltered. They are a part of the reality of things ; nor is any 
change conceivable, unless we can conceive things to be what 
they are, and not to be what they are, at the same time. 

Once more : Truth, or the reality of things, comprises the 
fitness of things, or their adaptation to certain ends or results. 
This fitness of things may be contemplated as it results from 
their nature, considered as actual existences ; and also as the 
ground or reason of the divine choice or will which gave them 
existence. In one sense, whatever God has created is what it 
is, because God willed that it should be what it is. This may 



THE NATUKE AND FITNESS OF THINGS. 463 

be assigned as the reason, why men are what they are, angels 
what they are ; in a word, why the universe is what it is. As 
actual existences, all things, with their properties, relations, 
and fitnesses, are what God willed them to be, and because he 
willed them to be what they are. But it is not irreverent to 
ask, why did God create things as they are ? The true answer 
honors God : because by being what they are, they are best 
fitted to answer the best ends. If the Most High made things 
as they are for this reason (and to suppose any other is to dis- 
honor him), then there was a fitness of things by which, as a 
Being infinitely wise and good, he could not fail to be influ- 
enced. Thus it was right that the Creator should secure the 
greatest good possible to him to secure ; and there was some 
one way in which this might be done. It was so not because 
he willed it to be so. God could not have prevented it, or 
caused it to be otherwise. To say that there was a way in 
which he could secure greater good than he could secure, is an 
absurdity ; and to say that there might be many ways in which 
he could secure the same degree of good, is to say that God 
has chosen the way which he has chosen without a reason for 
his choice. There was therefore a fitness of things which was 
as independent of his will, as his own existence and attributes. 
This fitness of things is a reality which no act of the will of 
God, no exercise of his power, no mandate of his sovereignty 
could alter. It is that which makes right what it is and wrong 
what it is, beyond all change. This fitness of things, instead 
of being determined by the will of God, determines his will, 
and is the ground or reason why God has done what he has 
done, and will do what he will do throughout eternity. To ask 
why it is, or whence it is, is like asking why or whence is infi- 
nite space or interminable duration, or why or whence is there 
a self-existent God. 

. Nor is it dishonoring God to say this. To place God above 
this fitness of things, is to place him above the eternal rule of 
right ; to suppose him to act without a reason for what he does, 
and therefore not to exalt but to degrade his character. It is 
the glory of God, not merely that he does as he pleases, but 
that he pleases to do that which is fit and proper to be done. 
This fitness of things then is independently and eternally the 
same ; and is a part of that reality of things by which the acts 
and doings of God are determined, and which we call truth 



46i WHAT IS TRUTH? 

But the question in the text, as I have remarked, has a fur- 
ther application to that system of truth, to which our Lord 
came into the world to bear witness. What then is truth in 
this application of the term ? I answer — 

II. It is that reality of things which the Gospel reveals. 

In other words, the great system of doctrines, of laws, of pre- 
cepts, of promises, of threatenings, to which Christ has testified, 
is a simple declaration of things as they are. These things are 
what they are asserted to be, not because Christ declared them 
to be so, nor because his testimony is supported by signs and 
wonders wrought by the finger of God. They are realities just 
as they are declared to be, independently of all testimony. 
They are a part of the reality of things, as this comprises the 
nature, the relations, and the fitness of things. 

This may be illustrated in several particulars. 

1. The Lord Jesus Christ hath borne witness to the character 
of God. He has told us what God is, what he is in himself, 
and the relations which he sustains to us. His testimony is 
true, because in his representations he deviates not in the least 
from the reality. Had nothing been declared concerning him, 
the self-existent God had been, and been what he is. Admit 
the begun existence of an atom, and you admit the existence 
of Him who inhabiteth eternity. Admit a creation, and you 
admit a self-efficient Being. As an eternal, self-existent, inde- 
pendent Being, he must be an unchangeable and an infinite 
Being. As an infinite Being, he must be an all-perfect Being. 
He must be as wise, as powerful, as good, as true, as just, as 
holy as this book declares him to be. Being what he is in the 
infinitude of his nature and perfection of his attributes, he 
must sustain to his creatures the same relations which this book 
reveals. For example, the relations which he sustains to crea- 
tures as their Creator, can not but be what they are, for he can 
not cease to be their Creator. So of every other relation, it 
can not but be what it is, himself being what he is. What God 
ever has been, God will ever be ; and we may as well think of 
causing an infringement on his Godhead in that eternity which 
is past, as in that which is to come. The being, the perfec- 
tions, the relations of God do not depend on the testimony of 
revelation. There is such a God, and the testimony of this 
book concerning him is true, because the God whom it reveals 
is a reality. 



PROVIDENTIAL AND MORAL GOVERNMENT. 465 

2. The Bible also reveals the providential government of 
God. It teaches that God governs the world ; that his govern- 
ment includes all things, even the minutest, in its plan ; that it 
is formed, arranged, and managed according to his eternal pur- 
pose, and carried onward to its results with all the securities of 
omnipotence. "Whatever God has purposed shall take place, 
will take place. Whatever does or shall take place, will, all 
things considered, be better than its prevention by himself. 
The result will show God's capacity to bless the universe of his 
own creation. He can not be God, if he has put the result at 
hazard by opening a door to the operations of chance. He 
can not be God, if he increase in knowledge or form new pur- 
poses. We submit the question to any one : Is this world of 
intelligent, sentient beings, forsaken of its Maker? Yea, is 
this universe of worlds and of systems abandoned to some 
blind, accidental, fortuitous energy? Or, is there a designing 
God on the throne ? 

3. This book also reveals the Moral Government of God. 
Its subjects, not the insects of a day, who through their insig- 
nificance can retreat from the responsibilities of their Maker's 
government, but creatures of God, made after his similitude, 
fitted to correspond with him and heaven, and to live and act 
as co-workers with God forever. And is it not so ? Is it cred- 
ible that there should be a perfect God, and he not give exist- 
ence to such beings '? A perfect God, and the universe without 
a creature qualified to admire, to love, to serve and to enjoy 
God ! A universe of his making, destitute of all the moral 
magnificence and glories of a moral kingdom ! Xo subjects in 
the purity and joys of holiness, reflecting his moral image ; no 
sanctuary of blessed worshipers ; no intelligence to see and 
adore Him that sitteth on the throne ; no heart to bring offer- 
ings of gratitude ; every song of praise still, and God, the glo- 
rious God, the mere superintendent of the laws of matter and 
of instinct ! Such a God as Jehovah reigning over such a des- 
ert ! Xo. If there is a God, then hath he moral and account- 
able subjects, and will reign over them amid the glories and 
grandeurs of eternity. Can we doubt it? Human conscious- 
ness attests human accountability. It attests our existence as 
intelligent, voluntary agents ; and from this fact, the convic- 
tion of right and wrong action is inseparable. As agents we 
do and must act, and right and wrong are nothing but the rela- 

30 £0* 



466 WHAT IS TRUTH? 

tions, tendencies, or fitness of free, voluntary actions — relations 
as inseparable from actions as the properties of matter or spirit 
are from its existence. Can we suppose the actions of an intel- 
ligent, voluntary agent such as man is, without tendencies to 
good and evil ? The eye of his own consciousness looking upon 
all the movements of the inner man, and himself ignorant of 
their tendencies? An intelligent being thus knowing right 
from wrong — knowing that the one tends to bless the universe, 
the other to fill it with lamentation and woe ; a free, voluntary 
agent, qualified to choose between right and wrong, and yet 
under no obligation to choose right ? It is no more possible 
that man should possess these powers and properties, and be 
released from moral obligation for a moment, than that he 
should possess and not possess them at the same time. He 
may deny it, he may argue against it, but he knows better. 
By his very nature, by the very properties of his conscious 
being, he is doomed to the conviction of his accountability — a 
conviction that ever does and ever will possess the soul with 
the certainty that whatever is, is. 

4. The Scriptures contain the law of God. This law is true, 
not simply because it is God's law (though this is the highest 
proof of its perfection), but because man, from the nature, 
relations, and fitness of things, ought to love God with all his 
heart, and his neighbor as himself. He ought thus to love 
God, because there is no object so great, so excellent, so worthy 
of affection. Here is no mistake. For who does not know 
that love is the fulfilling of the law ? Who does not know that 
he is bound to intend to do all the good he can f Who does not 
know that he is bound to act from this principle ? Who that 
is a man does not know it, as surely as he knows that he is a 
man ? We all know it. The whole world knows it. Athe- 
ists, deists, infidels, sinners, devils, all know it. All know that 
the purpose to do all the good we can, expressing itself in 
action, is the perfection of man in character and in happiness ; 
the perfection of one and of all of the entire moral universe. 
The divine law therefore does not create obligation, merely by 
its promulgation. It declares that to be our duty, which is so 
in the nature of things. What it declares is reality. Were 
God to make a law forbidding us to love* him with all the 
heart (if such a supposition may be made), it would not de 
stroy our obligation to love him. God would still be lovely. 



LAW AND PENALTY. 467 

While God then remains what he is, and man what he is, our 
duty to God can never change, can never cease. 

The same thing may be said of our duty to our neighbor. 
Nothing, no authority or command of God can make it right 
to hate a fellow-creature, or to exercise malevolence or cruelty. 
The law therefore which defines our duty to our neighbor, is 
not the dictate of despotic authority, but the simple declara- 
tion of what is true, what is real, wdiat is lovely, what ought 
to be done were there no law. 

5. The precepts of the law and the Gospel are also founded 
in the nature of things. It is as obvious to every one as are 
the tendencies of actions — and the tendencies of actions are as 
obvious as the tendencies of fire and water — that it can not be 
right to lie, to steal, to murder. Examine which moral pre- 
cept of the Gospel you will, you will see that it is just what it 
should be, making reality the standard ; that it declares that to 
be right which is so in the very nature, relations, and fitness of 
things ; that let any other precept be put in its place, still that 
and that only would be the right, true, and best precept. The 
greatest enemies of Jesus have been obliged to lay this testi- 
mony at his feet. 

6. The penalty of the law, and the more awful curse of the 
Gospel, rest on the same foundation. These, dreadful as they 
are, are no arbitrary denunciations. They result unavoidably 
from the nature, relations, and fitness of things. It is fit that 
God should administer a Moral Government — a government by 
law. It is fit that obedience to the best of laws should be 
secured, and disobedience prevented if possible by motives, 
and that these should be as weighty and powerful as may be. 
Obedience to the best law is the best thing, and it is fit to 
secure the highest possible degree of it ; and it is equally right 
that any and every thing that shall come into competition with 
this result should be sacrificed. The sacrifice of the rebel's 
happiness, and that in any degree, may be demanded, for obe- 
dience is the best thing, and it is fit that the highest possible 
degree of it should be secured ; and that whatever this high- 
est, best end demands, should be done. On the certain princi- 
ple then, that a less penalty would not secure as much obedi- 
ence as the greater, this highest, best end, does require the 
penalty of God's law. 

Or view the subject in another light. The greatest good 



468 WHAT IS TEUTH? 

requires a moral system — a Moral Government over moral 
beings. This is a government by authority, whose influence 
and energy lie in this — thus scdth the Eternal King. But this 
influence, this authority, this right to give law which imposes 
an obligation to obey, can not be sustained a moment unless the 
king show that in giving his law and punishing its violation, 
he acts on the principles of eternal rectitude. He must show 
that he esteems things as they are, and will act accordingly ; 
that he considers his law as the necessary means of the highest 
good, and as of the same value therefore as the end itself — as 
his own perfect dominion and the highest good of his universe. 
Xow the subject who violates this law, pronounces it unworthy 
of regard, tramples on the authority of the lawgiver, and vir- 
tually treads the whole system of Moral Government in the 
dust. If God does nothing his designs are defeated, and all 
that infinite wisdom and goodness have done, or ever can do 
to secure their high purpose, is in ruins. God then must do 
something, or the catastrophe is inevitable. And what ? The 
sinner has shown how he esteems the law ; God must now 
show his regard for it. He must show that he esteems it as 
the best means of the best end, and that whatever comes into 
competition with his authority shall be sacrificed. He must 
show a measure of indignation toward this act of the rebel, 
which shall tell how he regards his authority and his law ; that 
he will turn a revolted world into hell, rather than subvert the 
principles on which his throne alone can stand. How then 
shall this be done? Every one answers, only by inflicting 
punishment on the transgressor. But what punishment? If 
he inflict a temporary evil, it must be either because that will 
show his true and real regard for his law and authority ; or 
because he is unwilling to express that regard by the entire 
sacrifice of the sinner's happiness. But can any temporary 
evil show God's real disapprobation, his just indignation for an 
act that would destroy all good ? Can it express his real esti- 
mate of that law which he values more than a universe beside ? 
Would any thing less than endless punishment be a just ex- 
pression of the value he puts upon it? Why then does he 
inflict a limited punishment ? Plainly because he values the 
sinner's happiness so much that he is not willing to sacrifice it 
for any regard which he has for his authority, and for those 
higher interests which that authority is pledged to protect. 



SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINES. 469 

He values the well-being of the rebel more than he values his 
authority, his law, his kingdom. He is willing to sacrifice the 
greater to the less. He is not just to his kingdom. He no 
longer acts upon principle, and shows that he does not. All 
ground for confidence and reason for submission are gone. 
His authority is prostrated. He is no longer entitled to re- 
spect nor worthy of submission ; but is virtually driven an 
insulted, degraded exile from his throne. The bands of his 
moral administration are broken for eternity, and nothing is to 
be expected but that the fires of hell burst forth unchecked, 
and rebellion stand triumphant on the ruins. Ought this to 
be done ? or, will God act upon the principles of eternal right- 
eousness? Is this the truth, the reality? or has God guarded 
his throne and his kingdom by the securities of a law with an 
eternal penalty? 

View this topic in yet another light. Suppose the penalty 
of the divine law repealed — declared null and void. "What 
then ? Other things remaining as they are, would hell be an- 
nihilated ? Sin is hell. "Where is it ? "Wherever sin exists 
and reigns unsubdued and unrestrained. So it is, so it must 
be so long as sin is sin ; and in proportion to the guilt must 
be the torment. To the honor of God let it be remembered 
that he can not make sin holiness, nor its appropriate effects 
aught but wretchedness. Sin is, and must be hell, as an eter- 
nal reality. As to say that he who obeys the law of God shall 
live, is declaring one of the plainest and most unalterable of 
all realities, viz., that he that is holy shall be happy; so, to 
say that he who disobeys that law shall die, is declaring a re- 
ality equally plain and unalterable, viz., that he that sins shall 
be wretched. Break then the everlasting chains, and put out 
the fires of the pit, it remaineth to the sinner against God an 
eternal reality, " myself am hell." 

7. The great doctrines of the Gospel rest on the same foun- 
dation. The facts, the things declared, are realities. 

(1.) The sinful depravity of man is a reality. The testimony 
of the Scriptures does not alter his character, nor make it what 
it is. The Scriptures only give us an account of the matter of 
fact. The conduct of men evinces the reality and power of the 
selfish principle in the human heart beyond all question, and 
this by three incontrovertible principles. The one is, that the 
conduct of unrenewed men, in its fairest forms, can all be ac- 



470 WHAT IS TEUTH? 

counted for by tracing it to this principle. Secondly, there is 
a total destitution of all that is decisive of the holy principle. 
And thirdly, there is much, very much, that is absolutely de- 
cisive of such a sinful principle. Accordingly, the conduct 
of men does, in all human belief, evince its existence as deci- 
sively as the burning of a house shows the property of the 
element that destroys it. We no more think of exempting 
any individual from the operation of those laws, checks, 
and influences that are designed to restrain this principle, 
than we think of kindling a fire in the midst of our dwell- 
ings. Throughout the wide world, all the laws, provisions, 
and methods adopted by men to regulate the conduct of man- 
kind are simply an appeal in some form to the selfish prin- 
ciple. There is no hope in, no reliance upon, any other in 
the human bosom ; and for this reason, we know that there 
is no other there to be relied irpon. "Who is willing to dis- 
pense with bonds, and deeds, and mortgages, and trust the 
simple naked principle of doing as we would be done by, 
in his fellow-men? Take away all else, all regard to law, 
to public opinion, to reputation, to profit, to interest in every 
form — suppose no security against acts of violence, but the 
simple abstract principle of benevolent action — consternation 
would possess every mind in a moment. We all know that 
the security that we feel in every community of human be- 
ings is, that selfishness in some form will govern selfishness 
in other forms. We all know that the men of this world 
are honest, and true, and just, and kind, just so far, and no 
farther than it is for their interest to be so, and the proof 
is, that in all the wide range of business and intercourse all 
act on this assumption. This is just, or it is not. If it is, 
the fact is established. If it is not, it is a universal slander 
of our fellow-men of which all are guilty. These things 
show what man thinks of man, or rather what he knows to 
be true of him. And if we look at the providence of God, 
how do sorrow and sickness, trials, and calamities, pain and 
death, tell us that Gocl is angry with us ; how does this groan- 
ing creation proclaim that man as a moral being is in ruins ! 
Appeal also to human consciousness. Who does not know, 
that not the principle to impart, but the principle to obtain all 
the good he can, has been his governing principle? And this 
is depravity in its perfection. Oh, My Hearers, we all know 



DEPRAVITY BY NATURE. 471 

our own hearts in this matter. Human depravity then, is a 
part of the reality of things, a fact notorious as the sun in the 
heavens, whether the Gospel had declared it or not. The 
reality existed, in all its deformity, before the picture was 
drawn. 

(2.) This depravity of man is by nature. By this I do not 
mean, that the reason why man sins, in the first instance, is a 
previous sin. That the cause of all sin is itself sin, is a self- 
evident absurdity. Nor do I mean, that man deserves dam- 
nation for being what his Creator makes him. Nor, that man 
has a nature which compels him to sin ; nor that man is not 
in his first, and in every moral affection, exercise, or act, an 
accountable, free moral agent. None other can do right, or do 
wrong. But I mean, that the universal sinfulness of mankind, 
free moral agents as they are, must be traced to their nature. 
The universality of a fact proves the universality of some 
cause, ground, or reason of it. The universal fact, that heavy 
bodies, in all circumstances, move toward the earth, is proof 
that the fact is by nature. So in the present case, the univer- 
sal sinfulness of man, proves that it is by nature. For, in all 
circumstances, under every possible influence of light, truth, 
motives, example, persuasion, he exhibits, with absolute un- 
varying uniformity, the same moral character. Appeal to the 
history of all nations and all ages, when or where is the soli- 
tary exception to the fact, that selfishness is the first governing 
principle of human conduct ; the element and substance of 
human character, as it first exists in every human being. 
Show us the exception, by showing us the man whose first 
moral character has not been formed by the selfish principle. 
Show us the instance of prevention, by the influence of truth, 
or motives, or the power of example, or by any influence 
within the appropriate limits of our earthly being. Show us 
the man not depraved by nature, and we will show you a stone 
that does not tend toward the earth by nature. We know 
indeed, that the phenomena in these cases differ widely. So 
also do the causes. One is the cause of free moral action, 
and consistent with the nature of such action. The other is 
a physical cause and appropriate only to a physical effect. 
Still the cases are alike in one important respect — in uniform- 
ity of result. And if the uniformity with which an unsup- 
ported body moves toward the earth proves that it is by nature 



472 WHAT IS TRUTH? 

heavy, so does the uniformity of human sinfulness prove that 
man is depraved by nature. No change of condition, no in- 
crease of light, or of motives, no instructions, nor warnings, 
no power of argument, or example, changes the result. Un- 
less there be some interposition not included in these things — 
unless there be something above nature, the case is hopeless. 
Placed anywhere within the appropriate limits of his earthly 
being, man, an intelligent, free moral agent as he is, has also 
such a nature that Jie will be a sinner. 

(3.) An Atonement, if we admit the pardon of sin, is another 
reality. We have seen that according to the nature of things, 
especially of law and Moral Government, sin must be pun- 
ished. A law without sanctions, or which dispenses with its 
sanctions, every child knows, is no law. A law once broken 
must cease to be a law, or its authority must be sustained, 
either by the execution of penalty, or by an Atonement. The 
penalty must be executed, or that must be done which shall 
answer the end of its execution. Now these are plain prin- 
ciples, and regarded as no less infallible by the unperverted 
mind, than that food will nourish, and poison destroy the body. 
The conviction of their truth and infallibility results from, is co- 
eval with, and as it were incorporated into our very being. They 
are among the earliest, most unhesitating convictions of the 
human mind ; being associated with the condition of infancy 
itself, in its subjection and subordination to the will of a supe- 
rior. Every tenant of a prison understands them, as truly as 
the judge that condemned him. The nature and end of law, 
the reasons, the why and the wherefore of its penalty, are un- 
derstood and admitted as among the most necessary and infal- 
lible of all truths. No man ever did, or ever can live and act 
as a member of human society, without admitting and acting 
on these principles. Men may deny them, they may specu- 
late themselves into perdition in defiance of them, but they 
can never speculate themselves wholly out of the secret and 
troublesome conviction of their reality. In view of a coming 
eternity they can never rest in the securities of infallible truth, 
till they rest upon these principles. What ? A society of free, 
voluntary beings like men, living harmoniously, happily, with- 
out any rule of action ! Such a world, such a God as Jehovah, 
and he not reigning over it ! A moral kingdom without a law ! 
Or what would be substantially the same thing, a law proffer- 



NECESSITY OF REGENERATION. 4:73 

ing pardon to its violator, promising rewards alike to loyalty 
and rebellion ! The whole influence of the king inviting to 
one as well as to the other ! His law, leaving the execution of 
penalty at the option of the culprit ! The King of kings do 
this ; withdraw every, check and restraint from human selfish- 
ness, and throw the reins loose upon all its waywardness and 
violence ! Think what man did in paradise, — what angels did 
before the eternal throne, guarded as it was by all the jealous- 
ies of the Godhead ; and then say who would wish to live — 
who would dare to live in such a community, though its name 
were heaven ? ~No ; if sin be pardoned, law must be sustained 
by an Atonement. The pardon of a sinner demands an Atone- 
ment on the same immutable principle as the violation of 
law demands its curse. If the pardon of sin be a reality, then 
is an Atonement a reality. 

(L) The necessity of Regeneration is another illustration of 
this subject, a necessity resulting from the nature, relations, 
and fitness of things. " Except a mau be born again, he can 
not see the kingdom of God," is no arbitrary decision ; not a 
rule of exclusion from endless bliss by the prerogative of mere 
sovereignty. The impossibility asserted, is in the nature of 
things. Let this. book decide as it may, there can be no heaven 
to a sinner without this change. "What is heaven ? A holy 
world ; a world whose employment, society, joys are holy ; the 
habitation of God's holiness, and whose rapturous song is — 
" Holy, holy, holy Lord God Almighty." What fitness then 
has the unholy for such a world as this ? When removed into 
that eternity which is just before him, not a single object can 
be found to satisfy one wish of his heart. His spirit, with de- 
sires stretching onward to immortality, must remain in eternal 
want. He has no taste for contemplating the glory of God. 
He has never seen his need of a Saviour ; never felt his obli- 
gations to him, nor sought redemption by his blood. How 
then can he adore him in the songs of the redeemed ? What 
has an enemy of God to do with employments and joys like 
these ? Alas, he knows not the meaning of that song, 
"Worthy is the Lamb." There is not a note which he can 
sing ; its every sentiment were a lie on his tongue and anguish 
to his heart. Admit him then into that world, surround him 
with all that blesses the bright hosts of glory, and he is unable 
to taste one drop of that bliss with which their cup overflows. 



474 WHAT IS TRUTH? 

While each redeemed celestial, with endless rapture, cries, 
"Worthy is the Lamb ! worthy is the Lamb !" he can only say 
in the language of real feeling, " Oh, what a weariness is this !" 
In the presence of that God he hates, among heaven's ac- 
claiming throng, he is a solitary, forsaken, wretched outcast ! 
In the midst of all that ocean of blessedness there is not a 
drop for him ! So sure is it, that to the unholy mind heaven 
itself must be an absolute desert. The solemn truth of the 
sinner's immortality, the living fountains from the throne of 
God, are to him only sources of woe, and hell must be sought 
as his only refuge, the only relief from torments with which 
heaven would overwhelm his guilty spirit. 

(5.) The necessity of the Divine Spirit's influence in Regen- 
eration is another reality. " Except a man be born of water 
and of the Spirit, he can not enter into the kingdom of God," 
is a truth, whether God had declared it or not. Not indeed 
that it would be truly and properly a miracle, if man as a free 
moral agent should make himself a new heart. Not that man 
has not that heart, and soul, and mind, and strength with 
which his Maker requires him to love Him, — powers in man, 
which according to the very terms of the law, limit God's de- 
mand ; but that man, through his own voluntary cherished 
perverseness, will never use these powers as he ought, without 
the special, supernatural, transforming grace of God. Admit 
then the fact, that mankind are depraved by nature, and you 
admit the fact that no light, nor moral suasion by truth or 
motives, will ever accomplish the requisite moral transforma- 
tion in his character. Let Paul reason ; let Apollos persuade ; 
they are nothing, — but it is God who giveth the increase. Let 
the powers of oratory — to convince, to allure, to awe, be ex- 
hausted, such is the nature of man, and such his perverseness 
in sin, that no power of truth, no charms of redeeming love, 
nor the revealed glories of heaven, nor the rising smoke of tor- 
ment, will rescue a human being from the character and con- 
demnation of a depraved sinner. This fact stands out before 
us, with all the obviousness and all the certainty of the ordi- 
nances of heaven. It is not the result of divine prerogative, 
but of human perverseness ; not the result of imperfection in 
God's work, but of perverting the powers of a being made in 
the similitude of God ; not in the way of God's mending his 
work, but in the way of a new moral creation, and according 



THE aOSPEL GLORIOUS. 475 

to the nature and laws of such a creation, and compared with 
which the former shall not be remembered nor come into mind. 
I might make these illustrations more extensive and minute. 
Enough however has been said to show what truth is, and 
particularly that the truth, to which the Son of God bore wit- 
ness, is the reality of things. In this sense of the term we are 
to consider the Gospel, not as making these things what they 
are by the testimony of its Author, or by our belief or disbelief 
of them, but as simply declaring what is reality. In a word, 
the Gospel is a glass held up before us by the Son of God, to 
show us these tremendous realities as eternal truth. 

REMARKS. 

1. This subject gives us an exalted view of the Gospel. It 
reveals to us realities. It exhibits the things of which it testi- 
fies just as they are. Did we know nothing more of the dec- 
larations of this book than that they are the declarations of an 
Almighty Being who had power to execute his will : were we 
obliged to regard all their importance as consisting in this, that 
they are his declarations, and to admit that any others coming 
from him would have the same importance, even then it would 
seem as if they would irresistibly claim our respect. ^N"ay, 
were we satisfied that it were a mere fiction ; that the God 
whom it reveals, in his perfections, his government, his doings ; 
that the immense system of dispensations here unfolded ; the 
work of redemption here portrayed ; the final judgment of 
angels and of men, and its scenes of eternal retribution, were 
mere images of the fancy, still this book might reasonably 
excite our highest wonder. But how must our views and feel- 
ings rise, when we see and know that what we read is all re- 
ality ; that what this book reveals is truth, whether we believe 
or disbelieve it — truth not merely as supported by the highest 
testimony, but truth consisting in the reality of things — truth 
comprising the nature of things which the unchangeable God 
has given them ; the relations of things which are as unchange- 
able as the things themselves ; and that fitness of things which ' 
is unchangeable by God himself. The Gospel tells us not 
what might have been, not what' may be or may not be, but 
what is, what God is, what Christ is, what the divine law is, 
what man is, what the way of salvation is, what the judgment 
is, what heaven is, what hell is. It brings out and spreads 



476 WHAT IS TRUTH? 

these great realities before us. It is the mirror of truth 
held up by the Son of God, to show us these realities. No 
sooner do we look into it than we behold the self-existent 
God in all his majesty and glory. We see his eternal and 
unchaugeable purposes formed by infinite wisdom, and roll- 
ing onward to their complete and glorious fulfillment ; we 
see ourselves accountable and immortal beings, under that 
law which is the great bond of Jehovah's empire, and fixed 
as his throne ; we see ourselves too, the transgressors of that 
law, and with the amazing interests of the soul before us, con- 
demned by it to bear its fearful penalty ; we see a world in 
revolt, and the work of its redemption achieved by its God — 
a world which is the only place of our probation for the allot- 
ments of eternity — a world where the offers of pardon and 
everlasting life are made, and repeated to us in the midst of 
all our provocations and guilt — a world visited by angels, and 
redeemed saints, as ministering spirits — a world, in a word, in 
which, through the efficacy of Jesus' blood and the power of 
the Holy Ghost, the work of redeeming love is carried on to 
its glorious consummation. In a moment we see the heavens 
passing away, the elements melting with fervent heat, the 
earth and its works burned up. The throne of judgment rises 
to our view with all its glories and its terrors. On the one 
hand the bright hosts of the redeemed are ascending through 
the portals of glory to the throne of God and the Lamb. We 
behold their white robes, their palms of victory, their eternally 
brightening splendors, and increasing joys. On the other, the 
multitude of guilty, impenitent, unpardoned immortals, de- 
scending to the chains of darkness — the groans, the agonies of 
eternal despair. How solemn, how tremendous, that all this 
is no empty vision — no dream — but reality ! With what holy 
awe should we unfold these sacred leaves, and read this book 
of God ! 

2. How safe and how happy are they who are of the truth ! 
To be perfectly conformed to truth is to be perfectly holy. The 
reality of things perfectly accords with the feelings, affections, 
and purposes of all beings who are of the truth. Every thing 
is exactly as they would have it. God is just such a God as 
they would have him to be ; his government just what they 
desire ; Christ just what they wish him to be ; the divine law, 
the Gospel in its provisions, exactly suits their desires and their 



THE WORK OF THE MINISTRY. 477 

wishes. The vast reality of things they would not alter. 
Nothing in it or about it crosses their path or disturbs their 
quiet. The mighty whole is unspeakably lovely and glo- 
rious. With God himself they survey it and pronounce it 
" very good." That which pleases God pleases them ; that 
which satisfies God satisfies them. The amazing system of 
realities which is and which constitutes the glory and the bless- 
edness of God is their portion. What can annoy their peace 
or lessen their hajopiness ? What if the sea rage and the 
heavens gather blackness ? What if the hail descend, and the 
lightnings play, and the thunders roar, and earth shake to its 
centre? Still God lives, God reigns. Can God injure? No, 
for they are like himself. Can Christ ? No, for they are one 
with him. Can the divine law ? No ; they are rescued from 
its curse and conformed to its demands. Can the Gospel ? 
No ; they walk in its light and are surrounded, protected, com- 
forted, blessed by its promises of everlasting truth and grace. 
Can wicked men or devils hurt them ? No ; truth binds them 
in chains of everlasting darkness. Nothing, nothing can harm 
them. What Gocl hath said, God will do. He will carry on 
his purposes to their perfect accomplishment ; his kingdom will 
rise in all its glory ; that new and brighter creation of Chris- 
tian promises, the amazing reality of things, will stand an eter- 
nal monument of the wisdom, and power, and goodness of the 
infinite God, and they be found blessed whom God makes 
blessed. Learn then, Dear Brethren, the truth. Love the 
truth, walk in the truth, obey the truth. In this way all, all 
is well with you for eternity. 

3. Our subject gives us an interesting view of the work of 
the ministry. This work consists pre-eminently in the exhibi- 
tion of the truth or the reality of things. Its design, its end is 
to conform the character of man to this reality, and thus to 
bring him, in his affections, purposes, and action, into an un- 
changeable alliance with his God. How high and awful a 
function is this ! The means are those realities which the 
Scriptures display ; the God there revealed ; the Saviour, his 
incarnation, his miracles of grace, his great sacrifice by blood, 
his dominion and his triumphs ; the Holy Ghost, his transform- 
ing power in the Eenovation and Sanctification of his people ; 
the government of God ; his law ; its holiness, perfection, im- 
mutability in its demands, its penalty ; man, a guilty, ruined 



4:78 WHAT IS TKUTH? 

immortal ; redemption, unvailing tlie triune God in all the 
attractions of infinite love and grace to the guilty and the lost ; 
angels, as ministering spirits to the heirs of salvation ; death, 
the end of probation ; the resurrection of all earth's millions, 
a material universe on fire, judgment, heaven, hell ; — these are 
the realities of exhibition — these are the realities to be brought 
to influence, through divine grace, the soul of man, to illu- 
minate its powers by a celestial light, to expel the corrupting, 
enthralling control of this materialism ; to establish the do- 
minion of God in the soul, and introduce it to an intimate 
eternal fellowship with the Father of spirits. What an honor 
thus to release, under God, these prisoners from their bondage 
of vanity and shadows, guilt and madness, and to raise them 
into the regions, and place them amid the light and transform- 
ing glories of eternal realities ! That labor surely can not want 
dignity, which associates with itself the power of the Holy 
Ghost, in bestowing upon man such a character and preparing 
him for the destinies of eternity. 

What advantages too are possessed by the Christian minister 
for the cultivation of personal holiness. The high -priest of old 
occasionally entered the Holy place ; the minister of the Gos- 
pel lives and acts continually in the sanctuary of divine and 
eternal realities. His work, though done on earth, respects 
the things of eternity. His message is from the God of eter- 
nity. His business is the same that employs those spirits who 
are sent from on high to minister to the heirs of salvation. 
Even in his study, he seems as it were in the council-chamber 
of God. In his ministrations he stands in that temple where 
the glory of God doth lighten it, and the Lamb is the light 
thereof. What a savor of heavenly things in Christ should 
rest on such a man ! What superiority to worldly ambitions 
and selfish aims ! What devotion to God and to the kingdom 
of his clear Son, and to the salvation of earth's redeemed 
millions should characterize a Christian minister ! 

It is true, My Brethren, we have cause, abundant cause to 
serve the Lord with humility and with many tears. Fear, and 
weakness, and much trembling become an apostle ; much 
more do they become us. We ought to think little of our- 
selves, but we may not think lightly of our calling. As a 
work which so brings us in contact with the realities of God's 
revelation, and is designed to fit men for their eternal destiny, 



TRUTH ETERNAL. 479 

and is associated with the supernatural agency of God, it 
should lead us to stir irp the gift that is in us, and to consecrate 
ourselves to it with unwavering purpose, and to expect through 
a divine blessing, results becoming God's own institution. Let 
such be the practical influence of this view of our office. 
While we draw our instructions from these oracles of God, we 
shall be clad with truth as with a garment. While we bow to 
the dictates of that truth which we preach, and yield to the 
power of that grace which we supplicate, we shall have 
strength to be faithful. Then with what emotion shall we wit- 
ness, not by faith but by sight, the realities of the judgment 
and of eternity ! To have obtained mercy ourselves, and to 
have imparted it to others ; to recognize amid the innumerable 
multitude the souls of our ministry ; to have given to these, 
under God, that far more exceeding and eternal weight of 
glory; to hail them as our joy and crown, in the presence 
of the Lord Jesus Christ at his coming ; — with what rapture 
and praise shall we see the hand of Eternal Mercy place such 
a crown on such unworthy heads ! 

Finally: how vain it is to deny or to reject the truth! 
Truth is the reality of things. Object, cavil, doubt, disbe- 
lieve, deny the truth, you can not change it. Come with what 
weapon you will, you are in arms against the reality of things. 
Until right shall be wrong, sin holiness ; until it can be right 
to hate God and to hate your neighbor ; until you can make 
heaven hell and hell heaven, and subject to dissolution and 
change, the being and attributes of Him who is eternal, you 
can do nothing. Truth will remain. It will do all its work. 
It will bless its friends, it will crush its enemies. 

These hills and rocks shall crumble and perish ; this earth 
and these heavens shall pass away and have no place any 
more ; but truth, the word of God, abideth forever. Truth, 
Fellow-Sinners, will still commission death to sweep on its chill- 
ing blast, and carry these bodies to their graves. Truth will 
seize these spirits for their last trial, blessed or unblessed with 
the preparation of peace. It will sound the trump of God, and 
with the archangel's voice call you forth for its judgment and 
its retribution. It will summon you to that throne whereon 
God sitteth, and in its own clear and cloudless day will show 
you 'to the Judge and the Judge to you. It will utter in all its 
tearfulness the doom of the second death, and in the revealed 



480 WHAT IS TEUTH? 

righteousness of this its last, unalterable and resistless decree, 
will stop every mouth. Truth will carry you away to her eter- 
nal prison of wailing and despair ; it will forge and put on the 
chains of darkness, fix the impassable gulf, and light its 
quenchless fires. It will forbid all pity, exclude all mercy, 
quench all hope, and bind destiny forevermore. Oh, who will 
deny, who reject the truth? Ignorance may willfully refuse 
instruction, and unbelief, and skepticism, and a heart devoted 
to the world may make the fleeting phantoms of earth the only 
realities, and the realities of God's revelation the only phan- 
toms. The things of truth displaced from thought, and lost in 
the obscurity of distance or doubt, may relinquish the whole 
man to these lying vanities. These may form his character, 
and his preparation for the scenes of his immortality shall be 
as if God were not ; as if Christ, and heaven, and hell, and all 
that lies beyond this short life were not. But, Oh, when these 
realities shall break on the sight in eternal day — when truth 
shall show them to such a man — when God shall become a 
reality, never more to be forgotten or unthought of in the ter- 
rors of his indignation — heaven a reality never to be forgotten 
or unthought of as a lost inheritance, and hell a reality in the 
ceaseless experience of its woes — who, who then will not wish 
that he had received the truth in the love of it ? 



THE END. 






f 778 < 




Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: July 2005 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATIO 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 1606b 
(724)779-2111 




>>Su 


















